





CHARRON  
—  
OF WISDOME  
—  
LONDON  
1670
















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














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
**R**Eader, stay here, and Wifdoms (A) Palace view;  
(B) Wifdom, who courts thee in her native hue;  
Modest, and cheerful, manly, and upright;  
Challenging, or Reverence, or Delight;  
Like the Eternal Thought she's always One;  
And contemplates her self in (C) Self alone;  
Like It, (for from that sacred source she flows,)  
In her Reflected Self she all things knows;  
Knows how to rule those slaves to'er (D) footstool chain'd,  
Imperious slaves, which yet dread her command,  
(So once the petty Gods, the God of Love  
Himself, stood chain'd to th' Chair of Mighty Jove.)  
First (E) Passion, Abortive Reason's Race,  
With Gasty Eyes, and a distorted Face,  
Had she but Wifdoms Glafs, her spots to see,  
Shce'd first her own, then Wifdoms Convert be.  
(F) Opinion next, whom Vulgars shoulders bears,  
Hurried, like them, t'wixt Mortals hopes, and fears.  
Then (G) Superstition, with her fetter'd hands,  
Much like Stylites her Fam'd Votary, stands,  
Whose Phancies dismal, and enchanted Cell  
Makes God no longer Such, makes Heaven Hell;  
Next her (H) Pedantick Science, the vain pretence  
Of Men and Devils, to cast off Innocence,  
A Bookish thing; yet, Reader, scorn not Thou  
To look in This, and Do, what others Know.





London Printed for Nathaniel Ranew and Ionathan Robinson at the Kings Arms in s<sup>t</sup> Pauls Church yaed  
1670









TO THE  
READER.

**G**Entle Reader, when I first saw this Book in French divided into three parts, and all three carrying the title of *Wisdom*, and having read the Preface, I conceived some excellency in it beyond the reach of common endeavours; The first part teaching us the knowledg of our selves, and our humane condition, with the inward and outward parts of man, his thoughts, words, actions, and all his motions, as a preparative unto *Wisdom*; The second part instructing a civil life, and forming a man for the world; shewing the priviledges and proper qualities of a wise man, and how every man ought to live, and how to die; The third part reaching the way how to attain to wisdom, and instructing man universally in all things, and that by a discourse of the four moral virtues; and finding the matter penned with so great gravity and wisdom (as a great and learned Doctor said unto  
A 3 me,



To the Reader.

me, after I had shewed him some part thereof in English) that it was a work (as he thought) beyond the capacity of man; He gave me encouragement to go forward in the translation of it, both for the great worth thereof, and the general good; In which I must acknowledg, that not without advice I have partly omitted, and partly altered the discourse upon some points which I conceived not fit to pass the Press. For the main work I think it needless to say much in commendation of it, for it hath already sufficiently commended it self to the world by four former Impressions; And for this sixth, though it be the last, I hope this new labour will not make it less esteemed.

Samson Lennard.



## A Table of the Chapters of these three Books of Wisdom.

**T**He Preface containing a Discourse of the name, subject, purpose and method of this Work, with an Advertisement unto the Reader.

The first Book of knowledg of our selves and humane condition.

An exhortation to the study and knowledg of our selves.

The Preface of the first Book.

The first consideration of man, which is natural, by all the parts whereof he is composed.

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OF

# WISDOM

Three Books.

## The PREFACE.

*Where the Name, Subject, Purpose, and Method of this Work is set down, with an Advertisement to the Reader.*

**I**T is required at the first entry into this Work, that we know what this wisdom is; and since it beareth that name and title, how we purpose to speak thereof. All men in general at the first view of the simple word it self, do easily conceive and imagine it to be some quality, sufficiency or habit, not common or vulgar, but excellent, singular, and elevated above that which is common and ordinary, be it good or evil: For it is taken and used (though perhaps improperly) in both kinds: *Sapientes sunt ut faciant mala: They are wise to do evil:* and signifieth not properly a good and laudable quality, but exquisite, singular, excellent in whatsoever it be. And therefore we do as well say a wise Tyrant, Pirat, Thief, as a wise King, Pilot, Captain: that is to say, Sufficient, prudent, advised; not simply and vulgarly, but excellently: For there is opposite unto Wisdom not only folly, which is an irregularity or looseness of life, and Wisdom a regularity or moderation, well measured and proportioned; but also common baseness and vulgar Simplicity: For Wisdom is high, strong, and excellent; yea, whe-

1.  
Of the word  
Wisdom.

*Herom.  
Arist. lib. 3.  
Metaphys.*



*The Preface.*

whether it be in good or evil, it containeth two things: Sufficiency, that is, Provision or furniture for whatsoever is required & necessary; and that it be in some high degree of excellency. So that you see what the simpler sort imagine Wisdom to be at the first view and the simple sound of the word; whereby they conclude, that there are few wise men, that they are rare as every excellency is; and that to them by right it appertaineth to command and govern others; that they are as Oracles: from whence is that saying, *Believe others, and refer thy self to the wise.* But well to define this thing, and according to truth, and to distinguish it into his true parts, all men know not, neither are they of one accord, nor is it easie, for otherwise do the common people, othwise the Philosophers, othwise the Divines speak thereof. These are the three floors and degrees of the world. The two latter proceed by order, and rules, and precepts; the former very confusedly and imperfectly.

2.  
The division  
of Wisdom.

Now then we may say, That there are three sorts & degrees of Wisdom, Divine, Humane, Mundane; which correspond unto God; Nature pure and entire; Nature vitiated and corrupted. Of all these sorts and every of them do all these three orders of the world, which before we speak of, write and discourse, every one according to his own manner and fashion: but properly and formally the common sort, that is to say, the world of worldly wisdom, the Philosopher of humane, the Divine of divine wisdom.

3.  
Worldly wisdom.

Worldly wisdom, and of the three the more base, which is divers according to the three great Captains and Leaders of this inferiour world, Opulency, Pleasure, Glory, or rather Avarice, Luxury, Ambition: *Quicquid est in mundo est concupiscentia oculorum, concupiscentia carnis, superbia vite; All that is in the world is the lust of the eyes, the concupiscentie of the flesh, and the pride of life:* For which cause it is called by S. James, *Terrena, Animalis, Diabolica:* Earth-

1 John 2. 16.

James 1. 15.

### The Preface.

Earthly, Sensual, Devillish,) is proved by Philosophy and Divinity, which pronounceth its folly before God; *Stultitiam fecit Deus sapientiam hujus mundi: God hath made the wisdom of this world foolishness.* Of this wisdom therefore we speak not in this Book, except it be to dispraise and condemn it.

Divine Wisdom, and of the three the highest, is defined and handled by Philosophers and Divines, but somewhat diversly. As for the common or worldly Wisdom, I disdain it, and pass by whatsoever may be spoken thereof as prophane, and too unworthy in this Treatise to be read. The Philosophers make it altogether Speculative, saying, That it is the knowledge of the principles, first causes, and highest power to judg of all things, even of the most Sovereign which is God himself: and this Wisdom is Metaphysical; and resideth wholly in the understanding, as being the chief good and perfection thereof: it is the first and highest of the five intellectual virtues, which may be without either honesty, action, or other moral virtue. The Divines make it not altogether so speculative, but that it is likewise in some sort Practick; for they say, That it is the knowledge of divine things, from which there ariseth a judgment and rule of humane actions; and they make it two-fold, The one acquired by study, and comes near to that of the Philosophers; which I am to speak of: The other infused and given by God, *De sursum descendens, Coming from above.* This is the first of the seven gifts of the holy Ghost, *Spiritus Domini Spiritus sapientie, The spirit of God is the spirit of wisdom.* Which is not found but only in those that are just and free from Sin, *In malevolam animam non introibit sapientia: Wisdom cannot enter into a wicked heart.* Of this Divine wisdom likewise our purpose is not here to speak, it is after some sort and measure handled in my first Verity, and in my discourses of Divinity.

4.  
Divine wisdom.

Thom. 1. 2.  
quest. 57. 2.  
2. p. 19.

Sap. 13.



*The Preface.*

5.  
Humane.

Wisdom ac-  
cording to the  
common sort.

It followeth therefore, that it is Humane Wisdom which in this Book we are to deliver unto you, and whereof it takes the name, and of which in this place we must give some brief and general view, which may be as an Argument and Summary of this whole Work. The common descriptions are diverse and insufficient; Some and the greatest part think that it is only a wisdom, discretion and advised carriage in a mans affairs and conversation. This may be well called common, as respecting nothing but that which is outward and in action, and considereth not at all any other thing then that which outward appeareth. It is altogether in the eyes and ears of men, without any respect or very little of the inward motions of the mind: so that according to their opinion wisdom may be without essential piety or probity, that is, a beautiful cunning, a sweet and modest subtilty. Others think that it is a rude, unreasonable, rough singularity, a kind of fullen frowning and frampole austerity in opinions, manners, words, actions and fashion of life; and therefore they call them that are wounded and touched with that humour, Philosophers, that is to say, in their counterfeited language, fantastical, divers, different and declining from the customs of other men.

According to  
Philosophers  
and Divines.

A comparison  
betwixt Divi-  
nity and Phi-  
losophy.

Now this kind of wisdom according to the doctrine of our Book, is rather a folly and extravagancy. You must therefore know, that this wisdom whereof we speak, is not that of the common people, but of Philosophers and Divines, whereof both have written in their Moral learnings. The Philosophers more at large, and more professedly, as being their true and proper dish they feed on, and formal subject they write of, because they apply themselves to that which concerneth Nature and Action. Divinity mounteth much higher, and is occupied about virtues infused, Contemplative and Divine, that is to say, about Divine Wisdom and Belief. So that Philosophers

*The Preface.*

phers are more stayed, dispersed more certain, and more common, ruling and instructing not only the particular knowledge or actions of men, but the common and publick, teaching that which is good and profitable to Families, Corporations, Common-weals, Empires. Divinity is more sparing and silent in this point, looking principally into the eternal good and salvation of every one. Again, the Philosopher handleth this subject more sweetly and pleasingly, the Divine more austere and drily. Again, Philosophy which is the elder (for Nature is more ancient then Grace, and the Natural than the Supernatural) seemeth to perswade graciously, as being willing to please in profiting, as the Poet speaketh:

*simul & jucunda & idonea dicere vitæ,*

Horace.

*Lectorem delectando, pariterque monendū:*

It is enriched with discourses, reasons, inventions, examples, similitudes, decked with speeches, Apothegmes, sententious mots, adorned with Eloquence and Art. Theologie, which came after, altogether austere, it seemeth to command, and imperiously like a Master to enjoin. And to conclude, the virtué and honesty of Divines is too anxious, scrupulous, deject, sad, fearful and vulgar. Philosophy, such as this Book teacheth, is altogether pleasant, free, bucksome, and if I may so say, wanton too; and yet notwithstanding, puissant, noble, generous, and rare. Doubtless the Philosophers have herein been excellent, not only in writing and teaching, but in the rich and lively representation thereof in their honourable and heroical lives. I understand here by Philosophers and Wise men, not only those that have carried the name of Wisemen, such as *Thales*, *Solon*, and the rest of that rank, that lived in the time of *Cyrus*, *Croesus*, *Pisistratus*; nor those that came afterwards, and have publickly taught it, as *Pythagoras*, *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Aristotle*, *Aristippus*, *Zenon*, *Antisthenes*, all chief Professours apart, and



### The Preface.

and many other their Disciples different and divided in Sects; but also all those great men who have made singular and exemplary profession of virtue and wisdom, as *Phocion, Aristides, Pericles, Alexander*, whom *Plutarch* called as well a Philosopher as a King, *Epaminondas*, and divers other Greeks: The *Fabricii, Fabii, Camilli, Catones, Torquati, Reguli, Lelii, Scipiones*, Romans, who for the most part have been Generals in Armies. And these are the reasons why in this my Book I do more willingly and ordinarily follow the advice and sayings of Philosophers, not in the mean time omitting or rejecting those of the Divines: For both in substance they do all agree, and are very seldom different, and Divinity doth nothing disdain to employ, and to make good use of these wise sayings of Philosophy. If I had undertaken to instruct the cloister, and the retired life, that is, that profession which attendeth the secrets Evangelical, I must necessarily have followed *ad amussim* the advice of the Divines: but our Book instructeth a civil life, formeth a man for the world, that is to say, to humane wisdom, not divine.

6.  
A general description of humane wisdom.

We say then naturally and generally both with the Philosopher and the Divine, and this humane wisdom is a kind of law or reason, a beautiful and noble composition of the entire man, both in his inward part and his outward, his thoughts, his words, his actions, and all his motions. It is the excellency and perfection of man as he is a man, that is to say, according to that which the first fundamental and natural law doth require; as we say, That that work is well wrought and excellent, that is compleat and perfect in all the parts thereof, and wherein all the rules of Art have been observed; that man is accounted a wise man, that best knoweth after the best and most excellent manner to play the man, that is to say, (to give a more particular picture thereof) that knowing himself and the condition of men, doth keep and preserve himself from all vices,

### *The Preface.*

vices, errours, passions and defects as well inward and proper to himself, as outward and common to other men, maintaining his spirit pure, free, universal, considering and judging of all things without band or affection, always ruling and directing himself in all things according to nature, that is to say, that first reason and universal law and light inspired by God, and which shineth in us, unto which he doth apply and accommodate his own proper and particular light, living in the outward view of the world, and with all men according to their laws, customs, and ceremonies of the country where he is without the offence of any, carrying himself wisely and discreetly in all affairs, walking always uprightly, constant, comfortable, and content in himself, attending peaceably whatsoever may happen, and at the last, death it self. All these parts or qualities, which are many, for our better ease and facility may be drawn to four principal heads; Knowledge of our selves, Liberty of spirit pure and generous, Imitation of Nature, (this hath a very large field, and alone might almost suffice) True contentment. These can no where be found but in him that is wise: and he that wanteth any of these cannot be wise. He that hath an erroneous knowledg of himself, that subjecteth his mind to any kind of servitude, either of passions or popular opinions, makes himself partial, and by enthralling himself to some particular opinion, is deprived of the liberty and jurisdiction of discerning, judging and examining all things. He that striveth against Nature, under what pretence soever it be, following rather opinion or passion, then reason; he that carrieth himself troubledly, disquietly, male-content, fearing death, is not wise. Behold here in a few words the picture of humane Wisdom and folly, and the sum of that which I purpose to handle in this Work, especially in the second Book, which expressly containeth the rules, treatise, and



### *The Preface.*

offices of Wisdom, which is more mine then the other two, and which I once thought to have published by it self. This verbal description of Wisdom is represented unto the eye even at the entrance or threshold of this Book by a woman all naked, in a place void and empty, resting her self upon nothing, in her pure and simple nature, beholding her self in a glass, her countenance cheerful, merry, & manly, upright, her feet close Joynted, upon a square pillar, and imbracing her self, having under her feet inchained four other women as slaves unto her, that is to say, *Passion*, with a changed and hideous countenance; *Opinion*, with wandring eyes, inconstant, giddy, born upon the heads of the People; *Superstition*, astonished and in a trance, and her hands fastned the one to the other; *Virtue*, or Honesty and pedantical Science with a fullen visage, her eye-lids elevated reading in a Book, where was written, *Yea, No*. All this needs no other application, then that which hereafter followeth: but hereof more at large in the second Book.

7.  
Two ways to  
attain this  
wisdom.

To attain unto this wisdom, there are two means: the first is in the original forming and first temper, that is to say, in the temperature of the seed of the Parents, the milk of the Nurse, and the first education; whereby a man is said to be either well born, or ill born, that is to say, either well or ill formed and disposed unto wisdom. A man would little think of what power and importance this beginning is; for if men did know it, there would be more care taken, and diligence used therein then there is. It is a strange and lamentable thing, that so wretchless a carelessness should be in us, of the life and good life of those whom we desire to make our other selves; when in matters of less importance we take more care, use more diligence, more counsel then we should, never thinking of our greatest affairs and most honourable, but by hazard and peradventure. Who is he that taketh counsel with him-  
self,

*The Preface.*

Self, or endeavoureth to do that which is required for the preserving and preparing of himself as he ought to the generation of male-children, healthful of spirit, and apt for wisdom? for that which serveth for the one, serveth for the other, and Nature after one manner attendeth them all. This is that which men think of least, yea little or not at all (in the act of generation) doth it enter into their thoughts to frame a new creature like themselves, but only like beasts to satisfie their lustful pleasures. This is one of the most important faults and of greatest note in a Common-weal, whereof there is not one that thinketh or complaineth, neither is there concerning it either law or rule, or publick advice. It is most certain, that if men did herein carry themselves as they ought, we should have other men of more excellent spirit and condition, then we have amongst us. What is required herein, and to the first nourishment and education, is briefly set down in our third Book, *Chap. 14.*

The second means to attain wisdom is the study of Philosophy, I mean not of all the parts thereof, but Moral (yet not forgetting the Natural) which is the light, the guide, the rule of our life, which explaineth & representeth unto us the law of Nature, instructeth man universally in all things, both publick and private, alone and in company, in all domestical and civil conversation, taketh away all that savage nature that is in us, sweetneth and tames our natural rudeness, cruelty and wildness, and worketh and fashions it to wisdom. To be brief, it is the true science of man; all the rest in respect of it, is but vanity, or at leastwise not necessary, or little profitable: for it giveth instructions to live and die well, which is all in all, it teacheth us perfect wisdom, an apt, judicious, well-advised honesty. But this second mean is almost as little practised, and as ill employed as the first: for no man careth greatly for this wisdom, so much are all given to



*The Preface.*

that which is worldly. Thus you see the two principal means to attain to wisdom, the Natural, and Acquired. He that hath been fortunate in the first, that is to say, that hath been favourably formed by Nature, that is, of a good and sweet temperature, which bringeth forth a great goodness in Nature, and sweetness in manners, hath made a fair march without great pain to the second: But that man with whom it is otherwise, must, with great and painful study of the second, beautifie and supply that which is wanting; as *Socrates* one of the wisest said of himself, That by the study of Philosophy he had corrected and reformed his natural infirmities.

9.  
The lets to  
wisdom, and  
means to folly  
are two.

1.  
Natural.

There are contrariwise two formal lets or hinderances to wisdom, and two counter-means or powerful ways unto folly, Natural, and Acquired. The first, which is Natural, proceedeth from the original temper and temperature, which maketh the brain either too soft, moist, and the parts thereof gross and material, whereby the spirits remain sottish, feeble, less capable, plain diminished, obscure, such as that is, for the most part, of the common sort of people; or too hot, ardent, and dry, which maketh the spirits foolish, audacious, vicious. These are the two extreams, *Sottishness* and *Folly*: Water and Fire, Lead and Mercury, altogether improper or unapt to wisdom, which requireth a spirit full of vigour and generous, and yet sweet, pliant, and modest: but the second is more easily amended by discipline then the former.

2.  
Acquired.

The second, which is Acquired, proceedeth either from no culture or instruction, or from that which is evil, which amongst other things consisteth in an obstinate and sworn prejudicate prevention of opinions, wherewith the mind is made drunken, and taketh so strong a tincture, that it is made unapt and incapable to see or to find better whereby to raise and enrich it self. It is said of these kind of men, That they are wounded and stricken, that they

### *The Preface.*

they have a hurt or blow in the head: unto which wound if likewise learning be joyned, because that puffeth up, it bringeth with it presumption and temerity, and sometimes arms to maintain and defend those anticipated opinions: it altogether perfecteth the form and frame of folly, and maketh it incurable. So that natural weakness, and acquired prevention, are two great hinderances; but science, if it do not wholly cure them, which seldom it doth, strengthneth them and maketh them invincible, which turneth not any way to the dishonour of learning (as a man may well think) but to the greater honour thereof.

Science or Learning is a very good and profitable staff or waster, but which will not be handled with all hands; <sup>10.</sup> Of Learn and he that knows not how well to rule it, receiveth thereby more hurt then profit. It besotteth and maketh foolish (saith a great learned Writer) the weak and sick spirit; it polisheth and perfecteth the naturally strong and good. The feeble spirit knows not how to possess science, how to handle it, and how to make use thereof as he should: but contrariwise is possessed and ruled by it, whereby he submits himself, and remains a slave to it, like a weak stomach overcharged with more victuals then it can digest. A weak arm wanting power and skill well to wield a waster or staff that is somewhat too heavy for it, wearieth it self and fainteth. A wise and courageous spirit overmastereth his wisdom, enjoyeth it, useth it, and employeth it to his best advantage, informeth his own judgment, rectifieth his will, helpeth and fortifyeth his natural light, and maketh himself more quick and active; whereas the other is made thereby more sottish, more unapt, and therewithal more presumptuous; so that the fault or reproach is not in learning, no more then that Wine or other good drug is faulty which a man knoweth not how to apply and accommodate to his own needs: *Non est culpa vini, sed culpa bibentis. The fault is not in the Wine, but in*



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II.  
Of the word  
Pedant, or  
School-master.

*the infirmity of him that drinks it.* Now then against such spirits, weak by nature, preoccupied, puffed up, and hindered by acquired wisdom, I make open war in this Book, and that oftentimes under the word *Pedant*, not finding any other more proper, and which by many good Authors is used in this sense. In its own Greek Original it was taken in the better sense, but in other later Languages, by reason of the abuse, and bad carriage of such men in the profession of their learning, it is accounted base, vile, questuous, contentious, opinative, vain-glorious and presumptuous; by too many practised, and used but by way of injury and derision, and is in the number of those words that by continuance of time have changed their signification, as *Tyrant*, *Sophister*, and divers other. *Le sieur de Bellay*, after the reherſal of many notorious vices, concludeth as with the greatest, *But of all the rest, Knowledge pedantical I detest.* And in another place,

*Said I thou didst live but to eat and drink,  
Then poor were my revenge, thy faults scanty:  
But that which most doth make thy name to stink,  
Is, to be short, thou art a Pedanty.*

An Advertisement.

It may be, some will take offence at this word, thinking it likewise toucheth them, and that I thereby have a will to tax or scoff the Professours and Teachers of Learning; but let them be pleased to content themselves with this free and open declaration which here I make; That it is no part of my meaning to note by this word any Gown-men or learned profession whatsoever: yea I am so far from it, that Philosophers are in so high esteem with me, that I should oppose my self against my self, because I account my self one of them, and profess the same learning: only I touch a certain degree and quality of spirits, before deciphered, that is, such as have natural capacity and sufficiency

*The Preface.*

ciency after a common and indifferent manner, but afterwards not well tilled, preoccupied, possessed with certain opinions: and these are men of all fortunes, all conditions, and go as well in short garments as in long gowns: *Vulgum tam chlamydatus, quam coronam voco: I reckon amongst the vulgar sort, as well Kings and Crowns, as Pedants and Clowns.* If any man can furnish me with any other word as significant as this to express these kind of spirits, I will willingly forgo this. After this my declaration, he that findeth himself aggrieved, shall but accuse and shew himself too scrupulous. It is true that a man may find other opposites to a wise man besides a *Pedant*, but it is in some particular sense, as the common, profane, vulgar sort of people; and oftentimes I use these opposites; but this is, as the low is opposite to the high, the weak to the strong, the valley to the hill, the common to the rare, the servant to the master, the prophane to the holy; as also a fool, which indeed according to the true sound of the word, is his truest opposite: but this is a moderate man to an immoderate, a glorious opinative man to a modest, the part to the whole, the prejudicate and tainted to the neat and free, the sick to the sound: but this word *Pedant* in that sense we take it, comprehendeth all these and more too, for it noteth and signifieth him that is not only unlike and contrary to a wise man, as those before mentioned, but such a one as arrogantly and insolently resisteth it to the face, and as being armed on all sides, raiseth himself against it, speaking out of resolution and authority. And forasmuch as after a sort he feareth it, by reason that he seeth himself discovered even from the top to the bottom, and his sport troubled by it, he prosecuteth it with a certain intestine hatred, he taketh upon him to censure it, to defame it, to condemn it, accounting and carrying himself as the truly wise, though he be a fool without peer, and an ignorant self-conceited Gull.



*The Preface.*

II.  
The method  
of this Book.

After the purpose and argument of this Work, we come to the order and method thereof. There are three Books: The first is wholly in the knowledge of our selves and humane condition, as a preparative unto wisdom, which is handled at large by five main and principal considerations, each one including in it divers others. The second Book containeth in it the treatises, offices, and general and principal rules of wisdom. The third, the particular rules and instructions of wisdom, and that by the order and discourse of four principal and moral virtues, *Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance*; under which four is comprised the whole instruction of the life of man, and all the parts of duty and honesty. Finally, I here handle this matter, not Scholar-like or Pedantically, not with enlarged discourse, and furniture of Eloquence or other Art; (For wisdom (*quæ si oculis ipsis cerneretur mirabiles excitaret amores sui*, If it could be seen with our corporal eyes, would stir up in us an admirable desire thereof) needs no such helps to commend it self, being of it self so noble and glorious) but rudely, openly, and ingenuously, which perhaps will not please all. The propositions and verities are compact, but many times dry and sower, like Aphorisms, overtures, and seeds of discourse.

Some think this Book too fool-hardy and free to contract and wound the common opinions, and are offended therewith, whom in four or five words I thus answer: First, that wisdom which is neither common nor vulgar hath properly this liberty and authority, *Jure suo singulari*, to judg of all, (it is the priviledg of a wise and spiritual man, *spiritualis omnia dijudicat, & à nemine judicatur*, *1. Cor. 2. 15.* The spiritual man judgeth all, and is judged of none) and in judging to censure and condemn (as for the most part erroneous) common and vulgar opinions. What then should she do? for the case standing thus, it cannot be, but she must incur the disgrace and envy of the world. In another

### *The Preface.*

otherplace I complain of these kind of men, and reprove their popular weakness and feminine daintiness, as unworthy, being over tender and delicate, to understand any thing of worth, and altogether uncapable of wisdom. The hardest and hardiest propositions are best besitting an hardy and elevated spirit, and there can nothing seem strange unto him that doth but know what the world is. It is weakness to be astonished at any thing; we must rouse up our hearts, confirm and strengthen our minds, harden & inure our selves to hear, to know, to understand, to judge of all things, seem they never so strange. All things are agreeing and well besitting the palate of the spirit, so a man be not wanting to himself, and neither do any thing, or yield his consent to whatsoever is not good and truly fair, no, though the whole world perswade him unto it. A wise man sheweth equally in them both his courage, his delicates are not capable of the one or the other, there being a weakness in them both.

Thirdly, in all that I shall propose, my meaning is not to bind any man unto it, I only present things, and lay them out as it were upon a stall, I grow not into choler with many that gives me no credit, or dislikes my ware, that were to play the *Pedant*. *Passion* witnesseth that it is not reason so to do, and he that out of passion doth any thing, out of reason cannot do it. But why are they angry with me? Is it because I am not altogether of their opinion? Why, I am not angry with them because they are not of mine. Is it because I speak something which is not pleasing to their taste, or to the palate of the vulgar sort? Why, therefore I speak it. I speak nothing without reason, if they knew how to understand it, how to relish it. If they can bring better reason to disprove mine, I will hearken unto it with delight and thanks to him that shall shew it me. But yet let them not think to beat me down with authorities, multitudes, and allegations of other men,



*The Preface.*

men, for these have but small credit in my jurisdiction, save in matter of Religion, where only authority prevails without reason: This is authorities true Empire, reason only bearing sway in all other Arts without it, as *S. Augustine* doth very well acknowledge. For it is an unjust tyranny and an enraged folly to subject and enthrall our spirits to believe and to follow whatsoever our Ancestours have said, and what the vulgar sort hold to be true, who know neither what they say, nor what they do. There are none but fools that suffer themselves to be thus led by the noses: and this Book is not for such, which if it should popularly be received and accepted of the common sort of people, it should fail much in its first purpose and designment. We must hear, consider, make account of our ancient Writers; not captivate our selves unto them but with reason. And if a man would follow them, what should he do? for they agree not among themselves. *Aristotle*, who would seem to be the most sufficient amongst them, and hath adventured to challenge and to censure all that went before him, hath uttered more gross absurdities then them all, and is at no agreement with himself, neither doth he know many times where he is; witness his Treatises of the Soul of man, of the Eternity of the world, of the Generation of the winds and waters, and so forth. It is no cause of wonder or astonishment, that all men are not of one opinion; but it were rather strange and wonderful that all men were of one opinion: for there is nothing more befitting nature and the spirit of man then variety. That wise Divine Saint *Paul* giveth us this liberty, in that he willet every man to abound in his own understanding, not judging or condemning that man that doth otherwise, or think otherwise. And he speaketh it in a matter of greater moment or more ticklish, not in that which consisteth in outward action and observation, wherein we say we are to conform our selves to the common

*The Preface.*

mon sort, and to that which is prescribed and accustomed to be done, but also in that which concerneth Religion, that is the religious observance of viands and dayes: whereas all that liberty and boldness of speech which I challenge to my self, is but in thoughts, judgments, opinions, in which no man is quarter-master, but he that hath them every man about himself.

Notwithstanding all this, many things which may seem too harsh and brief, too rude and difficult for the simpler sort (for the stronger and wiser have stomachs warm enough to concoct and digest all) I have for the love of them explicated, enlightned and sweetned in this third Edition, reviewed, and much augmented.

I would willingly advertise the Reader that shall undertake to judg of this Work, to take heed that he fall not into any of these seven over-sights, as some others have done; that is: To refer that unto law and duty, which is proper unto action; that unto action, which is only to be censured; that to resolution and determination, which is only proposed, consulted of, and problematically and academically disputed; that to me and mine opinions, which I deliver from report, and is the opinion of another man; that to the outward state, profession and condition, which is proper to the spirit and inward sufficiency; that to Religion and Faith, which is but the opinion of man; that to grace and supernatural inspiration, which is proper to natural and moral virtue and action. All passion and preoccupation being taken away, he shall find in these seven points well understood, how to resolve himself in his doubts, how to answer all objections, made by himself or by others, and inform himself touching my intention in this Work. And if nevertheless after all this, he will neither rest satisfied and contented, nor approve what I have written, let him boldly and speedily disprove it (for only to speak ill, to bite,  
to



*The Preface.*

to slander the name of another man, though it be easie enough, yet it is base and pedantical) and he shall speedily receive either a free confession and assent (for this Book doth glory and feast it self in the truth and ingenuity thereof) or an examination of the impertinencies and follies thereof.

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*The subject and order of these three Books.*

**T***He first Book teacheth the knowledg of our selves and our humane condition, which is the foundation of Wisdom by five great and principal considerations of man, and containeth 62 Chapters.*

*The second containeth the principal rules of Wisdom, the priviledges and proper qualities of a wise man, and hath 12 Chapters.*

*The third, in a Discourse of the four moral virtues, Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance, setteth down the particular instructions of Wisdom, in 43 Chapters.*



I

OF  
WISDOM,

THE FIRST BOOK.

Which is

*The knowledg of our selves, and our humane  
condition.*

An exhortation to the study and knowledg of our  
*SELVES.*

---

*The Preface to the first Book.*

**T**HE most excellent and divine counfel, the best and  
most profitable advertisement of all others, but  
least practised, is to study and learn how to know  
our selves: This is the foundation of Wisdom, and  
the high way to whatsoever is good; and there is  
no folly comparable to this, To be painful and di-  
ligent, to know all things else whatsoever, rather then our selves:  
For the true science and study of man, is man himself.

GOD, Nature, the wise, the world, preach man, and exhort  
him both by word and deed to the study and knowledg of him-  
self. GOD eternally and without intermission beholdeth, consi-  
dereth, knoweth himself. The World hath all the lights thereof

1.  
*The knowledg  
of our selves  
the first things.*

2.  
*Enjoyned to all  
by all reason.*

CON-



*An exhortation to the study*

contracted and united within it self, and the eyes open to see and behold it self. It is as necessary for Man to learn how to know himself, as it is natural unto him to think, or to be near unto himself: Nature hath enjoined this work unto all. To meditate and to entertain our thoughts therein, is a thing above all things easie, ordinary, natural; it is the food, sustentation, life of the spirit, *cujus vivere est cogitare: Whose life is cogitation.* Now where can a man begin or continue his meditation more truly, more naturally then with himself? is there any thing that toucheth him more nearly? Doubtless, to study other learnings, and to forget our selves is a thing both unnatural and unjust. The true and principal vocation of every man, is to employ his thoughts upon himself, and to tie himself unto himself: for so doth every thing else, setting bounds and limits to their other business and desires. And thou man, which wilt seem to contain the whole universe, to know all things, to controll, to judge, neither knowest nor endeavourest the knowledg of thy self; and so going about to make thy self skilful, and a Judge of Nature, thou provest the only fool of the world; thou art of all other the most beggerly, the most vain and miserable; and yet most proud and arrogant. Look therefore into thy self, know thy self, hold thy self to thy self; thy spirit and will which is elsewhere employed, reduce it unto thy self. Thou forgettest thy self and lovest thy self about outward things; thou betrayest and disrobest thy self; thou lookest always before thee: gather thy self to thy self and shut up thy self within thy self: examine, search, know thy self.

*Nosce te ipsum; nec te quaesiveris extra;*

*Respice quod non es.*

*Tecum habita, & noris quàm sit tibi curta supellex,*

*Tu te consule,*

*Te ipsum concute, nunquid vitiorum*

*Inseverit olim natura, aut etiam consuetudo mala.*

*Know well thy self, and seek to know no more,*

*And what thou art not, shame the same therefore:*

*Look truly to thy self; then shalt thou see*

*How short abode thou hast, advised therefore be.*

*Examine still thy conscience, which doth witness bear,*

*What vice or evil is (by nature) sowed there.*

By the knowledg of himself man arriveth sooner and better to the knowledg of God, then by any other means, both because he findeth

and knowledg of our selves.

Andeth in himself better helps, more marks and footsteps of the  
divine nature, then in whatsoever besides he can any way know, <sup>3.</sup> *The ladder to*  
and because he can better understand and know that which is in <sup>the knowledg</sup>  
himself then in another thing. *Formasti me & posuisti super me* <sup>of the divine</sup>  
*manum tuam, ideo mirabilis facta est scientia tua, id est, tui ex me : Psalm.*  
*Thou hast formed me, and put thy hands upon me, therefore thy sci-*  
*ence is become marvellous in me, that is, scientia tui, ex me : the*  
*science of thee in me.* And therefore there was engraven in letters  
of gold over the porch of the Temple of *Apollo* the god (accord-  
ing to the *Panims*) of Knowledg and Light, this sentence, *Know*  
*thy self*, as a salutation and advertisement of God unto all ; sig-  
nifying unto them, that he that would have access unto that *Di-*  
*vinity*, and entrance into that Temple, must first know himself,  
and could not otherwise be admitted. *Si te ignoras, o pulcherri-*  
*ma, egredere, & abi post hædos tuos.* If thou know not who thou <sup>Canst.</sup>  
art, O thou the fairest among women, get thee forth, and follow thy  
kids.

To become truly wise, and to lead a life more regular and  
pleasant, there needs no other instruction but from our selves : and <sup>4.</sup> *Disposition un-*  
doubtless, if we were good Scholars, there are no Books could bet- <sup>to wisdom.</sup>  
ter instruct us, then we teach our selves. He that shall call to  
mind, and consider the excess of his passed choler, even how far  
this fever and frensie hath carried him, shall better be perswaded  
of the foul deformity of this passion, then by all the reason that  
*Aristotle* or *Plato* can alledg against it : and so of all other passions  
and motions of the soul whatsoever. He that shall call to mind  
how often he hath miscarried in his judgment, and been deceived  
by his memory, shall learn thereby to trust it no more. He that  
shall note how often he hath held an opinion, and in such sort un-  
derstood a thing even to the engaging of his own credit, and the  
satisfying of himself and any other therein, and that afterwards  
time hath made him see the truth, even the contrary to that he  
formerly held, may learn to distrust his own judgment, and to  
shake off that importunate arrogancy and querulous presumption ;  
a capital enemy to discipline and truth. He that shall well note  
and consider all those evils that he hath run into, that have threat-  
ned him ; the light occasions that have altered his courses and turn-  
ed him from one estate to another : how often repentances and  
millikes have come into his head, will prepare himself against fu-  
ture changes, learn to know his own condition ; will preserve his  
modesty,



*An exhortation to the study.*

4

modesty, contain himself within his own rank, offend no man, trouble nothing, nor enterprise any thing that may pass his own forces: And what were this, but to see *Justice* and *Peace* in every thing? To be brief, we have no clearer looking-glass, no better book then our selves, if as we ought we do study our selves, always keeping our eyes open over us, and prying more narrowly into our selves.

5.  
Against such  
as mis-know  
themselves.

But this is that which we think least of, *Nemo in se tentat descendere*: No man endeavours to descend directly into himself: whereby it cometh to pass that we fall many times to the ground, and tumble headlong into the same fault, neither perceiving it, nor knowing to what course to betake us: we make our selves fools at our own charges. Difficulties in every thing are not discerned, but by those that know them: and some degree of understanding is necessary even in the marking of our own ignorance. We must knock at the door to know whether the door be shut: for when men see themselves resolved and satisfied of a thing, and think they sufficiently understand it, it is a token they understand nothing at all: for if we knew our selves well, we would provide far better for our selves and our affairs; nay, we should be ashamed of our selves and our estate, and frame our selves to be others then we are. He that knows not his own infirmities, takes no care to amend them, he that is ignorant of his own wants, takes as little care to provide for them, he that feels not his own evils and miseries, adviseth not with himself of helps, nor seeks for remedy. *Deprehendas te oportet, priusquam emendes: sinitatis initium, sentire sibi opus esse remedio.* Thou must of necessity know thy self, before thou amend thy self: it is the very first beginning of health, to acknowledge thy sickness, and that thou hast need of remedy. And here behold our unhappiness: for we think all things go well with us, and we are in safety, and we live in content with our selves, and so double our miseries. *Socrates* was accounted the wisest man of the world, not because his knowledg was more compleat, or his sufficiency greater then others, but because his knowledg of himself was better then others; in that he held himself within his own rank, and knew better how to play the man. He was the King of men, as it is said, that he that hath but one eye is a king in respect of him that hath never an eye, that is to say, doubly deprived of his sense: for they are by nature weak and miserable, and therewithal proud, and feel not their misery. *Socrates* was but purblind;

blind; for being a man as others were, weak and miserable, he knew it, and ingenuously acknowledged his condition, and lived, and governed himself according unto it. This is that which the *Truth* it self spake unto those which were full of presumption, and by way of mockery said unto him, *Are we blind also?* If ye were blind, saith he, that is, if ye thought your selves blind, you should see, but because ye think ye see, therefore you are blind; therefore your sin remaineth. For they that in their own opinion see much, are in truth stark blind; and they that are blind in their own opinion, see best. It is a miserable thing in a man, to make himself a beast by forgetting himself to be a man. *Homo enim cum sis, id fac semper intelligas: seeing thou art a man, see thou always remember it.* Many great personages, as a rule or bridle to themselves, have ordained that one or other should ever buzze into their ears that they were men. O what an excellent thing was this, if it entered as well into their hearts, as it sounded in their ears! That Mot of the *Athenians* to *Pompey* the Great, Thou art so much a God, as thou acknowledgedst thy self to be a man, was no ill saying: for at the least to be an excellent man, is to confess himself to be a man.

John 9.

The knowledg of our selves (a thing as difficult and rare, as to misdeem and deceive our selves easie) is not obtained by any other, that is to say, by the comparison, rule, or example of another.

6.

False means to know our selves

*Plus aliis de te quam tu tibi credere noli: Do not believe others more of thy self, then thou thy self knowest of thy self.* Much lets also by our speech and judgment, which oftentimes commeth short to discern, and we disloyal and fearful to speak: not by any singular act, which sometimes unawares hath escaped a man, pricked forward by some new, rare and accidental occasion, and is rather a trick of *Fortune*, or an eruption of some extraordinary lunacy, than any production of fruit truly ours. A man judgeth not of the greatness or depth of a River, by that water which by reason of some sudden inundation of neighbour rivers overfloweth the banks. One valiant act makes not a valiant man; nor one just, a just man. The circumstances and source of occasions doth import much and alter us, and oftentimes, a man is provoked to do good by vice it self: so hard a thing is it, for man to know man. Nor likewise by all those outward things, that are outwardly adjacent unto us, as offices, dignities, riches, nobility, grace, and applause of the greatest Peers and common people. Nor by the

C

carriages



carriages of a man in publick places is a man known; for as a king at Chesse, so he standeth upon his guard, he bridled and contracteth himself; fear, and shame, and ambition, and other passions, make him play that part that you see: But truly to know him, we must look into his inward part, his privy chamber, and there not how to day, but every day he carrieth himself. He is many times a different man in his house, from that he is in the Country, in the Palace, in the Market-place; another man amongst his domestical friends, from that he is amongst strangers: when he goeth forth of his house into some publick place, he goeth to play a Comedy, and therefore stay not thou there, for it is not himself that playeth, but another man, and thou knowest him not.

7.  
*True means.*

The knowledge of a mans self, is not acquired by all these four means, neither must we trust them, but by a true, long, and daily study of himself, a serious and attentive examination, not only of his words, and actions, but of his most secret thoughts (their birth, progress, continuance, repetition) and whatsoever is in him, even his nightly dreams prying narrowly into him, trying him often and at all hours, pressing and pinching him even to the quick. For there are many vices hid in us, and are not felt for want of force and means; so that the venomous serpent that is benumbed with cold, suffereth himself to be handled without danger: neither doth it suffice afterwards to acknowledge the fault by tale or piece-meal, and so think to mend it by marring it; but he must in general re-acknowledge his weakness, his misery, and come to an universal amendment and reformation.

8.  
*The proposition  
and division of  
this Book.*

Now if we will know man, we must take more than ordinary pains in this first Book, taking him in all senses, beholding him with all visages, feeling his pulse, sounding him to the quick, entering into him with a candle and a snuffler, searching and creeping into every hole, corner, turning, closet, and secret place: and not without cause; for this is the most subtle and hypocritical covert and counterfeit of all the rest, and almost not to be known. Let us then consider him after five manners, set down in this Table, which is the sum of the Book.

*and knowledge of our selves.*

7

The first, Natural, of all the parts whereof he is composed and their appurtenances.

The second, Natural and Moral, by comparison of man with beasts.

The third, of his life in declining state.

There are five considerations of man & humane condition :

The fourth, Moral, of his manners, humours, conditions, which are referred to five things.

- 1 Vanitie.
- 2 Weakness.
- 3 Inconstancy.
- 4 Misery.
- 5 Presumption.

The fifth, Natural and Moral, of the differences that are between men in their

- 1 Natures.
- 2 Spirits and sufficiencies.
- 3 Charges and degrees of superiority, inferiority.
- 4 Profession and conditions of life, advantages and disadvantages

- Natural.
- Acquired.
- Casual.

The first consideration of Man, which is Natural, by all the parts and members whereof he is composed.

CHAPTER I.

*Of the frame or formation of Man.*

**I**T is twofold, and to be considered after a twofold manner: the first and original, once immediately by God in his supernatural creation; the second and ordinary, in his natural generation. According to that description which Moses setteth down touching the workmanship and creation of the world ( the richest piece of work, that ever man brought unto light : I mean the History of the nine first Chapters of Genesis, which is of the world newly born and reborn ) man was made of God, not only after all creatures, as the most perfect, but the master and superintendent of all, *Ut præsit piscibus maris, volatilibus cæli, bestiis terre :*

I.  
Man made last:  
Gen. 1, 2. &c.



*Of the frame or formation of Man.*

*terra: That he might rule over the fish of the Sea, the Fowls of the air, and the beasts of the earth.* And in the self same day, where- in the four-footed beasts of the earth that come nearest unto him were created ( although those two that resemble him most are, for the inward parts the Swine, for the outward the Ape ) but also after all was done and ended, as the closing up, seal, and sign of his works, he hath also there imprinted his arms, and his pour- trait, *Exemplumque Dei quisque est in imagine parva. Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui.* Every man is a short compendious image of God. The light of his countenance is sealed upon us, as a summary recapitulation of all things, and an epitome of the world, which is all in man, but gathered into a finall volume, whereby he is call- ed, The little world; as the whole Universe may be called, The great man: as the tie and ligament of Angels and beasts, things heavenly and earthly, spiritual and corporal; and in one word, as the last hand, the accomplishment, the perfection of the work, the honour and miracle of Nature. The reason is, because God having made him with deliberation, counsel, and preparation, & *dixit, Faciamus hominem ad imaginem & similitudinem nostram: and he said, Let us make man in our Image, according to our likeness,* he rested. And this rest also was made for man: *Sabbatum propter hominem, non contra.* The Sabbath is for man, not man for it. And afterwards he had nothing to make new, but make himself man; and that he did likewise for the love of man: *Propter nos homines & propter nostram salutem: For us men and our salvation.* Whereby we see, that in all things God hath aimed at man, finally in him, and by him, *brevi manu; in a short summe, or summarily,* to accommodate all un- to himself, the beginning and end of all.

2.  
*Naked.*

Secondly, he was created all naked, because more beautiful than the rest, being pure, neat, and delicate, by reason of his thin humours well tempered and seasoned.

3.  
*Upright.*

Thirdly, upright, but little touching the earth, his head directly tending unto heaven, whereon he gazeth and sees and knows him- self as in a glasse, quite opposite unto the plant, which hath its head and root within the earth: so that man is a divine plant, that flou- risheth and grows up unto heaven: A beast as in the middle betwixt a man and a plant, goes as it were athwart, having his two extreame towards the bounds or extremities of the *Horizon* more or less. The cause of this uprightness in man, besides the will of his Master- workman, is not properly the reasonable soul; as we see in those

## Of the frame or formation of Man.

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those that are crook-backed, crump-shouldred, lame; nor in the straight line of the backbone, which is likewise in Serpents, nor in the natural or vital heat, which is equalled, or rather greater in divers beasts, although all these may (perhaps) serve to some purpose; but this upright gate is due and belonging to man, both as he is man, the holiest and divinest creature.

*Sanctius his animal mentisque capaciùs altæ:*

*Apostrophe from these, in making man*

*He made a sacred Creature, beasts profane,  
Who (though they were not made enough to see't)*

*Was made the means, where they and God do meet.*

*Dumb works for man; but God made man we find*

*To contemplate these works, and know his mind:*

and as King in this lower region. To small and particular royalties, there belong certain marks of Majesty, as we see in the crowned Dolphin, the Crocodile, the Lion with his collar, the colour of his hair, and his eyes; in the Eagle; the King of the Bees: so man the universal King of these lower parts, walketh with an upright countenance as a Master in his house ruling, and by love or force taming every thing.

His body was first framed of virgin-earth, and red, from whence he took his proper name *Adam*, for the appellative was *Ish*: and that being not yet moistened with rain but with the water of the fountain. *How formed.  
Gen. 2.*

—— *Mixtam fluvialibus undis*

*Finxit in effigiem*——

*Of running water and of settled earth*

*Did God build man, (the Poet knew not breath)*

*Grace ran away, or rather he from that,*

*Yet man stood still, or rather nature sate,*

*But not in Paradise; Globe of earth and seas,*

*Now only earth, past over Euphrates.*

By reason the body is the first-born, or elder then the soul, as the matter then the form; the house must be made and trimmed before it be inhabited, the shop before the workman can use it. Afterwards the Soul was by divine inspiration infused, and so the body by the soul made a living creature, *Inspiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitæ, &c.* He breathed in his face the breath of life.

In that ordinary and natural generation and formation, which is made of the seed in the womb of the woman, the self-same *5.  
He is made in  
the matrix.*



order is observed: The body is first formed as well by the elementary force of the *Energie*, and forming virtue which is in the seed, aiding in some sort the heat of the matrix, as the celestial, which is the influence and virtue of the Sun; *Sol & homo generant hominem, the Sun and Man do engender man.* In such order, that the seven first days the seed of the Father and Mother do mingle, unite and curdle together like cream, and are made one body, which is the conception. *Nonne sicut lac mulsisti me, & sicut caseum me coagulasti? hast thou not milked me like milk, and hast thou not coagulated, and curdled me as cheese?* The next seven days this seed is concocted, thickned, and changed into a mass of flesh, and indigested formless bloud which is the proper matter of an humane body. The third seven days following, of this mass or lump is made and fashioned the body in gross, so that about the twentieth day are brought forth the three noble and heroical parts, the *Liver, Heart, Brain*, distant an oval length, or, as the *Hebrews* say, holding themselves by thin *commissures* or *joynts*, which afterwards fill themselves with flesh, after the fashion of an *Ant*, where there are three grosser parts joyned by two thin. The fourth seven days which end near thirty, the whole body is ended, perfected, joynted, organized; and so it begins to be more an *Embrion*, that is, unperfect in shape, but capable, as a matter prepared to its form, to receive the soul; which faileth not to insinuate and invest it self into the body towards the seven and thirtieth or fortieth day after the five weeks ended. Doubling this term, that is to say, at the third month this infant endowed with a soul, hath motion and sense, the hair and nayls begin to come. Tripling this term, which is at the ninth month, he cometh forth, and is brought into the light. These terms or times are not so justly prefixed, but that they may either be hastened, or prolonged, according to the force or feebleness of the heat both of the seed and of the matrix: for being strong it hasteneth, being weak it sloweth; whereby that seed that hath less heat and more moisture, whereof women for the most part are conceived, requireth longer time, and is not endowed with a soul, until the fortieth day or after; and moveth not till the fourth month, which is near by a quarter more late then that of the male children.

Conceived of  
coagulated seed

Changed.

Formed in  
gross.

Joynted, organized.  
First furnished  
with fit instruments  
for sense.

Indowed with  
soul motion.  
Brought forth.

*The first and general distinction of Man.*

HI

CHAP. II.

*The first and general distinction of Man.*

MAN, as a prodigious creature, is made of parts quite contrary, and enemies to themselves. The soul is a little God, <sup>1.</sup> *The division of* the body as a beast, as a dunghil. Nevertheless, these two parts *man in two* are in such sort coupled together, have such need the one of the *parts.* other to perform their functions, *Alterius sic altera poscit opem res, & conjurat amice: So one thing doth ask the fellowship and help of another, and doth as it were friendly conjure it;* and do so with all their complaints embrace each other, that they neither can continue together without wars, nor separate themselves without grief and torment; and as holding the Wolf by the ears, each may say to other, *I can neither live with thee nor without thee, Nec tecum, ne sine te.*

But again, forasmuch as there are in this soul two parts very different, the high, pure, intellectual, and divine, wherein the beast hath no part; and the base, sensitive, and brutish, which hath body and matter, and is as an indifferent mean betwixt the intellectual part and body; a man may by a distinction more moral and politick, note three parts and degrees in man: The *Spirit*, the *Soul*, the *Flesh*: where the *Spirit* and *Flesh*, hold the place of the two ex- <sup>2.</sup> *Into three* streams, as heaven and earth; the *Soul* the middle region, where *parts.* are ingendred the Meteors, tumult, and tempests. The *Spirit* the highest and most heroical part, a diminutive, a spark, an image, and dew of the Divinity, is in a man as a King in his Commonwealth, it breatheth nothing but good, and heaven to which it tendeth; the *Flesh* (contrarywise) as the dregs of a people besotted, and common sink of man, tendeth always to the matter, and to the earth; the *Soul* in the middle, as the principal of the people, betwixt the best and the worst, good and evil is continually solicited by the *Spirit* and the *Flesh*, and according unto that part towards which it applyeth it self, it is either spiritual and good, or carnal and evil. Here are lodged all those natural affections, which are neither virtuous nor vicious, as the love of our Parents and friends, fear of shame, compassion toward the afflicted, desire of good reputation.

This distinction will help much to the knowledge of man, and to discern his actions, that he mistake not himself, as it is the manner to do, judging by the bark and outward appearance, thinking <sup>3.</sup> *The utility thereof.* that to be of the *Spirit* which is of the *Soul*, nay, of the *Flesh*;



attributing unto virtue that which is due unto nature, nay unto vice. How many good and excellent actions have been produced by passion, or at least by a natural inclination, *Ut serviant genio, & suo indulgent animo?* That they may serve their humour, and satisfy their pleasure?

## CHAP. III.

Of the Body, and first of all the parts thereof, and their places.

1.  
The division of  
the body.

2.  
Inward and  
outward.

3.  
Singular, four  
regions of the  
body.

THE Body of man consisteth of a number of parts, inward and outward, which are all for the most part round and orbicular, or coming near unto that figure.

The inward are of two sorts; the one in number and quantity spread through the whole body, as the *bones*, which are as the basis and upholding pillars of the whole building, and within them (for their nourishment) the *marrow*, the *muscles* for motion and strength; the *veins* issuing from the *liver*, as channels of the first and natural blood; the *arteries* coming from the *heart*, as conduits of the second blood, more subtil and vital. These two mounting higher then the *liver* and the *heart*, their original sources are more strait then those that go downwards; to the end they should help to mount the blood; for that narrowness more straitned, serves to raise the *humours*, the *sinews* proceeding by couples, as instruments of sense, motion, and strength of body and conduits of the animal spirits, whereof some are soft, of which there are seven pairs which serve the senses of the head, *Sight, Hearing, Taste, Speech*, the other are hard, whereof there are thirty couples proceeding from the reins of the back to the muscles; the *Tendrels, Ligaments, Gristles*; the fourth, *Humours, Blood, Choler*, which worketh, provoketh, penetraeth, hindereth obstructions, casteth forth the excrements, bringeth chearfulness; *Melancholy*, which provoketh an appetite to every thing, moderateth sudden motions; *Pblegme*, which sweetneth the force of the two *Cholers*, and all other heats: The *Spirits* which are as it were the fumigations that arise from the natural heat and radical humour, and they are in three degrees of excellency, the *Natural, Vital, Animal*; The *Fat*, which is the thickest and grossest part of blood.

The other are singular (save the kidneys and stones, which are double) and assigned to a certain place. Now there are four places

*Of the body, and first of all the parts.*

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or regions, as degrees of the body, shops of nature, where she exerciseth her faculties and powers. The first and lowest is for generation, in which are the privy parts serving thereunto. The second near unto that, in which are the entrails, *viscera*, that is to say the *stomach*, yielding more to the left side, round, straiter in the bottom than at top, having two orifices or mouths, the one above to receive, the other beneath, which answereth the bowels, to cast forth and discharge it self. It receiveth, gathereth together, mingleth, concocteth the victuals, and turns them into *Chyle*, that is to say, a kind of white *Suc*, fit for the nourishment of the body, which is likewise wrought within the *Meseraique* veins, by which it passeth unto the *Liver*. The *Liver* hot and moist, inclining toward the right side, the store-house of blood, the chief or rather fountain of the veins, the seat of the natural nourishing faculty, or vegetative soul, made and ingendered of the blood of that *Chyle*, which it draweth from the *Meseraique* veins, and receiveth into its lap by the *vena porta*, which entreth into the concavities thereof, and afterwards is sent and distributed thorow the whole body by the help of the great *Vena cava*, which ariseth from the bunch and branches thereof, which are in great number as the rivers of a Fountain. The *Splene* towards the left side, which receiveth the discharge and excrements of the *Liver*: The *Reins*, the *Entrails*, which though they are all in one, yet are distinguished by six differences and names, equalling seven times the length of a man, as the length of a man is equalled by seven foot. In these two first parts or degrees, which some take to be but one (although there are two faculties very different, the one generative for the continuance of the kind, the other nutritive for every particular person, and they make it to answer to the lowest and elementary part of the world, the place of generation and corruption) is the concupiscible soul.

The third degree compared to the *Ætherian* region, separated from the former by the *Diaphragma* or *Midriff*, and from that above by the narrowness of the throat; in which is the irascible soul, and the pectoral parts *Præcordia*, that is to say, the *Heart*, very hot, placed about the fifth rib, having his point under the left pap or dug, the original fountain of *Arteries*, which are always moved, and cause the *Pulse* to beat, by which, as by channels, it sendeth and distributeth thorow the whole body the vital blood which it hath concocted, and by it the spirit and virtue vital.

1.

2.

3.



The *Lungs*, of substance very soft and spongy, supple to draw to, and force forth, like a pair of bellows, instruments both of respiration, whereby the heart is refreshed, drawing unto it the blood, the spirits, the air, and disburthening it self of those fumes and excrements which oppress it, and of the voice by means of the rough *Arterie*.

The fourth and highest, which answereth to the celestial region, is the head, which containeth the *Brain*, cold and spongy, wrapped within two skins, the one more hard and thick, which toucheth the brain-pan, *Dura mater*; the other more easie and thin, which includeth the Brain, *Pia mater*: from it do issue, and are derived, the *Sinews* and marrow that descendeth and falleth down into the reins of the back. This *Brain* is the seat of the reasonable soul, the source of sense and motion, and of the most noble animal spirits, composed of the vital, which being raised from the heart by the *Arteries* unto the brain, are concocted and re-concocted, elaborated and made subtile by the help of the multiplicity of small *Arteries*, as fillets diversly woven and interlaced, by many turnings and windings, like a labyrinth or double net, *Rete mirabile*; within which this vital spirit being retained and sojourning, oftentimes passing and repassing, is refined and perfected, and becomes a creature, spiritual in an excellent degree.

3. The outward and visible parts, if they be single, are in the middle; as the *Nose*, which serveth for respiration, smell, and the comfort of the brain, and the disburthening thereof, in such sort, that by it the air entreteth, and issueth both down into the lungs, and up into the brain. The *Mouth*, which serveth to eat and to speak, and therefore hath many parts serviceable thereunto; without, the lips; within, the tongue, soft and very subtile, which judgeth of savours; the *Teeth*, which bruise and grind the victuals; the *Navel*, the two sinks or ways to ease and disburthen the body.

4. If they be double and alike, they are all collaterals and equal, as the two *eyes*, planted in the highest stage, as sentinels, composed of many and divers parts, three *humours*, seven *tunics*, seven *muscles*, divers colours of many fashions, and much art. These are the first, and most noble outward parts of the body in beauty, utility, mobility, activity, yea, in the action of love *ὡς ἰδοὺ ὡς ἐμυλῶν*, they are to the visage, that which the visage is to the body, they are the face of the face: and because they are tender, delicate, and precious, they are fenced and rampired on all parts, with *skins*,  
lids,

3.  
Outward parts  
singular.

4.  
Double and  
equal.

*lids, brows, ears.* The ears, in the self same height that the eyes are, as the scouts of the body, Porters of the spirit, the Receivers, and Judgers of sounds which always ascend; they have their entrance oblique and crooked, to the end the air and the sound should not enter at once, whereby the sense of hearing might be hindred and judge the worse. The arms and hands, the work-masters of all things, and universal instruments. The legs and feet, the props and pillars of the whole building.

CHAP. IV.

*Of the singular properties of the body of man.*

**T**HE body of man hath many singularities, and some peculiar and proper unto themselves, not common with other creatures. The first and principal are speech, upright stature, the form or feature, the port or carriage, whereof the wise, yea, the Stoicks themselves made such account, that they were wont to say, That it was better to be a fool in a humane shape, then wise in the form of a beast. The hand is a miracle (that of the Ape is not to be termed a hand) His natural nakedness, laughter, crying. The Sense of tickling, hair on the lower lid of the eye, a visible navel, the point of the heart on the left side. The toes of the feet not so long as the fingers of the hand. Bleeding at nose, a strange thing, considering that he carrieth his head upright, and a beast downwards: To blush for shame, wax pale for fear. To be an ambidexter; disposed at all times to the sports of *Venus*. Not to move the ears, which bewrayeth in beasts the inward affections, but man doth sufficiently make them known, by his blushing, paleness, motion of the eyes, and nose.

1.

*Peculiar properties in the body of man.*

The other properties are likewise peculiar unto man, but not wholly, but by way of excellency; for they are also in beasts, but in a less degree, that is to say, multitude of muscles and hair in the head. The pliant facility of the body, and the parts thereof to all motion and every sense. The elevation of the breasts. The great abundance of the brain. The greatness of the bladder. The form of the foot, long forward, short backward. The quantity and pure subtility of the blood. The mobility and agility of the tongue. The multitude and variety of dreams, insomuch that he seemeth the only dreamer, Sneezing. And to be short, the many motions of the eyes, the nose, the lips,

2.

*Peculiar properties by way of excellency.*

There



*Of the goods of the body: Health, Beauty, &c.*

3. *habits.* There are also habits proper and peculiar, but different; some are gestures, motions, and artificial and affected countenances; others are so proper and natural, that they that have them, neither feel them nor know them in themselves; as to go stooping: but all have that which proceedeth not so much from reason, as a pure, natural, and ready impulsion, that is, to put forth a mans hand before him when he falleth.

## CHAP. V.

*Of the goods of the body: Health, Beauty, &c.*

1. *The praise of health.*

THE goods of the body are, Health, Beauty, Chearfulness, Strength, Vigour, a prompt readines and disposition: but of all these Health is the first, and passeth all the rest. Health is the most beautiful and rich present that Nature can bestow upon us, and above all other things to be preferred, not onely Science, Nobility, Riches, but Wisdom it self, which the austere among the wise do affirm. It is the onely thing that deserveth our whole employment, yea, our life it self to attain unto it: for without it life is no life, but a death, virtue and wisdom grow weak and faint. What comfort can all the wisdom of the world bring to the greatest man that is, if he be thoroughly stricken with an *Apoplexie*? Doubtless, there is nothing to be preferred before this bodily health but *Honesty*, which is the health of the *Soul*. Now it is common unto us with beasts, yea, many times it is greater, and far more excellent in them than in us: and notwithstanding it be a gift of nature, *Gaudeant bene nati.*

*He that is gently born may well rejoyce,  
To have by nature what he would by choice:*

given in the first formation, yet that which afterward followeth, The milk, Good government, which consisteth in sobriety and moderate exercises, lightness of heart, and a continual avoidance of all passions, do preserve it much. Grief and sickness are the contraries unto it; which are the greatest, if not the onely evils that follow man, whereof we shall speak hereafter. But in the preservation hereof, beasts likewise simply following nature, which hath given them health, do far exceed men; they oftentimes forgetting themselves, though afterwards they pay dearly for it.

2. *Beauty.*

Next followeth *Beauty*, a good of great account in the society of men. It is the first means of reconciling or uniting one to another

*Of the goods of the body: Health, Beauty, &c.*

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ther, and it is very likely, that the first distinction that hath been of one man from another; and the first consideration that giveth pre-eminence to one above another, hath been the advantage of beauty. It is likewise a powerful quality, there is none that surmounteth it in credit, or that hath so great a part in the society of men; for there are none so barbarous, none so resolute, that have not been beaten by it. It representeth it self unto the view, it seduceth and preoccupateth the judgment, it makes deep impressions, and preseth a man with great authority: and therefore *Socrates* called it, *A short tyranny*; and *Plato*, *The priviledg of Nature*: for it seemeth that he that carrieth in his countenance the favours of Nature, imprinted in a rare and excellent beauty, hath a kind of lawful power over us, and that we turning our eyes towards him, he likewise turneth our affections, and enthralleth them in despite of our selves. *Aristotle* saith, that it appertaineth to those that are beautiful, to command; that they are venerable next to the Gods themselves; that there are none, but such as are blind, but are touched with it. *Cyrus*, *Alexander*, *Cæsar*, these great Commanders, have made great use thereof in their greatest affairs; yea, *Scipio*, the best of them all. *Fair* and *Good* are near neighbours, and are expressed by the self-same words, both in *Greek*, and in the Scriptures. Many great Philosophers have attained to their wisdom, by the assistance of their beauty. It is likewise considerable, and much required in beasts themselves.

There are in Beauty divers things to be considered: That of <sup>3.</sup> *The distinction of Beauty.* men is properly the form and feature of the body; as for other beauties, they belong unto women. There are two sorts of beauties, the one settled which moveth not at all, and it consisteth in the due proportion, and colour of the members, a body that is not swoln or puffed up, wherein the sinews and veins appear not from fat, nor the bones press not the skin, but full of blood and spirit, and in good state, having the muscles elevated, the skin smooth, the colour Vermillion: The other moveable, which is called a good grace, and is the true guiding, or carriage of the motion of the members, and above all, the eyes. The former beauty of it self is as it were dead, this active and full of life. There are beauties that are rude, fierce, sowre; others that are sweet, yea, though they be fading.

Beauty is properly to be considered in the visage. <sup>4.</sup> *Of the Visage.* There is nothing more beautiful in man, than his soul; and in the body of man than



than his visage, which is as it were the soul abbreviated, that is, the pattern and image of the soul ; that is, her Escutcheon, with many quarters, representing the collection of all her titles of honour, planted and placed in the gate and fore-front, to the end that men may know, that here is her abode and her palace. By the countenance it is that we know the person of a man ; and therefore Art, which imitateth Nature, takes no care to represent the person of a man, but only to paint or carve the visage.

3.  
*Seven singularities in the visage of man.*

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

There are many special singularities in the visage of man, which are not in beasts, (for to say the truth, they have no visage) nor in the rest of the body of man : as the number and diversity of the parts and forms of them, in beasts there is neither chin, nor cheeks, nor forehead, much less any form or fashion of them. Variety of colours, as in the eye only there is black, white, green, blue, red, chrystaline. Proportion for the senses are there double, answering the one to the other, and in such a manner, that the greatness of the eye is the greatness of the mouth, the largeness of the forehead, the length of the nose ; the length of the nose, that of the chin and lips. An admirable diversity of countenances ; and such, that there are hardly found two faces, in all respects, like one another : this is a chief point of workmanship, which in no other thing can be found. This variety is very profitable, yea necessary for humane society ; first, to know one another : for infinite evils, yea, the dissipation of humane kind must needs follow, if a man should mistake himself by the semblance and similitude of divers visages ; yea, it would be a confusion worse than that of *Babel*. A man would take his daughter for his sister, for a stranger, his enemy for his friend. If our faces were alike, we should not discern a man from a beast ; and if they were not all unlike one another, we could not know how to discern a man from a man. Besides, it was an excellent art of Nature, to place in this part some secret that might give contentment to one another, through the whole world : for by reason of this variety of faces, there is not a person that in some part is not beautiful. The dignity and honour of it, round figure, form upright and elevated on high, naked and uncovered, without hair, feathers, scales, as in other creatures, looking up unto heaven. Grace, sweetness, a pleasant and decent comeliness, even to the giving up of a mans *Soul*, and the ravishing of his will, as hath been shewed before. To be brief, the visage is the throne of beauty and love ; the seat of laughter and kissing, two things very proper and agreeable

## Of the goods of the body: Health, Beauty, &c.

agreeable unto man, the true and most significant symbols of amity and good discretion. Finally, it is apt for all alterations, to declare the inward motions and passions of the Soul, as Joy, Heaviness, Love, Hatred, Envy, Malice, Shame, Choler, Jealousie, and so forth. It is as the hand of a Dial which noteth the houres and moments of time, the wheelles and motions themselves being hid within. And as the aire, which receiveth all the colours and changes of the time, sheweth what the weather is, so saith one, the aire of a mans countenance. *Corpus animum tegit & detegit, in facie legitur homo.* The body covereth and discovereth the soul, and man is known even by his face.

The beauty of the face consisteth in a large, square, well extended and cleer front, eye-brows well ranged, thin and subtil, the eye well divided, chearful, sparkling; as for the colour, I leave it doubtful: the nose lean, the mouth little, the lips coralline, the chin short and dimpled, the cheeks somewhat rising, and in the middle the pleasant *gelasin*, the eares round and well compact, the whole countenance with a lively tincture white and vermilion. Nevertheless, this description of Beauty is not generally received; the opinions of Beauty are different, according to the diversity of Nations. With the Indians the greatest Beauty consisteth in that, which we account the greatest deformity, that is, in a tawny colour, thick and swollen lips, a flat and large nose, teeth spotted with black or red, great eares and hanging, a little low forehead, dugs great and pendent, to the end they may give their little ones suck over their shoulders: and to attain to this form of Beauty, they use all manner of Art. But not to wander so far, in *Spain* the chiefeſt Beauty is lean and neatly compt; in *Italy* fat, corpulent and solid: the soft, and delicate, and flattering please the one; the strong, vigorous, fierce, and commanding the other.

The beauty of the Body, especially the visage, should in all reason demonstrate and witness the beauty of the soul, (which is a quality and rule of opinions and judgements, with a certain steadfastness and constancy) for there is nothing that hath a truer resemblance, than the conformity and relation of the body to the spirit: and when this is not, we must needs think, that there is some accident that hath interrupted the ordinary course, as it comes to pass, that we oftentimes see it: for the milk of the Nurse, the first institution, conversation, bring great alterations to the original nature of the soul, whether in good or evil. So-

2.

A description  
of the beauty  
of the face.

7.

The beauty of  
the soul and  
body.

crates.



crates confessed that the deformity of his body, did justly accuse the natural deformity of his soul, but that by industry and institution he had corrected that of the soul. This outward countenance is a weak and dangerous surety; but they that belye their own physiognomy, are rather to be punished then others, because they falsifie and betray that good promise that Nature hath planted in their front, and deceive the world.

## CHAP. VI.

## Of the vestments of the body.

*Nakedness is  
natural.*

There is great likelihood, that the custom or fashion of going naked, as yet continued in a great part of the world, was the first and original amongst men, and that of covering and adorning the body with garments was artificial, and invented to help and enlarge Nature, as they which by artificial light go about to increase the light of the day: for Nature having sufficiently provided for all other creatures a covering, it is not to be believed, that she hath handled man worse than the rest, and left him onely indigent, and in such a state, that he could not help himself without forraign succours, and therefore those reproaches that are made against Nature as a step-mother, are unjust. If men from the beginning had been cloathed, it is not unlikely that they would ever have disrobed themselves, and gone naked, both in regard of their health, which could not but be much offended with that change, and shame it self: and nevertheless, it is done and observed amongst many nations. Neither can it be alledged that we cloath our selves either to cover our nakedness or privy parts, or to defend us against cold (for these are the two reasons pretended; for against heat, there is no appearance of reason) because Nature hath not taught us, that there is any thing in our nakedness, that we should be ashamed of: it is we that by our own fault and fall, have told it our selves: *Quis indicavit tibi quod nudus esses, nisi quod ex ligno quod praeceperam tibi ne comederes comedisti? Who told thee that thou wast naked, unless thou hast eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat?* And Nature hath already sufficiently hid them, put them far from our eyes, and covered them. And therefore it is less needful to cover those parts onely, as some do in those Countries where they go all naked, and ordinarily are not covered: for why should he that is Lord of all other creatures, not daring to shew

shew himself naked unto the world, hide himself under the spoils of another, nay adorn himself? As for cold, and other particular and local necessities, we know that under the self-same air, the self-same heaven, one goes naked, another apparelled; and we have all the most delicate part uncovered: and therefore a wandering person being asked, How he could go so naked in winter, answered, that our faces are always naked, and he was all face: Yea many great personages have ever gone with their heads uncovered, *Missinissa*, *Cæsar*, *Hannibal*, *Severus*; and many Nations there are, which go to the wars and fight all naked: and the counsel that *Plato* giveth for the continuance of health is, never to cover either head or feet. And *Varro* saith, that when it was first ordained, that men should uncover their heads in the presence of the gods, and of the magistrate, that it was rather for healths sake, and to harden themselves against the injuries of the times, than for reverence. Lastly, the invention of covers and houses against the injuries of heaven and men, is more ancient, more natural, more universal, then of garments, and common with many creatures, but an industrious search for victual more natural than either. Of the use of garments, and aliments hereafter. Lib. 3. c. 43.

CHAP. VII.

*Of the Soul in general.*

**B**Ehold here a matter of all others most difficult, handled and *The Preface.* discoursed by the wisest of all Nations, especially *Egyptians*, *Greeks*, *Arabians*, and *Latines*: by our later Writers more shallowly, as all other Philosophy, but with great diversity of opinions, according to the diversity of Nations, Religions, professions, without any certain accord or resolution: the general knowledge and discourse thereof, may be referred to these ten points: The definition, Essence or Nature, Faculties and Actions, Unity or Plurality, Source, Entrance into the body, Residence therein, Seat, Sufficiency to exercise her functions, the End, and Separation from the body.

It is first very hard to define, or truly to say what the Soul is, as generally all other forms, because they are things relative which subsist not in themselves, but are parts of a whole, and this is the reason, why there is such and so great diversity of definitions of them, whereof there is not any received without contradiction. I.  
*The definition very difficult.*

D

*Aristotle*



*Aristotle* hath confuted twelve that were before him, and could hardly make good his own.

2.  
Easie to say  
what it is not.

It is easie to say what it is not: That it is not *Fire*, *Aire*, *Water*; Nor the temperature of the four Elements, or qualities or humours, which is always changeable, without which a creature is and lives; and besides that, this is an accident, the *Soul* a substance. Again, Metals and things inanimate, have likewise a temperature of the four Elements, and first qualities. Neither is it blood, (for there are many things animate and living without blood, and many creatures die without the shedding of a drop of blood.) Nor the beginning and cause of motion (for divers things inanimate move, as the Adamant moves the Iron; Amber or Jet, Straw; Medicines and Roots of Trees being cut and dried, draw and move,) Neither is it the act, or life, or *Energie*, or perfection, for that word *Entelechia* is diversly taken and interpreted) of a living body: for all this is but the effect or action of the *Soul*, and not the *Soul* it self, as to live, to see, to understand is the action of the *Soul*. And it would likewise follow, that the *Soul* should be an accident, not a substance, and could not subsist without that body whereof it is the act and perfection, no more than the cover of an house may be without the house, and a relative without his correlative: To be brief, it is to say what the *Soul* doth and is to another, not what it is in it self.

3.  
Hard to say  
what it is.

But to say what the *Soul* is, is very difficult; A man may simply say, That it is an essential quickning form, which giveth to the plant the vegetative or growing life; to a beast, a sensible life, which comprehendeth the vegetative; to a man an, intellectual life, which comprehendeth the other two, as in number the greater contains the less, and in figures the *Pentagone* contains the *Tetragone*, and this the *Trigone*. I call it the intellectual soul, rather than the reasonable, which is comprehended in the intellectual as the less in the great: for the reasonable in some sense and measure, according to the opinion of the greatest Philosophers and experience it self, is likewise in beasts, but not the intellectual, as being more high. *Sicut equus & mulus in quibus non est intellectus: Like a horse and mule in whom there is no understanding.* The *Soul* then is not the beginning or source, that word doth properly belong to the sovereign first author, but an inward cause of life, motion, sense, understanding. It moveth the body,  
and

and it self is not moved; as contrarily, the body is moved, and moveth not at all: it moveth I say the body, and not it self, for nothing but God moveth it self; and whatsoever moveth it self, is Eternal Lord of it self: and that it moveth the body, it hath it not of it self, but from an higher cause.

Concerning the Nature and Essence of the *Soul*, I mean an humane *Soul* (for the *Soul* of a beast is without all doubt corporal, material, bred and born with the matter, and with it corruptible) <sup>4.</sup> *The Nature and essence of the Soul.* there is a question of greater importance than it seemeth: for some affirm it to be corporal, some incorporeal: and this is very agreeable to reason, if a man be not opinative. That it is corporal, see what the grounds are; *Spirits* and *Devils*, good and ill, which are wholly separated from all matter, are corporal, according to the opinion of all Philosophers, and our greatest Divines, *Tertullian*, *In homil. 1. de Origen*, *S. Basil*, *Gregory*, *Augustine*, *Damascene*; how much more the *Soul* of man, which hath society, and is united to a matter? Their resolution is, that whatsoever is created, being compared unto God, is gross, corporal, material, and only God is incorporeal; that every spirit is a body, and hath a bodily Nature. Next unto authority almost universal, the reason is irrefragable. Whatsoever is included in this finite world, is finite, limited both in virtue and substance, bounded with a superficies, inclosed and circumscribed in a place, which are the true and natural conditions of a body: for there is nothing but a body which hath a superficial part, and is barred and fastned in a place. God only is wholly infinite, incorporeal; the ordinary distinctions, *circumscriptive*, *definitive*, *effective*, are but verbal, and in nothing either help or hurt the cause: for it always stands good that spirits are in such sort in a place, that at the self-same time that they are in a place, they cannot be elsewhere; and they are not in a place either infinite, or very great, or very little, but equal to their limited and finited substance and superficies. And if it were not so, spirits could not change their place, nor ascend or descend, as the Scripture affirmeth that they do: and so they should be immoveable, indivisible, indifferently in all. Now if they appear that they change their place, the change convicteth that they are moveable, divisible, subject unto time, and to the succession thereof, required in the motion and passage from one place to another, which are all the qualities of a body. But because many simple men under this word corporal, do imagine visible, palpable, and think not that the



pure air, or fire without the flame or coal are bodies, have therefore likewise affirmed, That spirits both separated and humane are not corporal, as in truth they are not in that sense: for they are of an invisible substance, whether airy, as the greatest part of Philosophers and Divines affirm; or celestial, as some *Hebrews* and *Arabicks* teach, calling by the self-same name both the heaven and the spirit, an essence proper to immortality; or whether (if they will have it so) of a substance more subtile and delicate, yet they are always corporal, since limited by place, moveable, subject to motion and to times. Finally, if they were not corporal, they should not be passible and capable of suffering as they are: the humane receiveth from his body pleasure and displeasure, sorrow and delight in his turn; as the body from the spirit, and his passions, many good qualities, many bad virtues, vices, affections, which are all accidents: and all, as well the spirits separated and Devils as humane, are subject to punishment and torments. They are therefore corporal: for there is nothing passible, that is not corporal, and it is only proper unto bodies to be subject to accidents.

3.  
*The faculties  
and actions of  
the Soul.*

Now the *Soul* hath a great number of virtues and faculties, as many almost as the body hath members: There are some in plants, more in beasts; most in man, to know, to live, to feel, to move, to desire, to allure, to assemble, to retain, to concoct, to digest, to nourish, to grow, to reject, to see, to hear, to taste, to smell, to speak, to breathe, to ingender, to think, to reason, to contemplate, to consent, dissent, to remember, judge, all which are no parts of the *Soul*: for so it should be divisible, and should consist upon accidents, but they are her natural qualities. The actions come after and follow the faculties, and so there are three degrees, according to the doctrine of great *S. Dennis* followed of all, that is, we must consider in spiritual creatures three things; *Essence, Faculty, Operation*: By the latter, which is the action, we know the faculty, and by it the essence. The actions may be hindred and wholly cease without any prejudice at all unto the soul, and her faculties, as the *Science* and faculty of *Painting* remaineth entire in the *Painter*, although his hands be bound, and so be made unable to *Paint*: But if the faculties themselves perish, the *Soul* must needs be gone, no otherwise then *Fire* is no longer fire, having lost the faculty of warming.

4.  
*The unity of  
the Soul.*

The essence and nature of the *Soul* being after a sort explicated, one of the busiest questions that belongeth unto the *Soul*, offereth

offereth it self to our consideration, that is, whether there be in a creature, especially in man, one soul or many? Touching which point, there are divers opinions, but may be reduced into three. Some of the *Greeks*, and almost all the *Arabicks* imitating them, have thought (not only in every particular man, but generally in all men) that there was but one immortal *Soul*. The *Egyptians* for the most part held an opinion quite contrary, that there was a plurality of souls in every creature, all diverse and distinct, two in every beast, and three in man; two mortal, the vegetative and sensible, and the third intellective, immortal. The third opinion, as the mean betwixt the two former, and most followed, being held by many of all Nations, is, that there is but one *Soul* in every creature, not more. In every of these opinions there is some difficulty. I leave the first as being already sufficiently confuted and rejected. The plurality of souls in every creature and man, on the one side seemeth very strange and absurd in Philosophy, for that were to give many forms to one and the same thing, and to say that there are many substances and subjects in one, two beasts in one, three men in one; on the other side, it giveth credit and helpeth much our belief, touching the immortality of the intellectual *Soul*, for there being three souls, there can follow no inconvenience, that two of them should die, and the third continue immortal. The unity of the *Soul* seemeth to resist the immortality thereof; for how can one and the same indivisible, be in a mortal part and an immortal? as nevertheless *Aristotle* would have it. Doubtless it seemed that of necessity the *Soul* must be either altogether mortal, or altogether immortal, which are two very foul absurdities. The first abolisheth all Religion and sound Philosophy: the second maketh beasts likewise immortal. Nevertheless it seems to be more true, that there is but one *Soul* in every creature; for the plurality and diversity of faculties, instruments, actions, neither derogateth any thing at all, nor multiplieth in any thing this unity, no more than the diversity of rivers, the unity of one spring or fountain, nor the diversity of effects in the Sun, to heat, to enlighten, to melt, to drie, to whiten, to make black, to dissipate the unity and simplicity of the Sun; for should they, there should be a great number of souls in one man, and Suns in one world. Neither doth this essential unity of the *Soul* any thing hinder the immortality of the humane *Soul* in her essence, notwithstanding the vegetative and sensitive faculties, which are but acci-



accidents, die, that is to say, cannot be exercised without the body, the *Soul* not having a subject or instrument whereby to do it, but the third intellectual *Soul* is always well, because for it there is no need of the body, though whilst it is within it, it make use thereof to exercise it self; inasmuch that if it did return unto the body, it were only again to exercise her vegetative and sensitive faculties, as we see in those that are raised unto life to live here below, not in those that are raised to live elsewhere, for such bodies need not to live by the exercise of such Faculties: Even as there is no want nor decay in the Sun, but it continueth in it self wholly the same, though during a whole eclipse it neither shine nor warm, nor perform his other effects in those places that are subject to it.

The source of  
the soul.

Having shewed the unity of the soul in every subject, let us see from whence it cometh, and how it entrencheth into the body. The original beginning of souls is not held to be the same of all, I mean of humane souls; for the vegetative and sensitive, of plants and beasts, is by the opinion of all altogether material, and in the seed, for which cause it is likewise mortal. But concerning the *Soul* of man there are four celebrated opinions. According to the first, which is of the *Stoicks*, held by *Philo Judæus*, and afterward by the *Manichees*, *Priscillianists*, and others, it is transferred and brought forth as a part or parcel of the substance of God, who inspireth it into the body, alledging to their best advantage the words of *Moses*, *Inspiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitæ: He breathed in his face the breath of life.* The second opinion, held by *Tertullian*, *Apokinaris*, the *Luciferians*, and other Christians, affirmeth that the *Soul* proceedeth and is derived from the souls of our Parents with the seed, as the *Soul* of a beast. The third opinion, which is that of the *Pythagoreans* and *Platonists*, held by many *Rabbins* and Doctors of the Jews, and afterwards, by *Origen*, and other Doctors, teacheth, that the souls of men have been from the beginning all created of God, made of nothing, and reserved in heaven, afterwards to be sent into the lower parts, as need should require, and that the bodies of men are formed and disposed to receive them: and from hence did spring the opinion of those that thought that the souls of men here below, were either well or ill handled, and lodged in bodies either sound or sick, according to that life which they had led above in heaven, before they were incorporate. And truly the master of Wisdom himself, sheweth, that the *Soul*, of the two, was the elder, and before the body, *Eram puer, bonam indolem sortitus,*

## Of the Soul in general.

27

*Sortitus, imo bonus cum essem, corpus incontaminatum reperi.* I was a Boy, who by lot obtained a good disposition and nature, yea even being good, I obtained also an undefiled body. The fourth opinion received and held through all Christendom is, that they are all created of God, and infused into bodies prepared, in such manner, that the Creation and infusion is done at one and the same instant. These four opinions are all affirmative, but there is a fifth much retained, which determineth nothing, and is content to say, that it is a secret unknown unto men: of which opinion was Saint *Augustine*, Gregory *De orig. Epist.* and others, who nevertheless thought the two latter affirmative opinions more like to be true than the former. 28. 157.

Let us now see when and how the Soul entreth into the body, whether altogether at one instant, or successively; I mean the humane Soul: for that of a beast there is no doubt since it is natural in the seed, according to *Aristotle* (whom most do follow) that is, by succession of times, and by degrees, as an artificial form, which a man maketh by pieces, the one after the other; the head, afterwards the throat, the belly, the legs, inasmuch that the vegetative and sensitive Soul, altogether material and corporeal, is in the seed, and with the descent of the Parents which fashioneth the body in the matrix: and that done, the reasonable Soul arriveth from without. And therefore there are neither two nor three souls, neither together, nor successively, neither is the vegetative corrupted by the arrival of the sensitive, nor the sensitive by the arrival of the intellectual; but it is but one Soul which is made, finished, & perfected in that time which Nature hath prescribed. Others are of opinion, that the soul entreth with all her faculties at one instant, that is to say, then when all the body is furnished with Organs, formed, and wholly finished, and that until then there was no Soul, but only a natural virtue and *Energie*, an essential form of the seed, which working by the spirits which are in the said seed, with the heat of the matrix and material blood, as with instruments, do form and build up the body, prepare all the members, nourish, move and increase them; which being done, this *Energie* and seminal form vanisheth and is quite lost, so that the seed ceaseth to be seed, losing its form by the arrival of another more noble, which is the humane Soul, which causeth that which was seed, or an *Embryon*, that is a substance without shape, to be no longer seed, but a man.

The Soul being entred into the body, we are likewise to know what kind of existence therein it hath, and how it is there resident. 7. The residence of the Soul in the body. Some



Some Philosophers not knowing what to say, or how to joyn and unite the *Soul* with the body, make it to abide and reside therein as a Master in his house, a Pilot in his Ship, a Coach-man in his Coach: but this were to destroy all, for so the *Soul* should not be the form nor inward and essential part of a creature, or of a man, it should have no need of the members of the body to abide there, nor any feeling at all of the contagion of that body, but it should be a substance wholly distinct from the body, of it self subsisting, which at its pleasure might come and go, and separate it self from the body, without the distinction and diminution of all the functions thereof; which are all absurdities. The *Soul* is in the body, as the form in the matter, extended and spread throughout the body, giving life, motion, sense, to all the parts thereof, and both of them together make but one *Hypostasis*, one entire subject, which is the creature, and there is no mean or middle that doth unite and knit them together: for betwixt the matter and the form there is no middle, according to all Philosophy. The *Soul* then is all, in all the body; I add not (though it be commonly said) and all in every part of the body; for that implyeth a contradiction, and divideth the *Soul*.

8.  
The seat and  
instruments of  
the Soul.

Now notwithstanding the *Soul*, as it is said, be diffused and spread through the whole body, yet nevertheless, to excite and exercise its faculties, it is more specially and expressly in some parts of the body, than in others; in which it is said to have place, yet not to be wholly there, lest the rest should be without *Soul*, without form. And as it hath four principles and chief faculties, so men give it four seats, that is, those four regions, which we have noted before in the composition of the body, the four first principal instruments of the *Soul*, the rest refer themselves unto them, as also all the faculties to these, that is to say, the ingendring faculty to the ingendring parts, the natural to the liver, the vital to the heart, the animal and intellectual to the brain.

9.  
The sufficiency  
of the Soul for  
the exercise of  
her faculties.

We are now to speak in general of the exercise of the faculties of the *Soul*, whereunto the soul of it self is wise and sufficient, in so much that it faileth not to produce that which it knoweth, and to exercise its functions as it ought, if it be not hindered, and that the instruments thereof be well disposed. And therefore it was well and truly said of the wise, That Nature is wise, discreet, industrious, a sufficient mistress, which maketh a man apt to all things: *Insita sunt nobis omnium artium ac virtutum semina, magisterque ex oculis*

*Deus*

*Deus producit ingenium.* We have, as it were, sown in us the seed of all arts and virtues, and God, as a good Master, doth produce, extend, and teach our wit : which is easily shewed by induction. The vegetative soul without instruction, formeth the body in the matrix with excellent Art, afterwards it nourisheth it, and makes it grow, drawing the victual unto it, retaining and concocting it; afterwards casting out the excrements, it ingendreth and reformeth the parts that fail; these are things that are seen in plants, beasts, and men. The sensitive *Soul* of it self, without instruction, maketh both beasts and men to move their feet, their hands, and other members; to stretch, to rub, to shake, to move the lips, to press the dug, to cry, to laugh. The reasonable, of it self, not according to the opinion of *Plato*, by the remembrance of that which it knew before it entred into the body; nor according to *Aristotle*, by reception and acquisition, coming from without by the senses, being of it self as a white paper, void of impression, although that serve to good purpose; but of it self without instruction, imagineth, understandeth, retaineth, reasoneth, discourseth. But because this of the reasonable *Soul*, seemeth to be more difficult than the other, and woundeth in some sort *Aristotle* himself, it shall be handled again in its place, in the discourse of the intellectual *Soul*.

It remaineth that we speak of the last point, that is, of the separation of the *Soul* from the Body, which is after a diverse sort and manner; the one and the ordinary is natural by death, and this not the same in beasts and men: for by the death of beasts, the *Soul* dieth, and is annihilated, according unto that rule, By the corruption of the subject, the form perisheth, the matter remaineth: by the death of man the *Soul* is separated from the body, but is not lost, but remaineth, inasmuch as it is immortal.

The immortality of the *Soul* is a thing universally, religiously ( for it is the principal foundation of all Religion ) and peaceably received and concluded upon throughout the world, I mean by an outward and publick profession: seriously and inwardly, not so: witness so many Epicures, Libertines, and mockers in the world: yea, the *Sadduces*, the greatest Lords of the Jews, did not stick with open mouth to deny it; though a thing profitable to be believed, and in some sort proved by many natural and humane reasons, but properly and better established by the authority of Religion, then any other way. It seemeth that there is in a man a kind of inclination, and disposition of nature to believe it; for man desireth

10.  
The separation  
of the body  
two-fold.

1. Natural  
and ordinary.

2. The immor-  
tality of the  
*Soul*.



reth naturally to continue and perpetuate his being, from whence likewise proceedeth that great, yea furious care and love of our posterity and succession. Again, two things there are that give strength thereunto, and make it more plausible; the one is the hope of glory and reputation, and the desire of the immortality of our name, which how vain soever it be, carrieth a great credit in the world: the other is an impression, that vice which robbeth a man of the view and knowledge of humane justice, remaining always opposite to the Divine Justice, must thereby be chastised, yea after death: so that besides that, a man is altogether carried and disposed by Nature to desire it, and consequently to believe it, the Justice of God doth conclude it.

3.  
The Proof.

From hence we are to learn, that there are three differences and degrees of *Souls*, an order required even to the perfection of the Universe. Two extreams, the one is that which being altogether material, is plunged, and overwhelmed in the matter, and inseparable from it, and therewithal corruptible, which is the *Soul* of a beast, the other quite contrary, is that which hath not any commerce, or society with the matter or body, as the soul of immortal Angels or Devils. In the middle, as the mean betwixt these two, is the humane soul, which is neither wholly tied to the matter, nor altogether without it, but is joyned with it, and may likewise subsist and live without it. This order and distinction is an excellent argument of immortality; for it were a *vacuum*, a defect, a deformity too absurd in Nature, dishonourable to the Author, and a kind of ruine to the world, that betwixt two extreams, the corruptible and incorruptible, there should be no middle; that is, partly the one and partly the other: there must needs be one that ties and joyns the two ends or extreams together, and that can be none but man. Below, the lowest and wholly material, is that which hath no *Soul* at all, as stones; above, the highest and immortal, is the eternal only God.

4.  
2. Not natural. The other separation not natural nor ordinary, and which is done by strange impussions, and at times, is very difficult to understand, and perplex. It is that which is done by ecstasies and ravishments, which is diverse, and done by different means: for there is a separation that is Divine, such as the Scripture reporteth unto us, of *Daniel*, *Zachary*, *Esdra*s, *Ezechiel*, *S. Paul*. There is another that is demoniacal, procured by devils, and good spirits and bad, as we read of many, as of *John Duns*, called *Lescot*, who being  
in

in his ecstasie, a long time held for dead, was carried into the air and cast down upon the earth; but so soon as he felt the blow that he received by the fall, he came to himself, but by reason of the great store of blood which he lost, his head being broken, he died outright. *Cardan* telleth it of himself, and of his father, and it continueth authentickly verified in many and divers parts of the world of many, and those for the most part of the vulgar sort, weak and women possessed, whose bodies remain not only without motion, and the beating of the heart and arteries; but also without any sense or feeling of the greatest blows, either with iron or fire, that could be given them, and afterwards (their souls being returned) they have felt great pain in their limbs, and recounted that which they have seen and done in places far distant. Thirdly, there is an humane separation, which proceedeth either from that maladie, which *Hippocrates* calleth *Sacer*, commonly called, *The falling sickness*, *Morbus comitialis*, the sign whereof is a foaming at the mouth, which is not in those that are possessed; but instead thereof they have a stinking savour, or it is occasioned by stipticks, stupifying and benumbing medicines; or ariseth from the force of imagination, which enforcing and bending it self with too deep an attention about a thing, carrieth away the whole strength and power of the Soul. Now in these three kinds of ecstasies or ravishments, *Divine*, *Diabolical*, *Humane*, the question is, Whether the Soul be truly and really separated from the body; or if remaining in it, it be in such sort employed and busied about some outward thing, which is forth of the body, that it forgetteth its own body, whereby followeth a kind of intermission and vacation of the actions, and exercise of the functions thereof. Touching the Divine ecstasie, the Apostle speaking of himself, and his own act, dares not define any thing, *Si in corpore vel extra corpus nescio, Deus scit: Whether in the body, or without, I know not, God knoweth.* An instruction that may serve for all others, and for other separations of less quality. Touching the *Demoniacal* ecstasie, as not to feel a blow be it never so great, to report what hath been done two or three hundred leagues off, are two great and violent conjectures of a true separation from the body, but not altogether necessary: for the devil can so alienate and occupy the soul within the body, that it shall not seem to have any action or commerce with the body for some certain time, and in that time so befotteth the soul by presenting things unto the imagination, that have been done afar  
off,



off, that a man may speak and discourse thereof: for to affirm that certainly the *Soul* doth wholly depart and abandon the body, Nature is too bold and fool-hardy: to say that it doth not wholly depart, but that the imaginative or intellectual is carried out, and that the vegetative soul remaineth, were more to entangle our selves; for the soul in its essence should be divided, or the accident onely should be carried out, and not the substance. Touching the humane ecstasie, doubtless there is no separation of the *Soul*, but onely a suspension of the patent and outward actions thereof.

II.  
The state of the  
Soul after  
death.

What becomes of the *Soul*, and what the state thereof is, after the natural separation by death, divers men think diversly: and this point belongeth not to the subject of this Book. The *Metempsychose* and transanimation of *Pythagoras*, hath in some sort been embraced by the *Academicks*, *Stoicks*, *Ægyptians*, and others; but yet not of all in the same sense: for some do admit it onely for the punishment of the wicked, as we read of *Nebuchadnezzar*, who was changed into a beast by the judgment of God. Others, and some great, have thought that good souls, being separated, become Angels; the wicked, Devils. It had been more pleasing to have said, Like unto them; *Non nubent, sed erunt sicut Angeli. They marry not, but shall be as the Angels of God.* Some have affirmed, that the souls of the wicked, at the end of a certain time, were reduced to nothing. But the truth of all this, we must learn from Religion, and Divines, who speak hereof more clearly.

### CHAP. VIII.

*Of the Soul in particular; and first of the vegetative faculty.*

I.  
The faculties  
of the Soul.

AFTER this general description of the *Soul*, in these ten points, we must speak thereof more particularly, according to the order of the faculties thereof, beginning at the basest, that is, the Vegetative, Sensitive, Apprehensible or Imaginative, Appetible, Intellectual, which is the sovereign *Soul* and truly humane. Under every one of these three are divers others which are subject unto them, and as parts of them, as we shall see, handling them in their rank.

2.  
Of the vegeta-  
ble and her  
subalternate.

Of the vegetable and basest *Soul*, which is even in Plants, I will not speak much; it is the proper subject of Physicians of health and sickness. Let me onely say, that under this there are contained other three great faculties, which follow on the other: for the first

first serveth the second, and the second the third ; but the third neither of the former. The first then is the nourishing faculty, for the conservation of the *Individuum* or particular person, which divers others do serve as the *Attractive* of the victual, the *Concoctive*, the *Digestive*, separating the good and proper, from the naught and hurtful, the *Retentive*, and the *Expulsive* of superfluities : The second, the increasing and growing facultie, for the perfection and due quantity of the *Individuum* : The third, is the *Generative*, for the conservation of the kind. Whereby we see, that the two first are for the *Individuum*, and work within in the body ; the third is for the kind, and hath its effect and operation without in another body, and therefore is more worthy than the other, and cometh nearer to a faculty more high, which is the *Sensitive*. This is a great height of perfection, to make another thing like it self.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Sensitive faculty.

**I**N the exercise of this faculty and function of the Senses, these six things do concur, whereof four are within, and two without. *Six things required to the exercise of this faculty.* That is to say, the *Soul*, as the first efficient cause. The faculty of *Sense* ( which is a quality of the *Soul*, and not the *Soul* it self ) that is, of perceiving and apprehending outward things ; which is done after a fivfold manner, which we call *The five senses* ( of this number we shall speak hereafter ) that is to say, *Hearing, Seeing, Smelling, Tasting, Touching*. The corporal instruments of the *Sense*, whereof there are five, according to the number of the *Senses* ; the Eye, the Ear, the high concavity of the Nose ; ( which is the entrance to the first ventricles of the brain ) the Tongue, the whole Skin of the body. The *Spirit* which ariseth from the brain the fountain of the sensitive *Soul*, by certain sinews in the said instruments, by which spirit and instrument the soul exerciseth her faculty. The sensible *Species*, or object offered unto the instruments, which is different according to the diversity of the sense. The object of the eye-sight, according to the common opinion, is colour, which is an adherent quality in bodies, whereof there are six simple, as White, Yellow, Red, Purple, Green, and Blew ; some add a seventh, which is Black ; but to say the truth, that is no colour, but a privation, being like unto darknes, as the other colours more or less unto the light. Of compound colours the number is infinite :

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.



infinite: but to speak more truly, the true object is light which is never without colour, and without which the colours are invisible. Now the light is a quality which cometh forth of a luminous body, which makes both it self visible and all things else; and if it be terminated and limited by some solid body, it reboundeth and redoubleth its beams: otherwise if it pass without any stop or termination, it cannot be seen except it be in the root of that light or luminous body from whence it came, nor make any thing else to be seen. Of the Ear or Hearing, the object is a sound, which is a noise proceeding from the encounter of two bodies, and it is diverse: the pleasant and melodious sweetneth and appeaseth the spirit, and for its sake the body too, and drives away maladies from them both: the sharp and penetrant, doth contrariwise trouble and wound the spirit. Of tasting, the object is a savour or smack, whereof there are six diverse simple kinds, *Sweet, Sour, Sharp, Tart, Salt, Bitter*; but there are many compounds. Of smell, the object is an odour or scent, which is a fume rising from an odoriferous object ascending by the Nose to the first ventricles of the brain; the strong and violent hurteth the brain, as an ill sound the ear: the temperate and good doth contrariwise rejoyce, delight and comfort. Of the sense of Touching, the object is heat, cold, drouth, moisture either pleasant and polite, or sharp and smarting, motion, rest, tickling.

1. The middle or space betwixt the object and the instrument, which is the Air neither altered nor corrupted, but such as it ought to be.

2. So that sense is made, when the sensible species presenteth it self by the middle to an instrument sound and well disposed, and that therein the spirit assitting, receiveth it and apprehendeth it in such sort, that there is there both action and passion; and the senses are not purely passive: for notwithstanding they receive and are stricken by the object, yet nevertheless in some sense and measure they do work or react in apprehending the species and image of the object proposed.

3. In former times and before *Aristotle*, they did make a difference betwixt the sense of *Seeing*, and the rest of the senses, and they all held, that the sight was active, and was made by emitting or sending forth of the eye the beams thereof unto the outward objects, and that the other senses were passive, receiving the sensible object; but after *Aristotle*, they are made all alike, and all passive, receiving in the organ or instrument, the kinds and images of things, and the reasons of the Ancients to the contrary are easily answered.

There

There is more and more excellent matter to be delivered of the senses hereafter.

Now besides these five particular senses which are without, there is within the common sense; where all the diverse objects apprehended by it, are assembled and gathered together, to the end they may afterward be compared, distinguished, and discerned the one from the other; which the particular senses could not do, being every one attentive to his proper object, and not able to take knowledge thereof, of his companion.

CHAP. X.

*Of the senses of Nature.*

ALL knowledge is begun in us by the senses; so say our Schoolmen: but it is not altogether true, as we shall see hereafter. They are our first masters: it beginneth by them, and endeth with them: they are the beginning and end of all. It is not possible to recoil further back: every one of them is a Captain and Sovereign Lord in his order, and hath a great command, carrying with it infinite knowledges. The one dependeth not, or hath need of the other, so are they equally great, although the one have a far greater extent, and train, and affairs than the other; as a little King is as well a Sovereign in his little narrow command, as a great in his great estate.

1.  
*The importance  
of the natural  
senses.*

It is an opinion amongst us, that there are but five senses of Nature, because we mark but five in us; but yet there may very well be more, and it is greatly to be doubted that there are; but it is impossible for us to know them, to affirm them, or to deny them, because a man shall never know the want of that sense which he hath never had. There are many beasts which live a full and perfect life, which want some one of our five senses; and a creature may live without the five senses, save the sense of *Feeling*, which is only necessary unto life. We live very commodiously with five, and yet (perhaps) we do want one, or two, or three, and yet it cannot be known. One sense cannot discover another: and if a man want one by nature, yet he knows not which way to affirm it. A man born blind can never conceive that he seeth not, nor desire to see, nor delight in his sight: it may be he will say, that he would see, but that is because he hath heard say, and learn'd of others, that it is to be desir'd: the reason is, because the senses are the first gates, and entrances  
to

2.  
*The number.*



to knowledge. So man not being able to imagine more then the five that he hath, he cannot know how to judg whether there be more in Nature; yet he may have more. Who knoweth whether the difficulties that we find in many of the works of Nature, and the effects of creatures, which we cannot understand, do proceed from the want of some sense which we have not? Of the hidden properties which we see in many things, a man may say that there are sensible faculties in Nature, proper to judg and apprehend them; but yet he must confess that we have them not, and that the ignorance of such things proceedeth from our own fault. Who knoweth whether it be some particular sense, that discovereth in the Cock the hour of mid-night and morning, and that moves him to crow? Who taught some beasts to choose certain herbs for their cure, and many such like wonders as these are? No man can affirm or deny, say this it is, or that it is.

3.  
Their sufficiency.

Some have assayed to give a reason of this number of the five senses, and to prove the sufficiency of them by distinguishing and diversly comparing their outward objects; which are, either all near the body, or distant from it; if near, but yet remaining without, it is the sense of Touching; if they enter, it is Taste; if they be more distant and present by right line, it is the Sight; if oblique and by reflection, it is the Hearing. A man might better have said thus, That these five senses being appointed for the service of an entire man, some are entirely for the body, that is to say, *Taste* and *Touching*; that, in that it entreteth; this, in that it remains without. Others first and principal for the soul, as *Sight* and *Hearing*; the *sight* for invention, the *hearing* for acquisition and communication; and one in the middle, for the middle spirits, and ties of the soul and body, which is the *Smell*. Again, they answer to the four Elements, and their qualities: The sense of *Feeling* to the earth; of *Hearing* to the air; of *Taste* to the water and moysture; the *Smell* to the fire. The *Sight* is a compound, and partakes both of water and fire, by reason of the bright splendour of the eye. Again, they say that there are so many senses, as there are kinds of sensible things; which are colour, sound, odour, tast or savour, and the fifth, which hath no proper name, the object of *Feeling*, which is heat, cold, rough, plain, and so forth. But men deceive themselves, for the number of the senses is not to be judged by the number of sensible things; which are no cause that there are so many. By this reason there should be many more, and one and the same sense

sense should receive many diverse heads of objects, and one and the same object be apprehended by divers senses: so that the tickling of a feather, and the pleasures of *Venus*, are distinguished from the five Senses, and by some comprehended in the sense of *Feeling*: But the cause is rather, for that the spirit hath no power to attain to the knowledge of things, but by the five Senses, and that Nature hath given it so many, because it was necessary for its end and benefit.

Their comparisons are diverse in dignity and nobility. The Sense of *Seeing* excelleth all the rest in five things: It apprehendeth farther off, and extendeth it self even to the fixed stars. It hath more variety of objects: for to all things, and generally in all, there is light and colour, the objects of the eye. It is more exquisite, exact, and particular, even in the least and finest things that are. It is more prompt and sudden, apprehending even in a moment, and without motion, even the heavens themselves: in the other senses there is a motion that requireth time. It is more divine, and the marks of Divinity are many. Liberty incomparable above others, whereby the eye seeth, or seeth not, and therefore it hath lids ready to open and to shut: power not to turmoil it self, and not to suffer it self to be seen: Activity and Ability to please or displease, to signify and insinuate our thoughts, wills, and affections: for the eye speaketh and striketh, it serveth for a tongue and a hand; the other senses are purely passive. But that which is most noble in this Sense is, that the privation of the object thereof, which is darkness, brings fear, and that naturally; and the reason is, because a man findeth himself robbed of so excellent a guide: and therefore whereas a man desireth company for his solace, the Sight in the light is in place of company. The sense of Hearing hath many excellent singularities, it is more spiritual, and the service thereof more inward. But the particular comparison of these two, which are of the rest the more noble, and of Speech, shall be spoken in the Chapter following. As for pleasure or displeasure, though all the Senses are capable thereof, yet the sense of Feeling receiveth greater grief, and almost no pleasure; and contrarily, the Taste great delight, and almost no grief. In the organ and instrument, the Touch is universal, spread through the whole body, to the end the body should feel heat and cold: The organs of the rest are assigned to a certain place and member.

4.  
Comparison.

5.

The weakness  
and uncertainty  
of the  
Senses.

From the weakness and incertitude of our senses comes ignorance, error, and mistakings: for sithence that by their means and



mixture we attain to all knowledge, if they deceive us in their report, we have no other help to stick unto. But who can say, or accuse them, that they do deceive us, considering that by them we begin to learn and to know? Some have affirmed that they do never deceive us; and when they seem to do it, the fault proceedeth from something else; and that we must rather attribute it to any other thing, than to the senses. Others have said clean contrary, that they are all false, and can teach us nothing that is certain. But the middle opinion is the more true.

6.  
*The mutual  
deceit of the  
spirit & senses.*

Now whether the Senses be false or not, at the least it is certain that they deceive, yea, ordinarily enforce the discourse, the reason, and in exchange are again mocked by it. Do then but consider what kind of knowledge and certainty a man may have, when that within, and that without is full of deceit and weakness, and that the principal parts thereof, the essential instruments of science, do deceive one another. That the Senses do deceive and enforce the understanding, it is plain in those senses whereof some do kindle with fury, others delight and sweeten, others tickle the *Soul*. And why do they that cause themselves to be let blood, launced, cauterized, and burnt, turn away their eyes; but that they do well know that great authority that the senses have over their reason? The sight of some bottomless depth or precipitate downfal, astonisheth even him that is settled in a firm and sure place: and to conclude, doth not the Sense vanquish, and quite overcome all the beautiful resolutions of virtue and patience? so on the other side, the senses are likewise deceived by the understanding; which appeareth by this, that the *Soul* being stirred with Choler, Love, Hatred, or any other passion, our senses do see and hear every thing otherwise then they are; yea, sometimes our Senses are altogether dulled by the passions of the *Soul*, and it seemeth that the *Soul* retireth and shutteth up the operation of the Senses, and that the spirit being otherwise employed, the eye discerneth not that which is before it, and which it seeth, yea, the sight and the reason judge diversly of the greatness of the Sun, the Stars, nay of the figure of a staff any thing distant.

7.  
*The senses  
common to man  
and beast, but  
diversly.*

In the Senses of Nature, the beasts have as well part as we, and sometimes excel us: for some have their hearing more quick than man, some their sight, others their smell, others their taste: and it is held, that in the sense of Hearing, the Hart excelleth all others; of Sight, the Eagle; of Smell, the Dog; of Tastes, the Ape; of Feeling, the

the Tortoise: nevertheless, the preheminance of that sense of Touch is given unto man, which of all the rest is the most brutish. Now if the Senses are the means to attain unto knowledge, and that beasts have a part therein, yea sometimes the better part; why should not they have knowledge?

But the Senses are not the only instruments of knowledge, neither are our Senses alone to be consulted or believed: for if beasts by their Senses judge otherwise of things than we by ours, as doubtless they do; who must be believed? Our spittle cleanseth and drieth our wounds, it killeth the serpent; What then is the true quality of our spittle? to dry and to cleanse, or to kill? To judge well of the operation of the senses, we must be at some agreement with the beasts, nay, with our selves: for the eye pressed down and shut, seeth otherwise than in its ordinary state; the ear stopt, receiveth the objects otherwise than when it is open: an infant sees, hears, tastes, otherwise than a man; a man, then an old man; a sound then a sick, a wise then a fool. In this great diversity and contrariety, what shall we hold for certain? Seeing that one sense believeth another, a picture seems to be held up to the view, and the hands are folded together.

8.  
*The judgement  
of the senses  
hard and dan-  
gerous.*

CHAP. XI.

*Of Sight, Hearing, and Speech.*

These are the three most rich and excellent jewels of all those that are in this muster, and of whose prehemincy it is disputed. Touching their Organs, that of the Sight in its composition and form is admirable, and of a lively and shining beauty, by reason of the great variety and subtilty of so many small parts or pieces; and therefore it is said, That the eye is one of those parts of the body, which do first begin to be formed, and the last that is finished: and for this very cause it is so delicate, and said to be subject to sixscore maladies. Afterwards comes that of Speech, which helpeth the sense of Hearing to many great advantages. For the service of the body, the Sight is most necessary, and therefore doth more import a beast, then hearing. But for the spirit, the Hearing challengeth the upper place. The sight serveth well for the invention of things, which by it have almost all been discovered, but it bringeth nothing to perfection. Again, The Sight is not capable but of corporal things and particular, and that only of their crust or superficial part; it is the instrument of ignorant men and unlearned,

1.  
*A comparison of  
the three.*



*qui moventur ad id quod adest, quodque presens est: who are moved with the present object.*

2.  
*The prehem-  
nency of hear-  
ing.*

The Ear is a spiritual Sense, it is the intermedler and Agent of the understanding, the instrument of wise and spiritual men, capable not only of the secrets and inward parts of particular bodies, whereunto the Sight arriveth not; but also of the general kinds, and all spiritual things and divine, in which the sight serveth rather to disturb than to help; and therefore we see not only many blind, great and wise, but some also that are deprived of their sight, to become great Philosophers; but of such as are deaf, we never heard of any. This is the way by which a man entreth the fortrefs; and makes himself master of the place, and employeth his spirit in good or ill; witness the wife of King *Agamemnon*, who was contained in her duty of chastity by the sound of a Harp: and *David* by the self-same means chased away the evil spirit from *Saul* and restored him to health: and that skilful player of the Flute, that sweetned the voice of that great Oratour *Gracchus*. To be brief, Science, Truth, and virtue, have no other entrance into the Soul, but by the Ear. Christianity it self teacheth, that faith and salvation cometh by Hearing, and that the Sight doth rather hurt, then help, thereunto: that faith is the belief of those things that are not seen, which belief is acquired by hearing; and it calleth such as are Apprentices or novices therein, Auditors; *κατηχημένους, catechised*. Let me add this one word; that the hearing giveth succour and comfort in darkness, and to such as are asleep, that by the sound they may be awaked, and so provide for their preservation. For all these reasons have the wisest so much commended Hearing, the pure and virgin-guardian from all corruption, for the health of the inward man; as for the safety of a City; the gates and walls are guarded that the enemy enter not.

3.  
*The force and  
authority of  
Speech.*

Speech is peculiarly given unto man, an excellent present and very necessary, in regard of him from whom it proceedeth: it is the interpreter and image of the Soul, *animi index & speculum*, the messenger of the heart, the gate by which all that is within issueth forth, and committeth it self to the view, all things come forth of darkness and secret corners into the light, and the spirit it self makes it self visible: and therefore an ancient Philosopher said once to a child; *Speak, that I may see thee*, that is to say, the inside of thee. As vessels are known whether they be broken or whole, full or empty by the sound, and metals by the touch; so man by his

his speech. Of all the visible parts of the body which shew themselves outward, that which is nearest the heart, is the tongue, by the root thereof; so that which comes nearest unto our thought, is our speech: for from the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh. In regard of him which receiveth it, it is a powerful matter, an imperious commander, which entrencheth the fortress, possesseth it self of the possessor, stirreth him up, animateth, exasperateth, appeaseth him, maketh him sad, merry, imprinteth in him whatsoever passion it handleth, and feedeth the Soul of the hearer, and makes it pliable to every sense: it makes him blush, wax pale, laugh, cry, tremble for fear, mad with choler, to leap for joy, and pierceth him through with passion. In regard of all, Speech is the hand of the spirit, wherewith, as the body by his, it taketh and giveth, it asketh counsel and succour, and giveth it. It is the great Intermeddler and Huckster: by it we traffick, *Merx à Mercurio*, peace is handled, affairs are managed, Sciences and the good of the spirit are distributed, it is the band and cement of humane society (so that it be understood: For, saith one, A man were better to be in the company of a dog that he knoweth, than in the company of a man whose language he knoweth not, *Ut externus alieno, non sit hominis vice,*) As a stranger unto a stranger, and not in place of a man. To be brief, it is the instrument of whatsoever is good or ill, *Vita & mors in manibus lingue: Life and death is in the power of the tongue*: There is nothing better, nothing worse than the tongue. *Of the good and evil tongue* The tongue of a wise man is the door of a royal Cabinet, which is no sooner opened, but incontinently a thousand diversities present themselves to the eye, every one more beautiful than other come from the *Indies, Peru, Arabia*; So a wise man produceth and rangeth them in good order, sentences, and Aphorisms of Philosophy, similitudes, examples, histories, wise sayings, drawn from all the mines, and treasures old and new, *Qui profert de thesauro suo nova & vetera, who brings forth of his treasury old and new things*, which serve for a rule of good manners, of policy, and all the parts both of life and of death, which being applied in their times and to good purpose, bring with it great delight, great beauty and utility, *Mala aurea in lectis argenteis, verba in tempore suo. Like golden apples in beds of silver, so were words spoken in due season.* The mouth of a wicked man is a stinking & contagious pit, a slanderous tongue murdereth the honour of another, it is a sea and university of evils, worse than fetters, fire, poyson, death, hell, *Universitas iniquitatis, malum*



*malum inquietum, venenum mortiferum, ignis incendens omnia, mors illius nequissima, utilis potius infernus quam illa. The generality of iniquity, an unquiet evil, a deadly poyson, a fire consuming all, whose death is most wicked, and more unprofitable than hell it self.*

4.  
The correspondency of Hearing and Speech.

Now these two, Hearing and Speech, answer, and are accommodated the one to the other; there is great alliance betwixt them, the one is nothing without the other, as also by Nature in one and the same subject, the one is not without the other. They are the two great gates, by which the soul doth traffick, and hath her intelligence. By these two, the souls are poured the one into the other, as vessels when the mouth of one is applyed to the entry of the other; So that if these two gates be shut, as in those that are deaf and dumb, the spirit remaineth solitary and miserable: Hearing is the gate to enter, by it the spirit receiveth all things from without, and conceiveth as the female: Speech is the gate to go forth, by it the spirit acteth and bringeth forth as the male. From the communication of these two, as from the stroke of two flints, or irons together, there comes forth the sacred fire of truth: for they rubbing and polishing the one the other, they shake off their rust, purifie and cleanse themselves, and all manner of knowledge comes to perfection. But hearing is the first: for there can nothing come forth of the soul, but that which first entreth: and therefore he that by Nature is altogether deaf, is likewise dumb. It is necessary that first the spirit be furnished with moveables, and utensils, by the sense of Hearing, to the end it may by speech distribute them; so that the good and ill of the tongue, and almost of the whole man, dependeth upon the ear. He that hears well, speaks well; and he that hears ill, speaks ill. Of the use and government of the tongue, hereafter, *Lib. 3. Chap. 43.*

## CHAP. XII.

*Of the other faculties, Imaginative, Memorative, Appetitive.*

THE phantastick or imaginative faculty, having recollected, and with-drawn the kinds and images apprehended by the senses, retaineth and reserveth them: in such sort that the objects being absent and far distant, yea, a man sleeping, and his senses being bound and shut up, it presenteth them to the spirit and thought; *Phantasmata idola, seu imagines dicuntur; The Phan-*

*Of the intellectuive faculty and truly humane.*

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*Phantasmes* are called *idols, images, and representations of things*, and do almost work that within in the understanding, which the object doth without in the sense.

The Memorative faculty is the Guardian and Register of all the species or kinds and images, apprehended by the sense, retired, and sealed up by the imagination.

The Appetitive faculty seeketh and pursueth those things, which seem good and convenient.

CHAP. XIII.

*Of the intellectuive faculty and truly humane.*

TWO things are to be known, before we enter into this discourse, the seat or instrument of this intellectuive faculty, and the action. The seat of the reasonable soul, *ubi sedet pro tribunali*, <sup>I.</sup> *where he sitteth as in his throne or tribunal seat*, is the brain, and not the heart, as, before *Plato* and *Hippocrates*; it was commonly thought: for the heart having feeling and motion, is not capable of wisdom. <sup>The seat and instrument of the reasonable Soul.</sup>

Now the brain which is far greater in man, then in all other creatures, if it be well and in such manner made and disposed, that the reasonable soul may work and exercise its powers, it must come near unto the form of a Ship, and must not be round nor too great; nor too little, although the greater be less vitious. It must be composed of a substance and parts subtile, delicate, and delicious, well joyned and united without separation, having four little chambers or ventricles, whereof three are in the middle, ranged in front, and collaterals between and behind them, drawing towards the hinder part of the head; the fourth is alone, wherein is framed the preparation and conjunction of the vital spirits, afterwards to be made animal, and carried to the three ventricles before, wherein the reasonable soul doth exercise its faculties, which are three, *Understanding, Memory, Imagination*, which do not exercise their powers apart and distinctly, each one in each ventricle, as some have commonly thought; but in common all three together in all three, and in every of them, according to the manner of the outward senses, which are double, and have two ventricles, in each of which the senses do wholly work, whereby it comes to pass, that he that is wounded in one or two of these ventricles (as he that hath the pallee) ceaseth not



nevertheless to exercise all the three; though more weakly, which he could not do, if every faculty had his chamber or ventricle apart.

2.  
The reasonable  
Soul is Orga-  
nical.

Some have thought that the reasonable *Soul* was not organical, that is, had no need of any corporal instrument to exercise its functions, thinking thereby the better to prove the immortality of the *Soul*. But not to enter into a labyrinth of discourse, ocular and ordinary experience disproveth this opinion, and convinceth the contrary: For it is well known that all men understand not, nor reason not alike and after one manner, but with great diversity; yea, one and the same man may be so changed, that at one time he may reason better than at another; in one age, one estate, and disposition, better than in another, such an one better in health than in sickness; and another better in sickness than in health; one & the same man, at one and the same time, may be strong in judgement, and weak in imagination. From whence can these diversities and alterations proceed, but from the change and alteration of the state of the organ or instrument? From whence cometh it, that drunkenness, the bite of a mad dog, a burning fever, a blow on the head, a fume rising from the stomach, and other accidents, pervert and turn topsie-turvey the judgment, intellectual spirit, and all the wisdom of *Greece*, yea, constrain the *Soul* to dislodge from the body? These accidents being purely corporal, cannot touch nor arrive to this high spiritual faculty of the reasonable soul, but only to the organs or instruments, which being corrupted, the *Soul* cannot well and regularly act and exercise its functions, and being violently inforced, is constrained either to absent it self, or depart from the body. Again, that the reasonable *Soul* should have need of the service of the instruments, doth no way prejudice the immortality thereof: for God maketh use thereof, and accommodates his actions; and as according to the diversity of the air, region, and climate, God brings forth men very diverse in spirit and natural sufficiency, as in *Greece* and *Italy* men more ingenious, than in *Muscovy* and *Tartary*: So the spirit according to the diversity of the organical dispositions, and corporal instruments, discourseth better or worse. Now the instrument of the reasonable *Soul*, is the Brain, and the temperature thereof, whereof we are to speak.

Temperature is the mixture and proportion of the four first  
qua.

*Of the Intellective faculty and truly humane.*

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qualities, Hot, Cold, Dry, Moist, and it may be a fifth besides, which is the harmony of these four. Now from the Temperature of the brain, proceedeth all the state and action of the reasonable Soul, but that which is the cause of great misery unto man, is, that the three faculties of the reasonable Soul, Understanding, Memory, Imagination, do require and exercise themselves by contrary Temperatures. The temperature which serveth, and is proper to the understanding, is dry, whereby it comes to pass that they that are stricken in years, do excel those in their understanding that are young, because in the brain as years increase, so moisture decreaseth. So likewise melancholick men, such as are afflicted with want, and fast much (for heaviness and fasting are driers) are wise and ingenious, *Splendor siccus, animus sapientissimus, vexatio dat intellectum: Heat drieth and refines the wit, affliction gives understanding:* And beasts that are of a dry temperature, as *Ants, Bees, Elephants*, are wise and ingenious, as they that are of a moist temperature are stupid and without spirit, as *swine*: And the Southern people of the world are dry, and moderate in the inward heat of the brain, by reason of their violent outward heat.

*Of the temperature of the brain, and of the faculties thereof.*

*The understanding dry. Old age.*

The temperature of the memory is moist, whereof it is that infants have better memory then old men, and the morning after that humidity that is gotten by sleep in the night, is more apt for memory, which is likewise more vigorous in Northern people. I here understand a moisture that is not waterish or distilling, wherein no impression may be made, but airy, viscous, fat and oily, which easily receiveth, and strongly retaineth, as it is seen in pictures wrought in oyl.

2.  
*The memory moist. Infancy. Septentrionals.*

The temperature of the imagination is hot, from whence it cometh that frantick men, and such as are sick of burning maladies, are excellent in that that belongs to imagination, as *Poetry, Divination*, and that it hath greatest force in young men, and of middle years (Poets and Prophets have flourished in this age) and in the middle parts betwixt North and South.

3.  
*The imagination hot. Youth. The middle region.*

By this diversity of temperatures it cometh to pass, that a man may be indifferent in all the three faculties, but not excellent; and that he that is excellent in any one of the three, is but weak in the rest: that the temperatures of the memory and understanding are very different and contrary, it is clear, as *drie and moist*; as for the imagination, it seemeth not to be so contrary from the others, because heat is not incompatible with drought and moisture.

4.  
*A comparison of the temperatures.*

figure.



moisture: and yet notwithstanding experience sheweth, that they that excell in imagination, are sick in understanding and memory, and held for fools and mad men; but the reason thereof is, because the great heat that serveth the imagination, consumeth both the moisture which serveth the memory, and the subtilty of the spirits and figures which should be in that driness, which serveth the understanding, and so it is contrary, and destroyeth the other two.

5.  
*Three only  
temperatures.*

By that which hath been spoken it appeareth, that there are but three principal temperatures, which serve and cause the reasonable Soul to work, and distinguish the spirits, that is to say, Heat, Driness, Moisture: Cold, is not active, nor serveth to any purpose, but to hinder all the motions and functions of the Soul; and when we find in some Authors, that Cold serveth the understanding, and that they that have cold brains, as Melancholick men and the Southern, are wise and ingenious; there Cold is taken, not simply, but for a great moderation of heat: for there is nothing more contrary to the understanding, and to wisdom, than great heat, which contrarywise serveth the imagination. According to the three temperatures, there are three faculties of the reasonable Soul; but as the temperatures, so the faculties receive divers degrees, subdivisions, and distinctions.

6.  
*Subdivision of  
the faculties.*

There are three principal offices and differences of understanding, to Infer, to Distinguish, to Chase: these Sciences which appertain to the understanding, are School-Divinity, the Theorick of Physick, Logick, Philosophy natural and moral. There are three kinds of differences of memory; easily to receive and lose the figures; easily to receive, and hardly to lose; hardly to receive, and easily to lose. The Sciences of the memory are Grammar, the Theorick of the Law, Positive-Divinity, Cosmography, Arithmetick. Of the imagination there are many differences, and a far greater number than either of the memory or understanding: to it do properly appertain, Inventions, Merry-conceits, and Jestes, Tricks of subtilty, Fictions and Lies, Figures and comparisons, Neatness, Elegancy, Gentility: because to it appertain, Poetry, Eloquence, Musick, and generally whatsoever consisteth in Figure, Correspondency, Harmony, and Proportion.

7.  
*The propriety of  
the faculties  
and their order.*

Hereby it appeareth that the vivacity, subtilty, promptitude, and that which the common sort call wit, belongs to a hot imagination; solidity, maturity, variety, to a drie understanding. The imagination

tion is active and stirring, it is it that undertaketh all, and sets all the rest a work: the understanding is dull and cloudy: the memory is purely passive, and see how; The imagination first gathereth the kinds and figures of things both present, by the service of the five senses, and absent by the benefit of the common sense: afterwards it presenteth them if it will, to the understanding, which considereth of them, examineth, ruminateth, and judgeth; afterwards it putteth them to the safe custody of the memory, as a Scrivener to his Book, to the end he may again, if need shall require, draw them forth (which men commonly call *Reminiscentia*, Remembrance) or else, if it will, it commits them to the memory before it presents them to the understanding; for to recollect, represent to the understanding, commit unto memory, and to draw them forth again, are all works of the imagination; so that to it are referred the common Sense, the Fantasie, the Remembrance, and they are not powers separated from it, as some would have it, to the end they may make more than three faculties of the reasonable Soul.

The common sort of people, who never judge aright, do more esteem of memory, and delight more in it, than in the other two, because they have much use of counting, and it makes greater thew and stir in the world, and they think, that to have a good memory is to be wise; esteeming more of Science, than of Wisdom; but yet of the three it is the least, being such as may be even in fools themselves: for very seldom is an excellent memory joyned with understanding and wisdom, because their temperatures are contrary. From this Error of the common people, comes that ill course, which every where we see, in the instruction of our youth, who are always taught to learn by heart, (so they term it) that which they read in their Books, to the end they may afterwards be able to repeat it; and so they fill and charge the memory with the good of another, and take no care to awaken and direct the understanding, and to form the judgement, whereby he may be made able to make use of his own proper good, and his natural faculties, which may make him wise and apt to all things: so that we see that the greatest Scholars that have all *Aristotle* and *Cicero* in their heads, are the veriest fots, and most unskilful in publick affairs, and the world is governed by those that know nothing. It is the opinion of all the wisest, that the understanding is the first, the most excellent and principal piece of harness: If that speed well, all goes well,

8.  
*Their comparison in dignity.*

*See of this lib. 3. cap. 13.*



well, and a man is wise; and contrariwise, if that miscarry, all goes across. In the second place is the imagination: the memory is the last.

9.  
*An Image of  
the three facul-  
ties of the soul.*

All these differences, it may be, will be better understood by this similitude, which is a picture or imitation of the reasonable soul. In every Court of justice, there are three orders or degrees, the highest are the Judges, with whom there is little stir, but great action; for without the moving or stirring of themselves, they judge, decide, order, determine of all things: this is the image of judgement, the highest part of the soul. The second are the advocates and Proctours, in whom there is great stir and much ado, without action, for it lies not in their power to dispatch or order any thing, only they hatch and prepare the business: this is the picture of the imagination, and undertaking unquiet faculty, which never resteth, no not in the profoundest sleep; and it makes a noise in the brain, like a pot that seetheth, but never setleth. The third and last degree is the Scribe or Register of the Court, with whom there is no stir nor action, but pure passion, as the Guardian or Custos of all things, and this representeth the memory.

10.  
*The action of  
the reasonable  
Soul.*

The action of the reasonable Soul is the knowledge and understanding of all things: The spirit of man is capable of understanding all things, visible, invisible, universal, particular, sensible, insensible, *Intellectus est omnia: Understanding is all*: but it self either understands it not at all, as some are of opinion (witness so great and almost infinite opinions thereof, as we have seen before by those doubts and objections that have always crossed it) or very darkly, imperfectly, and indirectly, by reflection of the knowledge of things upon themselves, by which it perceiveth and knoweth that it understandeth, and hath power and faculty to understand: this is the manner whereby the spirit knows it self. The first sovereign spirit, God, doth first know himself, and afterwards in himself all things; the latter spirit, Man, quite contrary, all other things rather than himself, and is in them as the eye in a glass: how then should it act or work in it self without mean, and by a straight line?

11.  
*The mean  
whereby it  
worketh.*

But the question is concerning the means whereby it knoweth and understandeth things. The common received opinion that came from Aristotle himself is, that the Spirit knoweth and understandeth by the help and service of the Senses, that it is of it self as a white empty paper, that nothing cometh to the understanding,

ding, which doth not first pass the senses: *Nil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit prius in sensu.* There is nothing in the understanding, which is not first in the sense. But this opinion is false: first because (as all the wisest have affirmed, and hath been before touched) the seeds of all sciences; and virtues are naturally dispersed and insinuated into our spirits, so that they may be rich and merry with their own; and though they want that tillage that is fit, yet then they sufficiently abound. Besides, it is injurious both to God and nature: for this were to make the state of the reasonable Soul worse then that of other things, then that of the vegetative and sensitive, which of themselves are wise enough to exercise their functions, as hath been said; for beasts without the discipline of the senses know many things, the universals by the particulars, by the sight of one man they know all men, and are taught to avoid the danger of things hurtful, and to seek and to follow after that which is fit for them and their little ones. And it were a thing shameful and absurd, that this so high and divine a faculty should beg its goods of things so vile and corruptible as the senses, which do apprehend only the simple accidents, and not the forms, natures, essence of things, much less things universal, the secrets of Nature, and all things insensible. Again, if the Soul were made wise, by the aid of the senses, it would follow, that they that have their senses most perfect and quick, should be most witty, most wise; whereas many times we see the clean contrary, that their spirits are more dull, and more unapt, and that many have of purpose deprived themselves of the use of some of them, to the end the soul might better, and more freely execute its own affairs. And if any man shall object that the soul being wise by Nature, and without the help of the senses, all men must necessarily be wise, and always understand and reason alike: which being so, how cometh it about that there are so many dull pates in the world, and that they that understand, exercise the functions more weakly at one time than at another, the vegetative soul far more strongly in youth, the reasonable soul more weakly than in old age, and in a certain state of health or sickness, than at another time? I may answer, that the argument is not good: for as touching the first, that is, That all men must be wise: I say that the faculty and virtue of understanding is not given alike unto all, but with great inequality, and therefore it is a saying, as ancient as honourable, even of the wisest; that the acting understanding was given but to few;  
and



and this inequality proveth that Science comes not of sense: for as it hath been said, they that excel others in their senses, come short of others in their understanding and Science. Touching the second; The reason why a man doth not exercise his functions always after one manner, is because the instruments whereby the Soul must necessarily work, cannot always be disposed as they should; and if they be for some special kind of faculties or functions, yet not for others. The temperature of the brain, by which the Soul worketh, is diverse and changeable; being hot and moist, in youth, it is good for the vegetative, naught for the reasonable; and contrarily, being cold and dry, in old age, it is good for the reasonable, ill for the vegetative. The brain by a hot burning malady being heated and purified, is more fit for invention and divination, unfit for maturity and soundness of judgment and wisdom. By that which hath been spoken let no man think, that I affirm that the spirit hath no service from the senses, which I confess to be great, especially in the beginning, in the discovery, and invention of things; but I say in the defence of the honour of the spirit, that it is false that it dependeth upon the senses, and that we cannot know any thing, understand, reason, discourse, without the sense: for contrariwise all knowledge comes from it, and the senses can do nothing without it.

12.

The spirit in this understanding faculty proceedeth diversly, and by order: It understandeth at the first instant, simply and directly a Lion to be a Lion, afterwards by consequents that he is strong: for seeing the effects of his strength, it concludeth that he is strong. By division or negative, it understandeth a Hare to be fearful; for seeing it flye and hide it self, it concludeth that a Hare is not strong, because fearful. It knoweth some by similitude, others by a collection of many things together.

## CHAP. XIV.

*Of the humane Spirit, the parts, functions, qualities, reasons, invention, verity thereof.*

**T**His humane Spirit, and *Oeconomy* of this great and high intellectual part of the soul, is a depth of obscurity, full of creeks and hidden corners, a confused and involved labyrinth, and bottomless pit, consisting of many parts, faculties, actions, divers motions having many names, doubts and difficulties.

1.

The first office thereof is simply to receive and apprehend the images

images and kinds of things, which is a kind of passion and impression of the Soul, occasioned by the objects and the presence of them; this is imagination and apprehension.

The force and power thereof, to feed, to handle, to stir, to concoct, to digest the things received by the imagination: this is reason, λόγος.

The action and office, or exercise of this force and power, which is to assemble, conjoin, separate, divide the things received, and to add likewise others: This is discourse, reasoning, λόγισμος, διανοία, quasi διανεύω.

The subtile facility, and chearful readiness to do all these things, and to penetrate into them, is called Spirit, *Ingenium*; and therefore to be ingenious, sharp, subtile, piercing, is all one.

The repetition and action of ruminating, reconcocting, trying by the whetstone of reason, and rewarding of it, to frame a resolution more solid: this is judgement.

The effect in the end of the understanding; this is knowledge, intelligence, resolution.

The action that followeth this knowledge and resolution, which is to extend it self, to put forward, and to advance the thing known: this is will. *Intellectus extensus & promotus.*

Wherefore all these things, *Understanding, Imagination, Reason, Discourse, Spirit, Judgement, Intelligence, Will*, are one and the same essence, but all diverse in force, virtue, and action: for a man may be excellent in one of them, and weak in another: and many times he that excelleth in Spirit and subtilty, may be weak in judgement and solidity.

I let no man to sing, and set forth the praises and greatness of the spirit of man, the capacity, vivacity, quickness thereof: let it be called the image of the living God, a taste of the immortal substance, a stream of the Divinity, a celestial ray, whereunto God hath given reason, as an animated stern to move it by rule and measure, and that it is an instrument of a compleat harmony; that by it there is a kind of kindred betwixt God and man: and that he might often remember him, he hath turned the root towards the heavens, to the end he should always look towards the place of his nativity: to be brief, that there is nothing great upon the earth but man, nothing great in man but his spirit; if man ascend to it, he ascendeth above the heavens. These are all pleasing and plausible words, whereof the Schools do ring.

But

2.  
The general  
description and  
commendation  
of the Spirit.



3.  
The dispraise.

But I desire, that after all this we come to sound and to study how to know this spirit: for we shall find after all this, that it is both to it self and to another a dangerous instrument, a ferret that is to be feared, a little trouble-feast, a tedious and importunate parasite, and which, as a juggler and player at fast and loose, under the shadow of some gentle motion, subtile and smiling, forgeth, inventeth, and caueth all the mischiefs in the world: and the truth is, without it there are none.

4.  
Diversities of  
distinctions of  
the spirit.  
See hereof  
more chap. 39.

There is far greater diversity of spirits than of bodics, so is there likewise a larger field to enter into, more parts and more forms or fashions to be spoken of: we may make three classes or forms, whereof each one hath many degrees: The first, which is the lowest, are those weak, base, and almost brutish spirits, near neighbours to beasts themselves, whether by reason of the first temper, that is to say, of the seed and temperature of the brain, either too cold or too moist, as amongst other creatures, Fishes are the lowest; or by reason that they have not been in some sort removed, and reviewed, but suffered to rust, and grow dull and stupid. Of these we make no great account, as being unfit to be ordered and settled into any certain and constant society, because both for their own particular they cannot possibly endure it, and it were necessary they should always be under the tuition of another, this is the common and base people, *qui vigilans stertit; mortua cui vita est; prope jam vivo atque videnti; who waking snorteth, whose life is dead; or rather almost alive, and seeing, which understandeth not, judgeth not it self.* The second, which is the highest, are those great and high spirits, rather devils than ordinary men, spirits well born, strong and vigorous. Of these kind of people, there was never age yet could tell how to build a common weal. The third, which is the middle, are all those indifferent spirits, whereof there are infinite degrees: of these almost is the whole world composed. Of this distinction and others, hereafter more at large. But we are to touch more particularly the conditions and nature of this spirit, as hard to be known as a countenance to be counterfeited to the life, which is always in motion.

5.  
The particular  
description.  
Agent perpetual.

First therefore it is a perpetual agent, for the spirit cannot be without action, but rather then it will, it forgeth false and phantastical subjects, in earnest deceiving it self, even to its own discredit. As idle and unmanured grounds, if they be fat and fertile, abound with a thousand kinds of wild and unprofitable herbs, until

until they be sowed with other seeds, and women alone without the company of men, bring forth sometimes great abundance of unformed, indigested lumps of flesh: so the *Spirit*, if it be not busied about some certain object, it runs riot into a world of imaginations, and there is no folly nor vanity that it produceth not, and if it have not a settled limit, it wandereth and loseth it self. For, to be every where, is to be no where. Motion and agitation is the true life and grace of the *Spirit*; but yet it must proceed from elsewhere, then from it self. If it be solitary, and wanteth a subject to work on, it creepeth along, and languisheth; but yet it must not be enforced, For too great a contention, and intention of the *Spirit* over-bent, and strained, deceiveth and troubleth the *Spirit*.

It is likewise universal, it meddleth and mingleth it self with all, it hath no limited subject or jurisdiction. There is not any thing wherewith it playeth not his part, as well to vain subjects and of no account, as high and weighty; as well to those we can understand, as those we understand not: For to know that we cannot understand or pierce into the marrow or pith of a thing, but that we must stick in the bone and bark thereof, is an excellent sign of judgment; for science, yea truth it self, may lodge near us without judgment, and judgment without them, yea, to know our own ignorance, is a fair testimony of judgment.

6.

Universal.

Thirdly, it is prompt and speedy, running in a moment from the one end of the World to the other, without stay or rest stirring it self, and penetrating through every thing; *Nobilis & inquieta mens homini data est, nunquam se tenet; spargitur vaga, quietis impatiens, novitate rerum letissima. Non mirum ex illo caelesti spiritu descendit, caelestium autem natura semper in motu est: A noble and unquiet mind is given unto man, who never withholdeth her motion, inconstant, every where dispersed, impatient of rest, delighted most with novelties: No marvel if she descend of celestial spirit; for that the nature of celestial things, is to be in perpetual motion.* This great speed and quickness, this agility, this twinkling of the eye, as it is admirable, and one of the greatest wonders that are in the spirit, so it is a thing very dangerous, a great disposition and propensity unto folly and madness, as presently you shall hear.

7.

Prompt and sudden.

By reason of these three conditions of the spirit, that is, a perpetual agent without repose, universal, prompt and sudden, it hath been accounted immortal, and to have in it self some mark and sparkle of Divinity.



8.  
The action of  
the Spirit.

The action of the spirit is always to search, ferret, contrive without intermission, like one famished for want of knowledge, to enquire and seek, and therefore *Homer* calls men ἀλγοςδε. There is no end of our inquisitions: the pursuits of the spirit of man are without limits, without form: the food thereof is double ambiguity, it is a perpetual motion without rest, without bound. The world is a school of inquisition; agitation, and hunting is its proper dish: to take, or to fail of the prey, is another thing.

9.  
It worketh  
rashly.

But it worketh and pursueth its enterprises, rashly, and irregularly, without order, and without measure: it is a wandering instrument, movable, diversly turning; it is an instrument of lead and of wax, it boweth and straitneth, applieth it self to all more supple and facile then the water, the aire, *Flexibilis, omni humore obsequentior*: & ut spiritus, qui omni materia facilior & tenuior: It is flexible, and more yielding to every humour, and as the spirit, which is more facile and easie to every matter or substance: It is the shoe of *Theramenes*, fit for all.

10.  
Reason hath  
divers faces.

The cunning is to find where it is; for it goes always athwart, and crosse, as well with a lie, as with truth: it sporteth it self and findeth a seeming reason for every thing; for it maketh that which is impious, unjust, abominable in one place, piety, justice, and honour in another: neither can we name any law, or custom, or condition, that is either generally received of all, or rejected; the marriage of those that are near of blood, the murder of Infants, Parents, is condemned in one place, lawful in another. *Plato* refused an embroydered and perfumed robe offered him by *Dionysius*, saying, That he was a man, and therefore would not adorn himself like a woman. *Aristippus* accepted of that robe, saying, The outward accoutrement cannot corrupt a chaste mind. *Diogenes* washing his coleworts, and seeing *Aristippus* pass by, said to him, If thou knewest how to live with coleworts, thou wouldest never follow the court of a Tyrant. *Aristippus* answered him, if thou knewest how to live with Kings, thou wouldest never wash coleworts. One perswaded *Solon* to cease from the bewailing the death of his sons, because his tears did neither profit nor help them. Yea, therefore (saith he) are my tears just, and I have reason to weep. The wife of *Socrates* redoubled her grief, because the Judges put her husband to death unjustly: What, saith he, wouldest thou rather I were justly condemned? There is no good, saith a wiseman, but that to the losse whereof a man is always prepared, *In æquo enim est dolor amissæ*.

*misſe rei, & timor amittende*: Alibe troubleſome is the grief of a thing already loſt, and the fear left it ſhould be loſt. Quite contrary ſaith another, we embrace and look upon that good a great deal the more carefully, which we ſee leſs ſure, and always fear will be taken from us. A Cynick Philoſopher demanded of *Antigonus* the King, a dram of ſilver; That, ſaid he, is no gift fit for a King. Why then give me a Talent, ſaith the Philoſopher. And that, ſaith the King, is no gift for a Cynick. One ſaid of a King of *Sparta* that was gentle and debonair, He is a good man even to the wicked. How ſhould he be good unto the wicked, ſaith another, if he be not wicked with the wicked? So that we ſee, that the reaſon of man hath many viſages: it is a two-edged Sword, a Staff with two picks. *Ognime daglià ha il ſuo riverſo*: there is no reaſon but hath a contrary reaſon, ſaith the ſoundeſt and ſureſt Philoſopher.

Now this volubility and flexibility proceedeth from many cauſes; from the perpetual alteration and motion of the body, which is never twice in a mans life in one and the ſame eſtate; from the objects which are infinite, the air it ſelf, and the ſerenity of the heaven,

*Tales ſunt hominum mentes quali pater ipſe*

*Jupiter auctiſeras luſtravit lampade terras*:

*Mens minds on earth, the ſelf ſame courſe do run,*

*Being fair or foul as is th' Olympick Sun.*

and all outward things: inwardly from thoſe ſhakings and tremblings which the Soul gives unto it ſelf by the agitation, and ſtirreth up by the paſſions thereof: inſomuch that it beholdeth things with divers countenances; for whatſoever is in the World hath divers luſtres, divers conſiderations. *Epiſtetus* ſaid, it was a pot with two hands. He might better have ſaid with many.

The reaſon hereof is, becauſe it entangleth it ſelf in its own work, like the Silk-worm; for as it thinketh to note from far, I know not what appearance of light, and imaginary truth, and flies unto it; there are many difficulties that croſs the way, new ſents that inebriate and bring it forth of the way.

The end at which it aimeth is two-fold, the one more common and natural, which is Truth, which it ſearcheth and purſueth; for there is no deſire more natural then to know the truth: we aſſay all the means we can to attain unto it, but in the end all our endeavours come ſhort; for truth is not an ordinary booty, or thing that will ſuffer it ſelf to be gotten and handled, much leſs to be

11.

12.

*The reaſon of this entangle-ment.*

13.

*The end is verity, which it can neither attain nor find.*



*Read before  
Chap. 9.*

possessed by any humane Spirit. It lodgeth within the bosom of God, that is her chamber, her retiring place. Man knoweth not, understandeth not any thing aright, in purity and in truth as he ought: appearances do always compass him on every side, which are as well in those things that are false, as true. We are born to search the truth; but to possess it, belongeth to a higher and greater power. Truth is not his that thrusts himself into it, but his that runs the fairest course towards the mark. When it falls out that he hits upon a truth, it is by chance and hazard; he knows not how to hold it, to possess it, to distinguish it from a lie. Errors are received into our soul, by the self-same way and conduit that the truth is: the spirit hath no means either to distinguish or to choose: and as well may he play the sot, that tells a truth, as a lie. The means that it useth for the discovery of truth, are reason and experience, both of them very weak, uncertain, diverse, wavering. The greatest argument of truth, is the general consent of the World. Now the number of Fools doth far exceed the number of the wise, and therefore how should that general consent be agreed upon, but by corruption, and an applause given without judgment and knowledge of the cause, and by the imitation of some one that first began the dance?

<sup>14.</sup>  
*The second end  
of invention.*

*The praise of  
Invention.*

The other end, less natural, but more ambitious, is Invention, unto which it tendeth as to the highest point of honour, to the end it may raise it self, and prevail the more: this is that which is in so high account, that it seemeth to be an Image of the Divinity. From the sufficiency of this invention, have proceeded all those works, which have ravished the whole World with admiration; which if they be such as are for the publick benefit, they have deified their Authours. Those works that shew rather fineness of Wit, then bring profit with them, are Painting, Carving, Architecture, the Art Perspective; as the Vine of *Zeuxis*, the *Venus* of *Apelles*, the Image of *Memnon*, the Horse of *Airain*, the wooden Pigeon of *Architas*, the Crow of *Myron*, the Flie and Eagle of *Montroyal*, the Sphere of *Sapor* King of the Persians, and that of *Archimedes*, with his other engins. Now Art and Invention seem not onely to imitate Nature, but to excel it, and that not onely in the *Individuum* or particular (for there is not any body either of man or beast so universally well made, as by art may be shewed) but also many things are done by art, which are not done by nature; I mean besides those compositions and mixtures, which are the true diet, and proper sub-

subject of art, those distillations of waters and oyls, made of simples, which Nature framed not. But in all this there is no such cause of admiration as we think; and to speak properly and truly, there is no invention but that which God revealeth: for such as we account and call so, are but observations of natural things, arguments and conclusions drawn from them, as Painting and the Art Optick from shadows, Sun-dials from the shadows of Trees, the graving of Seals from precious stones.

By all this that hath before been spoken, it is easie to see how rash and dangerous the spirit of man is, especially if it be quick and vigorous: for being so industrious, so free and universal, making its motions so irregularly, using its liberty so boldly in all things, not tying it self to any thing; it easily shaketh the common opinions, and all those rules whereby it should be bridled and restrained as an unjust tyranny: it will undertake to examine all things, to judge the greatest part of things plausibly received into the World, to be ridiculous and absurd, and finding for all an appearance of reason, will defend it self against all, whereby it is to be feared that it wandreth out of the way, and loseth it self; and we cannot but see, that they that have any extraordinary vivacity and rare excellency (as they that are in the highest roof of that middle *classis* before spoken of) are, for the most part, lawless both in opinions and manners. There are very few of whose guide and conduct a man may trust, and in the liberty of whose judgments a man may wade without temerity, beyond the common opinion. It is a miracle to find a great and lively spirit, well ruled and governed: it is a dangerous sword which a man knows not well how to guide; for from whence come all those disorders, revolts, heresies and troubles in the world, but from this? *Magni errores non nisi ex magnis ingeniis: nihil sapientiae odiosius acumine nimio.* Great errors proceed not but from great wits: nothing is more prejudicial to wisdom, then too much sharpness of wit. Doubtless that man lives a better time, and a longer life, is more happy and far more fit for the government of a Common-wealth, saith *Thucydides*, that hath an indifferent spirit, or somewhat beneath a mediocrity, then he that hath a spirit so elevated and transcendent, that it serves not for any thing but the torment of himself and others. From the firmest friendships do spring the greatest enmities, and from the soundest health the deadliest maladies: and even so, from the rarest and quickest agitation of our souls, the most desperate resolutions

15.  
The Spirit ve-  
ry dangerous



and disorderly Frenies. Wisdom and folly are near neighbours, there is but a half turn betwixt the one and the other ; which we may easily see in the actions of mad men. Philosophy teacheth, that Melancholy is proper to them both. Whereof is framed the finest folly, but of the finest Wit ? And therefore, saith *Aristotle*, there is no great spirit without some mixture of folly. And *Plato* telleth us, that in vain a temperate and sound spirit knocked at the door of Poetry. And in this sense it is, that the wildest and best Poets do love sometimes to play the fool, and to leap out of the hinges. *Insanire jucundum est, dulce desipere in loco : non potest grande & sublime quidquam nisi mota mens, & quamdiu apud se est.* It is a delightful thing sometimes to be mad, a sweet matter in some cases to be foolish : The mind, unless it be altogether employed, can do no great matter, or attempt any thing of moment as long as it is wholly collected within it self.

16.  
It must be bridled, and why.

*Seneca.*

And this is the cause why man hath good reason to keep it within narrow bounds, to bridle and bind it with Religions, Laws, Customs, Sciences, Precepts, Threatnings, Promises, mortal and immortal, which notwithstanding yet we see, that by a lawless kind of liberty it freeth it self, and escapeth all these, so unruly is it by nature, so fierce, so opinative : and therefore it is to be led by Art, since by force it cannot. *Natura contumax est animus humanus, in contrarium atque arduum nitens, sequiturque facilius quam ducitur, ut generosi & nobiles equi melius facili freno reguntur.* The mind of man is naturally stubborn, always inclining to difficult and contrary things, and doth easier follow then is led by force, like unto generous horses, that are better governed with an easie bridle, than a cutting bit. It is a surer way gently to tutour it, and to lay it asleep, then to suffer it to wander at its own pleasure : for if it be not well and orderly governed, ( as they of the highest classis which before we spake of ) or weak, and soft and plain ( as those of the lower rank ) it will lose it self in the liberty of its own judgment : and therefore it is necessary that it be by some means or other held back, as having more need of Lead then Wings, of a bridle then a spur, which the great Lawyers and Founders of States did especially regard, as wellknowing that people of an indifferent spirit, lived in more quiet and content, then the over-quick and ingenious. There have been more troubles and seditions in ten years in the only City of *Florence*, then in five hundred years in the Countries of the *Helvetians* and the *Retians*. And to say the truth, men of a common sufficiency

ficiency are most honest, better Citizens, more pliant and willing to submit themselves to the yoke of the Laws, their superiours, reason it self, then those quick and clear-sighted men, that cannot keep themselves within their own skins. The finest wits are not the wisest men.

The *Spirit* hath its maladies, defects, tares or refuse, as well as the body and much more, more dangerous, and more incurable : but that we may the better know them, we must distinguish them : some are accidental, and which come from else-where, and those arise from three causes : the disposition of the body : for it is manifest, that the bodily malady which after the temperature thereof, doth likewise alter the spirit and judgment ; or from the ill composition of the substance of the brain, and organs of the reasonable *Soul*, whether it be by reason of their first formation, as in those that have their heads ill made, either too round, or too long, or too little, or by accident of some blow or wound. The second is the universal contagion of vulgar and erroneous opinions in the World, wherewith the *Spirit* being preoccupied, tainted, and overcome, or which is worse, made drunken, and manacled with certain fantastical opinions, it ever afterwards followeth and judgeth according to them, without regard either of further enquiry, or recoiling back : from which dangerous deluge all spirits have not force and strength to defend themselves.

The third much more near, is the malady and corruption of the will, and the force of the passion, this is a World turned topsie-turvy : the will is made to follow the understanding as a guide and lamp unto it ; but being corrupted and seized on by the force of the passions ( or rather by the fall of our first Father *Adam* ) doth likewise perhaps corrupt the understanding, and so from hence come the greatest part of our erroneous judgments : Envy, Malice, Hatred, Love, Fear, make us to respect, to judge, to take things otherwise then they are, and quite otherwise then we ought from whence cometh that common cry, Judge without passion. From hence it is that the beautiful and generous actions of another man are obscured by vile and base mis-constructions, that vain & wicked causes and occasions are feigned. This is a great vice, and a proof of a malignant nature and sick judgment, in which there is neither great subtilty nor sufficiency, but malice enough : This proceedeth either from the envy they bear to the glory of another man, or because they judge of others according to themselves, or because they have their taste altered, and their sight so troubled, that they cannot

17.  
The defect of  
the spirit.  
Accidental  
proceeding  
from three  
causes.  
1. The body.

2. The World.

3. The passions.



*Exod. 31. 2.  
Parakl. 15. 3.  
Reg. 15.  
August. lib. 2.  
de civitate  
Dei.*

discern the clear splendour of virtue in its native purity; From this self-same cause and source it cometh, that we make the virtues and vices of another man to prevail so much, and extend them further then we ought, that from particularities we draw consequents and general conclusions: if he be a friend, all sits well about him, his vices shall be virtues; if he be an enemy, or of a contrary faction, there is nothing good in him: insomuch that we shame our own judgment, to smooth up our own passions. But this rests not here, but goeth yet further; for the greatest part of those impieties, heresies, errors in our faith and religion, if we look well into it, is sprung from our wicked and corrupt wills, from a violent and voluptuous passion, which afterwards draweth unto it the understanding it self, *Sedit populus manducare & bibere, &c. quod vult non quod est, credit, qui cupit errare*: The people sitteth down to eat and drink, &c. He that hath a meaning to go astray, believes every thing as he would have it, not as it is indeed. In such sort that what was done in the beginning with some scruple and doubt, hath been afterwards held and maintained for a verity, and revelation from heaven: that which was onely in the sensuality, hath taken place in the highest part of the understanding; that which was nothing else but a passion and a pleasure, hath been made a religious matter and an article of faith: so strong and dangerous is the contagion of the faculties of the Soul amongst themselves: These are the three outward causes of the faults and miscarriages of the *Spirit*, judgment, and understanding of man; The body, especially the head, sick, or wounded, or ill fashioned; The world with the anticipated opinions and suppositions thereof; The ill estate of the other faculties of the reasonable Soul, which are all inferiour unto it. The first are pitiful, and some of them to be cured, some not: the second are excusable and pardonable: the third are accusable and punishable, for suffering such a disorder so near them as this is; those that should obey the Law, to take upon them to give the Law.

18.  
*Natural.*

There are other defects of the *Spirit*, which are more natural unto it, and in it: The greatest and the root of all the rest is pride and presumption (the first and original fault of all the World, the plague of all spirits, and the cause of all evils) by which a man is onely content with himself, will not give place to another, disdaineth his counsels, reposeth himself in his own opinions, takes upon him to judge and condemn others, yea even that which he understands not. It is truly said, that the best and happiest distribution that God ever made,

made, is of judgment, because every man is content with his own, and thinks he hath enough. Now this malady proceedeth from the ignorance of our selves. We never understand sufficiently and truly the weakness of our spirit: but the greatest disease of the spirit is ignorance, not of Arts and Sciences, and what is included in the writing of others, but of it self; for which cause this first book hath been written.

## CHAP. XV.

## Of Memory.

Memory is many times taken ( by the vulgar sort ) for the sense and understanding, but not so truly and properly: for both by reason ( as hath been said ) and by experience, the excellency of the one is ordinarily accompanied with the weakness of the other; and to say the truth, it is a faculty very profitable for the World, but it comes far short of the understanding, and of all the parts of the *Soul*, is the more delicate, and most frail. The excellency thereof is not very requisite, but to three sorts of people; Merchants or men of Trade, great talkers, ( for the store-house of the memory is more full and furnished, then that of invention; for he that wants it, comes short, and must be fain to frame his speech out of the forge of his own invention ) and liars, *mendacem oportet esse memorem: it behoveth a liar to have a good memory.* From the want of memory proceed these commodities; to lie seldom, to talk little, to forget offences. An indifferent memory sufficeth for all.

## CHAP. XVI.

## Of the Imagination and Opinion.

The Imagination is a thing very strong and powerful, it is it that makes all the stir, all the clatter; yea the perturbation of the World proceeds from it (as we have said before, it is either the only, or at least the most active and stirring faculty of the *Soul*.) The effects thereof are marvellous and strange: it worketh not only in its own proper body and *Soul*, but in that of another man, yea it produceth contrary effects: it makes a man blush, wax pale, tremble, dote, to waver; these are the least and the best: it takes away the power and use of the engendring parts, yea, when there is most need of them, and is cause why men are more sharp

The effects of  
the Imagination  
on marvellous.



sharp and austere, not onely towards themselves, but others; witness those ties and bands, whereof the World is full, which are for the most part impressions of the apprehension, and of fear. And contrariwise, without endeavour, without object, and even in sleep it satisfieth the amorous desires, yea changeth the sex, witness *Lucius Cossitius*, whom *Pliny* affirmeth to have seen to be changed from a Woman to a Man, at the day of marriage; and divers the like: it marketh sometimes ignominiously, yea it killeth, and makes abortive the fruit within the Womb; it taketh away a mans speech, and gives it to him that never had it, as to the son of *Crassus*: it taketh away motion, sense, respiration. Thus we see how it worketh in the body. Touching the Soul, it makes a man to lose his understanding, his knowledge, judgment; it turns him fool and mad-man, witness *Gallus Vibius*, who having over-bent his spirits in comprehending the essence and motions of folly; so dislodged and dis-joynd his own judgment, that he could never settle it again: it inspireth a man with the fore-knowledg of things secret, and to come, and causeth those inspirations, predictions, and marvellous inventions, yea it ravisheth with extasies: it killeth not seemingly, but in good earnest; witness that man, whose eyes being covered to receive his death, and uncovered again, to the end he might read his pardon, was found stark dead upon the scaffold. To be brief, from hence spring the greatest part of those things, which the common sort of people call miracles, visions, enchantments. It is not always the Devil, or a familiar spirit, as now adays the ignorant people think, when they cannot find the reason of that they see: nor always the spirit of God (for those supernatural motions we speak not of here) but for the most part it is the effect of the imagination, or long of the agent, who saith and doth such things; or of the patient and spectator, who thinks he seeth that he seeth not. It is an excellent thing, and necessary in such a case, to know wisely how to discern the reason thereof, whether it be natural, or supernatural, false or true, *Discretio spirituum, A discerning of spirits*. And not to precipitate our judgments, as the most part of the common people do by the want thereof.

In this part and faculty of the soul doth opinion lodg, which is a vain, light, crude, and imperfect judgment of things, drawn from the outward senses, and common report, settling and holding it self to be good in the imagination, and never arriving to the understanding, there to be examined, sifted, and laboured; and to be made

made reason, which is a true, perfect, and solid judgment of things : and therefore it is uncertain, inconstant, fleeting, deceitful, a very ill and dangerous guide, which makes head against reason, whereof it is a shadow and image, though vain and untrue. It is the mother of all mischiefs, confusions, disorders : from it springs all passion, all troubles. It is the guide of fools, fots, the vulgar sort ; as reason of the wise and dexterous.

It is not the truth and nature of things, which doth thus stir and molest our souls, it is opinion, according to that ancient saying ; Men are tormented by the opinions that they have of things, not by the things themselves. *Opinione sæpius quàm re laboramus ; plura sunt quæ nos tenent, quàm quæ premunt.* <sup>3.</sup> *We are more troubled with the opinion of things, then with the things themselves ; there are more things that hold us, then which press or urge us.* The verity and Essence of things entrench not into us, nor lodgeth near us of it self, by its own proper strength and authority : for were it so, all things should be received of all, all alike and after the same fashion ; all should be of like credit, and truth it self, which is never but one and uniform, should be embraced throughout the whole World. Now for as much as there is so great a variety, yea contrariety of opinions in the World, and there is not any thing concerning which all do generally accord, no not the wisest and best born and bred ; it giveth us to understand, that things enter into us by composition, yielding themselves to our mercy and devotion, lodging themselves near unto us, according to our pleasure, and humour, and temper of our souls. That which I believe, I cannot make my companion believe ; but, which is more, what I do firmly believe to day, I cannot assure my self that I shall believe to morrow : yea it is certain, that at another time I shall judge quite otherwise. Doubtless every thing taketh in us such place, such a taste, such a colour, as we think best to give unto it, and such as the inward constitution of the soul is. *Omnia munda mundis ; immunda, immundis :* *All things are clean to the pure and clean ; as also unclean, to the impure and unclean.* As our apparel and accoutrements do as well warm us, not by reason of their heat, but our own, which they preserve, as likewise nourish from the coldness of the Ice and Snow ; we do first warm them with our heat, and they in recompence thereof preserve our heat.

Almost all the opinions that we have, we have not but from authority : we believe, we judge, we work, we live, we die, and all upon.



3. upon credit, even as the publick use and custom teacheth us; and we do well therein: for we are too weak to judge and chuse of our selves; no the wise do it not, as shall be spoken.

Lib. 1. cap. 1.  
Ch. 2.

## C H A P. XVII.

## Of the Will.

The prehem-  
inence and im-  
portance of the  
will.

The comparisen  
thereof with  
the understand-  
ing.

Doubtful, if  
not erroneous.

**T**He will is a great part of the reasonable soul, of very great importance, and it standeth us upon, above all things, to study how to rule it, because upon it dependeth almost our whole estate and good.

It only is truly ours, and in our power; all the rest, understanding, memory, imagination, may be taken from us, altered, troubled with a thousand accidents: not the will.

Secondly, This is that, that keepeth a man entire, and importeth him much: for he that hath given his will, is no more his own man, neither hath he any thing of his own.

Thirdly, This is it whereby we are made and called good or wicked, which giveth us the temper and the tincture.

As of all the goods that are in man, virtue or honesty is the first and principal, and which doth far excel knowledge, dexterity; so we cannot but confesse, that the will, where virtue and goodness lodgeth, is of all others the most excellent: and to say the truth, a man is neither good nor wicked, honest nor dishonest, because he understandeth and knoweth those things that are good, and fair, and honest, or wicked, and dishonest; but because he loveth them, and hath desire and will towards them. The understanding hath other preheminences: for it is unto the will as the husband to the wife, the guide and light unto the traveller, but in this it giveth place unto the will.

The true difference betwixt these faculties, is in that by the understanding things enter into the Soul, and it receiveth them (as those words, to apprehend, conceive, comprehend, the true offices thereof, do import) but they enter not entire, and such as they are, but according to the proportion and capacity of the understanding: whereby the greatest and the highest do recoil and divide themselves after a sort, by this entrance, as the Ocean entrencheth not altogether into the *Mediterrane* Sea, but according to the proportion of the mouth of the Strait of *Gibraltar*. By the will, on the other side, the soul goeth forth of it, and lodgeth and liveth se-

where in the thing beloved, into which it transformeth it self; and therefore beareth the name, the title, the livery, being called virtuous, vicious, spiritual, carnal: whereby it followeth, that the will is enabled by loving those things that are high, and worthy of love; is vilified by giving it self to those things that are base and unworthy; as a wife honoureth or dishonoureth her, by that husband that she hath taken.

Experience teacheth us, that three things do sharpen our will, Difficulty, Rarity, and Absence, or fear to lose the thing; as the three contrary dull it, Facility, Abundance, or Satiety, and daily presence or assured fruition. The three former give price and credit to things, the three latter ingender contempt. Our will is sharpened by opposition, it opposeth it self against denial. On the other side, our appetite contemneth and letteth pass that which it hath in possession, and runs after that which it hath not: *Permissum sit vile nefas; quod licet, ingratum est, quod non licet, acrius urit: Things permitted we despise, and that which is lawful we loath, but violently pursue those things that are prohibited.* Yea it is seen in all sorts of pleasures. *Omnium rerum voluptas ipso quod debet fugari periculo crescit: All pleasures are increased, even with the danger wherewith they ought to be despised.* Inasmuch that the two extremes, the defect and the abundance, the desire and the fruition, do put us to like pain. And this is the cause why things are not truly esteemed as they ought, and that there is no Prophet in his own Country.

How we are to direct and rule our wills, shall be said hereafter.

## PASSIONS and AFFECTIONS.

### An Advertisement.

**T**He matter of the passions of the mind is very great and plentiful, and takes up a great room in this doctrine of wisdom. To learn how to know them, and to distinguish them, is the subject of this book. The general remedies to bridle, rule, and govern them, the subject of the second book. The particular remedies of every one of them, of the third book, following the method of this book, set down in the Preface. Now that in this first book we may attain the knowledg of them, we will first speak of them in general in this first Chapter, afterwards in the Chapters

*Lib. 2. cap. 6 &  
7. lib. 2. in the  
virtues of for-  
titude and  
temperance.*



ters following, particularly of every one of them. I have not seen any that painteth them out more richly, and to the life, then *Le Sieur de Vair*, in his little moral books, whereof I have made good use in this passionate subject.

## C H A P. XVIII.

## Of the Passions in general.

1.  
*The description  
of Passions.*

Passion is a violent motion of the *Soul* in the sensitive part thereof, which is made either to follow that which the *Soul* thinketh to be good for it, or to fly that which it takes to be evil.

2.  
*Their agitation.*

But it is necessary that we know how these motions are made, how they arise and kindle themselves in us; which a man may represent by divers means and comparisons: first in regard of their agitation and violence. The soul which is but one in the body, hath many and divers powers, according to the divers vessels wherein it is retained, the instruments whereof it maketh use, and the objects which are presented unto it. Now when the parts wherein it is included, do not retain and occupy it, but according to the proportion of their capacity, and as far forth as it is necessary for their true use; the effects thereof are sweet, benign, and well governed: but when contrariwise the parts thereof have more motion and heat then is needful for them, they change and become hurtful; no otherwise then the beams of the Sun, which wandring according to their natural liberty, do sweetly and pleasingly warm; if they be collected and gathered into the concavities of a burning-glass, they burn and consume that they were wont to nourish and quicken. Again, they have divers degrees in the force of agitation; and as they have more or less, so they are distinguished; the indifferent suffer themselves to be tasted and digested, expressing themselves by words and tears, the greater and more violent astonish the soul, oppress it, and hinder the liberty of its actions. *Cura leves loquuntur, ingentes stupent. Light cares move the tongue, but great cause astonishment and silence.*

2.  
*Of their vice  
and irregularity.*

Secondly, in regard of the vice, disorder, and justice that is in these passions, we may compare man to a Commonweal, and the state of the soul to a state-royal, wherein the Sovereign for the government of so many people hath under-magistrates, unto whom for the exercise of their charges, he gives Laws and Ordinances, reserving

serving unto himself the censuring of the greatest and most important occurrents. Upon this order dependeth the peace and prosperity of the state : and contrariwise, if the Magistrates, which are as the middle sort betwixt the Princes and the people, shall suffer themselves either to be deceived by facility, or corrupted by favour; and without respect either of their Sovereign, or the Laws of him established, shall use their own authority in the execution of their affairs, they fill all with disorder and confusion. Even so in man, the understanding is the Sovereign, which hath under it a power estimative, and imaginative, as a Magistrate, both to take knowledge, and to judge by the report of the senses of all things that shall be presented, and to move our affections for the better execution of the judgments thereof: for the conduct and direction whereof in the exercise of its charge, the Law and light of Nature was given unto it: and moreover, as help in all doubts, it may have recourse unto the counsel of the Superiour, and Sovereign, the understanding. And thus you see the order of the happy state thereof: but the unhappy is, when this power which is under the understanding, and above the senses, whereunto the first judgment of things appertaineth, suffereth it self for the most part to be corrupted and deceived, whereby it judgeth wrongfully and rashly, and afterwards manageth and moveth our affections to ill purpose, and filleth us with much trouble and inquietness. That which molesteth and corrupteth this power, are first the senses, which comprehend not the true and inward nature of things, but onely the face and outward form, carrying unto the image of things, with some favourable commendation, and as it were a fore judgment and prejudicate opinion of their qualities, according as they find them pleasing, and agreeable to their particular, and not profitable and necessary for the universal good of man: and secondly, the mixture of the false and indifferent judgment of the vulgar sort. From these two false advisements and reports of the Senses, and vulgar sort, is formed in the soul an inconsiderate opinion *Opinion.* which we conceive of things, whether good or ill, profitable or hurtful to be followed or eschewed; which doubtless is a very dangerous guide, and rash mistress: for it is no sooner conceived, but presently without the committing of any thing to discourse and understanding, it possesseth it self of our imagination, and as within Citadel, holdeth the Fort against right and reason, afterwards it descendeth into our hearts, and removeth our affections, with violent



lent motives of hope, fear, heaviness, pleasure. To be brief it makes all the Fools, and the seditions of the soul, which are the passions, to arise.

I will likewise declare the same thing, by another similitude of military policy. The *Senses* are the *Sentinels* of the *Soul*, watching for the preservation thereof, and messengers, or scouts to serve as ministers, and instruments to the understanding, the sovereign part of the *Soul*. And for the better performance hereof, they have received power to apprehend the things, to draw the forms, and to embrace and reject them, according as they shall seem agreeable, or odious unto their nature. Now in exercising their charge, they must be content to know, and to give knowledge to others of what doth pass, not enterprising to remove greater forces, lest by that means they put all into an *alarm* and confusion. As in an Army, the *Sentinels* many times by want of the watch-word, and knowledge of the design and purpose of the Captain that commandeth, may be deceived, and take for their succour, their enemies disguised which come unto them; or for enemies, those that come to succour: So the *Senses*, by not apprehending whatsoever is reason, are many times deceived by an appearance, and take that for a friend, which is our enemy. And when upon this thought and resolution, not attending the commandment of reason, they go about to remove the power concupiscible and irascible, they raise a sedition and tumult in our souls, during which time, reason is not heard, nor the understanding obeyed.

4.  
The distinction  
of the Passions  
according to  
their object  
and subject.  
Of the concu-  
piscible six.

By this time we see their regiments, their ranks, their general kinds and special. Every passion is moved by the appearance and opinion, either of what is good, or what is ill. If by that which is good, and that the soul do simply so consider of it, this motion is called love: if it be present and such whereof the *Soul* in it self taketh comfort, it is called pleasure and joy: if it be to come, it is called desire: If by that which is evil, it is hate: if present in our selves, it is sorrow and grief: if in another, it is pity: if it be to come, it is fear. And these which arise in us by the object of an apparent evil, which we abhor and fly from, descend more deeply into our hearts and arise with greater difficulty. And this is the first band of that seditious rout, which trouble the rest and quiet of our souls, that is, in the concupiscible part: the effects whereof, notwithstanding they are very dangerous, yet they are not so violent as those that follow them: for these first motions formed in this part, by the object which present-eth

teth it self, do pass incontinently into the irascible parts, that is to say, into that compass where the soul seeketh the means to attain; or avoid that which seemeth unto it either good or ill. And then even as a Wheel that is already in motion, receiving another motion by a new force, turns with far greater speed; so the *Soul* being already moved by the first apprehension, joyning a second endeavour to the first, carrieth it self with far more violence then before, and is stirred up by passions more puissant and difficult to be tamed, inasmuch as they are doubled, and now coupled to the former, uniting themselves, and backing the one the other by a mutual consent: for the first passions, which are formed upon an object of an appearing good, entering into consideration of means whereby to obtain it, stir up in us either hope or despair. They that are formed upon an object of an evil to come, stir up in us either fear, or the contrary which is audacity; of a present evil, choler and courage: which passions are strangely violent, and wholly pervert the reason which they find already shaken. Thus you see the principal winds from whence arise the tempests of our *Soul*, and the pit whereout they rise, is nothing else but the opinion (which commonly is false, wandering, uncertain, contrary to Nature, verity, reason, certainty) that a man hath, that the things that present themselves unto us, are either good or ill: for having conceived them to be such, we either follow them, or with violence fly from them. And these are our passions.

*In the Irascible five.*

## OF PASSIONS IN PARTICULAR.

### *An Advertisement.*

WE will intreat of their natures, that we may thereby see their follies, vanity, misery, injustice, and that foulness that is in them, to the end we may know and learn how justly to hate them. The counsel that is given for the avoidance of them, is in the books following. These are the two parts of Physick, to shew the malady, and to give the remedy. It remaineth therefore, that here we first speak of all those that respect the appearing good, which are Love and the kinds thereof, desire, hope, despair, joy; and afterwards all those that respect the ill, which are many, choler, hatred, envy, jealousy, revenge, cruelty, fear, sadness, compassion.

*Lib. 3. in the virtue of Fortitude and Temperance.*



## CHAP. XIX.

## Of Love in general.

The distinction  
of Love and  
comparison.

Lib. 3.

**T**He first and chief mistress of the passions is Love, which consisteth of divers subjects, and whereof there are divers sorts and degrees. There are three principal kinds, unto which all the rest are referred (we speak of the vicious and passionate Love, for of the virtuous, which is Amity, Charity, Dilection, we will speak in the virtue of Justice) that is to say, Ambition or Pride, which is the Love of greatness and Honour; Covetousness, the Love of Riches; and Voluptuous or Carnal Love. Behold there the three gulfs, and precipitate steps, from which, few there are that can defend themselves: the three plagues and infections of all that we have in hand, the mind, body and goods: the armories of those three captain enemies of the health and quiet of mankind, the Devil, the flesh, the World. These are in truth three powers, the most common and universal passions: and therefore the Apostle hath divided into these three whatsoever is in the World; *Quicquid est in mundo, est concupiscentia oculorum, aut carnis, aut superbia vitæ: All that is in the World, is the lust of the Eyes, the concupiscence of the flesh, and the pride of life.* Ambition, as more spiritual, so it is more high and noble than the others. Voluptuous Love, as more natural and universal (for it is even in beasts themselves, where the rest are not) so it is more violent, and less vicious: I say simply violent, for sometimes ambition excels it, but this is some particular malady. Covetousness of all the rest is the sickest and most sottish.

## CHAP. XX.

## Of Ambition.

**I.**  
**The description.** **A**mbition (which is a thirst after honour and glory, a gluttonous and excessive desire of greatness) is a sweet and pleasing passion, which distilleth easily into generous spirits, but is not without pain got forth again. We think it is our duties to embrace what is good, and amongst those good things, we account of honour more than them all. See here the reason, why with all our strength we run unto it. An ambitious man will

will always be the first, he never looks backward, but still forward to those that are before him: and it is a greater grief unto him to suffer one to go beyond him, then it is pleasure unto him, to leave a thousand behind him. *Habet hoc vitium omnis ambitio, non respuit:* Seneca.

*All ambition hath this vice, not to look back.* It is two-fold: the one of glory and honour, the other of greatness and command: that is profitable to the World, and in some sense permitted, as shall be proved; this pernicious.

The seed and root of ambition is natural in us. There is a proverb that saith, That Nature is content with a little: and another quite contrary; That Nature is never satisfied, never content; but it still desireth, hath a will to mount higher, and to enrich it self, and it goeth not a slow pace neither, but with a loose bridle, it runneth headlong to greatness and glory. *Natura nostra imperii est avida, & ad implendam cupiditatem praecept:* We are naturally greedy of authority and empire, and run headlong to the satisfying of our desires. And with such force and violence do some men run, that they break their own necks, as many great men have done, even at the dawning as it were, and upon the point of entrance and full fruition of that greatness which hath cost them so dear. It is a natural and very powerful passion, and in the end it is the last that leaveth us: and therefore one calleth it, The shirt of the soul: because it is the last vice it putteth off. *Etiam sapientibus cupido gloriae novissima exuitur.* The last vice which even the wise abandon is desire of glory. 2.  
It is natural.

Ambition, as it is the greatest and most powerful passion that is, so it is the most noble and haughty, the force and puissance thereof is shewed, in that it mastereth and surmounteth all other things: even the strongest of the World, yea all other passions and affections, even Love it self, which seemeth nevertheless to contend with it for the Primacy: As we may see in all the great men of the World, *Alexander, Scipio, Pompey*, and many other, who have courageously refused to touch the most beautiful Damsels, that were in their power, burning nevertheless with ambition, yea that victory they have over Love, served their ambition, especially in *Cæsar*, For never was there a man more given to amorous delights, even of all sexes, and all sorts of people, witness so many exploits, both in *Rome* and in strange Countries, nor more careful and curious in adorning his person: yet ambition did always so carry him, that for his amorous pleasures 3.  
The force and Primacy thereof.



pleasures he never lost an hour of time, which he might employ to the enlargement of his greatness, for ambition hath the sovereign place in him, and did fully possess him. We see on the other side, that in *Marcus Antonius* and others, the force of Love hath made them to forget the care and conduct of their affairs. But yet both of them being weighed in equal ballance, ambition carrieth away the prize. They that hold that Love is the stronger, say that both the soul and the body, the whole man, is possessed by it, yea that health it self dependeth thereupon. But contrariwise it seemeth that ambition is the stronger, because it is altogether spiritual. And in as much as Love possesseth the body, it is therefore the more weak, because it is subject to satiety, and therefore capable of remedies, both corporal, natural, and strange, as experience sheweth of many, who by divers means have allayed, yea quite extinguished the force and fury of this passion; but ambition is not capable of satiety, yea is sharpened by the fruition of that it desireth, and there is no way to extinguish it, being altogether in the soul it self and in the reason.

4. *The care of life* It doth likewise vanquish Love and robbeth it, not only of its health and tranquillity (for glory and tranquillity are things that cannot lodge together) but also of its own proper life, as *Agrippina* the mother of *Nero* doth plainly prove, who desiring and consulting with others to make her Son Emperour, and understanding that it could not be done, but with the loss of her own life, she answereth, as if ambition it self had spoken it, *Occidat modo imperet: Let me be slain, so he may reign.*

5. *The Laws.* Thirdly, ambition enforceth all the Laws, and conscience it self; the Learned have said of ambition, that it is the part of every honest man always to obey the Laws, except it be in a case, of sovereignty for a Kingdom, which onely deserveth a dispensation, being so dainty a morsel, that it cannot but break a mans fast; *Si violandum est jus, regnandi causâ violandum est, in ceteris pietatem colas.* If man may at any time violate justice, it must be to gain a Kingdom; in the rest observe Justice and Piety.

6. *Religion.* It likewise trampleth under foot, and contemneth the reverence and respect of Religion, witness *Jeroboam*, *Mahomet*, who never took thought for Religion; but tolerated all Religions, so he might reign: and all those arch-hereticks who have liked better to be chief leaders in error and lies with a thousand disorders, then to be disciples of the truth: there-

Therefore saith the Apostle, They that suffer themselves to be puffed up with this passion and affection, make shipwrack, and wander from the faith, piercing themselves through with many sorrows.

To be short, it offereth violence even to the Laws of Nature it self. This hath been the cause of so many murders of Parents, infants, brothers; witness *Abfalon, Abimelech, Athalias, Romulus, Scipio* King of the *Persians*, who killed both his father and brother, *Solyman* the great Turk, his two brothers. So that nothing is able to resist the force of ambition, it beats all to the ground, so high and haughty is it. It lodgeth only in great minds, even in the Angels themselves.

7.  
It enforceth Nature.

Ambition is not the vice or passion of base companions, nor of common or small attempts, and daily enterprises: Renown and glory doth not prostitute it self to so base a prize; it pursueth not those things that are simply and solely good and profitable, but those that are rare, high, difficult, strange, and unusual. That great thirst after honour and reputation, that casts down a man, and makes him a begger, and to duck and stoop to all sorts of people, and by all means, yea the most abject, at what base price soever, is vile and dishonourable: it is a shame and dishonour so to be honoured. A man must not be greedy of greater glory then he is capable of; and to swell and to be puffed up for every good and profitable action, is to shew his tail while he lifts up his head.

8.  
It is a lofty passion.

Ambition hath many and divers ways, and practised by divers means: there is one way straight and open, such as *Alexander, Caesar, Themistocles* took; there is another oblique and hidden, which many Philosophers and Professors of piety have taken, who go forwards by going backwards, go before others by going behind them, not unlike to Wier-drawers, who draw and go backward; they would fain be glorious by contemning glory. And to say the truth, there is a greater glory in refusing and trampling glory under foot, then in the desire and fruition thereof, as *Plato* told *Diogenes*. And ambition is never better carried, better guided, then by wandering, and unusual ways.

9.  
It hath divers ways.

Ambition is a folly and a vanity; for it is as much as if a man should run to catch the smoak, instead of the light, the shadow instead of the body, to fasten the contentment of his mind upon the opinion of the vulgar sort, voluntarily to renounce his own liberty.

10.  
It is a folly.



ty, to follow the passions of others, to enforce himself, to displease himself, for the pleasure of the beholders ; to let his own affections depend upon the eyes of another ; so far forth to love virtue as may be to the liking of the common sort ; to do good, not for the love of good, but reputation. This is to be like unto vessels when they are pierced, a man can draw nothing forth before he give them a vent.

11. Ambition hath no limits, it is a gulf that hath neither brink  
*It is insatiable.* nor bottom ; it is that vacuity which the Philosophers could never find in Nature ; a fire which increaseth by that nourishment that is given unto it. Wherein it truly payeth his master : for ambition is only just in this, that it sufficeth for his own punishment, and is executioner to it self. The wheel of *Ixion* is the motion of his desires, which turn and return up and down, never giving rest unto his mind.

12. They that will flatter ambition, say it is a servant or help unto  
*The excuses of ambition vain.* virtue, and a spur to beautiful actions ; for it quitteth a man of all other sins, and in the end, of himself too ; and all for virtue : but it is so far from this, that it hideth sometimes our vices ; yet it takes not them away, but it covereth or rather hatcheth them for a time under the deceitful cinders of a malicious hypocrisie, with hope to set them on fire all together, when they have gotten authority sufficient to reign publicly and with impiety. Serpents lose not their venom, though they be frozen with cold, nor an ambitious man his vices, though with a cold dissimulation he cover them : for when he is arrived to that pitch of height that he desired, he then makes them feel what he is. And though ambition quit a man of all other vices, yet it never taketh away it self. An ambitious man putteth himself forth to great and honourable actions, the profit whereof returneth to the publick good, but yet he is never the better man that performs them, because they are not the actions of virtue, but of passion ; no, though that saying be often in his mouth, We are not born for our selves, but for the Weal publick. The means men use to mount themselves to high estate, and their carriages in their states and charges, when they are arrived thereunto, do sufficiently shew what men they are, and their own consciences tell the most that follow that dance, that however the publick good be their outward colour, yet their own particular is that they intend.

Particular advisements and remedies against this evil you shall find *Lib. 3. Cap. 42.*

CHAP. XXI.

Of Covetousness and her counter-passion.

**T**O love and affect riches is Covetousness; not only the love and affection, but also every over-curious care and industry about riches, yea their dispensions themselves and liberty, with Art and too much attention procured, have a scent of Covetousness: for they are not worthy an earnest care and attention.

1.  
What it is.

The desire of goods, and the pleasure we take in possessing of them, is grounded only upon opinion. The immoderate desire to get riches is a gangrene in our soul, which with a venomous heat consumeth our natural affections, to the end it might fill us with virulent humours. So soon as it is lodged in our hearts, all honest and natural affection which we owe either to our parents or friends, or our selves, vanisheth away. All the rest, in respect of our profit seemeth nothing, yea we forget in the end, and condemn our selves, our bodies, our minds, for this transitory trash, and as our Proverb is, We sell our horse to get us hay.

2.  
The force thereof.

Covetousness is the vile and base passion of vulgar fools, who account riches the principal good of a man, and fear poverty as the greatest evil; and not contenting themselves with necessary means, which are forbidden no man, weigh that is good in a Goldsmiths ballance, when Nature hath taught us to measure it by the ell of necessity. For what greater folly can there be then to adore that which Nature it self hath put under our feet, and hidden in the bowels of the earth, as unworthy to be seen, yea rather to be condemned, and trampled under foot? This is that that the only sin of man hath torn out of the entrails of the earth, and brought unto light, to kill himself. *In lucem propter quæ pugnaremus excutimus: non erubescimus summa apud nos haberi, quæ fuerunt ima terrarum.* We dig out the bowels of the earth, and bring to light those things for which we would fight; we are not ashamed to esteem those things most highly, which are in the lowest and nethermost parts of the earth. Nature seemeth, even in the first birth of gold, and womb from whence it proceedeth, after a sort to have presaged the misery of those that are in love with it: for it hath so ordered the matter, that in those Countries where it groweth, there grows with it neither grass, nor plant, nor other thing that is worth any thing, as giving us to understand thereby, that in those minds where the desire of this Metal groweth, there cannot remain so much as a

3.  
The folly and misery of covetousness in five points.



spark of true honour and virtue : for what thing can be more base, then for a man to degrade, and to make himself a servant, and a slave to that, which should be subject unto him ? *Apud sapientem divitiæ sunt in servitute, apud stultum in imperio. Riches serve wise men, but command a fool.* For a covetous man serves his riches, not they him ; and he is said to have goods as he hath a fever, which holdeth and tyrannizeth over a man, not he over it. What thing more vile then to love that which is not good ? neither can make a good man ; yea is common, and in the possession of the most wicked of the world, which many times pervert good manners, but never amend them ? Without which so many wise men have made themselves happy, and by which many wicked men have come to a wicked end. To be brief, what thing more miserable then to bind the living unto the dead, as *Mezentius* did, to the end their death might be languishing and the more cruel ; to tie the spirit to the excrement and scum of the earth ; to pierce through his own soul with a thousand torments, which this amorous passion of riches brings with it ; and to entangle himself with the ties and cords of this malignant thing, as the Scripture calleth them, which doth likewise term them thorns, and thieves which steal away the heart of man, snares of the Devil, idolatry, and the root of all evil. And truly he that shall see the Catalogue of those envies and molestations which riches ingender within the heart of man, as their proper thunderbolt and lightning, they would be more hated then they are now loved. *Desunt inopiæ multa, avaritiæ omnia : in nullum avarus bonus est, in se pessimus.* Poverty wanteth many things, but covetousness all ; a covetous man is good to none, and worst of all to himself.

4.  
The counter-  
passion to covetousness.

There is another contrary passion to this, and vicious, To hate riches, and to spend them prodigally ; this is to refuse the means to do well, to put in practice many virtues, and to flye that labour which is far greater in the true command and use of riches, then in not having them at all ; to govern himself better in abundance then in poverty. In this there is but one kind of virtue, which is, not to faint in courage, but to continue firm and constant. In abundance there are many, Temperance, Moderation, Liberality, Diligence, Prudence, and so forth. There, more is not expressed, but that he look to himself : here, that he attend first himself, and then the good of others. He that is spoiled of his goods, hath the more liberty to attend the more weighty affairs of the spirit : and for this cause many, both Philosophers and Christians, out of the great-

ness

ness of their courage, have put it in practice. He doth likewise discharge himself of many duties and difficulties that are required in the good and honest government of our riches in their acquisition, conservation, distribution, use and imployment : but he that quitteth himself of his riches, for this reason, flyeth the labour and business that belongs unto them ; and quite contrary, doth it not out of courage, but cowardize : and a man may tell him, that he shakes off his riches, not because they are not profitable, but because he knoweth not how to make use of them, how to use them. And not to be able to endure riches, is rather weakness of mind, then wisdom, saith *Seneca*.

CHAP. XXII.

Of carnal Love.

**C**ARNAL love is a Fever and furious passion, and very dangerous unto him that suffereth himself to be carried by it : For what becomes of him ? He is no more himself ; his body endureth a thousand labours in the search of his pleasure ; his mind a thousand hells to satisfy his desires ; and desire it self increasing, grows into fury. As it is natural, so it is violent and common to all, and therefore in the action thereof it equalleth and coupleth fools and wise men, men and beasts together. It maketh all the wisdom, resolution, contemplation, and operation of the soul beastly and brutish. Hereby, as likewise by sleep, *Alexander* knew himself to be a mortal man, because both these suppress the faculties of the soul.

Philosophy speaketh freely of all things, that it may the better find out their causes, govern and judge of them ; so doth Divinity, which is yet more chaste and more strait. And why not, since that all things belong unto the jurisdiction and knowledge thereof ? The Sun shines on the dunghil, and is neither infected, nor annoyed therewith. To be offended with words, is a token either of great weakness, or some touch or guilt of the same malady. Thus much be spoken for that which followeth, or the like, if it shall happen. Nature on the one side with violence thrusteth us forward unto this action ; all the motion of the world resolveth and yieldeth to this copulation of the male and female : on the other side it causeth us to accuse, to hide our selves, to blush for shame, as if it were a thing ignominious and dishonest. We call it a shameful.

1.  
*It is strong, natural, and common.*

2.  
*Why ignominious.*



ful act, and the parts that serve thereunto, our shameful parts. But why shameful, since natural, (and keeping it self within its own bounds) just, lawful, and necessary? Yea, why are beasts exempted from this shame? It is because the countenance seems foul and deformed. Why foul, since natural? In crying, laughing, champing, gaping, the visage is more distorted; Is it to the end it may serve as a bridle and a stay to such a kind of violence? Why then doth Nature cause such a violence? Or contrariwise: Is it because shame serveth as a spur, and as sulphur; or that the instruments thereof move without our consent, yea against our wills? By this reason beasts likewise should be bashful, and many other things move of themselves in us, without our consent, which are neither vicious nor shameful: not only inward and hidden (as the pulse and motion of the heart, arteries, lungs, the instruments and parts that serve the appetite of eating, drinking, discharging the brain, the belly, and their shuttings and openings, are besides, nay, many times against our wills: witness thole sneelings, yawnings, tears, hoquets, and fluxions, that are not in our own power, and this of the body: the spirit forgetteth, remembreth, believeth, misbelieveth, and the will it self, (which many times willeth that which we would it willed not) but outward and apparent: the visage blusheth, waxeth pale, wan, the body groweth fat, lean, the hair turneth gray, black, white, grows, stands on end, without and against our consent. Is it that hereby the poverty and weakness of man may be the more truly shewed? that is as well seen in our eating and drinking, our griefs, weariness, the disburdening of our bodies, death, whereof a man is not ashamed. Whatsoever the reason be, the action in it self, and by nature is no way shameful, it is truly natural; so is not shame: witness the beasts. Why say I beasts? The nature of man, saith Divinity, maintaining it self in its first original state, had never known what shame was, as now it doth; for from whence cometh shame, but from weakness, and weakness but from sin, there being nothing in Nature of it self shameful? The cause then of this shame not being in Nature, we must seek it elsewhere. It is therefore artificial. It is an invention forged in the closet of *Venus*, to give the greater price to the business, and to enkindle the desire thereof the more. This is with a little water to make the fire burn the clearer, as Smiths use to do, to enflame the desire to see what it is, that is hidden; to hear and know what it is that is muttered and whispered. For to handle things

things darkly, as if they were mysteries, and with respect and shame, giveth taste and estimation unto them. Contrariwise, a loose, free, and open permission and commodity, derogateth from the worth, and taketh away the true relish and delight thereof.

This action then it self, and simply taken, is neither shameful nor vicious, since it is natural and corporal, no more then other the like actions are: yea, if it be well ordered, it is just, profitable, necessary at the least, as it is to eat and drink. But that which doth so much discredit it, is, that moderation is seldom kept therein, and that to attain thereunto, we make great stirs, and many times use bad means, whereby it draweth after it, if it go not before, many evils, all worse then the action it self. The charge riseth above the principal, and this is to fish (as it is said) with threds of gold and purple. And all this is purely humane. Beasts that follow simply nature, are quit from all these troubles. But the art of man on the one side sets a strait guard about it, planteth at the gate shame to give it relish: on the other side (O the coufening of men!) it inflameth and sharpneth the desire, it deviseth, removeth, troubleth, turneth all topsie-turvy to attain unto it, (witness Poetry, which sporteth not it self in any thing, so much as in this subject) and findeth every entrance unto it to be better, then by the gate, and the lawful way, and followeth every wandering way, rather then the common way of marriage.

CHAP. XXIII.

*Desires, Concupiscence.*

Here arise not so many billows and waves in the Sea, as desires in the heart of man: it is a bottomless depth, it is infinite, diverse, inconstant, confused, and irresolute, yea, many times horrible and detestable, but ordinarily vain, and ridiculous in its own desires.

But first it shall not be amiss to distinguish them. Some are natural, and they are just and lawful: they are likewise in beasts, they have their limits and bounds, a man may see the end of them; and living according to those, there is no man a begger. Of these shall be spoken hereafter more at large: for (to say the truth) these are not passions. Others are besides nature, proceeding from our opinions and phantasie, artificial, superfluous, which we may, for distinction sake, call concupiscences or lusts. These are purely hu-

3.  
In what sense  
vicious.

1.  
The bottomless  
depth of desire:

2.  
Their distinction.  
on.  
Natural necessary, lib. 2. c. 6:  
Not natural.



Seneca.

humane; beasts know not what they are, only man is immoderate in his appetites: these are without limits, without end, and are nought else but confusion. *Desideria naturalia finita sunt, ex falsa opinione nascentia, ubi desinant non habent. Nullus enim terminus falso est: via eunti aliquid extremum est, error immensus est.* Natural desires have their bounds, but those which grow of a false opinion are without end: For in that which is false, there is no limit: he that travelleth in his right way, comes to an end of his journey; but he that is out of his way, knows not whither he wanders. And therefore living according to these; there is no man can be rich and contented. Of these it is properly that we have spoken in the beginning of this Chapter, and that we farther intend in this matter of the passions: It is for these that a man sweats, and travels, *Ad supervacua sudatur*, that a man journeyeth by Sea and by Land, goeth to War, kills himself, drowns, betrays, loseth himself: and therefore it was well said, That concupiscence is the root of all evil. Now it falleth out many times (a just punishment) that when a man seeketh how to satisfy his desires, and to glut himself with the goods and pleasures of Fortune, he loseth and is deprived of those of Nature: and therefore *Diogenes* having refused that money that *Alexander* offered him, desired him to give him that he had taken from him, to go out of the Sun.

## CHAP. XXIV.

## Hope, Despair.

Our desires and concupiscences gather heat, and redouble their force, by hope, which inflameth with the soft and gentle air thereof our foolish desires, kindleth in our minds a fire, from whence ariseth a thick smoak, which blindeth our understanding, carrieth with it our thoughts, holds them hanging in the clouds, makes us dream waking. So long as our hopes endure, our desires endure with them. It is a play-game, wherewith Nature busieth our minds. Contrariwise, when despair is once lodged near us, it tormenteth our souls in such a sort, with an opinion of never obtaining that we desire, that all business besides must yield unto it. And for the love of that which we think never to obtain, we lose even the rest of whatsoever we possess. This passion is like unto little children, who to be revenged of him that hath taken one of their play-games from them, cast the rest into the fire. It is angry

gry with himself; and requireth of it self the punishment of its own folly and infelicity. After those passions that respect the apparent good, come we to those that respect the evil.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Choler.

**C**Holer is a foolish passion, which putteth us wholly out of our selves, and with seeking the means to withstand and beat back the evil which it threatneth us, or hath already procured us, maketh the blood to boil in our hearts, and stirreth up furious vapours in our spirits, which blind us and cast us headlong to whatsoever may satisfie the desire which we have of revenge: It is a short fury, a way to madness: by the prompt and ready impetuosity and violence thereof, it carrieth and surmounteth all passions. *Repentina & vis universa ejus est: Sudden and violent is the force thereof.*

1.  
The description

The causes that dispose and move unto choler, are first, Weakness of spirit, as we see by experience in Women, old men, infants, sick men, who are commonly more cholerick then others. *Invalidum omne naturæ querulum est: All weak things are full of complaint.* A man deceiveth himself, to think that there is courage where there is violence: violent motions are like the endeavours of children and old men, who run when they think to go: for there is nothing more weak then an immoderate motion, and a great imbecillity is it in a man to be cholerick. Secondly, the malady of the mind, whereby it is made over-tender to bear blows, as the ulcerate parts of the body, where the sound being interested therein, are astonished and wounded with light matters. *Nusquam sine querela agra tanguntur: Sore things are never touched without complaint.* The loss of a penny, or the omission of gain puts into choler a covetous man; a laughter or glance of his wife, stirs this passion in a jealous man. Thirdly, lust, vain niceness, self-love, which makes a man anxious and angry, puts him into choler for the least cause that may be. *Nulla res magis iracundiam alit, quàm luxuria: Nothing doth more nourish anger then luxury.* This love of trifles, of a glass, a dog, a bird, is a kind of folly that troubleth us much, and stirs up this cholerick passion in us. Fourthly, too much curiosity; *quis nimis inquirat, seipsum inquietat: He that searcheth too much, disquieteth himself.* This is to seek occasions, and out of the lightness of the

2.  
The cause thereof.

1.

2.

3.

4.



the heart to cast a man into choler, not attending any cause thereof, *Sæpe ad nos ira venit, sæpius nos ad illam: anger often cometh unto us, we oftner to it.* Fifthly, lightness in believing what comes first to the ear. But the principal and former cause is, an opinion of contempt and misusage, either by word, deed, countenance. These are the reasons whereby we pretend to justify our choler.

3.  
The signs.

The signs and symptoms are very manifest, and more then of any other passion; and so strange, that they alter and change the whole estate of man, they transform and disfigure him. *Ut sit difficile utrum magis detestabile vitium, aut deforme: So that it is difficult to know, whether it be a more detestable or deformed vice.* Some of them are outward, the face red and deformed, the eyes fiery, the looks furious, the ear deaf, the mouth foaming, the heart panting, the pulse beating, the veins swollen, the tongue stammering, the teeth gnashing, the voice loud and hoarse, the speech imperfect, and to be brief, it puts the whole body into a fire and fever. Some have broken their veins, suppress their urine, whereby present death hath ensued. What then can the estate of the spirit be within, when it causeth so great a disorder without? Choler at the first blow driveth away and banisheth reason and judgment, to the end it may wholly possess the place; afterwards it fills all with fire, and smokes, darkness, and noise; like unto him that puts the Master out of the house, and then sets fire and burns himself alive within; or like unto a ship, that hath neither stern nor Pilot, nor sails, nor oars, which commits its fortune to the mercy of the waves, winds, and tempests, in the midst of a furious sea.

4.  
The effects.

The effects thereof are great, many times miserable and lamentable. Choler first enforceth us to injustice, for it is kindled and sharpened by a just opposition, and by the knowledge that a man hath of the little reason he hath to be angry. He that is moved to anger, upon a false occasion, if a man yield him any good reason why he should not be angry, he is presently more incensed, even against the truth and innocence it self: *Pertinaciores nos facit iniquitas iræ; quasi argumentum sit iuste irascendi, graviter irasci.* The iniquity of anger doth make us more stubborn; as if it were an argument and proof of just anger, to be grievously angry. The example of Piso is very notable, and proves this true, who excelling otherwise in virtue (the history is very well known) being moved to choler, did unjustly put three to death, and by a subtle occasion caused them to be found guilty, onely because they acquitted one

as unguilty, whom he by his former sentence had condemned. It is likewise sharpened by silence and cold replies, as gathering thereby that it proceedeth out of a contempt both of him and his choler; which is proper unto Women, who many times are angry, to the end they may stir up that passion in another, and increase their choler even to fury, when they see that a man vouchsafeth not to nourish that humour in them, by chiding with them. So that *Choler* sheweth it self to be more savage than a beast, since neither by defence or excuse, nor by silence and patience without defence, it will not be won or pacified. The injustice thereof is likewise in this, that it will be both a judge and a party; that it will that all take part with it, and grows to defiance with as many as will seem to contradict it. Secondly, forasmuch as it is inconsiderate and heady, it casteth us headlong into great mischiefs, and sometimes even into those which we must flie, and do wish and would willingly procure another man. *Dat pœnas dum exigit, It is punished while it punisheth*, or far worse. The passion is fitly compared to great ruines, which burst themselves in pieces upon that which they fall, it pursueth with such violence the ill of another, that it heeds not the avoiding of its own, it intrappeth and intangleth us, makes us to speak and to do things shameful, uncomely, unworthy our selves. Lastly, it carrieth us so beyond our selves, that it makes us to do things scandalous, dangerous, and irrevocable, murders, poisonings, treasons, whereby follow great and too late repentances; witness *Alexander* the Great after he had slain *Clytus*: and therefore *Pythagoras* was wont to say, that the end of *Choler* was the beginning of repentance.

This passion feeds upon it self, flattereth and tickleth it self, with a perswasion that it hath reason, that it is just, excusing it self upon the malice and indiscretion of another; but the injustice of another cannot make that just, nor the loss that we receive by another make that profitable unto us: it is too rash and inconsiderate to do any thing that is good, it would cure an evil with an evil; for to yield the correction of an offence to *Choler*, is to correct a vice by it self. Reason which should have the command over us, needs no such officers as of their own heads execute Laws, not attending her ordinance; she would have all things done according to nature by measure, and therefore violence doth no ways besit it. But what, shall virtue see the insolency of vice and not be angry with it? shall the liberty thereof be so bridled as not to dare to be



be moved against the wicked? virtue desires no indecent liberty, it needs not turn its own strength against it self, nor that the wickedness of another should trouble it: a wise man must as well bear the vices of a wicked man without choler, as his prosperity without envy. He must endure the indiscretions of rash and inconsiderate men, with the self-same patience that Physicians do the injuries of mad men. There is no greater wisdom, nor more profitable in the World, then to endure the folly of another, for otherwise by not suffering it with patience, we make it our own. That which hath heretofore been spoken touching *Choler*, may likewise be spoken of these passions following, hatred, envy, revenge, which are made or formed *Cholers*.

Particular advisements and remedies against this evil, are *Lib. 3. cap. 31.*

## C H A P. XXVI.

*Hatred.*

**H**Atred is a stranger, which strangely and without reason troubleth us: and to say the truth, what is there in the World that tormenteth us more? By this passion we put our selves into the power of him that we hate, to afflict and vex us; the sight of him moveth our senses, the remembrance stirreth our spirits both waking and sleeping; yea, we never present him to our memories, but with despight and gnashing of teeth, which puts us besides our selves, and tears our own hearts; whereby we suffer in our selves, the punishment of that evil we wish unto another. He which hateth, is the patient; he that is hated, the agent: contrary to the sound of the words, the hater is in torment, the hated in ease. But what do we hate? Men, or their matters and affairs? Doubtless we hate nothing that we should: for if there be any thing to be hated in this World, it is hate it self, and such like passions, contrary to that which should command in us.

Particular considerations and remedies against this evil, are *Lib. 3. cap. 32.*

## C H A P. XXVII.

*Envy.*

**E**Nvy is a cousin-german to Hatred; a miserable passion, and outrageous beast, which in torment excelleth hell it self. It is a desire of that good that another possesseth, which gnaweth our heart,

heart, and turneth the good of another man to our own hurt. But how should it torment us, since it is as well against that which is ill, as that which is good? Whilest an envious man looketh obliquely upon the goods of another man, he loseth what is good in himself, or at leastwise takes no delight in it.

Particular advisements and remedies against this evil, are *Lib. 3. Cap. 33.*

CHAP. XXVIII.

*Jealousie.*

**J**ealousie is a passion like almost both in Nature and effect unto Envy, but that it seemeth that Envy considereth not what is good, but in as much as it is in the possession of another man, and that we desire it for our selves; and Jealousie concerneth our own proper good, whereof we fear another doth partake.

Jealousie is a weak maladie of the soul, absurd, vain, terrible, and tyrannical, it insinuateth it self under the title of amity, but after it hath gotten possession, upon the self-same foundation of love and good will, it buildeth an everlasting hate. Virtue, health, merit, reputation, are the incendiaries of this rage, or rather the fuel unto this fury.

It is likewise the Gall that corrupteth all the Hony of our life: it is commonly mingled with the sweetest and pleasantest actions, which it maketh so sharp and lower, as nothing more: it changeth love into hate, respect into disdain, assurance into diffidence: it ingendreth a pernicious curiosity and desire in a man to clear himself of that evil, which being past remedy, by too much stirring stinketh the more: For what doth he but publish, put out of all doubt, bring into the light, sound with a trumpet his own shame and misery, and the dishonour of his own children?

Particular considerations and remedies against this evil, are *Lib. 3. Cap. 35.*

CHAP. XXIX.

*Revenge.*

**T**he desire of revenge is first a cowardly and effeminate passion proceeding from a base, weak, and abject mind, which experience telleth us to be true; for we commonly see the weakest minds



minds the most malicious and revengeful, as women and children. The valiant and generous mind doth little feel this passion, but contemneth and disdaineth it, either because the injury toucheth him not, or because he that offereth the injury toucheth him not, or because he that offereth the injury is not worthy his revenge, as not daigning so far to debase himself: *Indignus Caesaris ira, Unworthy the anger of Caesar.* The hail, thunder, and tempests, and those fearful motions that are in the air, do neither trouble nor touch the superiour celestial-bodies, but only the weak and inferiour: and even so the indiscretions and childish brawls of fools wound not great and high minds. All the great men of the world, *Alexander, Caesar, Epaminondas, Scipio*; have been so far from revenge, that quite contrary they have done good unto their enemies.

2.  
Biting.

Secondly, it is a boyling and biting passion, and like a worm it gnaweth the hearts of those that are infected with it, it molesteth them by day, and by night keeps them awake.

3.  
Unjust.

It is likewise full of injustice, for it tormenteth the innocent, and addeth affliction. It is to make the party offending, to feel that evil and punishment, which the desire of revenge giveth to a mans heart; and the party offended goes to lay on the burthen, as if he had not already hurt enough by the injury received, in such sort, that many times and ordinarily, whilest he tormenteth himself to seek means of revenge, he that hath committed the offence laughs and makes himself merry with it. But it is also far more unjust in the means of the execution, which many times is wrought by treasons and villainous practices.

4.  
Dangerous.

Lastly, the execution is not only painful, but dangerous too; for experience telleth us, that he that seeks to be revenged doth not that which he would, and what his blow intendeth, but commonly that which he would not, comes to pass, and thinking to put out the eye of his enemy, he putteth out both his own. The fear of justice tormenteth him, and the care to hide those that love him.

5.  
To kill is not to  
revenge.

Again, to kill and to make an end of his enemy, is not revenge, but meer cruelty, which proceedeth from cowardlinefs and fear. To be revenged, is to beat his enemy, to make him stoop, not to kill him; for by killing he feels not the power of his wrath, which is the end of revenge. And this is the reason why a man cares not to be revenged upon a dog or a beast, because he can no way taste or conceit his revenge. In true revenge there must be a

kind

kind of pleasure and delight in the revenger: and he upon whom he is revenged, must feel the weight of his displeasure, suffer pain, and repent him of the cause, which being kild he cannot do; yea, he is rather freed thereby from all misery; and contrariwise, he that is the revenger, endureth many times that torment and fear which he wisheth to his enemy. To kill then is a token of cowardliness and fear, lest his enemy feeling the force of his revenge, should live to requite him with the like; which though it make an end of the quarrel, yet it woundeth his reputation; it is a trick of precaution, and not of courage: and is the way to proceed safely, but not honourably. *Qui occidit longe, non ulciscitur, nec gloriam assequitur: He that killeth afar off, doth neither revenge, nor obtain renown.*

Particular advicements and remedies against this evil, are *Lib. 3. Cap. 34.*

## CHAP. XXX.

## Cruelty.

**C**Ruelty is a villanous and detestable vice, and against Nature, and therefore it is likewise called inhumanity. It proceedeth from weakness; *Omnis ex infirmitate feritas est: All cruelty proceedeth of infirmity.* And it is the daughter of cowardliness: for a valorous man doth always exercise his strength against a resisting enemy, whom he hath no sooner at his mercy, but he is satisfied, *Romana virtus, parcere subjectis, debellare superbos: The Roman virtue, was to spare the humble, and subdue the proud.* Forasmuch therefore as cowardly weakness cannot be of this rank, to the end it may yet get the name of Valour, it makes bloud and massacres the proof thereof. Murders in victories are commonly executed by common people, and the officers of the baggage. Tyrants are bloody, because they fear, not knowing how to secure themselves, but by rooting out those that may offend them; and therefore they exercise their cruelty against all, even women too, because they fear all; *Cuncta ferit, dum cuncta timet: He strikes all, because he fears all.* Cowardly dogs bite and tear with their teeth, within the house, the skins of those wild beasts, which in the open field they durst not look upon. What make civil wars so cruel, but that tie wherewith the common people are led and linked, who like dogs that are backt by their master, back one another? the Emperour



*Mauritius* being told that one *Phocas* a souldier should kill him, enquired what he was, and of what Nature and condition; being told by his son-in-law *Philip*, that he was a base coward: Why then, saith he, no marvel if he be a murderer and cruel. It proceedeth likewise from the inward malignity of the soul, which feedeth and delighteth it self with the hurt of another. Monsters like *Caligula*.

## CHAP. XXXI.

*Sadness, or heaviness of heart.*

1.  
*The description.*

**S**Adness, is a languishing feebleness of the spirit, and a kind of discouragement ingendred by the opinion that we have of the greatness of those evils that afflict us. It is a dangerous enemy to our rest, which presently weakneth and quellerh our souls, if we take not good heed, and taketh from us the use of reason and discourse, and the means whereby to provide for our affairs, and with time it rusteth and fenoweth the soul, it corrupteth the whole man, brings his virtues asleep, even then when he hath most need to keep them awaked, to withstand that evil which oppresseth them: but we must discover the foulness and folly, the pernicious effects, yea, the injustice that is in this cowardly, base, and feeble passion, to the end we may learn with all our might to fly and avoid it, as most unworthy the wisest men, according to the doctrine of the Stoicks; which is not so easy to be done, because it excuseth and covereth it self with many beautiful colours of Nature, Piety, Goodness, yea, the greatest part of the world it draws to honour and favour it, making it an ornament to wisdom, virtue, conscience.

2.  
*Not natural.  
Publick mournings.*

First then, it is so far from being natural (as it would make men believe) that it is formal, and an enemy to Nature, as may easily be proved. Touching ceremonious sorrows, and publick mournings, so much affected and practised in former times, and likewise at this present (my meaning is not to touch the honesty and moderation of obsequies and funerals, nor that sorrow that belongs to piety and religion) what greater imposture or deceitful couzenage can there be in any thing besides? How many feigned and artificial counterfeit couzenages are there, with no small cost and charges, both in those whom it concerneth, the authors of the sport, and those whose offices they make use of in that business? For to give the better

better credit to their juggling tricks, they hire people to lament and to send up their shriekings, cries, and lamentations, which all men know to be feigned and extorted for mony, tears that are not shed but to be seen, and so soon as they are out of sight, are dried up: where is it that Nature hath taught us this? Nay, what is there that Nature doth more abhor and condemn? It is a tyrannical, false and vulgar opinion (the worst, as hath been said, almost of all the passions) that teacheth us to weep, and lament in such a case. And if a man cannot find occasion of tears and an heavy countenance in himself, he must buy it at a dear price in another, in such sort that to satisfy this opinion, he must enter into a great charge, whereof Nature if we would credit it, would willingly discharge us. Is not this willingly and publickly to betray reason, to enforce and to corrupt Nature, to prostitute his own manhood, to mock both the world and himself, to satisfy the vulgar sort, which produce nothing but error, and account of nothing that is not counterfeit and disguised? Neither are those more particular sorrows natural, as it seems to many; for if they did proceed from Nature, they would be common to all men, and almost touch all men alike. Now we see that the self-same things that are causes of sorrow to some, give occasion of joy unto others, that one Province, one person laugheth, at that whereat another weepeth; that they that are conversant with those that lament, exhort them to resolution, and to quit themselves of their tears. Yea the greatest part of those that *Particular.* thus torment themselves, when you have talked with them, or that themselves have had the leisure but to discourse upon their own passions, they confess that it is but a folly thus to afflict themselves, and praise those who in the like adversities, have made head against Fortune, and with a manly and generous courage have withstood their afflictions. And it is certain, that men do not accommodate their mournings to their cause of sorrow, but the opinion of those with whom they live. And if a man mark them well, he shall find that it is opinion, which the more to annoy us presenteth the things unto us, which torment us either more than they should, or by anticipation, fear and prevention of that which is to come, sooner than they should.

But it is against Nature, in as much as it polluteth and defaceth whatsoever Nature hath made beautiful and amiable in us, which *3. Against Nature* is drowned by the force of this passion, as the beauty of a Pearl is dissolved in vinegar. We make our selves hereby spectacles of pity,



we go with our heads hanging, our eyes fastened on the earth, our mouths tongueless, our members immoveable, our eyes serve for no other use than to weep, that you may say we are nothing but sweating statues, turned (as the Poets feign) like *Niobe* into a stone by the power of this passion.

4.  
*Injust and im-  
pious.*

Now it is not only contrary and an enemy unto Nature, but God himself; for what other thing is it, but a rash and outrageous complaint against the Lord and common Law of the whole world, which hath made all things under the Moon changeable and corruptible? if we know this Law, why do we torment our selves? If we know it not, wherefore do we complain, but of our own ignorance, and that we know not that which Nature hath written in all the corners and creatures of the world? We are here not to give a law, but to receive it, and to follow that which we find establish'd: for to torment our selves by contradicting, doth but double our pain.

5.  
*Pernicious.*

Besides all this, it is pernicious and hurtful unto man, and by so much the more dangerous, because it killeth when we think it comforts, hurteth under the colour of doing good, under a false pretence of plucking the Iron out of the wound, it drives it to the heart; and the blows thereof are so much the more hardly avoided, and the enterprises broken, because it is a domestical enemy brought up with us, which we have engendred for our own punishment.

6.  
*Outwardly.*

Outwardly, by a deformed and new countenance wholly altered and counterfeited; it dishonoureth and defameth man. Do but consider when it entreth into us, it filleth us with shame, in such sort, that we dare not shew our selves in publick place, no not privately to our dearest Friends: and after we are once possessed of this passion, we do nothing but seek corners to hide our selves from the sight of men. What is this to say, but that it condemneth it self, and acknowledgeth how indecent it is? For it is for a woman that is taken in her wantoness to hide her self, and to fear to be known. Again, do but consider the vestments and habits of sorrow, how strange and effeminate they are; which sheweth, that it taketh away whatsoever is manly and generous in us, and puts upon us the countenances and infirmities of women: and therefore the *Thracians* adorned those men that mourned, like women. And some say, that sorrow makes men Eunuchs. The first and more manly and generous laws of the Romans forbade these effeminate lamentations, finding it an horrible thing, that men should so degenerate from

from their own Natures, and do things contrary to manhood; allowing only of those first tears which proceed from the first encounter of a fresh and new grief, which may fall even from the eyes of Philosophers themselves, who keep with their humanity, their dignity: and may fall from the eyes, virtue not falling from the heart.

Now it doth not only alter the visage, change and dishonestly disguise a man outwardly, but piercing even to the marrow of the bone, *Tristitia exsiccat ossa: Heaviness drieth the bones.* It weakneth likewise the soul, troubleth the peace thereof, makes a man unapt to good and honourable enterprises, taking away the taste, the desire, and the disposition to do any thing that is profitable either to himself or to another, and not only to do good, but to receive it. For even those good fortunes that light upon him displease him: every thing is tart unto his soul, as victuals to a corrupted stomach: and lastly, it maketh bitter our whole life, and poysoneth all our actions.

It is two-fold, great and extream, or at leastwise, though not great in it self, yet great when by reason of a sudden surpris and furious unexpected allarm it seizeth upon the heart of man, pierceth it through, depriveth him of motion and sense, like a stone, and not unlike that miserable Mother Niobe,

*Dirigit visu in medio, calor ossa relinquit,  
Labitur, & longo vix tandem tempore satur.  
She swounded at the half, all being too much,  
To see at once and live; her grief was such:  
She falls, she fluctuates, she resounds and breaks,  
And scarce at length, with much ado she speaks.*

And therefore the Painter diversly and by degrees presenting unto us the sorrow and miserable estate of the parents and friends of *Iphigenia* when she was sacrificed; when he came to her Father, he painted him with his face covered, as confessing his Art not sufficient to express in the visage a grief of that degree. Yea, sometimes a sorrow may be such, that it killeth out-right. The second degree is the indifferent sorrow, which though perhaps it may be greater than the former, yet in time it is lessened and eased, and is expressed by tears, sobs, sighs and lamentations: *Cura leves loquuntur, ingentes stupent; Light cares do speak, great confound.*

Particular adviselements and remedies against this evil, are *Lib. 3. cap. 29.*



## CHAP. XXXII.

## Compassion.

**W**E sigh with those that are afflicted, and with a fellow-like feeling pity their miseries, either because by a secret consent we participate on the other evils, or because we fear that in our selves, which hath happened to others. But this is done two ways, whereby there is likewise a two-fold compassion; The one good, when a man with a good will, not troubling or afflicting himself, not effeminating his own Nature, and without impeachment of equity or honour, doth freely and effectually succour those that are afflicted: this is that virtue so much commended in Religion, found in the holiest and wisest in the world: the other is a passion of a feeble mind, a sottish and feminine pity, which proceedeth from a delicate tenderness, a troubled spirit, proper to Women, Infants, and to cruel and malicious minds (which are consequently base and cowardly, as hath been proved in the Chapter of *Cruelty*) who pity the punishment of offenders, which produceth unjust effects; not respecting the depth and merit of the cause, but the present fortune, state, and condition.

Advise ments and remedies against this evil, you shall find, *Lib. 3. Cap. 30.*

## CHAP. XXXIII.

## Fear.

<sup>1.</sup>  
*The description.* **F**ear is the apprehension of an evil to come, which holdeth us in a continual care, and runs before those evils which fortune threatneth us.

We speak not here of that fear of God so much commended in Scripture, nor of that fear which proceedeth from love, and is a sweet respect towards the thing beloved, commendable in subjects and all inferiours towards their superiours; but of that vicious fear that troubleth and afflicteth, which is the seed of sin, the twin of shame, both of one womb, sprung from that close and curled marriage of the spirit of man with a diabolical perswasion. *Timeo eo quod nudus essem, & abscondi me: I fear, because I was naked, and therefore I hid my self.*

<sup>2.</sup>  
*The malice and tyranny thereof.* It is a deceitful and malicious passion, and hath no other power over us, but to mock and seduce us: it serves its turn with that which

which is to come, where though we seem to foresee much, we see nothing at all, and in that doubtful darkness it holdeth us, as in a dark place, as thieves do by night, to the end they may rob a man, and not be known, and give a great and sudden affright with a small number. And therefore it tormenteth us with masks and shews of evils, as men fear children with bug-bears; evils that have nothing but a simple appearance, and have nought in themselves whereby to hurt us, yea, are not evils, but that we think them so. It is the only apprehension which we have, which makes that evil to us, which is not so, and draweth evil even from our own good to afflict us withal. How many do we see every day, that with fear to become miserable, become that they fear, and turn their vain fear into certain miseries? how many have lost their Friends, by distrusting their Friends; have got diseases, by fearing them? One hath in such sort conceived an opinion, that his wife hath played false play with him, that for grief he languisheth; another hath in such sort apprehended such a conceit of poverty, that he falleth sick: and to be brief, some have died for fear to die. And even so may a man say almost of whatsoever we fear; for fear seemeth not to other end, then to make us find that which we fly from. Doubtless, fear is of all other evils the greatest and most tedious; for other evils are no longer evils then they continue, and the pain endureth no longer than the cause; but fear is of that which is, and that which is not, and that (perhaps) which never shall be, yea sometimes of that which cannot possibly be. Behold then a passion truly malicious and tyrannical, which draweth from an imaginary evil, true and bitter sorrows, and is over-greedy by thought and opinion, to overtake, nay, out-run them.

Fear doth not only fill us with evils, and many times by false appearances, but it likewise spoyleth all the good that we have, and all the pleasure of our life, as an enemy to our rest. A man can take no delight in the fruition of that good which he feareth to lose, life it self cannot be pleasant, if a man fear to die. Nothing good (saith an ancient Writer) can bring pleasure with it, but that against the loss whereof a man is always prepared.

It is also a strange passion, indiscreet, and inconsiderate, and proceeds as often from the want of judgment, as of heart: It ariseth from dangers, and many times casteth us into dangers; for it engendreth in us such an inconsiderate desire to get out, that it astonisheth, troubleth, and hindreth us from taking that order that is fit to

get

3.

4.



get out. It bringeth a violent kind of trouble, whereby the soul being affrighted, with-draweth it self into it self, and debateth with it self how to avoid that danger that is presented. Besides that great discouragement that it bringeth, it seizeth on us with such an astonishment, that we lose our judgment, and there is no longer reason or discourse in us, it maketh us to fly when no man pursueth, yea, many times our own friends and succourers: *Adeo pavor etiam auxilia formidat; Insomuch that fear dreadeth his own helps.* Many have run mad herewith, yea the senses themselves have hereby lost their use: we have our eyes open, and see not; one speaks to us, and we harken not unto him; we would fly, and we cannot go.

An indifferent fear puts wings to our heels; a great nails, fastens our feet and entangles them. Fear perverteth and corrupteth the entire man: both the spirit, *Pavor sapientiam omnem mihi ex animo expectorat; Fear depriveth my mind of all wisdom and understanding.* And the body,

*Obstupui, steteruntque comæ, vox faucibus hæsit.  
Cold sudden fear supplants his Natures heat,  
And lays him speechless, till his blood retreat.*

Sometimes it makes desperate, and therefore resolute, like that Roman Legion under the conduct of the Consul *Sempronius* against *Hannibal*, *Audacem fecerat ipse timor; Fear made him bold.* There are fears and affrightments without any apparent cause, and as it were by some celestial impulsion, which they call Panick terrors. *Terrores de celo, arescentibus hominibus præ timore; Terrors from heaven, men consuming away with fear:* such as once happened in the City of *Carthage*, and wherewith whole people and armies have been confounded.

Particular advisements and remedies against this evil, are *Lib. 3. Cap. 28.*

Luke 21.

The

## The second Consideration of Man, by comparing him with all other Creatures.

### CHAP. XXXIV.

**W**E have considered man wholly and simply in himself: Now let us consider him, by comparing him with other creatures, which is an excellent means to know him. This comparison hath a large extent, and many parts that bring much knowledge of importance, and very profitable, if it be well done. But who shall do it? shall man? He is a party, and to be suspected, and to say the truth, deals partially therein: which may be easily proved, because he keeps neither measure nor mediocrity. Sometimes he placeth himself far above all; he terms himself a Master, and disdaineth the rest; divides unto them their morsels, distributeth such a portion of faculties and powers unto them as shall seem good unto him. Sometimes, as it were in despight, he debateth himself beneath all; he murmureth, complaineth, wrongeth Nature as a cruel step-mother, makes himself the outcast and most miserable of the world. Now both these extremes are equally against reason, verity, modesty. But how would you have him to walk, uprightly and evenly with all other creatures, when he doth it not with man, his companion, nor with God himself, as shall be shewed? This comparison is also difficult to do: for how can a man know the inward and secret carriages of creatures, that which moveth within them? But yet let us do our endeavour to do it without passion.

First, the policy of the world is not so unequal, so deformed and irregular, neither is there so great a disproportion between the parts thereof, but that they are near neighbours, and touch one another, have a resemblance, some more, some less. So is there a great vicinity and kindred betwixt man and other creatures: they have many things alike and common to each other, and they have differences likewise, but not so far distant and unlike, but that they may hold together. Man is neither altogether above, nor beneath the rest. *All that is under heaven, saith the Wisdom of God, runs the same fortune.*

Let us first speak of those things that are common to all and almost

1.  
*A profitable  
and difficult  
comparison,  
wherein man is  
suspected.*

*In the Chapter  
of presumption.*

2.

*Ecclesiast  
most*



*The second consideration of Man,*

3.  
Things common.  
Ecc. 4.

almost alike; which are, to engender, nourish; to do, move, live, die:  
*Idem interitus hominis & jumentorum, & aqua utriusque conditio:*  
As the death of men so of beasts, and condition of them both is alike.

1. Nakedness.  
cap. 5.

2. Swadling  
Clothes.

3. Crying.

4. Arms.

5. Eating.

6. Speech.

And this is against those that find themselves aggrieved, saying, That man is the most contemptible creature of Nature, abandoned, left naked upon the naked earth, without covert, without armour, bound, swaddled, without instruction of what is fit for him: whereas all other creatures are clothed and covered with shells, husks, hair, wooll, feathers, scales; armed with teeth, horns, talons, both to assail and to defend: taught to swim, to run, to lie, to sing, to seek their relief, and man knows neither how to go, nor to speak, nor to eat, nor any thing but cry, without an apprenticeship and much labour. All these complaints to him that considereth the first composition and Natural condition, are unjust and false; Our skin is as sufficiently proved against the injuries of times and seasons as theirs; witness many Nations (as hath been said) that never knew what garments meant: yea, those parts that we think good, we keep uncovered, yea the most tender and sensible, as the face, the hands, the stomach, and the delicatest Damsels their breasts. Bands and swadling clothes are not necessary, witness the *Lacedemonians*, and in these days the *Switzers*, *Almains*, which dwell in cold Countreys; the *Bisques* and vagabonds that are called *Egyptians*. Crying is likewise common unto beasts, all creatures almost complain and groan for a time, after they come into the world. As for armour, we want not that which is natural, and have more motion of our members, use their service more naturally and without instruction. If some beasts excel us in this, we in the same excel divers others. The use of eating is both in them and in us natural and without instruction. Who doubteth that an Infant being once able to feed himself, knows how to seek his sustenance? And the earth likewise bringeth forth and offereth enough unto him for his necessity, without either culture or art; witness so many Nations, which without labour, industry and care, live plentifully. As for speech, a man may well say, that if it be not natural, it is not necessary: but it is common to man with other creatures: What else but speech is that faculty we see in them, of complaining, rejoicing, of calling others to their succour, of making love? And as we speak by gestures and motion of the eyes, the head, the shoulders, the hands (herein deaf men are very cunning) so beasts, as we see in those that have no voice, who nevertheless do inter-

change

### *The second consideration of Man.*

change their mutual offices, and as in some kind of measure beasts understand us, so we them. They flatter us, threaten us, intreat us, and we them; we speak to them, and they to us, and if we perfectly understand not one another, where is the fault? In us or in them? That is not to be determined. They may as well account us beasts by that reason, as we them, yea they reproach us for that we our selves understand not one another. We understand not the *Bisques*, the *Britains*, and they all understand the one the other, not only of the same, but (which is more) of a diverse kind. By a certain barking of the dog, the horse knoweth that he is in choler, and by another voice he knoweth he is not.

Again, they have their intelligence with us. In the wars in the midst of the fight, Elephants, Dogs, Horses, understand with us they frame their motions according to the occasion they pursue, they make their stand, they retire, nay they have their pay, and divide the booty with us, as it hath been practised in the new conquest of the Indies. And these are those things that are common to all, and alike.

3.  
*Mutual intelligence.*

Let us now come to those differences and advantages that the one hath over the other. Man is singular and excellent in some things above other creatures, and in others, beasts have the superiority, to the end that all things might thereby be knit and inchained together, in this general policy of the world and Nature. The certain advantages or excellencies of man, are those great faculties of the soul; the subtilty, vivacity, and sufficiency of the spirit to invent, to judge, to chuse, speech to demand, and to offer, and to succour, the hand to execute that the spirit hath invented, either of it self, or learned from another. The form also of the body, the great diversity of the motion of the members, whereby his body doth him better service.

4.  
*Differences & advantages of man.*

The certain advantages that beasts have over men, and such as are past all doubt, are either general or particular. The general are health, and strength of body far more perfect, constant, and strong in them, among whom there are no blind, deaf, lame, mute, diseased, defective and ill-born, as amongst men. The *Sereno* hunts them not, they are not subject to rheumes, from whence proceed almost all other diseases; from which man though he cover his head with a hat and a house too, can hardly defend himself. Moderation in diet and other actions, innocency, safety, peace, and tranquillity of life, a plain and intire liberty without shame, fear,

5.  
*Of beasts general.*



*The second consideration of Man,*

I.  
*Particular.*

fear, or ceremony, in things natural and lawful, (for it is only man that hath cause to hide himself in these actions, and whose faults and imperfections offend others.) Exemption from so many vices and disorders, superstition, ambition, avarice, envy, yea mighty dreams trouble not them as they do men: not so many thoughts and phantasies. The particular advantages are the pure, high, healthful, pleasant ambition, and abode of birds in the air. Their sufficiency in some Arts, as the Swallow and other birds in building; the Spider in spinning and weaving; divers beasts in Physick; and the Nightringale in Musick. Marvellous effects and properties not to be imitated, no not imagined, as the property of the fish *Remora*, to stay the greatest vessels of the Sea; as we read of the chief galley of *Marcus Antonius*, and the self-same of *Caligula*; of the *Torpedo* or Cramp fish, to benum and dead the members of another, though not far distant, and not touching him; of the Hedgehog, to foresee the winds; of the Chameleon, to change his colours. Prognostications, as of birds in their passages from country to country, according to the diversity of the reasons; of all beasts that are dams, in knowing which of their young is the best; for some hap falling out, of defending them from danger, or conveying them to their nests, they always begin with that they know and foresee to be the best. In all these things man is far their inferior, and in some of them he hath no skill at all. A man may add unto this, if he will, the length of our lives, which in some beasts doth seven or eight times exceed the longest term of the life of man.

6.  
*Disputable advantages.*

I.  
*Reason.*

Those advantages that men pretend to have above beasts, but are yet disputable, and perhaps as well in beasts as men, are many: First the reasonable faculties, discourse, reasoning, discipline, judgement, prudence. There are here two things to be spoken, the one of the verity of the thing it self. It is a great question, whether beasts be deprived of all these spiritual faculties. The opinion that they are not deprived, but have them, is the more true and the more authentick. It is defended by many great Philosophers, especially by *Democritus*, *Anaxagoras*, the *Stoicks*, *Galen*, *Porphry*, *Plutarch*, and maintained by this reason. The composition of the brain, which is that part which the soul makes use of, and whereby it reasoneth, is all alike, as the same in beasts and men, confirming by experience. Beasts from particulars conclude generals; by the sight of one onely man, they know all men, they know how

*by comparing him with all other creatures.*

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how to joyn, and divide, and distinguish, the good from the ill, for the safeguard of their lives, liberty, and little ones. Yea, we read and see, if we would but mark and consider it, many things done by beasts, that do far excel the sufficiency, subtilty, and all the wit and cunning of the common sort of men; some of those that are best worth the noting, I will note unto you. The Fox being to pass over a river that is frozen with ice, applieth his ear unto the ice, to find whether he can hear any noise, and that the water do run under it, that thereby he may resolve either to go forward, or to retire back; of whom the *Thracians* have learned the same cunning, being to pass their frozen rivers. A Dog, to the end he may know which way of three, either his master, or that beast he hunteth is gone, having assured himself by scenting them, that he hath not passed by two of them, because he finds not the trace, without the setting of his nose to the ground, or farther traversing, he runneth mainly into the third. The Mule of the Philosopher *Thales* crossing a river with a sack of Salt on his back, and being plunged into the deep with his burthen, his salt dissolved in the water, and made his burthen the lighter; which the Mule (falling into the deep by chance) having found, being afterwards loaden with wool, used the same remedy, and sunk the more. *Plutarch* reporteth, that he saw a Dog in a Ship, casting stones into a pipe of oil, to make the oil to mount, that he might the better come at it. As much is reported of the Crows of *Barbary*, who by that means raise the water when it is too low, that they may drink. So likewise Elephants gather stones and sticks, and cast them into that ditch whereinto their companion is fallen, to help him to get out. The Oxen of the Kings gardens of *Suze*, being taught to go in a wheel just a hundred turns, to draw water, to water the gardens, they would never exceed that just number, and were never deceived in their account. All these things, how can they be done, without discourse and reason, addition and division? To say they know not this, were to deny that we see they do. What should we think of that dexterity that is in the Elephant, in plucking those darts and javelings forth of his body, with little or no pain at all? of the Dog that *Plutarch* speaketh of, which in a publick play upon a scaffold counterfeited death, drawing towards his end, trembling, afterwards growing stiff, and suffering himself to be carried forth, by little & little coming to himself, and lifting up his head counterfeited a new resurrection? of so many apish imitations and  
strange



strange tricks that the dogs of Players and Jugglers do ? of the policies and inventions wherewith beasts defend themselves against the assaults we make upon them ? of the husbandry and great providence of the Ant, in laying abroad his grain to dry, lest it take moisture and so corrupt ; in nipping the ends thereof, that it grow not ? of the policy of the Bee, where there is such diversity of offices and charges so firmly established.

7.  
An opposition of  
the natural in-  
stinct.

To beat down all this, some do maliciously attribute these things to a natural, servile, and forced inclination ; as if beasts did perform their actions by a natural necessity, like things inanimate, as the stone falleth downward, the fire mounteth upward. But besides that, that cannot be, nor enter into our imagination ; for there must be a numbring of the parts, comparison, discourse by addition and division, and consequents ; they likewise know not what this natural inclination and instinct is ; they be words which they abuse to small purpose, that they might not be deaf and mute altogether. Again, this saying is retorted against them : for it is beyond all comparison more noble, honourable, and resembleth more the Divinity to work by Nature than by Art and Apprentiship : to be led and directed by the hand of God, then by our own ; regularly to act by a natural and inevitable condition, then regularly by a rash and casual liberty.

By this objection of the natural instinct, they would likewise deprive them of instruction and discipline both active and passive, but experience gives them the lye ; for they do both receive it : witness the Pie, the Parrot, the Black-bird, the Dog, the Horse, as hath been said ; and they give it, witness the Nightingale, and above all other the Elephant, which excelleth all other beasts in docility, and all kind of discipline and sufficiency.

8.

As for this faculty of the spirit whereof man doth so much glory, which is to spiritualize things corporal and absent, robbing them of all accidents, to the end it might conceive them after its own manner : *Nam intellectum est intelligente ad modum intelligentis ; For that which is understood, is in him that understandeth, after the manner of the understander*, beasts themselves do the like. The Horse accustomed to the Wars, sleeping in his Stable, trembleth and groaneth, as if he were in the midst of the fight, conceiveth the sound of the Drum, the Trumpet, yea an Army it self. The Hare in sleep, panting, lifteth up her scut, shaking her legs, conceiveth a spiritual Hare. Dogs that are kept for guard, in their sleep do snarl, and

and sometimes break out-right, imagining a stranger to be come: To conclude this first point, we must confesse that beasts do reason, have the use of discourse and judgment, but more weakly and imperfectly then man; they are inferiour unto men in this, not because they have no part therein at all; they are inferiour unto men, as amongst men some are inferiour unto others; and even so amongst beasts there is such a difference: but yet there is a greater difference between men; for (as shall be said hereafter) there is a greater distance between a man and a man, then a man and a beast. But for all this, we must not hereby infer a kind of equality or parity betwixt a beast and a man (though, as *Aristotle* saith, there are some men so weak and blockish, that they differ from a beast only in figure) and that the soul of a beast is immortal, as that of a man; or the soul of a man mortal, as that of a beast: for these are but malicious illations. For, besides that in this reasoning faculty, a man hath a very great advantage above beasts, so hath the other faculties more high and wholly spiritual, whereby he is said to be like unto God himself, and is capable of immortality, wherein beasts have no part, and are signified by that understanding, which is more then a simple discourse, *Nolite fieri sicut equus & mulus, in quibus non est intellectus: Be not like horse or mule, in whom there is no understanding.*

9.  
The other point which we are to speak of in this matter is, that this preheminance and advantage of understanding, and other spiritual faculties that man pretendeth, is sold him at a dear rate, and brings with it more hurt then good: for it is the principal source of all those evils that oppress him; of vices, passions, maladies, irresolutions, trouble, despair, which beasts want, by the want of this great advantage: witness the Hog of *Pyrrho*, which did eat his meat peaceably in the ship, in the midst of a great tempest, when all the men were almost dead for fear. It seemeth that these great parts of the soul, have been denied unto beasts; or at least-wise lessened, and given them more feeble, for their great good and quiet, and bestowed upon man for his torment: for it is long of them that he toileth and travelleth, tormenteth himself with what is past, and that which is to come, yea he imagineth, apprehendeth, and feareth those evils that are not, nor ever shall be. Beasts apprehend nothing that is ill, until they feel it; and being escaped, they are presently in security and at peace. So that we see that man is most miserable even in that wherein he  
I thought



thought himself most happy : whereby it seemeth that it had been better for man, not to have been endued and adorned with all those beautiful and celestial arms, since he turneth them against himself, even to his own destruction. And to say the truth, we see those that are most stupid and feeble of spirit, live at best content, and feel not their evil accidents in so high a degree, as those that are more spiritual.

10.  
a. Signiory and  
command.

Gen. 1.

Another advantage that man pretendeth above beasts, is a signiory and power of commanding, which he thinketh he hath over beasts : but besides, that is an advantage that men themselves have, and exercise the one over the other, this is not true. For where is this command of man, this obedience of the beasts ? It is a monster that was never seen, yea men do more fear beasts, then beasts them. It is true, that man hath a great preeminence over beasts ; *Ut præsit piscibus maris, volatilibus cæli, bestiis terræ : That he might rule over the fish of the sea, the fowls of the air, and the beasts of the earth.* And this by reason of his beautiful and upright form, of his wisdom, and the prerogative of his spirit : but not that he should either command, or they obey.

11.  
8. Liberty.

There is likewise another advantage, near neighbour to this pretended by man, which is a plain liberty, reproaching beasts with their servitude, captivity, subjection : but this is to small purpose. There is far greater reason why man should reproach man ; witness those slaves, not only made by force, and such as descend from them, but also those that are voluntary, who either sell for money their liberty, or give it out of the lightness of their hearts, or for some commodity, as the ancient Fencers sold out-right Women to their Mistresses, Souldiers to their Captains. Now, there is none of all this in beasts, they never serve one another, nor yield themselves to any servitude either active or passive, either to serve, or to be served, and are in every thing more free then men. And as man goeth to the chase, taketh, killeth, eateth the beast ; so is he taken, killed, eaten by them in his turn, and honourably too, by main strength, not by wit and art, as man doth : and not only by them is he killed, but by his companion, by another man, a thing base and dishonourable. Beasts assemble not themselves in troops to go to kill, to destroy, to ransack, to intral another troop of their kind, as men do.

12.  
4. Virtue.

The fourth and greatest advantage pretended by man, is in virtue, but of moral it is disputable ( I mean moral materially by the out-

outward action: ) for formally the morality, good or evil, virtue and vice, cannot be in a beast. Kind acknowledgment, officious amity, fidelity, magnanimity, and many other virtues, which consist in society and conversation, are more lively, more express and constant, then can be in the common sort of people. *Hircanus* the dog of *Lyfimachus* continued upon the bed of his dead master, refusing all kind of sustenance, and afterwards cast himself into that fire wherein his master was burnt, and there dyed with him. The self-same did another belonging to one *Pyrrhus*. That dog of wife *Hesiodus* discovered the murder of his master. Another in like sort in the presence of King *Pyrrhus*, and his whole Army. Another which never ceased, as *Plutarch* affirmeth, going from City to City, until that sacrilegious Robber of the Temple of *Athens* was apprehended and brought to Judgment. That History is famous, of the Lion that was host and nurse to *Androdes* the slave, and his Physician, which would not touch him being cast out unto him: which *Appion* affirmeth to have seen at *Rome*. An Elephant having in choler killed his Governour, repenting himself of it, refused any longer to eat, drink, or live. Contrariwise, there is not a creature in the world more unjust, unthankful, traiterous, perfidious, lying, and deceitful, then man. Again, forasmuch as virtue consisteth in the moderation of our appetites, and the bridling of our pleasures, beasts are much more moderate therein then we, and do better contain themselves within the limits of Nature. For they are not only not touched with unnatural, superfluous, and artificial passions and desires, which are all vicious and infinite, as men, who for the most part are plunged in them, but also in the natural, as eating and drinking, the acquaintance betwixt the male and the female, they are far more moderate and stayed. But that we may see which is the more virtuous or vicious, *Humanity.* a man or a beast, and in good earnest to shame a man more then a *Cruelty.* beast, let us take the virtue most proper and agreeable unto man, that is, as the word it self importeth, humanity: as the most strange and contrary vice is cruelty. Now herein beasts have advantage enough, even to make men blush for shame. They never assail, and seldom offend those of their kind. *Major serpentum ferarumque concordia quam hominum:* Greater is the concord and agreement amongst Serpents and wild beasts, then amongst men. They never fight but for great and just causes, as the defence and preservation of their lives, liberty, and their little ones: and that they



they do with their natural and open arms, by their only force and valour, and that one to one, as in single combats, and not in troops, nor by designment. Their combats are short, and soon ended, until one of them be either wounded, or yieldeth; and the combat ended, the quarrel, hatred, and choler is likewise at an end. But man hath no quarrel but against man, for not only light, vain, and frivolous causes, but many times unjust, with artificial and traitorous arms, by deceits and wicked means, in troop and assembly gathered by assignment; and lastly, his wars are long, and never ended but with death; and when he is able no longer to hurt, yet the hatred and choler endureth.

12.  
*The conclusion  
of the second  
consideration.*

The conclusion of this comparison is, that untruly and vainly doth man glorifie himself above beasts. For if man have in him something more then they, as especially the vivacity of the spirit and understanding, and those great faculties of the soul, so likewise in exchange is he subject to a thousand evils from which the beasts are freed; inconstancy, irresolution, superstition, a painful care of things to come, ambition, avarice, envy, curiosity, detraction, lying, and a world of disordered appetites, discontentments, emulations. This spirit wherewith man maketh himself so merry, brings him a thousand inconveniences, and then most, when it is most stirred and enforced. For it doth not only hurt the body, trouble, break and weaken the bodily forces and functions, but also it hurts and hindereth it self. What casteth man into folly and madness, but the sharpness, agility, and proper force of the spirit? The most subtil follies and excellent lunacies proceed from the rarest and quickest agitations of the spirit, as from greatest amities spring greatest enmities, and from soundest healths mortal maladies: Melancholy men, saith *Plato*, as they are more capable of knowledge and wisdom, so likewise of folly. And he that well marketh it, shall find, that in those elevations and sales of a free soul, there is some mixture of folly; for to say the truth, these things are near neighbours.

13.  
*An exhortation.*

Touching a simple life, and such as is according to nature, beasts do far exceed men; they live more freely, securely, moderately, contentedly. And that man is wise that considereth hereof, and benefiteth himself by making them an instruction unto himself, which doing, he frameth himself to innocency, simplicity, liberty, and that natural sweetness which shineth in beasts, and is wholly altered and corrupted in us by our artificial inventions

tions, and unbridled licentiousness, abusing that wherein we say we excel them, which is the spirit and judgment. And therefore God doth many times send us to school to birds, beasts themselves, to the Kite, the Grasshopper, the Swallow, the Turtle, the Ant, the Ox, the Ass, and divers others. Lastly, we must remember that there is a kind of commerce betwixt beasts and us, a certain relation and mutual obligation, whereof there is no other reason, but that they belong to one and the same master, and are of the same family that we are. It is an unworthy thing to tyrannize over them, we owe justice unto men, and pity and gentleness to such other creatures as are capable thereof.

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The third Consideration of Man, which is  
by his life.

CHAP. XXXV.

*The estimation, brevity, description of the life of man, and  
the parts thereof.*

**I**T is a great and principal point of Wisdom, truly to know how to esteem of life, to hold and preserve it, to lose or to take it away, to keep and direct it, as much as after such a manner as is fit; there is not perhaps any thing wherein a man faileth more, or is more hindered. The vulgar unlearned sort account it a sovereign good, and preferreth it above all things; yea, he will not stick to redeem and prolong it by all the delays that may be, upon what conditions soever, thinking it can never be bought too dear: for it is all in all with him, his Motto is, *Vita nihil charius: Nothing is dearer than life.* He esteemeth and loveth his life for the love of it self: he lives not but to live. It is no marvel if he fail in all the rest, if he be wholly compounded of errors, since from his very entrance, and in this fundamental point he mistakes himself so grossly. It may be likewise with some less esteemed and more basely accounted of then it should, either by reason of some insufficiency in judgment, or a proud mis-knowledge thereof: for falling into the hands of those that are good and wise, it may be a profitable instrument both to themselves and others; and I cannot be of their opinion (as it is simply taken) that say it is best of all, not to be

<sup>I.</sup>  
*Of the estimation and worth  
of life.*



at all : and that the best is the shortest life : *Optimum non nasci, aut quam citissime aboleri* : The best thing is, not to be born, or presently to dye. And it is neither well nor wisely said, What hurt or what matter had it been, if I never had been ? A man may answer him with the like question : Where had that good been which is come, and being not come, had it not been evil not to have been ? It is a kind of evil that wanteth good, whatsoever it be, yea though not necessary : These extremities are too extream and vicious, though not equally : but that seems true that a wise man spake, That is such a good as a man would not take, if he knew well what it were before he took ; *Vitam nemo acciperet, si daretur scientibus* ; No man would accept of life, if he knew what it were. It is well that men are within before they see the entrance, and that they are carried hood-winkt into it. Now when they are within, some do cocker and flatter themselves therein, that upon what condition soever, they will not go forth again ; others do nothing but murmur and vex themselves : but the wiser sort seeing it to be a market that is made without themselves, ( for a man neither lives nor dyes when and how he will ) and that though the way be rough and hard, yet nevertheless it is not always so, without wining, or striving, and troubling any thing, they accommodate themselves unto it as they may, and so pass their life in quietness, making of necessity a virtue ; which is a token of wisdom and industry : and so doing, they live as long as they should, and not, like fools, as long as they can. For, there is a time to live, and a time to dye : and a good death is far better then an ill life. A wise man lives no longer, then that his life may be worth more then his death : for the longest life is not always the better.

See hereof lib.  
2. cap. 11.

2.  
Of the length  
and brevity of  
life.

All men do much complain of the brevity of the life of man : not only the simple vulgar sort, who wish it should never have end ; but also ( which is most strange ) the greatest and wisest make it the principal ground of their complaints. To say the truth, the greatest part thereof being diverted and otherwise employed, there remains little or nothing for it self : for the time of our infancy, old age, sleep, maladies of mind and body, and many other times, both unprofitable and unfit for any good, being taken away, that which remaineth, is little or nothing at all. Nevertheless, without oppoling the contrary opinion to them that hold a short life, to be a great good and gift of Nature, their complaint seemeth to have little equity and reason, and rather to proceed from malice. For,

to

to what end serveth a long life? Simply to live, to breathe, to eat, to drink, to see this world: for all this what needs so long time? We have seen, known, tasted, all in a short space; and knowing it, to desire so long a time to practise it, and still to reiterate the same thing, to what end is it? Who will not be satisfied, nay wearied, to do always one and the same thing? If it be not tedious and irksome, at the least it is superfluous: it is a turning Wheel where the same things come and go: it is always to begin where we end, and to re-spin the same Web. But perhaps they will say they desire a long life, to learn and to profit the more, and to proceed to a greater perfection of knowledge and virtue. Alas! good souls that we are, what should we know, or who should teach us? We employ but badly that little which is given us, not only in vanities, and those things that yield us no profit, but in malice and sin; and then we cry out and complain, that we have not enough given unto us. And to say the truth, to what end serves so great store of knowledge and experience, since in the end we must leave it and dislodge it; and having dislodged it altogether, forget and lose it all, or know it better and otherwise? But you will say, that there are beasts that do triple and quadruple the life of man. To omit those fables that are told thereof; be it so: but yet there are a number that live not a quarter of that time that man doth, and few neither, that live out their time. By what right, or reason, or privilege, can man challenge a longer life than other creatures? Is it because he doth better employ it in matters more high and more worthy life? By this reason, he should live less time than all other creatures; for there is none comparable to man, in the ill employments of his life, in wickedness, ingratitude, intemperance, and all manner of disorder and immodesty in manners, as hath been shewed before, in the comparison of man with beast: so that as I asked even now, to what end a long life served; now I ask what evils there would be in the world, if the life of man were long? What would he not enterprise, since the shortness of life, which cuts off his way, and (as they say) interrupts his cast; and the uncertainty thereof, which takes away all heart and courage, cannot stay him, living as if he should live ever? On the one side he feareth, perceiving himself to be mortal, but notwithstanding that, he cannot bridle himself from not coveting, hoping, enterprising, as if he were immortal. *Tanquam semper victuri vivitis, Seneca. nunquam vobis fragilitas vestra succurrit: omnia tanquam mor-*



Seneca.  
Look lib. 3.  
cap. 6.

*tales timetis, tanquam immortales concupiscitis.* Ye live as though ye were always to live; your frailty never comes into your mind: ye fear all things as mortal, but ye desire all things as immortal. And to say the truth, what need hath Nature of all these great and goodly enterprises and employments, whereby man challengeth a longer life then other creatures? Man therefore had no subject whereof to complain, but to be angry with himself. We have life enough, but we are not good husbands, we manage it not well; life is not short, but we make it so; we are not in want, but prodigal, *non inopes vitæ, sed prodigi*: we lose it, we dissipate it, we vilifie it, as if it were nought worth, as if we had more then enough: we all fall into one of these three faults, either we employ it ill, or about nothing, or in vain. *Magna vitæ pars elabitur malè agentibus, maxima nihil agentibus, tota aliud agentibus:* A great part of life is lost to those that do ill, a greater to those that do nothing, and all to those that do that they should not do. A man studieth not to live, but rather busieth himself in any other thing; he shall never know how to do a thing well, by acquitting himself of labour, but by care and attention. Others reserve their lives until they can live no longer, then take comfort in life, when there is nothing left but the lees and dregs thereof. Oh what folly, what misery is this! Yea there are some that have sooner ended, then begun to live, and life is past before they thought of it. *Quidam vivere incipiunt, cum desinendum; quidam autè desierunt, quàm inceperint.* Inter cetera mala, hoc quoque habet stultitia, semper incipit vivere. Some begin to live, when they should dye; some ended, before they begin; amongst other evils, folly hath this, that it always begins to live.

3.  
A description of  
the life of man. Our present life is but the entrance and end of a Tragedy, a perpetual issue of errors, a web of unhappy adventures, a pursuit of divers miseries chained together on all sides; there is nothing but evil that it distilleth, that it prepareth; one evil drives forward another evil, as one wave another; torment is ever present, and the shadow of what is good deceiveth us; blindness and want of sense possesseth the beginning of our life, the middle is ever in pain and travel, the end in sorrow; and beginning, middle, and end in error.

The life of man hath many discommodities and miseries common, ordinary and perpetual; it hath likewise some particular and distinct, according to the diversity of the parts, ages, and seasons; infancy,

infancy, youth, virility, old age ; every one have their proper and particular discommodities.

The greatest part of the world speak more honourably and favourably of old age, as the more wise, ripe, moderate ; accusing and shaming youth of a vicious, foolish, licentious life, but very unjustly : for in truth the infirmities and vices of old age are more in number, more great and troublesome than those of youth, it fills the mind more with wrinkles, than the visage ; and there is not a soul growing old, grows not slower and rotten. With the body the spirit is used, and the worse for the use, and at last returns to infancy again, *Bis pueri senes : Old men twice children.* Old age is a necessary and puissant malady, which loadeth us insensibly with many imperfections. It were absurd to term wisdom a difficulty of humours, an anxiety and distaste of things present, an impotency to do as in former times : Wisdom is too noble to be served with such officers. To wax old is not to wax wise, nor to take away vices, but to change them into worse. Old age condemneth pleasure, but it is because it cannot taste or relish it aright, like *Æsop's* dog, it saith it will none of it, but it is because it cannot joy in it : for old age leaveth not pleasure properly, but pleasure disdaineth old age ; for it is always wanton and sporting ; and it is no reason that impotency should corrupt judgment, which should in youth know vice in pleasure ; and, in old age, pleasure in vice. The vices of youth are temerity, indiscreet forwardness, and unbridled liberty, and over-greedy desire of pleasure, which are natural things proceeding from the heat of the blood and natural vigour, and therefore the more excusable ; but the vices of old age are far otherwise. The lighter are a vain and frail protervity, an envious prating, unsociable humours, superstition, care to get riches, even then when the use of them is lost ; a sottish avarice, and fear of death, which proceedeth properly, not from the want of spirit and courage, as they say, but because old men are long acquainted, and as it were cockered in this world ; whereby their affections are knit unto it, which is not in young men : but besides these they are envious, forward, unjust : but that which is most sottish and ridiculous in them, is that they would not only be revered, but feared, and therefore they put upon them an austere look and disdainful, thinking thereby to extort fear and obedience : but they are therein much deceived, for this stately and furious gesture is received of youth with mockery and laughter, being practised only to blind their eyes, and

5.  
A comparison  
betwixt youth  
and old age.



and of purpose to hide and disguise the truth of things. There are in old age so many faults on the one side, and so many impotencies on the other, and therefore so fit for contempt, that the best way to compass their desires, is love and affection : for command and fear are no longer fit arms for them. It ill befits them to make themselves to be feared : and though they could do it, yet love and honour is a fairer purchase.

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**The fourth Consideration of Man, moral, by his Manners, Humours, Conditions, very lively and notable.**

**THE PREFACE.**

1. **A**LL the descriptions, the wise and such as have taken greatest pains in the study of humane knowledge, have given unto men, seem all to note in man four things : *Vanity, Weakness, Inconstancy, Misery* ; calling him the spoil of times, the play-game of Fortune, the image of inconstancy, the example and spectacle of infirmity, the ballance of envy and misery, a dream, a phantasia, ashes, a vapour, a morning-dew, a flower that presently fadeth and withereth, a wind, grass, a bladder, or bubble, a shadow, leaves of trees carried with the wind, unclean seed in his beginning, a sponge of ordures, a sack of miseries in his middle age, a stench, a meat for worms in his end ; and to conclide, the most miserable and wretched thing in the world. *Job*, one of the most sufficient in this matter, as well in the practice and contemplation thereof, hath well and at large described him, and after him, *Solomon*, in their books. To be short, *Pliny* seemeth very properly to have deciphered him, in calling him the most miserable, and yet the most arrogant creature in the world. *Solum ut certum sit nihil esse certi, nec miserius quicquam homine aut superbius : That it is only certain, that there is nothing certain, neither any thing more proud, and miserable then man.* By the first word ( miserable ) he comprehendeth all those former descriptions, and as much as well the rest have said ; but by the other ( the most proud ) he toucheth another chief point very important : and he seemeth in these two words to have uttered whatsoever can be said. These are those  
two

two things, that seem to hurt and hinder one the other, Misery and Pride, Vanity and Presumption. See then how strange and monstrous a patch-coat man is.

Forasmuch as man is composed of two diverse parts, the soul and the body, it is a matter of difficulty well to describe him entire, in his perfection and declining state. Some refer unto the body whatsoever ill can be spoken of man; they make him an excellent creature, and, in regard of his spirit, extol himself above all other creatures; but, on the other side, whatsoever is ill, either in man, or in the whole world, is forgot and proceedeth from the spirit of man, and in it there is far more vanity, inconstancy, misery, presumption, then in the body, wherein there is little matter of reproach in respect of the spirit, and therefore *Democritus* calleth it a world of hidden miseries, and *Plutarch* proveth it in a book written of that subject. Now let us consider man more according to the life, then heretofore we have done, and pinch him where it itcheth not, referring all to these five heads, *Vanity*, *Weakness*, *Inconstancy*, *Misery*, and *Presumption*, which are his more natural and universal qualities, but the two latter touch him more nearly. Again, there are some things common to many of these five, which a man knows not to which to attribute it, and especially, imbecillity and misery.

CHAP. XXXVI.

I. *Vanity*.

**V**Anity is the most essential and proper quality of humane Nature. There is nothing so much in man, be it malice, infelicity, inconstancy, irresolution (and of all these there is always abundance) as base feebleness, sottishness, and ridiculous vanity: and therefore *Democritus* met better with it, with a kind of disdain of humane condition, mocking and laughing at it, then *Heraclitus*, that wept and tormented himself, whereby he gave some testimony, that he made some account thereof; and *Diogenes* who scorned it, then *Timon* that hater and flyer of the company of men. *Pindarus* hath expressed it more to the life then any other, by the two vainest things in the world, calling it the dream of a shadow, *οἷός τις ὄναρ ἀνθρώπων*.

This is that, that both wrought in the wisest so great a contempt of man, that hearing of some great designment and honourable enterprise,



enterprise, and judging it such, were wont nevertheless to say, that the World was not worthy a mans labour and pains, (so answered *Statilius* to *Brutus*, talking with him about the conspiracy against *Cæsar*) and that a wise man should do nothing but for himself, for it is not reason that wise men, and wisdom should put themselves in danger for fools.

2.  
*Thoughts.*

This vanity is shewed and expressed many ways, and after a diverse manner; first in our thoughts and private imaginations, which are many times more than vain, frivolous, and ridiculous, wherein nevertheless we spend much time, and yet perceive it not. We enter into them, we dwell in them, and we come forth again insensibly, which is a double vanity, and great forgetfulness of our selves. One walking in a Hall, considereth how he may frame his paces after a certain fashion upon the boards of the floor: another discourseth in his mind, with much time and great attention, how he should carry himself if he were a King, a Pope, or some other thing, that he is assured can never come to pass; and so he feedeth himself with wind, yea less than wind, that neither is, nor ever shall be. Another dreameth how he shall compose his body, his countenances, his gestures, his speech after an affected fashion, and pleaseth himself therein, as with a thing that wonderfully becomes him, and that every man should take delight in. But what a vanity and sottish weakness in our desires is this, that brings forth beliefs and hopes far more vain? And all this falleth out, not only when we have nothing to do, when we are swallowed up with idleness, but many times in the midst of our most necessary affairs: so natural and powerful is vanity, that it robbeth and plucketh out of our hand the truth, solidity, and substance of things, and fills us with wind, yea with nothing.

3.  
*Care for time  
to come.*

Another more sottish vanity, is a troublesome care of what shall here fall out when we are dead. We extend our desires and affections beyond our selves, and our being; we would provide that something should be done unto us, when we know not what is done unto us; we desire to be praised after our death: what greater vanity? It is not ambition, as it seemeth, and a man may think it, for that is the desire of a sensible and perceptible honour: if this praise of our selves when we are gone, might any way profit either our children, our parents, or our friends that survive us, it were well, there were some benefit, though not to our selves; but to desire that as a good, which shall no way touch us, nor benefit

nefit others, is a meer vanity, like that of those who fear their wives will marry after their departure ; and therefore they desire them with great passion to continue unmarried, and bind them by their wills so to do, leaving unto them a great part of their goods upon that condition. This is a vanity, and many times injustice. It was contrariwise a commendable thing in those great men in times past, which, dying, exhorted their wives to marry speedily for the better increase of the Common-wealth. Others ordain, that for the love of them, and for their sakes, a friend keep such and such a thing, or that he do this or that unto their dead bodies, which rather sheweth their vanity, then doth any good to soul or body.

See here another vanity, we live not but by relation unto another ; we take not so much care what we are in our selves in effect and truth, as what we are in the publick knowledge of men ; in such sort, that we do many times deceive and deprive our selves of our own goods and commodities, and torment our selves, to frame our outward appearances to the common opinion. This is true, not only in outward things, and such as belong to the body, and the expence and charge of our means, but also in the goods of the spirit, which seem unto us to be without fruit, if others enjoy them not, and they be not produced to the view and approbation of strangers.

Our vanity is not only in our simple thoughts, desires, and discourses, but it likewise troubleth, shaketh, and tormenteth both soul and body. Many times men trouble and torment themselves, more for light occasions and matters of no moment, then for the greatest and most important affairs that are. Our soul is many times troubled with small phantasies, dreams, shadows, fooleries, without body, without subject, it is intangled and molested with choler, hatred, sorrow, joy, building castles in *Spain*. The remembrance of a farewell of some particular grace or action, afflicteth us more then a whole discourse of a matter of greater importance. The sound of names and certain words pronounced with a pitiful voice, yea with sighs and exclamations, pierceth even to the quick, as Orators and Players, and others that sell wind and smoak, do well know and practise. And this wind catcheth and carrieth away many times men that are most constant and settled, if they stand not upon their guard : so puissant is vanity over men. And not only light and little things do shake and trouble

4.

5.  
Agitations of  
the Spirit.



trouble us, but also lies and impostures, even those we know to be such (a strange thing) in such sort, that we take pleasure to deceive our selves in good earnest, to feed our phantasies with tales, with nothing. *Ad fallendum nosmetipsos ingeniosissimi sumus : We are wise to deceive our selves ;* witness they that weep and afflict themselves hearing a relation, or seeing a Tragedy, which they know to be an invention made for delight, even of those things that never were. I could tell you of one that was so besotted, that he died for one whom he knew to be foul, old, deformed, not because he loved her, but because she was well painted, and plaistered or coloured with other impostures, though he always knew them to be such.

6. *Visitations and offices of courtesy.* Let us come from the particular vanity of every particular man in his common life, to see how much this vanity is tyed to the nature of man, not only as a private and personal vice. What vanity and loss of time is there in those visitations, salutations, congies, and mutual entertainments, those offices of courtesy, orations, ceremonies, offers, praises, promises ? How many hyperbolical speeches, hypocrisies, and impostures are there in the sight and knowledge of all, both of those that give them, that receive them, that hear of them ! inasmuch that it seemeth to be a match and market made together, to mock, lye, and deceive one another. And that which is worth all the rest, he that knows that a man doth impudently lye unto him, must yet give him thanks ; and he that knows that when he lyes he is not believed, sets a bold face upon the matter, attending and observing one the other, who shall first begin and end ; when they could both be content they were both asunder. What inconveniences doth man endure ? He feigneth, counterfeiteth, disguiseth himself ; he endureth heat, cold, troubleth his rest, afflicteth his life for those courtly vanities, and leaveth his weighty affairs for the wind. We are vain at the charge of our own ease, yea of our health and of our life. The accidents and the lighter things trample under foot the substance, and the wind carrieth the body, so much is man a slave to vanity : and he that will do otherwise, shall be held for a fool, and a man that understands not the world. It is dexterity well to play this Comedy, and folly, not to be vain. Being entred into speech and familiar discourse, how many vain and unprofitable, false, fabulous tales are there (not to say wicked and pernicious, which are not of this count) how many vaunts and vain boastings ! Man desireth and delighteth

delighteth to speak of himself, and that which is his, and if he think he have either done, or said, or possess any thing that is worthy estimation, he is not at ease until he hath uttered it, and made it known unto others : when a commodity first cometh, he entrencheth into an account thereof, he valueth it, he raiseth the price, nay he will not seem to attend his commodity, though he seek it with industry ; and then to hear what the speech of the people is abroad, he thrusts himself into company, and it tickleth him at the heart to hear his happy success spoken of, and that men esteem of him the more, and of what he esteems.

But better to make known what credit and command this vanity hath over the nature of man, let us call to mind that the greatest alterations of the world, the most general and fearful agitations of States and Empires, Armies, Battels, Murthers have risen from light, ridiculous and vain causes, witness the Wars of Troy and Greece, of Silla and Marius, Caesar and Pompey, Augustus and Anthony. The Poets signify as much, when they set all Greece and Asia on fire for an Apple. The first occasions and motives arise of nothing, afterwards they grow and increase : a testimony of the vanity and folly of man. Many times the accident doth more then the principal, the lesser circumstances touch more to the quick then the greatest, nay the causes and subjects themselves. The Robe of Caesar troubled Rome more then his death did, or those two and twenty stabs with a Poinard that were given him.

7.  
Publick and  
universal agi-  
tations.

Lastly, the crown and perfection of the vanity of man is shewed, in that which he most affecteth and seeks after ; he pleaseth himself, and placeth his whole felicity in those vain and frivolous goods, without which he may well and commodiously live, and takes not that care that he should for the true and essential : his chance is wind, his whole good nothing but opinion and dreams, wherein he is matchless. God hath all good things in essence, all evil in understanding ; man quite contrary possesseth his good things by phantasie, his evil in essence. Beasts content not, nor feed themselves with opinions and phantasies, but with that which is present, palpable, and in verity. Vanity hath been given unto man, as his proper part and condition ; he returns, he stirs, he hunts up and down, he catcheth a shadow, he adoreth the wind, he flies, he dyes, and a moat at the last is the hire of his days work ; *Vanitati creatura subiecta est etiam nolens, universa vanitas omnis homo*

8.  
Felicity and  
contentment,



*homo vivens* : Every creature is subject to vanity, even against his will, and all men living are but vanity.

## CHAP. XXXVII.

## Debility or Infirmitie.

1. **B**Ehold here the second head of this Consideration and humane knowledge : for how should vanity be other then frail and feeble ? This weaknes is confessed, and proved by all that account many things easie to be understood of all, but is not taken to be such in those things it should, as in such wherein a man seemeth to be most strong, and least weak ; in desiring, possessing, and using those things that he hath and holdeth, and in every good and evil ; and to be short, in such wherein he glorieth most, wherein he thinketh to excel others, and to be something. These are the true testimonies of his weaknes : but we shall see this better apart.

2. *In desiring and chusing.* First, touching desire, a man cannot settle his contentment in any thing, no not his own desire and imagination. It is not in our power to chuse what we should ; and whatsoever we have desired or obtained, it satisfies us not : but we go bleating after things unknown and to come, because things present content us not, and we more esteem of things absent. If one should put a man to his own choice, make him his own carver, it is not in his power so to chuse, as that he repent not his choice, or which he will not add unto, or take from, or alter some way or other ; for he desires that which he knows not how to expresse : and at the last nothing can content him, but he is angry, and falleth out with himself.

3. *In passing and using.* The weaknes of man doth more appear, and is greater in the possession and use of things, and that divers ways : first, in that he cannot make use of any thing in its own purity and simple nature ; but he must disguise, alter, and corrupt them, before he can accommodate them to his use : the elements, metals, and all things else in their own nature are not fit for use. Good things, delights, and pleasures cannot be enjoyed without some mixture of evil and discommodity ; *Medio de fonte leporum surgit amari aliquid, quod in ipsis floribus angat* : Even from amidst the fountains of delights do arise always some bitterness, which even in the height of pleasure do annoy. The highest pleasure that is, hath a sigh and a complaint to accompany it ; and being come to perfection, is but debility, a dejection

dejection of the mind, languishment. And extreme and full contentment hath more moderate severity, then wanton delight: *Ipsa felicitas, se nisi temperat, premit: Felicity it self, unless it temper it self, vexeth.* And therefore it was well said of him, that God sells unto us whatsoever good thing he sends us: that is to say, That he giveth nothing unto us purely good, but that we buy it at the scales with an addition of some evil to make up weight. So likewise sorrow is never pure, without the alliance of some pleasure; *Labor voluptasque dissimillima natura, societate quadam naturali inter se sunt juncta; est quadam flere voluptas: Labour and pleasure, though in Nature most unlike, yet by a certain natural society, they are linked together, so that even to weep is a certain delight.* So all things in this world are mingled and compounded with their contraries: those motions and wrinkles in the visage that serve to laugh, serve to weep, as Painters teach us: and we see that the extremity of laughter is mingled with tears. There is no good thing in us, that hath not some vicious tincture with it: *Omnes justitiæ nostræ sunt tanquam pannus menstruæ: All our righteousness is as a menstruous cloth,* as anon shall be shewed in his due place; nor no evil without some good: *Nullum sine auctoramento malum est: There is no sin without punishment.* Misery it self always serves to some end: for there is no evil without good, no good in man without evil: all is mingled, and there is nothing pure in our hands. Secondly, whatsoever happeneth unto us, we take and enjoy with an ill hand; our taste is unresolved and uncertain, it knows not how to hold and possess any thing after a good manner: and from thence sprang that undetermined question of the sovereign good. The better things many times in our hands, by our infirmities, vice, insufficiency, are made worse, are corrupted, become nothing, are unprofitable unto us, yea sometimes hurtful and contrary.

But humane imbecillity is more richly displayed in good and evil, in virtue and vice: hence it is, that man cannot be, when it seems good unto himself, either wholly good, or wholly wicked, but he hath his weakness, his impotencies in them both. Touching virtue, three points are to be considered: the first is, that it is not in the power of man to do all good, to put in practice all virtue; insomuch that many virtues are incompatible, and cannot be all together, at least in one and the same subject, as filial or maidenly continency and vidual, which are wholly different; the married and unmarried estate; the two second of widow-hood & marriage, being



Tertul.

being more painful and busie, and having more difficulty and virtue than the two first, of virginity and the unmarried estate, which have more purity, grace and ease: *Virgo felicior, vidua laboriosior: in illa gratia, in ista virtus coronatur: the Virgin is the happier, the Widow the more painful, in the former grace, in the latter virtue is crowned.* That constancy which is in poverty, want, adversity, and that which is in abundance and prosperity: patience in beggary and liberality. And this is more true in vices, which are opposite one against the other.

3.

The second point is, That many times a man cannot perform that, which belongs to one virtue, without the scandal and offence either of another virtue, or of it self; insomuch that they hinder one the other: whereby it comes to pass, that a man cannot satisfie the one, but at the charge of the other; which we must not attribute unto virtue, or think that the virtues cross and contrary one another; for they agree well enough; but unto the weakness of our humane condition, all the sufficiency and industry thereof being so short and so feeble, that it cannot find any certain universal and constant rule, whereby to make an honest man: and such order cannot be taken, but that the means to do well, do many times hinder one the other. Let us take for example, Charity and Justice; If I encounter my father or my friend in the wars, on the enemies part, in justice I ought to kill him, but in charity I should spare and save him. If a man be wounded to death and past all remedy, and there remained nothing but a grievous languishing, it were a deed of charity to make an end of him, as he did that killed *Saul* at his earnest entreaty; but this charity is punished by justice, as he was by *David*, and that justly, *David* being the minister of publick justice, not private charity: yea to be found neer unto a man in such a case, in a suspicious place, and where there is doubt of the murderer, although he be there to perform some office of humanity, is very dangerous; and the best thing that can happen unto him, is to be called into question, and put to answer to that accident, whereof he is innocent; So that we see that justice doth not only offend charity, but it hampereth and hindereth it self: and therefore it was very well said, and truly, *Summum jus, summa injuria: Extreme right, extreme wrong.*

4.

The third point and the most notable is, that a man is constrained many times to use bad means for the better avoidance of some great evil, or the execution of what is good, in such sort that he must  
some,

sometimes approve as lawful, not only those things that are not good, but that are stark naught; as if to be good, it were necessary to be somewhat wicked. And this is seen in every thing, in *Policy*, *Justice*, *Verity*, *Religion*.

In *Policy*, how many evils are there permitted, and publicly acted, not only by connivance or permission, but also by the approbation of the laws themselves? as shall hereafter be said in his due place; *Ex Senatusconsultis & plebiscitis scelera exercentur: Crimes are committed by the decrees of the Senate, and approbations of the people.* To disburden a State or Common-wealth, either of too great a number of people, or of such as are inflamed with a desire of wars, which the state, like a body replete with bad or abundant humours, cannot bear, it is the manner to send them elsewhere, and to ease themselves at the charge or disease of another. As the *French*, *Lombards*, *Goths*, *Vandals*, *Tartarians*, *Turks* have been accustomed to do. To avoid a civil war, it is the manner to entertain a strange war. To instruct others in the virtue of Temperance, *Lycurgus* caused the *Iloes* their servants to be made drunk, that by the ugly deformity of their superfluous inundation, others might grow into an horror and detestation of that sin. The Romans to prepare their people to valour, and a contempt of the dangers of death, ordained of purpose those furious spectacles of the Fencers, which at the first they ordained for offenders; afterwards for slaves or servants, but innocents; and lastly for free-men that gave themselves thereunto. Brothel-houses in great Cities, *usuries*, *divorces*, under the law of *Moses*, and in divers other nations, and religions, have been permitted for the better avoiding of great mischiefs, *Ad duritiem cordis eorum: For the hardness of mens hearts.*

In *Justice*, which cannot subsist, cannot be executed, without the mixture of some wrong, not only justice commutative, for that is not strange; it is after a sort necessary, and men could not live and traffick together, without mutual damage, without offence, and the laws allow of the loss which is under the moyety of the just price. But also justice distributive as it self confesseth; *Summum jus, summa injuria, & omne magnum exemplum habet aliquid ex iniquo, quod contra singulos utilitate publicâ rependitur: Extreme right is extreme wrong, and all great examples have some injustice which for the common good is practised against all: Plato alloweth, and it is not against the law, by deceits and false hopes of favour and pardon, to draw the offender to confess his fault. This is by injustice, deceit*



Of Tortures.

and impudency to do justice. And what should we say of the invention of tortures, which is rather a proof of patience, then verity? For, both he that can suffer them and cannot, will conceal the truth. For, why should grief cause a man rather to speak that which is, then that which is not? If a man think that an innocent is patient enough to endure torments, why should not he that is guilty, being a means to save his life? *Illa tormenta gubernat dolor, moderatur natura, cujusque tum animi, tum corporis regit quæstor, flebit libido, corrumpit spes, infirmat metus, ut in tot rerum angustis nil veritatis loci relinquatur;* Grief governeth those torments, Nature doth moderate, the searcher both of the body and mind doth rule, lust boweth, hope corrupteth, fear weaketh, so that in so many extremities, there is no place for truth. In defence hercof it is said, that tortures do astonish and quell the guilty, and extort from him a truth; and contrariwise strengthen the innocent: but we do so often see the contrary that this may be doubted; and to say the truth, it is a poor means full of uncertainty, full of doubt. What will not a man say, what will he not do, to avoid such torment? *Etenim innocentes mentiri cogit dolor:* For grief enforceth innocents to lie; in such sort that it falleth out that the Judg which giveth the torture to the end an innocent should not die, causeth him to die an innocent, and tortured too. A thousand and a thousand have falsly accused their own heads, either to shorten their torments, or their lives. But in the foot of this account, is it not a great injustice and cruelty to torment and to rack a man in pieces, for that offence which is yet doubted of? To the end, they may not kill a man without just cause, they do worse then kill him: if he be innocent and bear the punishment, what amends is made him for his unjust torture? He shall be quit; a goodly recompence, and much reason he hath to thank you. But it is the least evil that the weakness of man could invent.

Verity.

If a man be weak in virtue, much more is he in verity, whether it be eternal and divine, or temporal and humane. That astonisheth him with the lightening, and beats him down with the thunder thereof, as the bright beams of the Sun, the weak eyes of the Owl: if he presume to behold it, being oppressed, he presently fainteth; *Qui scrutator est majestatis, opprimetur à gloria:* The curious searcher of Gods majesty shall be oppressed by his glory: in such sort, that to give himself some breath, some taste, he must disguise, temper, and cover it with some shadow or other. This, that is, humane verity, offendeth and woundeth him, and he that speaks it, is many times holden

holden for an enemy: *Veritas odium parit, Truth breedeth hatred.* It is a strange thing, man desireth naturally to know the truth and to attain thereunto, he removeth all lets whatsoever, and yet he cannot attain it, if it be present: he cannot apprehend it, if he apprehend it, he is offended with it. The fault is not in the truth, for that is always amiable, beautiful, worthy the knowledg; but it is humane imbecillity that cannot endure the splendour thereof. Man is strong enough to desire, but too weak to receive and hold what he desireth. The two principal means, which he useth to attain to the knowledg of truth, are reason and experience. Now both of them are so feeble and uncertain (though experience the more weak) that nothing certain can be drawn from them. Reason hath so many forms, is so pliable, so wavering, as hath been said, and experienced much more, the occurrents are always unlike; there is nothing so universal in Nature, as diversity, nothing so rare and difficult, and almost impossible, as the likenesse and similitude of things: and if a man cannot note this dissimilitude, it is ignorance and weakness; I mean this perfect, pure, and entire similitude, and dissimilitude: for to say the truth, they are both whole and entire, there is no one thing that is wholly like or dislike to another. This is an ingenious and marvellous mixture of Nature.

Chap. 14.

But after all this, what doth better discover this humane imbecillity than Religion? yea, the very intention thereof, is to make man feel his own evil, his infirmity, his nothing, and to make him to receive from God his good, his strength, his all things. First, it preacheth it unto him, it beats it into our memory, it reproacheth man, calling him dust, ashes, earth, flesh, bloud, grais. Afterwards it insinuateth it into him, and makes him feel it after an excellent and goodly fashion, bringing in God himself, humbled, weakned, debased for the love of him, speaking, promising, swearing, chiding, threatning: and to be brief, conversing and working with a man after a base, feeble, humane manner, like a father that counterfeits his speech, and plays the child with his children. The weakness of man being such, so great, so invincible, that to give it some access and commerce with the Divinity, and to unite it unto God, it was necessary that God should debase himself to the basest: *Deus quia in altitudine sua à nobis parvulis apprehendi non poterat, ideo se stravit hominibus: God because in his height he could not be apprehended by us little ones, did humble himself to men.* Again, it makes him see his own weakness by ordinary effects, for all the prin-

10.

Religion.



## Sacrifices.

cipal and holiest exercises, the most solemn actions of religion, are they not the true symptoms and arguments of humane imbecillity and sickness? Those sacrifices that in former times have been used thorowout the world, and yet in some countries continue, not only of beasts, but also of living men, yea of innocents, were they not shameful marks of humane infirmity and misery? First, because they were signs and symbols of his condemnation and malediction ( for they were as publick protestations, that he had deserved death, and to be sacrificed as those beasts were ) without which there had never been any bloody offerings, propitiatory and expiatory sacrifices. Secondly, because of the baseness of the purpose and intent, which was to think to appease, flatter, and gratifie God by the massacre and blood of beasts, and of men; *Sanguine non colendus Deus: quæ enim ex trucidatione immerentium voluptas est?* God is not worshipped with blood: for what pleasure can there be in shedding innocent blood? It is true, that God in those first ages, yet the feeble infancy of the world, and Nature remaining simple, did well accept of them at the hands of religious men, even for their devotion, or rather Christ his sake: *Respexit Dominus ad Abel, & ad munera ejus: God had respect to Abel, and to his gifts,* taking in good part that which was done, with an intent to honour and serve him; and also afterwards, the world being as yet in its apprenticeship, *sub pedagoga*, was wholly seasoned in this opinion so universal, that it was almost thought Natural. I touch not here that particular mystery of the religion of the Jews, who used them for figure ( that is a point that belongs to religion ) and with whom it was common to convert that which was humane, or natural and corporal, to a holy and sacred use, and to gather from thence a spiritual fruit. But this was not because God took pleasure in them, nor because it was by any reason in it self good: witness the Prophets, and the clearest sighted amongst them, who have always freely said; *Si voluisses, sacrificium dedissem, utique holocaustis non delectaberis, sacrificium & oblationem nolui, holocaustum pro peccato non postulasti, non accipiam de domo tua vitulos, &c.* If thou wouldest have sacrifice, I had given it thee, but thou delightest not in burnt offerings, neither wilt thou have any sacrifice, or oblation, nor requirest any burnt offering for sin, I will not receive the calves from thy house, &c. And have called back and invited the world to another sacrifice more high, spiritual, and worthy the Divinity; *Sacrificium Deo spiritus: aures autem perforasti mihi, ut* face-

*facerem voluntatem tuam, & legem tuam in medio cordis mei: Immo-  
la Deo sacrificium laudis: Misericordiam volo, non sacrificium: The  
spirit is a sacrifice to God, thou hast heared mine ears, to the end I  
might do thy will, and keep thy law in the midst of my heart: Offer  
unto God the sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving: I will have mercy and  
not sacrifice.* At the last, the Son of God, the Doctor of Truth, be-  
ing come to secure and free-denize the world, did abolish them  
wholly: which he had not done, if it had been a thing in it self and  
essentially good, and that it had pleased his father: for contrarily  
*Pater non tales quærit, sed tales qui adorent in spiritu & veritate:*  
*My Father doth not seek such, but those that worship him in spirit  
and truth.* And to say the truth, it is one of the godliest effects  
and fruits of Christianity after the abolition of Idols. And there-  
fore *Julian* the Emperour, his capital enemy, as in despight  
of him, offered more sacrifices than ever any other did in the  
world, attempting to set them up again with Idolatry. Where-  
fore let us here leave them, and let us see those other principal parts  
of Religion.

The Sacraments in a matter base and common bread and wine, *Sacraments.*  
and an outward action as base, are they not testimonies of our po-  
verty and baseness? Repentance, the universal remedy of our ma-  
ladies, is a thing in it self shameful, feeble, yea evil: for to repent, *Repentance.*  
to be sorry, to afflict the spirit, is evil; though by consequent it be  
good. An oath, what is it, but a symptom and shameful mark of di- *An oath.*  
strust, infidelity, ignorance, humane infirmity, both in him that re-  
quires it, that gives it, that ordains it? *Quod amplius est, à malo est:*  
*That which is more, is from the devil.* See then how religion healeth  
our evils by means not only small and feeble, our weakness so re-  
quiring: *Stulta & infirma mundi elegit Deus: God hath chosen the  
foolish and simple of the world;* but such as by no means are of any  
value, nor are good in themselves, but good in that they serve and  
are employed against evil, as medicines are: they sprang from an  
ill cause, yet they drive away ill: they are good as gibbets and  
wheels are in a Common-wealth, as vomits and other discharges  
proceed from ill causes, are to the body: to be brief, they are such  
good things, as that it had been far better we had never had them;  
and never had we had them, if man had been wise, and preserved  
himself in that estate wherein God had placed him; neither shall  
he have them any more, so soon as he is delivered from this captivi-  
ty, and arrived to his perfection.



11.  
In evil.

All this sheweth how great this humane weaknes is to any thing that is good, in Policie, Justice, Verity, Religion toward God, but that which is more strange is; that this weaknes is as great in what is evil: for man, though he be willing to be wicked, yet he cannot be wholly such, but when he hath done his worst, there will be more to do. There is always some remorse and fearful consideration, that mollifieth the will, and maketh it relent, and still reserveth something to be done; which hath been the cause of the ruine of many, although perhaps they made it a project for their safety. This is imbecillity and sottishment, and from hence did arise that Proverb at their cost; That a man must not play the fool by halves. A speech uttered with judgment; but that may have both a good and ill sense. To say that a man when he is once in, must still proceed to worse, and worse, without any reservation or respect, it is a very pernicious doctrine, and the Proverb saith well against it; the shorter follies are the better. But yet in some certain cases, the middle way is very dangerous; as when a man hath a strong enemy by the throat, like one that holdeth a Wolf by the ears, he must either win him altogether by courtesie, or utterly undo him and extinguish him; which was always the practice of the Romans, and that very wisely: amongst others, concerning the *Latines* or *Italians*; at the exhortation of *Camillus*; *Pacem in perpetuum petere, vel serviendo, vel ignoscendo: To get perpetual peace, either serving, or in pardoning*: For in such a case to do things by halves, is to lose all, as the *Samnites* did, who for want of putting in practice that counsel given them by an old weather-beaten souldier, concerning the Romans, whom they had then inclosed and shut up, paid dearly for it; *Aut conciliandus, aut tollendus hostis: An enemy is either to be reconciled, or made out of the way*. The former course of courtesie is the more noble, honourable and rather to be chosen; and we ought not to come to the second but in extremities, and then when the enemy is not capable of the first. By this that hath been said, is shewed the extreme imbecillity of man, in good and evil; and that good or evil which he either doth, or flieth, is not purely and entirely good or evil: so that it is not in his power to be wholly deprived of all good, not altogether wicked.

12.  
Reprehensions  
and repulses.

Let us likewise note many other effects and testimonies of humane weaknes. It is imbecillity and pusillanimity not to dare, or not to be able to reprehend another, or to be reprehended: he that

that is feeble or courageous in the one, is so in the other. Now it is a strange kind of delicateness, to deprive either himself, or another of so great a fruit, for so light and verbal a wound, that doth only touch and pierce the ear. Near neighbour unto this it is, not to be able to give a denial with reason, nor to receive and suffer a repulse with patience.

In false accusations and wicked suspicions, which are done in place of justice and judgment, there is double imbecillity; the one in those that are accused and suspected, and that in justifying and excusing themselves too carefully, and, as it were, ambitiously. <sup>13.</sup> *Mendax infamia terret quem nisi mendacem? Whom doth an infamous lie fear but a liar?* This is to betray their own innocency, to put their conscience and their right to compromise and arbitrement; for by such plea *Perspicuitas argumentatione elevatur: Perspicuity by argument is made more apparent.* Socrates in judgment it self would not do it, neither by himself, nor by another, refusing to use the learned plea of great *Lysias*, and chose rather to die; the other is in a contrary case, that is when the accused is so courageous, that he takes no care to excuse or justify himself, because he scorneth the accusation and accuser, as unworthy his answer and justification, and he will not do himself that wrong to enter the lists: this course hath been practised by generous men; by *Scipio* above all others, many times out of the marvellous constancy of his mind. Now others are offended herewith, thinking it too great a confidence and pride, and it stingeth them, that he hath too sensible a feeling of his innocency, and will not yield himself: or imputing this silence and contempt to the want of heart, distrust of the law and inability to justify himself. O feeble humanity! the accused or suspected, whether he defend or defend not himself, it is imbecillity and cowardliness. We wish a man courage to defend himself, and when he hath done it, we shew our own weakness by being offended with it.

*False suspicions and accusations*

Another argument of imbecillity is, when a man shall subject and addict himself to a certain particular form of life; this is a base kind of tenderness, and effeminate delicacy, unworthy an honest man, and makes us unprofitable, different in conversation, and may be hurtful too, in a case where change of manners and carriage is necessary. It is likewise a shame, either not to dare, or not to be able to do that which he seeth every man do besides himself. It were fittest that such people should live, and hide themselves in the

<sup>14.</sup> *Tenderness and delicacie.*



the Chimny-corner in their private houses. The fairest form of living is to be pliable to all, even to exceed it self, it need be; to be able, to dare, to know how to do all things, and yet to do nothing but what is good. It is good to know all, not to use all.

15.  
Search of  
books.

It is likewise imbecillity, and a great vulgar foolishness, to run after strange and Scholastical examples, after allegations, never to settle an opinion without testimonies in print, nor to believe men but such as are in Books, nor truth it self, but such as is ancient. By this reason, fooleries and toies, if they once pass the Press, they have credit and dignity enough. Now there are every day many things done before our eyes, which if we had but the spirit and sufficiency well to collect, to search with dexterity, to judge of, and to apply to their time, which should frame and find miracles and marvellous examples, which yield not in any thing to those of times past, which we so much admire, and therefore we admire because they are ancient and in Print.

16.

Again, another testimony of weakness is, that man is not capable but of indifferent things, and cannot endure extremities; for if they be small and in outward shew base, he contemneth and disdaineth them as unworthy, and it is offensive unto him to consider of them: if they be very great and over splendid, he fears them, he admires them, and is offended with them. The first doth principally concern great and high minds; the second is common with those that are weak.

17.  
Sudden occur-  
rents.

This weakness doth likewise appear in our hearing, sight, and in the sudden stroke of a new unexpected occurrent, which surpriseth and seizeth upon us unawares. For they do in such sort astonish us, that they take from us, both our sense and speech.

*Dirigit visu in medio, calor ossa reliquit,  
Labitur, & longo vix tandem tempore satur:  
Stiff in our sight he grew, heat left his bones,  
He falls, and scarce at length breaths out these mones.*

Yea, sometimes life it self: whether they be good; witness that Roman Dame, who died for joy, seeing her son return safe from the wars, *Sophocles* and *Dionysius* the tyrant: or whether they be evil; witness *Diodorus*, who died in the field for shame, because he was not able to resolve a doubt, nor answer an argument.

18.  
Braveries and  
submissions.

Yet there is another imbecillity, and it is two-fold, and after two contrary manners. Some yield and are overcome by the tears and

and humble supplication of another, and their courage and gallantry is wounded with their words: others quite contrary are not moved by all the submissions and compliances that may be, but are rather more obdurate and confirmed in their constancy and resolution. There is no doubt but the former proceeds of weakness, and it is commonly found in effeminate and vulgar minds: but the second is not without difficulty, and is found in all sorts of people. It should seem that to yield unto virtue, and to manly and generous strength and vigour, is the part of a valorous and generous mind. It is true, if it be done in a reverent esteem of virtue, as *Scanderbeg* did, receiving into grace a souldier whom he had seen to carry himself valorously in fight even against himself; or as *Pompey* did, pardoning the City of the *Mamertians*, for the virtue of *Zenon* a Citizen thereof; or as the Emperour *Conradus* did, forgiving the Duke of *Baviers*, and others besieged with him, for the magnanimity of their women, who privily conveyed them away, and took the danger upon their own heads. But if it be done with a kind of astonishment and affright of the power of virtue, as the people of *Thebes*, who lost their hearts hearing *Epaminondas* then accused, recount unto them his honourable acts, and severely reproaching them with their ingratitude, it is debility and cowardize. The fact of *Alexander*, containing the brave resolution of *Betis* taken with the City of *Gaza* where he commanded, was neither weakness nor courage, but choler, which in him had neither bridle, nor moderation.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

3. *Inconstancy.*

**M**AN is a subject wonderfully diverse, and wavering, upon whom it is very difficult to settle an assured judgment, I say a judgment universal and entire, by reason of the great contrariety and disagreement of the parts of our life. The greatest part of our actions, are nothing else but eruptions and impussions enforced by occasions, and that have reference to others: Irresolution on the one part, and afterwards inconstancy and instability, are the most common and apparent vices in the nature of man. Doubtless our actions do many times so contradict one the other, in so strange a manner, that it seems impossible they should all come forth of one and the same shop; we alter and we feel it not, we  
escape.



## 3. Inconstancy.

escape as it were from our selves, and we rob our selves; *Ipsi nobis furto subducimur*: Being stolen as it were from our selves. We go after the inclinations of our appetite, and as the wind of occasions carrieth us, not according to reason; *At nil potest esse equabile quod non à certa ratione profiscatur*: nothing can be just which proceedeth not from reason. Our spirits also and our humours are changed with the change of time. Life is an unequal motion, irregular, of many fashions. In the end we stir and trouble our selves, by the instability of our behaviour. *Nemo non quoti dè consilium mutat & votum: modo uxorem vult, modo amicam; modo regnare vult, modo non est eo officiosior servus; nunc pecuniam spargit, nunc rapit, modo frugi videtur & gravis, modo prodigus & vanus; mutamus subinde personam.* No man there is, who daily changeth not his mind, purpose, and desires; sometimes he will have his Wife, sometimes a Concubine; sometimes he will domineer, again, no servant more humble and officious than he; now he prodigally spends his own, at another time he violately raketh after other mens goods; sometimes he would seem grave and thrifty, another time a spend-thrift and vain; so every moment we are changed.

*Quod petiit, spernit; repetit quod nuper amisit,  
Æstuat, & vitæ disconvenit ordine toto.*

*Scorns what he honor'd, seeks what he lost, to find,  
Swells and abates, inconstant as the wind.*

Man is a creature of all those the most hard to be sounded and known, for he is the most double and artificial covert, and counterfeit, and there are in him so many cabinets and blind corners, from whence he comes forth, sometimes a man, sometimes a Satyre: so many breathing holes, from whence he breaths sometimes heat, sometimes cold, and from whence comes forth so much smoak: all his carriage and motion is a perpetual race of errors; in the morning to be born, in the evening to die; sometimes in the rack, sometimes at liberty; sometimes a god, sometimes a flie, he laughs and weeps for one and the same thing; he is content, and discontent; he will, and he will not; and in the end he knows not what he will: now he is filled with joy and gladness, that he cannot stay within his own skin, and presently he falleth out with himself, nay dares not trust himself; *Modo amore nostri, modo tædio laboramus;* ometimes we love, sometimes we loath our selves.

## CHAP. XXXIX.

## 4. Misery.

**B**Ehold here the main and principal line and lineament of the picture of a man, he is (as hath been said) vain, feeble, frail, inconstant in good, in felicity, in pleasure, but strong, constant, and hardned in misery: he is misery it self quick and incarnate, and this is in a word to expresse humanity, for a man is all misery, and without him there is not any in the world. It is the property of a man to be miserable, only man and all man is always miserable. *Homo natus de muliere brevi vivens tempore, repletus multis miseriis*: Man born of a woman hath but a short time to live, and is full of miseries. He that will take upon him to represent unto us all the parts of humane misery, had need to discover his whole life, his substance, his entrance, his continuance, his end. I do not therefore undertake this business, it were a work without end, and besides it is a common subject handled by all: but I will here only quote certain points which are not common, nor taken for miseries, either because they are not felt, or sufficiently considered of, although they be such as press man most, if he know how to judge of them.

The first point and proof of the misery of man, is his birth; his entrance into the world is shameful, vile, base, contemptible; his departure, his death, ruine, glorious and honourable: whereby it seemeth that he is a monster, and against Nature, since there is shame in making him, honour in destroying him: *Nostri nosmet pœnitet & pudet*: We are ashamed and repent our selves of our selves: Hereof a word or two. The action of planting and making man is shameful, and all the parts thereof; the congre-  
dients, the preparations, the instruments, and whatsoever serves thereunto is called and accounted shameful; and there is nothing more unclean, in the whole Nature of man. The action of destroying and killing him honourable, and that which serves thereunto glorious: we guild it, we enrich it, we adorn our selves with it, we carry it by our sides, in our hands, upon our shoulders. We disdain to go to the birth of man; every man runs to see him die, whether it be in his bed, or in some publick place, or in the field. When we go about to make a man, we hide our selves, we put out the candle, we do it by stealth. It is a glory and pomp to unmake a man,

1.  
Misery proper  
unto man.

2.  
In his begin-  
ning and his  
end.

1.

2.

to



4.  
Tertul de  
Spectac.  
Seneca.

5.

to kill himself; we light the candles to see him die, we execute him at high noon, we sound a trumpet, we enter the combat, and we slaughter him when the sun is at highest. There is but one way to beget, to make a man, a thousand and a thousand means, inventions, arts to destroy him. There is no reward, honour or recompence assigned, to those that know how to encrease, to preserve humane nature; all honour, greatness, riches, dignities, empires, triumphs, trophies are appointed for those that know how to afflict, trouble, destroy it. The two principal men of the world, *Alexander*, and *Cæsar*, have unmade, have slain, each of them (as *Pliny* reporteth) more then a million of men, but they made none, left none behind them. And in ancient times, for pleasure only and pastime, to delight the eyes of the people there was publick slaughters, and massacres of men made. *Homo sacra res per jocum & lussu occiditur: satis spectaculi in homine mors est: innocentes in ludum veniunt, ut publicæ voluptatis hostiæ fiant: Man, though a sacred thing, is slain even for sport and delight; death in man is spectacle enough: Innocents come to the game, that they may be made the sacrifices of the publick pleasure.* There are some nations that curse their birth, bless their death. How monstrous a creature is this, that is made a horror unto himself? None of all this in any other creature, no not in the whole world besides.

The second point and testimony of the misery of man, is, the diminishing of his pleasure, even those small and slight ones that appertain unto him, (for of such as are great and sound he is not capable, as hath been shewed in his weakness) and the impairing of the number and sweetness of them. If it be so, that he do it not for Gods cause, what a monster is that? this is an enemy unto himself, robs and betrays himself, to whom his pleasures are a burthen and a cross. There be some that flie from health, joy, comfort, as from an evil thing.

*O miseri quorum gaudia crimen habent!*

*O wretched man, whose very goods are naught,*

*And whose indifferences worse, whose joys have fault!*

We are not ingenious but to our own hurt, it is the true diet of the force of the spirit.

4.  
Forging of  
evils.

But there is yet that which is worse, the spirit of man is not only a diminisher of his joy, a trouble-feast, and enemy to his small, natural and just pleasures, as I mean to prove; but also a forger of those that are evil: it faineth, feareth, flieth, abhorreth

#### 4. *Misery.*

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as great mischiefs, things that are not any way evil in themselves, and in truth, which beasts themselves fear not, but that by his own proper discourse and imagination they are feigned to be such, as not to be advanced in honour, greatness, riches, as cuckoldship, sterility, death: for to say the truth, there is nothing but grief it self that is evil, and which is felt. And though some wise men seem to fear these things, yet it is not for their own sakes, but because of that grief which sometimes doth accompany them afterwards, for many times it is a fore-runner of death, and sometimes followeth the loss of goods, of credit, of honour. But take from these things grief, the rest is nothing but fantastic, which hath no other lodging but in the head of man, which quits its self of other business to be miserable; and imagineth within his own bounds false evils besides the true, employing and extending his misery in stead of lessening and contracting it. Beasts feel not these evils, but are exempted from them, because Nature judgeth them not to be such.

As for sorrow, which is the only true evil, man is wholly born thereunto, and it is his natural property. The *Mexicanes* thus <sup>5.</sup> *He is born to* salute their infants coming forth of the womb of their mother: *sorrow.*

*Infant, thou art come into the world to suffer: endure, suffer and hold thy peace.* That sorrow is natural unto man, and contrariwise, pleasure but a stranger, it appeareth by these three reasons. All the parts of man are capable of sorrow, very few of delight. The parts capable of pleasure, cannot receive more then one or two sorts, but all can receive the greatest number of griefs, all different heat, cold, pricking, rubbing, trampling, flaying, beating, boyling, languishing, extension, oppression, relaxation, and infinite others, which have no proper name, (to omit those of the soul) in such sort, that man is better able to suffer them, then to express them. Man hath no long continuance in pleasure; for that of the body, is like a fire of straw; and if it could continue, it would bring with it much envy and displeasure: but sorrows are more permanent, and have not their certain seasons as pleasures have. Again, the empire and command of sorrow is far more great, more universal, more powerful, more durable, and (in a word) more natural, than that of pleasure.

To these three a man may add other three: Sorrow and grief is more frequent, and falls out often, pleasure is rare. Evil comes easily of it self, without seeking; Pleasure never comes willingly, it must

f.

2.

3.

4.

2.



## 4. Misery.

must be sought after, and many times we pay more for it then it is worth. Pleasure is never pure, but always distempered, and mingled with some bitterness, and there is always something wanting; but sorrow and grief is many times entire and pure. After all this, the worst of our market, and that which doth evidently shew the misery of our condition, is, that the greatest pleasures touch us not so neer, as the lightest griefs. *Segnius homines bona, quam mala sentiunt: men more slowly feel that which is good, then that which is evil.* We feel not so much our soundest health, as the least malady that is: *Pungit in cute vix summa violatum plagula corpus, quando valere nil quenquam movet.*

6.  
By memory and  
anticipation.

It is not enough that man be indeed and by Nature miserable, and besides true and substantial evils, he fain and forge false and fantastical, as hath been said; but he must likewise extend and lengthen them, and cause both the true and false to endure, and live longer then they can, so avarous is he of misery; which he doth divers ways. First, by the remembrance of what is past, and the anticipation of what is to come, so that we cannot fail to be miserable, since that those things which are principally good in us, and whereof we glory most, are instruments of misery. *Futuro torquemur & præterito, multa bona nostra nobis nocent, timoris tormentum memoria reducit, providentia anticipat, nemo presentibus tantum miser est: We are tormented with that which is past, and with that which is to come, even our own goods do harm us, memory reduceth the torment of fear, providence anticipateth, no man is miserable only by things present.* It is not enough to be miserable, but we must increase it by a continual expectation before it come, nay seek it, and provoke it to come, like those that kill themselves with the fear of death; that is to say, either by curiosity or imbecillity, and vain apprehension to preoccupate evils and inconveniences, and to attend them with so much pain and ado, even those which peradventure will never come neer us. These kind of people will be miserable before their time, and doubly miserable, both by a real sense or feeling of their misery, and by a long premeditation thereof, which many times is a hundred times worse then the evils themselves. *Minus afficit sensus fatigatio, quam cogitatio: The conceit of affliction, doth hurt more then affliction it self.* The essence or being of misery endureth not long, but the mind of man must lengthen and extend it, and entertain it before hand. *Plus dolent quam necesse est, qui ante dolet quam necesse est. Quædam magis, quædam*

*quædam antequam debeant, quædam cum omnino non debeant, nos torquent. Aut augemus dolorem; aut fugimus, aut præcipimus: He sorroweth more then he needs, that lamenteth before he hath need: some things afflict us more then they should, some before they should, some when they should not at all; either we encrease our grief, or we flie it, or we command it.* Beasts do well defend themselves from this folly and misery, and are much bound to thank Nature that they want that spirit, that memory, that providence that man hath. *Cæsar* said well, that the best death was that which was least premeditated. And to say the truth, the preparation before death, hath been to many a greater torment, then the execution it self. My meaning is not here to speak of that virtuous and philosophical premeditation, which is that temper, whereby the Soul is made invincible, and is fortified to the proof against all assaults and accidents, whereof we shall speak hereafter: but of that fearful and sometimes false and vain apprehension of evils that may come, which afflicteth and darkeneth, as it were with smoke, all the beauty and serenity of the Soul, troubleth all the rest and joy thereof, insomuch that it were better to suffer it self to be wholly surprised. It is more easie and more natural, not to think thereof at all. But let us leave this anticipation of evil, for simply every care and painful thought, bleating after things to come by hope, desire, fear, is a very great misery. For, besides that we have not any power over that which is to come, much less over that which is past; (and so it is vanity, as it hath been said) there doth still remain unto us that evil and damage, *Calamitosus est animus, futuri anxius; That mind is in a lamentable case, which is troubled for future things:* which robbeth our understanding, and taketh from us the peaceable comfort of our present good, and will not suffer us to settle and content our selves therein.

Lib. 2. cap. 8

But this is not yet enough. For, to the end man may never want matter of misery, yea that he may always have his full, he never ceaseth searching and seeking with great study, the causes and aliments of misery. He thrusteth himself into business even with joy of heart, even such as when they are offered unto him, he should turn his back towards them, and either out of a miserable disquiet of mind, or to the end he may shew himself to be industrious, a man of employment and understanding, that is a fool and miserable too, he enterpriseth, moveth and removeth new business, or else he putteth himself into that of other mens. To be short,

7.  
By unquiet  
search.

L

he



he is so strongly and uncessantly molested with care, and thoughts not only unprofitable and superfluous, but painful and hurtful, tormented with what is present, annoyed with what is past, vexed with that which is to come, that he seemeth to fear nothing more, then that he shall not be sufficiently miserable. So that a man may justly cry out, O poor and wretched creatures that you are, how many evils do you willingly endure, besides those necessary evils that Nature hath bestowed upon you! But what? Man contenteth himself in misery, he is obstinate to ruminate and continually to recal to mind his passed evils. Complaints are common with him, and his own evils and sorrows seem many times dear unto him, yea it is a happy thing for small and light occasions, to be termed the most miserable of all others: *Est quædam dolendi voluptas: There is a certain delight in grief.* Now this is a far greater misery to be ambitiously miserable, then not to know it, not to feel it at all. *Homo animal querulum, cupidè suis incumbens miseriis: Man is a complaining creature, willingly yielding to his own miseries.*

8.  
By incompati-  
bility.

We will not account it a humane misery, since it is an evil common to all men, and not to beasts; that men cannot accommodate themselves and make profit of one another, without the loss and hurt, the sickness, folly, sin, death of one another. We hinder, wound, oppress one the other in such manner, that the better sort even without thought or will thereunto, out of an insensible desire, innocently thirst after the death, the evil, the pain, and punishment of another.

9.  
In the remedies  
of misery.

So that we see man miserable, both naturally and voluntarily, in truth and by imagination, by obligation and willingness of heart. He is too miserable, and yet he fears he is not miserable enough, and laboureth to make himself more miserable: let us now see how. When he feels any evil, and is annoyed with some certain misery (for he is never without many miseries that he feels not) he endeavoureth to quit himself thereof; but what are his remedies? Truly such as importune him more then the evil it self, which he would cure; in such sort, that being willing to get forth of one misery, he doth but change it into another, and perhaps into a worse. But what of that? the change it self, perhaps delighteth him, or at least yields him some solace: he thinketh to heal one evil with another, which proceedeth from an opinion which the bewitched and miserable world holdeth: that is, That there is nothing profitable, if it be not painful: That is worth nought, that costs nothing,

thing, yea ease it self is much suspected. This doth likewise proceed from an higher cause. It is a strange thing but true, and which convicteth man to be miserable, That no evil can be taken away, but by another evil, whether it be in body or in soul. Spiritual maladies and corporal, are not cured and chased away, but by torment, sorrow, pain. The spiritual by repentance, watchings, fastings, imprisonments, which are truly afflictions, and such as gaul us too, notwithstanding the resolution and devotion willingly to endure them: for if we use them either for pleasure or profit, they can work no effect, but are rather exercises of pleasure, of covetousness, of household government, then of repentance and contrition of heart. The corporal in like sort be medicines, incisions, cauteries, diets, as they well feel that are bound to medicinal rules, who are troubled on the one side with the disease that afflicts them, on the other with that rule, the thought whereof continually annoys them. So likewise other evils, as ignorance is cured by great, long, and painful study: *Qui addit scientiam, addit & laborem: He that increaseth knowledge, increaseth labour.* Want and poverty, by great care, watchings, travel, sweatings: *In sudore vultus tui: In the sweat of thy brows:* So that both for the soul and for the body, labour and travel is as proper unto man, as it is for a bird to fly.

*It was erroneous, but corrected.*

All these miseries above mentioned are corporal, or common both to the spirit and to the body, and mount little higher then the imagination and phantasie. Let us consider of the more subtile and spiritual, which are rather to be called miseries, as being erroneous and malignant, more active and more our own, but less felt and confessed, which makes a man more, yea doubly miserable, because he only feeleth those evils that are indifferent, and not the greater; yea a man dares not touch them, or speak of them, so much is he confirmed, and so desperate in his miseries. We must therefore by the way as it were, and gently, say something, at least with the finger point afar off, to give him occasion to consider and think thereof, since of himself he hides it not. First, in regard of the understanding, is it not a strange and lamentable misery of humane Nature, that it should wholly be composed of errour and blindness? The greatest part of common and vulgar opinions, yet the more plausible, and such as are received with reverence, are false and erroneous, and which is worse, the greater part unprofitable for humane society. And although some of the wisest, which are but few in number,

10.  
*Spiritual miseries.*



ber, understand better then the common sort, and judg of these opinions as they should, nevertheless sometimes they suffer themselves to be carried, if not in all and always, yet in some and sometimes. A man had need be firm and constant, that he suffer not himself to be carried with the stream, yea sound and prepared to keep himself cleer from so universal a contagion. The general opinions received with the applause of all, and without contradiction, are as a swift river which carrieth all with it; *Prob superi, quantum mortalia pectora cæcæ noctis habent! O miseræ hominum mentes & pectora cæca, qualibus in tenebris vitæ, quantisque periculis degitur hoc ævi quodcunque est! O God, how much sottish blindness rests in the breasts of men! O the senseless and miserable blindness of mens minds; in what darkness is our life, and how many dangers doth this age whatsoever it is, pass through!* Now it were too long and too tedious a thing, to run over all those foolish opinions by name, wherewith the whole world is made drunken: yet let us take a view of some few of them, which in their due place shall be handled more at large.

*See lib. 3. cap. 1.* 1. To judge of advice and counsel by the events, which are no way in our own hands, and which depends upon the heavens.

*Lib. 2. cap. 8.* 2. To condemn and reject all things, manners, opinions, laws, customes, observations, as barbarous and evil, not knowing what they are, or seeing any inconvenience in them; but only because they are universal, and different from such as are ordinary and common.

*Lib. 3. cap. 3.* 3. To esteem and commend things, because of their novelty, or rarity, or strangeness, or difficulty, four messengers which have great credit in vulgar spirits; and many times such things are vain, and not to be esteemed, if they bring not with them goodness and commodity. And therefore that Prince did justly contemn him that glorified himself, because he could from far cast a grain of millet, thorow the eye of a needle.

4. Generally all those superstitious opinions wherewith children, women, and weak minds are infected.

5. To esteem of men for their riches, dignities, honours, and to contemn those that want them, as if a man should judg of a horse by his saddle and bridle.

6. To account of things not according to their true, natural, and essential worth, which is many times inward and hidden, but

but according to the outward shew, or common report.

7. To think to be revenged of an enemy, by killing him; for that is to put him in safety, and to quit him from all ill, and to bring a vengeance upon himself: it is to take from his enemy all sense of revenge, which is the principal effect thereof. This doth likewise belong unto weakness.

8. To account it a great injury, or to think a man miserable, because he is a cuckold: for what greater folly in judgment can there be, then to esteem of a man the less for the vice of another, which he never allowed? As much may be said of a bastard.

9. To account less of things present, and that are our own, and which we peaceably enjoy; and to esteem of them most, when a man hath them not, or because they are another mans: as if the presence and possession of them did lessen their worth, and the want of them increase it.

*Virtutem incolumem odimus,*

*Sublatam ex oculis quærimus invidi:*

*Absence endears, we weigh not what we have,*

*And yet in others, would envy and crave.*

And this is the cause, why a Prophet is not esteemed in his own country. So likewise, mastership and authority, ingendreth contempt of those that are subject to that authority; husbands have a careless respect of their wives, and many fathers of their children. Wilt thou (saith the good fellow) love her no more? then marry her. We esteem more the horse, the house, the servant of another, because he is anothers and not ours. It is a thing very strange to account more of things in imagination, then in substance, as a man doth all things absent and that are not his, whether it be before he have them, or after he hath had them. The cause hereof in both cases may be, because, before a man possess them, he esteemeth not according to that they are worth, but according to that which he imagineth them to be, or they have by another been reported to be; and possessing them, he esteems them according to that good and benefit he getteth by them, and after they are taken from him, he considereth and desireth them wholly, in their perfection and declination, whereas before he enjoyed them and used them but by piece-meal successively: for a man thinketh he shall always have time enough to enjoy them, and by that means they are gone before he was aware that he had them. And this is the reason, why the grief is greater in having them not, then the pleasure in



possessing them. But herein there is as much imbecillity as misery. We have not the sufficiency to enjoy, but only to desire. There is another vice clean contrary to this, and that is, when a man fetleth himself in himself, and in such sort conceits himself and whatsoever he hath, that he prefers it before all, and thinks nothing comparable to his own. Though these kind of people be no wiser then the other, yet they are at least more happy.

10. To be over-zealous in every question that is proposed, to bite all, to take to the heart, and to shew himself importunate and opinative in every thing, so he may have some fair pretext of justice, religion, the weal-publick, the love of the people.

*See cap. 27.*

11. To play the mourner, the afflicted person, to weep for the death, or unhappy accident of another, to think that not to be moved at all, or very little, is for want of love and affection. There is also vanity in this.

*Lib. 2. cap. 10.*

12. To esteem, to make account of actions that are done with rumour, clatter, and clamor, and to contemn those that are done otherwise, and to think that they that proceed after so sweet and calm a manner, do nothing, are as in a dream, without action; and to be brief, to esteem Art more then Nature. That which is puffed up, swollen and elevated by study, fame, report, and striketh the sense, (that is to say artificial) is more regarded and esteemed, then that which is sweet, simple, plain, ordinary, that is to say, Natural; that awaketh, this brings us asleep.

13. To give an ill and wrong interpretation of the honourable actions of another man, and to attribute them to base and vain, or vicious causes or occasions; as they that attributed the death of young *Cato*, to the fear he had of *Cæsar*, wherewith *Plutarch* seems to be offended; and others more foolishly, to ambition: This is a great malady of the judgment, which proceedeth either from malice, and corruption of the will and manners, or envy against those that are more worthy then themselves, or from that vice of bringing their own credit to their own door, and measuring another by their own foot, or rather then all this, from imbecillity and weakness, as not having their sight so strong and so certain, to conceive the brightness of virtue, in its own native purity. There are some that think they shew great wit and subtilty, in depraving and obscuring the glory of beautiful and honourable actions, wherein they shew much more malice then sufficiency. It is a thing easy enough to do, but base and villanous.

14. To defame and to chastise over-rigorously, and shamefully, certain vices, as crimes in the highest degree, villanous, and contagious, which are nevertheless but indifferent, and have their root and excuse in Nature: and not so much to detest, and to chastise with so greedy ado those vices that are truly great, and against Nature, as pretended and plotted murders, treasons, and treachery, cruelty, and so forth.

15. Behold also after all this, a true testimony of spiritual misery, but which is wily and subtle, and that is, that the spirit of man in its best temper, and peaceable, settled, and soundest estate, is not capable but of common, ordinary, natural, and indifferent things. To be capable of divine and supernatural, as of divination, prophesie, revelation, invention, and as a man may say, to enter into the cabinet of the Gods, he must be sick, displaced from his natural seat, and as it were corrupted, *corruptus*, either by extravagancy, extasy, inspiration, or by dreaming; inso much that the two natural ways to attain thereunto, are either fury, or dead sleep: So that the spirit is never so wise, as when it is a fool, nor more awaked, then when it sleepeth; it never meeteth better, then when it goes on one side, or crosseth the way; it never mounts or flies so high, as when it is most dejected. So that it must needs be miserable, because to be happy, it must be as it were lost, and without it self. This toucheth not in any sort the Divine disposition, for God can to whom, and when it pleaseth him, reveal himself; man in the mean time continuing settled in his sense and understanding, as the Scripture makes mention of *Moses* and divers others.

16. To conclude, can there be a greater fault in judgement, then not to esteem of judgement, not to exercise it, and to prefer the memory, and imagination, or phantasy before it? We see those great goodly, and learned orations, discourses, lectures, sermon-books, which are so much esteemed and admitted, written by men of greatest learning in this age (I except some few) what are they all, but a heap and collection of allegations, and the labours of other men (a work of memory and reading, and a thing very easy, being all culled and disposed to their hands, and hereof are so many books composed) with some few points handled, with a good instruction or two (a work of imagination) and here is all. This is many times a vanity, and there appeareth not in it any spark of judgment, or excellent virtue: so likewise the authors themselves,



are many times weak and common in judgment, and in will corrupted: how much better is it, to hear a country swain, or a Merchant talking in his counting-house, discoursing of many goodly proportions and verities, plainly and truly without art or form, and giving good and wholesome counsel, out of a sound, strong, and solid judgment?

11.  
*Of the Will.*

In the will there are as many, or rather more miseries, and more miserable; they are without number, among which these following are some few of them.

1. To be willing rather to seem an honest man, then to be, and rather to be such to another, then to himself.

2. To be far more ready and willing to revenge an offence, then to acknowledg a good turn, in such sort, that it is a corrosive to his heart to acknowledg pleasure and gain to revenge, a proof of a malignant nature, *gratia oneri est, ultio in questu habetur.*

3. To be more apt to hate, then to love; to slander, then to commend; to feed more willingly and with greater pleasure upon the evil, then the good of another, to enlarge it more, to display it more in his discourse and the exercise of his style: witness Lawyers, Oratours, and Poets, who in reciting the good of any man are idle, eloquent in evil. The words, inventions, figures, to speak ill, to scoff, are far otherwise, more rich, more emphatical and significant, then to praise, or speak well.

4. To fly from evil, to do what is good, not properly for the good effect by natural reason, and for the love of virtue; but for some other strange consideration, sometimes base and idle, of gain and profit, vain-glory, hope, fear, of custom, company; and to be brief, not simply for himself and his duty, but for some other outward occasion, and circumstance: all are honest men by occasion and accident. And this is the reason why they are such, unequally, diversly; not perpetually, constantly, uniformly.

5. To love him the less whom we have offended, and that because we have offended him, a strange thing; and which proceedeth not always from fear that he will take occasion to be revenged, for it may be he wisheth us never the worse; but it is because his presence doth accuse us, and brings to memory our fault and indiscretion. And if the offender love not the offended the worse, it is because the offence he committed was against his will: for commonly he that hath a will to offend, loves him the less whom he hath offended; *Chi offende, mai non pardona*: He that offends never forgives.

6. As

6. As much may be said of him to whom we are much bound for courtesies received, his presence is a burden unto us, he putteth us in mind of our band and duty, he reproacheth unto us our ingratitude and inabilities: and we wish he were not so, we were discharged of that duty. Villains by nature: *Quidam quò plus debent, magis oderunt: leve æs alienum debitorem facit, grave inimicum: Some, the more they ought to love, the more they hate: a little debt alienateth a little, a great maketh him an enemy.*

7. To take pleasure in the evil, hurt, and danger of another, to grieve and repine at his good advancement, prosperity, (I mean when it is without cause of hatred, or private quarrel, for it is another thing when it proceedeth from the ill desert of man.) I speak here of that common and natural condition, whereby, without any particular malice, men of indifferent honesty, take pleasure to see others adventure their fortunes at sea, and are vexed to see them thrive better than themselves, or that fortune should smile more upon others, than them, and make themselves merry with the sorrow of another: this is a token of a malicious seed in us.

To conclude, that I may yet shew you how great our misery is, let me tell you that the world is replenished with three sorts of people, who take up much room therein, and carry a great sway both in number and reputation: the *Superstitious, Formalists, Pedants*, who notwithstanding they are in divers subjects, jurisdictions, and theatres, (the three principal, religion, life or conversation, and doctrine) yet they are all of one stamp, weak spirits, ill born, or very ill instructed, a very dangerous kind of people in judgment, and touched with a disease incurable. It is lost labour to speak to these kind of people, or to persuade them to change their minds, for they account themselves the best and wisest in the world, opinative obstinacy is there in his proper seat; he that is once stricken and touched to the quick with any of these evils, there is little hope of his recovery: who is there more sottish, and withal more brain-sick and heady than these kind of people? Two things there are that do much hinder them, (as hath been spoken) natural imbecillity, and incapacity, and afterwards an anticipated opinion to do as well and better than others. I do here but name them, and point at them with the finger, for afterwards in their places here quoted, their faults shall be shewed at large.

The *superstitious*, injurious to God, and enemies to true religion,

COVER

12.

*The conclusion  
of these spiri-  
tual miseries.*



cover themselves with the cloak of piety, zeal and love towards God, even to the punishing and tormenting of themselves more than is needful, thinking thereby to merit much, and that God is not only pleased therewith, but indebted unto them for the rest. What would you do to these kind of people? if you tell them that they do more than they need, and that they receive things with the left hand, in not understanding them aright, they will not believe you, but tell you, that their intent is good (whereby they think to save themselves) and that they do it for devotion. Howsoever, they will not quit themselves of their gain, nor the satisfaction which they receive, which is to bind God unto them.

2.  
*Formalists.*

The *Formalists* do wholly tie themselves to an outward form and fashion of life, thinking to be quit of blame, in the pursuit of their passions and desires, so they do nothing against the tenor of the Laws, and omit none of their formalities. See here a miserable churle, which hath overthrown and brought to a desperate state many poor families; but this hath fallen out, by demanding that which he thought to be his own, and that by way of justice. Who then can affirm that he hath done ill? O how many good works have been omitted, how many evils committed, under this cloak of formes which a man sees not! And therefore it is very truly said, That the extremity of law, is the extremity of wrong: and as well said, God shield us from *Formalists*.

3.  
*Pedants. lib. 3.*  
*142. 13.*

The *Pedanty* or household School-master, having with great study and pains filched from other mens writings their learning, they set it out to the view and to sale, and with a questuous and mercenary ostentation they disgorge it, and let it flie with the wind. Are there any people in the world so sottish in their affairs, more unapt to every thing, and yet more presumptuous and obstinate? in every tongue and nation, *Pedant, Clerk, Master*, are words of reproach. To do any thing sottishly, is to do it like a *Clerk*. These are a kind of people, that have their memories stuffed with the wisdom of other men, and have none of their own: their judgments, wills, consciences are never the better, they are unapt, simple, unwise, in such sort, that it seems that learning serves them for no other use, then to make them more fools, yea more arrogant pratlers: yea they diminish, or rather swallow up their own spirits; and bastardize their understanding, but puff up their memory. Here is that misery seated which we now come to speak of, and is the last of those of the understanding.

## CHAP. XL.

5. *Presumption.*

**B**Ehold here the last and leudest line or lineament of this picture; it is the other part of that description given by *Pliny*; the plague of man, and the nurse of false and erroneous opinions, both publick and particular, and yet a vice both natural and original in man. Now this presumption must be considered diversly, and in all senses, high, low, collateral, inward and outward; in respect of God, things high and celestial, in regard of things base, as of beasts, man his companion, of himself, and all may be reduced to these two; To esteem too much of himself, and not to esteem sufficiently of another: *Qui in se confidebant, & aspernabantur alios: Trust- Luc. 18. ed in themselves, and despised others.* A word or two of either.

First in respect of God (and it is a horrible thing) all superstition and want in Religion, or false service of God, proceedeth from *Presumption* this; That we esteem not enough of God, we understand him not, *in regard of God.* and our opinions, conceits, and beliefs of the Divinity, are not high and pure enough. I mean not by this enough, proportion answerable to the greatness of God, which being infinite receiveth not any proportion, for it is impossible in this respect to conceit or believe enough, but I mean enough, in respect of what we can and ought to do. We soare not high enough, we do not elevate and sharpen sufficiently the point of our spirit, when we enter into an imagination of the Divinity; we over-basely conceit him, our services are unworthy his Majesty, we deal with him after a baser manner then with other creatures, we speak not only of his works, but of his Majesty, will, judgments, with more confidence and boldness, than we dare to do of an earthly Prince or man of honour. Many men there are, that would scorn such kind of service and acknowledgment, and would hold themselves to be abused, and their honours in some sort violated, if a man should speak of them, or abuse their names in so base and abject a manner. We enterprize to lead God, to flatter him, to bend him, to compound or condition with him; that I may not say, to brave, threaten, despise, murmur against him. *Cæsar* willed his Pilot not to fear to hoist up sails, and commit himself to the fury of the Seas, even against destiny and the will of the heavens, with this only



*See lib. 1. cap. 10.* only confidence, That it was *Cæsar* whom he carried. *Augustus* having been beaten with a tempest at sea, defied god *Neptune*, and in the chiefest pomp of the *Circean* sports, caused his image to be taken down, from where it was placed amongst the rest of the gods, to be revenged of him. The *Thracians* when it thundreth and lightneth, shoot against heaven, to bring God himself into order. *Xerxes* scourged the sea, and wrote a bill of defiance against the hill  
*See lib. 2. cap. 18.* *Atbos.* And one telleth of a Christian King, neer neighbour of ours, who having received a blow from God, swore he would be revenged,  
*See lib. 3. cap. 1.* and gave commandment that for ten years no man should pray unto him, or speak of him.

*Audax Iapeti genus,  
 Nil mortalibus arduum est;  
 Cælum ipsum petimus stultitiâ, neque  
 Per nostrum patimur scelus  
 Iracunda Jovem ponere fulmina.  
 Audacious Christians, Japhets backward seed,  
 Go the contrary way (to heaven) with speed,  
 Whose sins incessant, minute, hour, and day,  
 Provoke Gods rod to walk, his staff to stay.*

But to leave these strange extravagancies, all the common sort of people, do they not plainly verify that saying of *Pliny*, That there is nothing more miserable, and therewithal more glorious then man? For on the one side he saith lofty and rich opinions of the love, care, and affection of God towards him, as his minion and only beloved; and in the mean time, he returneth him no duty or service worthy so great and loving a God. How can a life so miserable, and a service so negligent on the one side, agree with an opinion and belief so glorious and so haughty on the other? This is at one and the same time, to be an angel and a swine: and this is that wherewith a great Philosopher reproached the Christians, that there were no people more fierce and glorious in their speech, and in effect more dissolute, effeminate, and villanous. It was an enemy that spake it, perhaps to wrong and abuse us, but yet he spake but that which doth justly touch all hypocrites.

2.  
*In respect of  
 Nature.*

It likewise seemeth unto us, that we burthen and importune God, the World, and Nature, that they labour and travel in our affairs, they watch not but for us, and therefore we wonder and are astonished with those accidents that happen unto us, and especially

cially at our death. Few there are that resolve and believe, that it is their last hour, and almost all do even then suffer themselves to be mocked with vain hopes. This proceedeth from presumption, we make too much of our selves, and we think that the whole world hath great interest in our death, that things fail us according to that measure that we fail them; or that they fail themselves, according to that measure that they fail us; that they go the self-same dance with us, not unlike those that row upon the water, think the heavens, the earth, yea Cities themselves to move, when they move; we think to draw all with us, and there is no man amongst us that sufficiently thinks he is but one.

Besides all this, man believeth that the heaven, the stars, all this great celestial motion of the world, is only made for him. <sup>3.</sup> *Tot Of heaven.*  
*circa unum caput tumultuantes Deos: And that all the Gods are in contention for him alone.* And the poor miserable wretch is in the mean time ridiculous: he is here beneath, lodged in the last and worst stage of the world; most distant from the celestial vault, in the sink of the world, amongst the filth and lees thereof, with creatures of baser condition, made to receive all those excrements and ordures, which rain down and fall from above upon his head; nay he lives not but by them, and to endure all those accidents that on all sides happen unto him; and yet he makes himself believe that he is the master and commander of all, that all creatures, yea those great luminous incorruptible bodies, whereof he knows not the least virtue, and which he is constrained with astonishment to admire, move not but for him, and to do him service. And because he beggeth (wretch that he is) his living, his maintenance, his commodities from the beams, light and heat of the Sun, from the rain and other distillations of heaven, and the air, he sticks not to say, that he enjoyeth the heavens and the elements, as if all had been made, and still move only for him. In this sense a gosling may say as much, and perhaps more justly and peremptorily. For man, who many times receiveth many discommodities from above, and of all that he receiveth hath nothing in his own power or understanding, nor can divine of them, is in continual doubt and fear, lest those superiour bodies should not move aright, and to that end and purpose which he hath proposed, and that they procure unto him sterility, sickness, and whatsoever is contrary to his designment, and so he trembleth under his burthen; whereas beasts receive whatsoever cometh from above, without stir or apprehension



*Sense.*

hension of what shall happen unto them, and without complaint, of that which is hapned, which man cannot do. *Non nos causa mundo sumus hyemem æstatemque referendi, suas ista leges habent, quibus divina exercentur: minus nos suspicimus, si digni nobis videmur propter quos tanta moveantur, non tanta cælo nobiscum societas est, ut nostro fato sit ille quoque siderum fulgor.* We are not the cause why the world hath course and recourse of winter and summer, these things have their rules and laws, by which the will of God is executed: we honour our selves the less, if we think our selves worthy, that for our sakes so many things should be moved: we have not that society with the heavens, that stars should only shine for us.

<sup>4.</sup>  
*Of creatures.*

In respect of things base and earthly, that is to say, all other creatures, he disdaineth and contemneth them, as if they did not appertain to the same master-workman, and came not of the same mother, did not belong to the same family with him, as if they did not any way concern him, or had any part or relation unto him. And from hence proceedeth that common abuse and cruelty that is practised against them, a thing that reboundeth against that common and universal matter which hath made them, which hath care of them, and hath ordained laws for their good and preservation, hath given them preheminance in certain things, and sent man unto them as to a school. But this belongs to the subject of the Chapter following.

Now this derogateth not any thing at all from that common doctrine, that the world is made for man, and man for God: for besides the instruction that man draweth in general, from every high and low thing, whereby to know God, himself, his duty, he also draweth in particulars from every thing, either profit, pleasure, or service. That which is above him, which he hath least in understanding, and nothing at all in his power, the azure heaven so richly decked and counterpointed with stars, and rowling torches never ceasing over our heads, he only enjoyeth by contemplation, he mounteth and is carried with admiration, fear, reverence of the author and soveraign Lord of all; and therefore in this sense it was truly said by *Anaxagoras*, That man was created to contemplate the Heaven and the Sun, and as truly by other Philosophers was he called, *θεωόσκοπον* from base and inferiour things, he draweth help, service, commodity; but for a man to perswade himself that in the framing of all these things, no other thing was thought upon but man, and that he is the only end and butt of all these

these luminous and incorruptible bodies, it is a great folly and an over-bold presumption.

Finally, but especially, this presumption is to be considered in man himself, that is to say, in regard of himself, and of man his companion, but within, in the progress of his judgment and opinion; and without in his communication and conversation with another. Concerning which, we are to consider three things, as three heads which follow on the other, where humanity bewraileth in a sottish imbecillity the foolish presumption thereof. The first in believing or misbelieving (here is no question of Religion, nor of faith and belief Theological, and therefore we must still call to mind the advertisement given in the Preface) where we are to note two contrary vices, which are common in humane condition; the one and the other more ordinary, is a kind of lightness, *quicquid credit, levis est corde; he that lightly believeth, is light in heart*: and too great a facility to believe and to entertain whatsoever is proposed, with any kind of appearance of truth or authority. This belongeth to the folly, simplicity, tenderness and imbecillity of the weaker sort of people, of spirits effeminate, sick, superstitious, astonished, indiscreetly zealous, who like wax do easily receive all impressions, suffer themselves to be taken and led by the ears. And this is rather an error and weakness, then malice, and doth willingly lodge in minds gentle and debonaire. *Credulitas error est magis quam culpa, & quidem in optimi cujusque mentem facile irrepit: Credulity is rather an error than a fault, which easily creepeth into the best mans heart.* We see almost the whole world led and carried with opinions and beliefs, not out of choice and judgment, yea many times before they have either years, or discretion to judge, but out of the custom of the country, or instruction in youth received, or by some sudden encounter as with a tempest, whereby they are in such sort fastened, subjected, and enthralled, that it is a matter of great difficulty, ever to unlearn them again. *Veluti tempestate delati ad quamcunque disciplinam tanquam ad saxum adhærescunt: They cleave to any discipline as to a stone, being carried thither as with a tempest.* Thus is the world led, we trust our selves too much, and then persuade others to believe us. *Unusquisque mavult credere quam judicare; versat nos & præcipitat traditus per manus error, ipsa consuetudo assentiendi periculosa & lubrica: Every one had rather believe then judge; error coming by tradition, doth precipitate and toss us, the very custom of assenting*

6.

*Of man himself.**Three degrees of humane presumption.**1 To misbelieve, misbelief.*



*is dangerous and slippery.* Now this popular facility, though it be in truth weakness and imbecillity, yet is not without presumption. For, so lightly to believe and hold for truth and certainty, that which we know not, or to enquire of the causes, reasons, consequents, and not of the truth it self, is to enterprize, to presume too much. For from what other cause proceeds this? If you shall answer from a supposition that it is true; why this is nothing: a man handleth and stirreth the foundations & effects of a thousand things which never were, whereby both *pro* and *contra* are false. How many fables, false and supposed miracles, visions, revelations, are there received in the world, that never were? And why should a man believe a miracle, a thing neither humane nor natural, when he is able by Nature and humane means to confute, and confound the truth thereof? Truth and lying have like visages, like carriage, relish, gate, and we behold them with one and the same eye. *Ita sunt finitima falsa veris. ut in præcipitem locum non debeat se sapiens committere: Falshood is so neer unto truth, that a wise man ought not to suffer himself to be unadvisedly carried away.* A man ought not to believe that of a man which is not humane, except he be warranted by supernatural and superhumane approbation, which is only God, who is only to be believed in that he saith, only because he saith it.

7.

The other contrary vice, is an audacious temerity, to condemn and reject as false, all things that are not easily understood, and that please not the palate. It is the property of those that have a good opinion of themselves, which play the parts of men of dexterity and understanding, especially *Hereticks, Sophists, Pedanties*, for they finding in themselves some special point of the spirit, and that they see a little more cleerly then the common sort, they assume unto themselves law and authority, to decide and determine all things. This vice is far greater, and more base than the former: for it is an enraged folly, to think to know as much as possibly is to be known, the jurisdiction and limits of Nature, the capacity of the power and will of God to frame unto himself and his sufficiency the truth and falshood of things, which must needs be in so certain and assured resolution and definition of them: for see their ordinary language, that is false, impossible, absurd: and how many things are there, which at one time we have rejected with laughter as impossible, which we have been constrained afterwards to confess and approve, yea and others too, more strange than they?

And

And on the other side, how many things have we received as articles of our faith, that have afterwards proved vanities and lies?

The second degree of presumption, which followeth and commonly proceedeth from the former, is certainly and obstinately to affirm or disprove that which he hath lightly believed, or misbelieved; So that it addeth unto the first, obstinacy in opinion, and so the presumption increaseth. This facility to believe, with time is confirmed, and degenerateth into an obstinacy, invincible, and incapable of amendment; yea, a man proceeds so far in this obstinacy, that he defends those things that he knows and understands least, *Majorem fidem homines adhibent iis que non intelligunt; cupiditate humani ingenii lubentius obscura creduntur: Men easily believe those things they understand not; by a natural desire of humane wit, obscure things are easily believed.* He speaks of all things with resolution. Now affirmation and opinative obstinacy, are signs of negligence and ignorance accompanied with folly and arrogancy.

The third degree, which followeth these two, and which is the height of presumption, is to perswade others to receive as canonical whatsoever he believeth, yea imperiously to impose a belief as it were by obligation, and inhibition to doubt. What tyranny is this? Whosoever believeth a thing, thinks it a work of charity to perswade another to believe the same; and that he may the better do it, he feareth not to add of his own invention, so much as he seeth necessary for his purpose to supply that want and willingness, which he thinks to be in the conceit of another of that he tells. There is nothing unto which men are commonly more prone, then to give way to their own opinions. *Nemo sibi tantum errat, sed aliis erroris causa & author est: No man errs only to himself, but is the author and cause of error to others.* Where the ordinary mean wanteth, there a man addeth commandment, force, fire, sword. This vice is proper unto dogmatists, and such as will govern, and give laws unto the world. Now to attain to the end hereof, and to captivate the beliefs of men unto themselves, they use two means: First, they bring in certain general and fundamental propositions, which they call principles and presuppositions, whereof they say we must neither doubt nor dispute; upon which they afterwards build whatsoever they please, and lead the world at their pleasure: which is a mockery, whereby the world is replenished with errors and lies. And to say the truth, if a man should examine

2. To affirm  
and condemn.

8.

3. To perswade.



these principles, he should find as great, or greater untruths and weaknesses in them, then in all that which they would have to depend upon them, and as great an appearance of truth in propositions quite contrary. There have been some in our time, that have changed and quite altered the principles and rules of our Ancients and best Professors in *Astronomy*, *Physick*, *Geometry*, in Nature, and the motion of the winds. Every humane proposition hath as much authority as another, if reason make not the difference. Truth dependeth not upon the authority and testimony of man: there are no principles in man if Divinity have not revealed them; all the rest is but a dream and smoke. Now these great masters will, that whatsoever they say, should be believed and received, and that every man should trust them, without judging or examining what they teach, which is a tyrannical injustice. God only (as hath been said) is to be believed in all that he saith, because that he saith it: *Qui à semetipso loquitur mendax est: He that speaketh of himself is a liar.*

The other mean is a supposition of some miraculous thing done, new and celestial revelation and apparition, which hath been cunningly practised by Law-makers, Generals in the field, or private Captains. The persuasion taken from the subject it self, possesseth the simpler sort; but at the first it is so tender and frail, that the least offence, mistaking or imprudence that shall happen, undoeth all: for it is a great marvel, how from so vain beginnings and frivolous causes, there should arise the most famous impressions. Now this first impression being once gotten, doth wonderfully grow and increase, in such sort, that it fasteneth even upon the most expert and skilful, by reason of the multitude of believers, witnesses, years, wherewith a man suffereth himself to be carried, if he see not well into it, and be not well prepared against it: for then it is to small purpose to spurn against it, or to enquire farther into it, but simply to believe it. The greatest and most powerful means to perswade, and the best touch-stone of truth, is multitude of years and believers: now fools do win the game, *sanitatis patrociniū est insānientium turba: The mad multitude is a patronage for sobriety.* It is a very difficult thing for a man to resolve and settle his judgment against the common opinion. All this may easily appear, by those many impostures and fooleries which we have seen to go for miracles, and ravish the whole world with admiration, but instantly extinguished by some accident, or by the exact inquiry

*Of the difference and inequality of men in general.*

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inquiry of such as are quick-sighted, who have cleared and discovered the couzenage; which if they had but time to ripen, and to have fortified in Nature, they had continued for ever, been generally received and adored. And even such as are divers others, which by the favour of fortune, have passed for current, and gained publick belief, whereunto men afterwards accommodate themselves, without any farther desire, to know the thing in its first form and original, *Nusquam ad liquidum fama perducitur: Report is never brought to full trial.* And this is the reason, why there are so many kinds of religion in the world, so many superstitious customes of the *Pagans*, which are yet remaining even in Christendom, and concerning which we cannot wholly assure the people. By this whole discourse we see what we are, and to what we tend, since we are led by such guides.

The fifth and last consideration of Man, by those varieties and great differences that are in him, and their comparisons.

CHAP. XLI.

*Of the difference and inequality of men in general.*

**T**Here is nothing in this lower world, wherein there is found so great difference as amongst men, and where the differences are so distant and divers in one and the same subject, and kind. If a man should believe *Pliny*, *Herodotus*, *Plutarch*, there are shapes of men in some countries, that have very little resemblance with ours, and some that are of a mixt and doubtful kind, betwixt men and beasts. There are some countries where men are without heads, carrying their eyes and mouths in their breasts; where they are *Hermaphrodites*; where they go with four feet; where they have one eye in the forehead, and a head more like to a dogs head then a mans; where they are as fish from the navel downwards, and live in the water; where their women bear children at five years of age, and live but eight; where they have their heads and foreheads so hard, that iron cannot pierce them; where they do naturally change into wolves and others beasts, and afterwards into men again; where they are without a mouth, nourishing themselves with the smell of certain odors; where they yield a



feed that is black, where they are very little and dwarfs, where they are very great and giants, where they go always naked, where they are all hairy, where they speak not, but live in woods like beasts, hidden in caves and hollow trees. And in our times we have discovered, seen with the eye, and touched with our fingers, where the men are without beards, without use of fire, corn, wine, where that is held to be the greatest beauty, which we account the greatest deformity, as hath been said before. Touching the diversity of manners, we shall speak elsewhere. And to omit many of these strange wonderments, we know that as touching the visage, it is impossible to find two in all things alike; it may fall out that we may mistake, and take the one for the other, because of the great resemblance that may be between two: but this must be in the absence of the one: for in the presence of them both, it is easy to note a difference, though a man know not how to express it. In the souls of men there is a far greater difference, for it is not only greater without comparison, betwixt a man and a man, then betwixt a beast and a beast: but there is a greater difference betwixt a man and a man, then a man and a beast; for an excellent beast comes nearer to a man of the basest sort and degree, then that man to another great and excellent personage. This great difference of men, proceedeth from the inward qualities, and from the spirit where there are so many parts, so many jurisdictions, so many degrees beyond number, that it is an infinite thing to consider. We must now at the last learn to know man by those distinctions, and differences that are in him, which are divers, according to the many parts in man, many reasons, and means to compare and consider of him. We will here set down five principal, unto which all the rest may be referred, and general all that is in man, *Spirit, body, natural, acquired, publick, private, apparent, secret*: and so this fifth and last consideration of man, shall have five parts, which are five great and capital distinctions of men, that is to say:

The first natural, essential, and universal of all men; soul and body.

The second natural and essential, principally, and in some sort acquired, of the force and sufficiency of the spirit.

The third accidental of the estate, condition and duty of man, drawn from superiority and inferiority.

The fourth accidental of the condition and profession of life:

The

The fifth and last of the favours and disfavours of Nature, and of Fortune.

CHAP. XLII.

The first distinction and difference of men, natural and essential, drawn from the divers situation of the world.

THE first more notable, and universal distinction of men, which concerneth the soul and body, and whole essence of man, is taken and drawn from the divers site of the world, according to which the aspect and influence of heaven, and the sun, the air, the climate, the country, are diverse. So likewise not only the colour, the feature, the complexion, the countenance, the manners, are diverse, but also the faculties of the soul: *Plaga cæli non solum ad robur corporum, sed & animorum facit. Athenis tenue cælum, ex quo etiam acutiores Attici; crassum Thebis, ideo pingues Thebani & valentes. The temperature of the celestial Climat, is of great operation, both for the strength of the body, and the vigour of the mind: The Athenian air is delicate, and therefore they of a more sharp and ready wit; The Theban gross, and they fat and strong.* And therefore Plato thanked God that he was an *Athenian*, and not a *Theban*. As fruits and beasts are diverse, according to the divers countries wherein they are: so men are born more and less warlike, just, temperate, docible, religious, chaste, ignenious, good, obedient, beautiful, sound, strong. And this is the reason why *Cyrus* would not agree to the *Persians*, to abandon their sharp and hilly country, to go to another more plain and pleasant, saying, That fat countries and delicate, made men soft and effeminate, and fertile grounds barren and infertile spirits.

Following this foundation, we may in gross, divide the world into three parts, and all men into three kinds of nature: we will make three general situations of the world, which are, the two extremities, South, and North, and the middle betwixt them both; every part and situation shall have sixty degrees. The Southern part which is under the *Æquator*, hath thirty degrees on this side the line, thirty on that, that is to say, all that part which is betwixt the two Tropicks, or somewhat more, where are the hot and Southern countries, *Africk*, and *Æthiopia* in the middle betwixt the East and the West; *Arabia*, *Calicut*, the *Maluques*, *Javes*, *Taprobana* towards the Orient; *Pern* and the great Seas towards the other middle part, hath



hath thirty degrees beyond the Tropicks, both on this side the line, and on that towards the Poles, where are the middle and temperate regions, all *Europe* with the *Mediterrane* Sea in the middle, betwixt the East and West; all *Asia* both the less and the greater, which is towards the East, with *China*, *Japan* and *America*, towards the West. The third, which is the thirty degrees, which are next to the two Poles on both sides, which are the cold and Icy countries, the *Septentrional* people, *Tartary*, *Muscovy*, *Estotilan*, *Magellan*, which is not yet throughly discovered.

6. Following this general partition of the world, the natures of *Their natures.* men are likewise different in every thing, body, soul, religion, manners, as we may see in this little Table: For the

	Northern people are	Middle are	Southern are
1 In their bodies,	{ High & great, phlegmatick, sanguine, white, and yellow, sociable, the voice strong, the skin soft and hairy, great eaters and drinkers, puissant.	{ Indifferent and temperate in all those things, as neutrals or partakers a little of these two extremities, and participating most of that region to which they are nearest neighbours.	{ Little, melancholick, cold, & dry, black, Solitary, the voice shrill, the skin hard, with little hair, and curled, abstinent, feeble.
2 Spirit.	{ Heavy, obtuse, stupid, sottish, facile, light, inconstant.	{	{ Ingenious, wise, subtle, opinative.
3 Religion.	{ Little religious and devout.	{	{ Superstitious, contemplative.
4 Manners.	{ Warriours valiant, painful, chaste, free from jealousy, cruel and inhumane.	{	{ No Warriours, idle, unchaste, jealous, cruel, and inhumane.

1. All these differences are easily proved. As for those of the body, they are known by the eye, and if there be any exceptions, they are rare, and proceed from the mixture of the people, or from the windes, the water, and particular situation of the place, whereby a mountain is a notable difference, in the self-same degree, yea the self-same Country and City. They of the higher part of the City of *Athens*, were of a quite contrary humour, as *Plutarch* affirmeth, to those that dwelt about the gate of *Pyrens*: and they that

that dwell on the North side of a mountain, differ as much from those that dwell on the South side, as they do both differ from those in the valley.

As for the differences of the spirit, we know that mechanical and manual Arts belong to the North, where men are made for labour; <sup>2.</sup> *The Spirit*. Speculative sciences came from the South. *Cæsar* and other ancients of those times, called the Egyptians ingenious, and subtle: *Moses* is said to be instructed in their wisdom; and Philosophy came from thence into *Greece*, Greatness began rather with them, because of their spirit and subtilty. The guards of Princes (yea in the Southern parts) are Northern men, as having more strength, and less subtilty and malice. So likewise the Southern people are indued with great virtues, and subject to great vices, as it is said of *Hannibal*: The Northern have goodness and simplicity. The lesser and middle Sciences, as policies, laws and eloquence, are in the middle nations, wherein the greatest Empires and Policies have flourished.

As touching the third point, religions may come from the South, *Egypt*, *Arabia*, *Chaldea*; more superstition in *Africk*, <sup>3.</sup> *Religion*. then the whole world besides, witness their vows so frequent, their Temples so magnificent. The Northern people, saith *Cæsar*, having little care of religion, being wholly given to the wars and to hunting.

As for manners and first touching wars, it is certain that the greatest armies, Arts, military instruments and inventions have <sup>4.</sup> *Manners*. come from the North. The *Scythians*, *Goths*, *Vandals*, *Huns*, *Tartarians*, *Turks*, *Germans*, have beaten and conquered all other nations, and ransacked the whole world; and therefore it is a common saying, That all evil comes from the North. Single combates came from them. The Northern people adored a sword fastned in the earth, saith *Solinus*. To other nations they are invincible, yea to the Romans, who having conquered the rest of the world, were utterly destroyed by them. They grow weak and languish with the Southern windes, and going towards the South; as the Southern men coming into the North, redouble their forces. By reason of their warlike fierceness, they will not endure to be commanded by authority, they love their liberty, at leastwise elective commanders. Touching chastity and jealousy in the North, saith *Tacitus*, one woman to a man: yea one woman sufficeth many men, saith *Cæsar*. There is no jealousy,



saith *Munster*, where men and women bathe themselves together with strangers. In the South *Polygamy* is altogether received. All *Africk* adoreth *Venus*, saith *Solinus*: The Southernns dye with jealousy, and therefore they keep Eunuchs, as guardians to their wives, which their great Lords have in great number, as they have stables of horses. Touching cruelty, the two extreame are alike cruel, but the causes are divers, as we shall see anon, when we come to speak of the causes. Those tortures of the wheel, and staking of men alive, came from the North: The inhumanities of the *Muscovites* and *Tartars*, are too well known. The *Almains*, saith *Tacitus*, punish not their offenders by Law, but cruelly murder them as enemies. The Southernns slay their offenders alive, and their desire of revenge is so great, that they become furious if they be not glutted therewith. In the middle regions they are merciful and humane: The Romans punished their greatest offenders with banishment. The Greeks used to put their offenders to death, with a sweet drug, made of a kind of Hemlock which they gave them to drink. And *Cicero* saith, that humanity and courtesie were the conditions of *Asia minor*, and from thence derived to the rest of the world.

5.  
The cause of  
the aforesaid  
differences.

The cause of all these corporal and spiritual differences, is the inequality and difference of the inward natural heat, which is in those countries and people, that is to say, strong and vehement in the Northernns, by reason of the great outward cold, which incloseth and drieth the heat into the inward parts; as caves and deep places are hot in Winter, so mens stomachs, *Ventre hyeme calidiores*. Our stomachs are hot in winter. Weak and feeble in the Southernns, the inward heat being dispersed and drawn into the outward parts, by the vehemency of the outward heat; as in Summer vaults, and places under the earth are cold. Mean and temperate in the middle regions. From this diversity, I say, and inequality of natural heat, proceed these differences not only corporal, which are easie to note, but also spiritual; for the Southernns by reason of their cold temperature, are melancholick, and therefore staid, constant, contemplative, ingenious, religious, wise: for wisdom is in cold creatures, as Elephants, who as they are of all other beasts the most melancholick, so are they more wise, docile, religious, by reason of their cold blood. From this melancholy temperature it likewise cometh, that the Southernns are unchaste, by reason of their frothy, fretting tickling melancholy, as we commonly see in Hares;

Hareſs, and cruel, becauſe this fretting ſharp melancholy, doth violently preſs the paſſions and revenge. The Northerns are of a phlegmatick and ſanguine temperature, quite contrary to the South-erns, and therefore have contrary qualities, ſave that they agree in this one, that they are likewiſe cruel and inhumane, but by another reaſon, that is for want of judgment, whereby like beaſts, they know not how to contain and govern themſelves. They of the middle regions are ſanguine and cholerick, tempered with a ſweet, pleaſant, kindly diſpoſed humour, they are active. We could likewiſe more exquisitely repreſent the divers natures of theſe three ſorts of people, by the application and compariſon of all things, as you may ſee in this little Table, where it appeareth that there doth properly belong, and may be referred to the

Northern.	Midlers.	Southern.	Qualities of the ſoul.
<i>The common ſenſe.</i>	<i>diſcourſe and reaſoning.</i>	<i>Underſtanding.</i>	
<i>Force as of Bears &amp; other beaſts.</i>	<i>Reaſon and juſtice of men.</i>	<i>Subtilty of force, and religion of Divines.</i>	
<i>Mars Warr.</i>	<i>Mercury { Emperors,</i>	<i>Saturn { contemplation,</i>	<i>Planets.</i>
<i>The moon hunting.</i>	<i>Jupiter. } Oratours.</i>	<i>Venus. } love.</i>	
<i>Art and handi-crafts.</i>	<i>Prudence, Knowledge of good and evil.</i>	<i>Knowledge of truth and falſhood.</i>	<i>Actions and parts of the Common weal.</i>
<i>Labourers, Artiſters, Souldiers, to execute and obey.</i>	<i>Magiſtrates, provident, to judg, command.</i>	<i>Prelates, Philoſophers to contemplate.</i>	
<i>Young men, unapt.</i>	<i>Perſect men, managers of affairs.</i>	<i>Grave old men, wiſe, penſive.</i>	

The other diſtinction more particular, may be referred to this general of North, and South: for we may refer to the conditions of the Northern, thoſe of the Weſt, and that live in mountains, warriours, fierce people, deſirous of liberty, by reaſon of the cold which is in mountains. So likewiſe, they that are far diſtant from the Sea, are more ſimple and innocent. And contrarily, to the conditions of the Southern, we may refer the Eaſterlings, ſuch as live in valleys, effeminate and delicate perſons, by reaſon of the fertility of the place, which naturally yieldeth pleaſure. So likewiſe



*The second distinction and more subtile difference*

wise they that live upon the Sea coasts are subtile, deceivers by reason of their commerce and traffick with divers sorts of people and nations. By all this discourse we may say, and see that generally those of the North do excel in body, have strength for their part; and they of the South in spirit, and have for their part subtilty; they of the middle Regions partake of both, and are temperate in all. So likewise we may see that their manners, to say the truth, are neither vices nor virtues, but works of Nature, which to amend or renounce altogether is more then difficult; but to sweeten, temper and reduce the extremity, to a mediocrity, it is a work of virtue.

## CHAP. XLIII.

*The second distinction, and more subtile difference of the spirits and sufficiencies of men.*

1.  
*Three sorts and  
degrees of people in the  
world.*

1.

2.

**T**HIS second distinction which respecteth the spirit and sufficiency, is not so plain, and perceptible as the other, and comes as well from nature as atchievment; according unto which there are three sorts of people in the world, as three conditions and degrees of spirits. In the first and the lowest are the weak and plain spirits, of base and slender capacity, born to obey, serve, and to be led, who in effect are simply men. In the second and middle stage are they that are of an indifferent judgment, make profession of sufficiency, knowledg, dexterity, but do not sufficiently understand and judg themselves, resting themselves upon that which is commonly held, and given them at the first hand, without further enquiry of the truth and source of things, yea with a perswasion that it is not lawful; and never looking farther then where they be, but thinking that it is every where so; or ought to be so, and that if it be otherwise, they are deceived, yea they are barbarous. They subject themselves to opinions, and the municipal laws of the place where they live, even from the time they were first hatched, not only by observance and custom, which all ought to do, but even from the very heart and soul, with a perswasion that that which is believed in their village is the true touchstone of truth, (here is nothing spoken of divine revealed truth, or religion) the only, or at least the best rule to live well. These sorts of people are of the school and jurisdiction of *Aristotle*, affirmers, positive men, dogmatists, who respect more utility then verity, according to the use and

and custom of the world, then that which is good and true in it self. Of this condition there are a very great number, and divers degrees; the principal and most active amongst them govern the world, and have the command in their hand. In the third and highest stage are men indued with a quick and clear spirit, a strong, firm, and solid judgment, who are not content with a bare affirmation, nor settle themselves in common received opinions, nor suffer themselves to be won and preoccupied by a publick and common belief, whereof they wonder not at all, knowing that there are many cosenages, deceits and impostures received in the world with approbation and applause, yea publick adoration and reverence: but they examine all things that are proposed, sound maturely, and seek without passion the causes, motives and jurisdictions even to the root, loving better to doubt, and to hold in suspense their belief, then by a loose and idle facility or lightness, or precipitation of judgment to feed themselves with lies, and affirm or secure themselves of that thing whereof they can have no certain reason. These are but few in number, of the School of *Socrates* and *Plato*, modest, sober, stayed, considering more the verity and reality of things then the utility; who if they be well born, having with that above mentioned probity and government in manners, they are truly wise, and such as here we seek after. But because they agree not with the common sort, as touching opinions, see more clearly, pierce more deeply, are not so facile and easie drawn to believe, they are suspected and little esteemed of others, who are far more in number, and held for phantasticks and Philosophers; a word which they use in a wrong sense, to wrong others. In the first of these three degrees or orders there is a far greater number then in the second, and in the second then in the third. They of the first and last, the lowest and highest, trouble not the world, make no stir, the one for insufficiency and weakness, the other by reason of too great sufficiency, stability, and wisdom. They of the middle make all the stir, the disputations that are in the world, a presumptuous kind of people, always stirred, and always stirring. They of the lower rank, as the bottom, the lees, the sink, resemble the earth, which doth nothing but receive and suffer that which comes from above. They of the middle resemble the region of the air, wherein are formed all the meteors, thundrings and alterations are made, which afterwards fall upon the earth. They of the higher stage resemble the firmament



ment it self, or at least the highest region next unto heaven, pure<sup>e</sup> clear, neat and peaceable. This difference of men proceedeth partly from the nature of the first composition and temperature of the brain, which is different, moist, hot, dry, and that in many degrees, whereby the spirits and judgments are either very solid, courageous, or feeble, fearful, plain: and partly from instruction and discipline; as also from the experience and practice of the world; which serveth to put off simplicity, and to become more advised. Lastly, all these three sorts of people are found under every robe, form and condition both of good and evil men, but diversly.

2.  
*Another distinction.*

There is another distinction of spirits and sufficiencies, for some there are that make way themselves, and are their own guides and governours. These are happy, of the higher sort, and very rare; others have need of help, and these are of two sorts: For some need only a little light, it is enough if they have a guide and a torch to go before them, they will willingly and easily follow. Others there are that must be drawn, they need a spur, and must be led by the hand. I speak not of those that either by reason of their great weakness cannot, as they are of the lower range, or the malignity of their nature will not, as they of the middle, who are neither good to follow, nor will suffer themselves to be drawn and directed, for these are a people past all hope.

#### CHAP. XLIV.

*The third distinction and difference of men accidental, of their degrees, estates and charges.*

**T**HIS accidental distinction, which respecteth the estates and charges is grounded upon two principles and foundations of humane society, which are to command and obey, power and subjection, superiority and inferiority. *Imperio & obsequio omnia constant: All things do consist of command and subjection.* This distinction we better see, first in gross in this Table.

		<p>Marriage, of the husband and the wife. This is the source of humane society.</p>		<p>The first general division.</p>	
		<p>Paternal of Parents over their Children. This is truly natural.</p>			
<p>Private which is either in</p>	<p>Families and household government; and it is fourfold:</p>	<p>Herile, which is twofold, of</p>	<p>Lords, over their slaves.</p>		
			<p>Masters, over their servants.</p>		
			<p>Patronal, of Patrons over their pupils: the use whereof is less frequent.</p>		
			<p>Corporations and Colledges, Civil communities over the particular members of that community.</p>		
<p>All power and subjection is either</p>	<p>Sovereign, which is threefold, and they are three sorts of estates, cunctas nationes &amp; urbes, populus aut primores, aut singuli regunt, i.</p>	<p>Monarchy, of one.</p>			
		<p>Aristocracy, of a few.</p>			
		<p>Democracy, of all.</p>			
<p>Publick which is either</p>	<p>Subaltern, which is in those who are superiors and inferiors, for divers reasons, places, persons, as</p>	<p>Particular Lords, in many degrees. Officers of the sovereignty, whereof there are divers sorts.</p>			

This publick power, whether it be sovereign, or subaltern, hath other subdivisions, necessary to be known. The sovereign, which (as hath been said) is threefold, in regard of the manner of government, is likewise threefold; that is to say, every one of these three is governed after a threefold manner, and is therefore called Royal, or Signorial, or Tyrannical. Royal, wherein the sovereign (be it one, or many, or all) obeying the laws of Nature, preserveth the



the natural liberty and propriety of the goods of his subjects. *Ad reges potestas omnis pertinet, ad singulos proprietas: omnia Rex imperio possidet, singuli dominio.* All power belongeth to Kings, to every particular man the propriety, the King possesseth all by command, private men by possession. Seignorial or Lordly, where the Sovereign is Lord both of men and goods, by the right of arms, governing his subjects as slaves. Tyrannical, where the Sovereign contemning all Laws of Nature, doth abuse both the persons and goods of his subjects, differing from a Lord, as a thief from an enemy in war. Of the three sovereign states, the *Monarchy*, and of the three governments, the Lordly, are the more ancient, great, durable, and majestical; as in former times, *Assyria, Persia, Egypt*, and now *Ethiopia* the most ancient, that is, *Muscovy, Tartary, Turkey, Peru*. But the better and more natural state and government, is the *Monarchy Royal*. The most famous *Aristocracies*, hath sometimes been that of the *Lacedemonians*, and now the *Venetians*. The *Democracies*, *Rome, Athens, Carthage*, Royal in their government.

3.  
Of particular  
Lords.

The publick subaltern power, which is in particular Lords, is of many kinds and degrees, principally five, that is to say, Lords *Tributaries*, who pay only tribute.

*Fendetaries*, simple *Vassals*, who owe faith and homage for tenure of their Land. These three may be Sovereigns.

*Vassals* bound to do service, who besides faith and homage, owe likewise personal service, whereby they cannot truly be Sovereigns.

Natural subjects, whether they be *Vassals* or *Censors*, or otherwise, who owe subjection and obedience, and cannot be exempted from the power of their Sovereign, and these are Lords.

4.  
Of officers.

The publick subaltern power, which is in the officers of the Sovereignty, is of divers kinds, and both in regard of the honour, and the power may be reduced to five degrees.

1. The first and basest, are those ignominious persons, which should remain without the City, the last executioners of justice.

2. The second, they that have neither honour nor infamy, Serjeants, Trumpeters.

3. The third, such as have honour, without knowledg and power, Notaries, Receivers, Secretaries.

4. The fourth, they that have with honour, power, and knowledg, but without jurisdiction, the Kings servants.

The

*An Advertisement.*

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5.

The fifth, they that have with the rest jurisdiction; and these are properly called Magistrates; of whom there are many distinctions, and especially these five, which are all double.

- |   |   |  |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|--|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | { | Majors, Senatours,   | { | 2 | { | Politicks.                                    |
|   |   | Minors, Judges.  |   |   |   | Militaries.                                   |
| 2 | { | Civil.   | { | 4 | { | Titularies in offices of form, who have it by |
|   |   | Criminal.  |   |   |   | Commissaries. (inheritance.                   |
| 3 | { | Perpetual, as the lesser both in number and otherwise should be. |   |   |   |   |
|   |   | Temporal and moveable, as the greater should be.                 |   |   |   |   |

Of the estates and degrees of Men in particular,  
following this precedent Table.

*An Advertisement.*

Here we are to speak in particular of the parts of this table, and the distinctions of powers and subjections, (beginning with the private and domestical) that is to say, of every estate and profession of men, to the end we may know them, and therefore this may be called, The Book of the knowledg of man, for the duties of every one shall be set down in the third Book, in the virtue of justice; where in like manner and order all these estates and chapters shall be resumed and examined. Now before we begin, it shall be necessary summarily to speak of commanding and obeying, two foundations and principal causes of these diversities of estates and charges.

CHAP. XLV.

*Of commanding and obeying.*

These, as hath been said, are the two foundations of all humane society, and the diversity of estates and professions: They are Relatives, they do mutually respect, ingender, and conserve one the other, and are alike required in all assemblies and communities; but are yet subject to a natural kind of envy, and an everlasting contestation, complaint and obrectation. The popular estate makes the Sovereign of worse condition then a Carter. The Monarchy placeth him above God himself. In commanding



## Of commanding and obeying.

ding is the honour, the difficulty (these two commonly go together) the goodness, the sufficiency, all qualities of greatness; Command, that is to say, sufficiency, courage, authority, is from heaven and of God, *Imperium non nisi divino fato datur: omnis potestas à Deo est: Empire and dominion is not given but by divine destiny: all power is from God above.* And therefore Plato was wont to say, That God did not appoint and establish men, that is to say, men of a common sort and sufficiency, and purely humane, to rule others, but such as by some divine touch, singular virtue, and gift of heaven do excel others: and therefore they are called *Heroes*. In obeying is utility, proclivity, necessity, in such sort, that for the preservation of the weal publick, it is more necessary then well to command; and the denial of obedience, or not to obey as men should, is far more dangerous, then for a Prince not to command as he should. Even as in marriage, though the husband and the wife be equally obliged to loyalty, and fidelity, and have both bound themselves by promise in the same words, the same ceremonies and solemnities; yet notwithstanding the inconveniencies are incomparably far greater, in the fact of adultery, to the wife then the husband: even so, though command and obedience are equally required in every state and company, yet the inconveniences of disobedience in subjects, are far more dangerous, then of ill government in a Commander. Many States have a long time continued and prospered too, under the command of wicked Princes and Magistrates, the subjects obeying, and accommodating themselves to their government: and therefore a wise man being once asked, why the Common-wealth of *Sparta* was so flourishing, and whether it were, because their Kings command well? Nay rather, saith he, because the Citizens obey well. For if the subjects once refuse to obey, and shake off their yoke, that state must necessarily fall to the ground.

## CHAP. XLVI.

## Of Marriage.

**N**otwithstanding the state of marriage be the first, more ancient, and most important, and as it were the foundation and fountain of humane society, whence arise families, and from them common-weals; *Prima societas in conjugio est, quod principium urbis, seminarium Reipublicæ; the first society is in wedlock, which*

was the beginning of Cities, and the seminary of the Common-wealth : Yet it hath been contemned and defamed by many great Personages, who have judged it unworthy men of heart and spirit, and have framed many objections against it.

First, they account the band and obligation thereof unjust, a hard and over-sight captivity, insomuch that by marriage, a man is bound and enthralled to the cares and humours of another. And if it fall out, that he hath mistaken in his choice, and have met with a hard bargain, more bone then flesh, his life is ever afterwards most miserable. What iniquity and injustice can there be greater, then for one hours folly, a fault committed without malice, and by meer over-sight, yea many times to obey the advice of another, a man should be bound to an everlasting torment ? It were better for him to put the halter about his neck, and to cast himself into the Sea his head downward, to end his miserable life, then to live always in the pains of hell, and to suffer without intermission on his side, the tempest of jealousy, of malice, of rage, of madness, of brutish obstinacy, and other miserable conditions : and therefore one sticks not to say, That he that invented this knot and tie of marriage, had found a goodly and beautiful means to be revenged of man, a trap or gin to entangle beasts, and afterwards to make them languish at a little fire. Another saith, That to marry a wife man to a fool, or a fool to a wife man, is to bind the living to the dead, which was the cruellest death invented by tyrants, to make the living to languish and die by the company of the dead. Secondly, they say, that marriage is a corruption and adulterating of good and rare spirits, insomuch that the flatteries and smooth speeches of the party beloved, the affection towards children, the care of household affairs, and advancement of their families, do lessen, dissolve, and molifie the vigour and strength of the most lively and generous spirit that is, witness *Samson*, *Solomon*, *Marc. Antony*. And therefore howsoever the matter go, we had not need to marry. But those that have more flesh then spirit, strong in body, and weak in mind, tie them to the flesh and give them the charge of small and base matters, such as they are capable of. But such as are weak of body, have their spirits great, strong, and puissant, it is not then a pity to bind them to the flesh, and to marriage, as men do beasts in the stable ? We see that beasts the more noble they are, the stronger and fitter for service, as horses and dogs, the more are they kept asunder from

2.

Objections against marriage.

N

the



the company and acquaintance of the other sex, and it is the manner to put beasts of least esteem at random together. So likewise, such men and women as are ordained to the most venerable and holiest vocation, and which ought to be as the cream, and marrow of Christianity, Church-men and religious, are (though not by any warrant from the word of God) excluded from marriage. And the reason is, because marriage hindereth and averteth those beautiful and great elevations of the soul, the contemplation of things high, celestial and divine, which is incompatible with the troubles and molestations of domestical affairs: for which cause the Apostle preferreth the solitary continent life before marriage. Utility may well hold with marriage, but honesty is on the other side.

Again, it troubleth beautiful and holy enterprises: as Saint *Austin* reporteth, that having determined with some other his friends, amongst whom there was some married, to retire themselves from the City, and the company of men, the better to attend to the study of wisdom and virtue, their purpose was quickly broken and altered, by the wives of those that were married. And another wise man did not doubt to say, that if men could live without women, they should be visited and accompanied by Angels: Moreover marriage is an hindrance to such as delight in travel, and to see strange countries, whether to learn to make themselves wise, or to teach others to be wise, and to publish that to others which they know. To conclude, marriage doth not only corrupt and deject good and great spirits, but it robbeth the weal-publick of many beautiful and great things, which cannot manifest themselves, remaining in the bosom and lap of a woman, or being spent upon young children. But is it not a goodly sight, nay a great loss, that he that is able for his wisdom and policy, to govern the whole world, should spend his time in the government of a woman and a few children? and therefore it was well answered by a great personage being solicited to marry, That he was born to command men, not a woman; to counsel Kings and Princes, not little children.

To all this a man may answer, that the nature of man is not capable of perfection, or of any thing against which nothing may be objected, as hath elsewhere been spoken. The best and most expedient remedies that it hath, are in some degree or other but sickly, mingled with discommodities: They are all but necessary evils.

3.  
The answer to  
the aforesaid  
objections, c. 4.

evils. And this is the best that man could devise for his preservation and multiplication. Some (as *Plato*, and others) would more subtilly have invented means to have avoided these thorny inconveniencies; but besides that they built castles in the air, that could not long continue in use, their inventions likewise if they could have been put in practice, would not have been without many discomforts and difficulties. Man hath been the cause of them, and hath himself brought them forth by his vice, intemperancy, and contrary passion; and we are not to accuse the state, nor any other but man, who knows not well how to use any thing. Moreover a man may say, that by reason of these thorns and difficulties, it is a school of virtue, an apprenticeship, and a familiar and domestical exercise: and *Socrates*, a Doctor of wisdom, did once say, to such as hit him in the teeth with his wives pettish frowardness, *That he did thereby learn even within his own doors, to be constant and patient every where else, and to think the crosses of fortune to be sweet and pleasant unto him.* It is not to be denied, but that he that can live unmarried doth best: but yet for the honour of marriage, a man may say, that it was first instituted by God himself in *Paradise*, before any other thing, and that in the state of innocency and perfection. See here four commendations of marriage, but the fourth passeth all the rest, and is without reply. Afterwards the Son of God approved it, and honoured it with his presence at the first miracle that he wrought, and that miracle done in the favour of that state of marriage, and married men; yea he hath honoured it with this privilege, that it serveth for a figure of that great union of his with the Church, and for that cause it is called a mystery, and great.

Without all doubt, marriage is not a thing indifferent: It is either wholly a great good, or a great evil; a great content, or a great trouble; a paradise or a hell: It is either a sweet and pleasant way, if the choice be good; or a rough and dangerous match, and a gauling burthensom tye, if it be ill: It is a bargain where truly that is verified which is said, *Homo homini Deus, aut lupus, Man is to man either a God or a Wolf.*

Marriage is a work that consisteth of many parts; there must be a meeting of many qualities, many considerations besides the parties married. For whatsoever a man say, he marrieth not only for himself; his posterity, family, alliance, and other means, are of great importance, and a grievous burthen. See here the cause why so few

4.  
Wholly good, or  
wholly ill.

5:  
A good marriage a rare  
good.



good are found; and because there are so few good found, it is a token of the price and value thereof; it is the condition of all great charges: Royalty is full of difficulty, and few there are that exercise it well and happily. And whereas we see many times that it falleth not out so luckily, the reason thereof is the licentious liberty and unbridled desire of the persons themselves, and not in the state and institution of marriage: and therefore it is commonly more commodious, and beter fitted in good, simple, and vulgar spirits, where delicacy, curiosity, and idleness are less troublesome: unbridled humours and turbulent wavering minds are not fit for this state or degree.

6.  
*A simple description and summary of marriage.*

Marriage is a step to wisdom, a holy and inviolable band, an honourable match. If the choice be good and well ordered, there is nothing in the world more beautiful: It is a sweet society of life, full of constancy, trust, and an infinite number of profitable offices, and mutable obligations: It is a fellowship not of love but amity. For love and amity are as different, as the burning sick heat of a fever, from the natural heat of a sound body. Marriage hath in it self amity, utility, justice, honour, constancy, a plain pleasure, but sound, firm, and more universal. Love is grounded upon pleasure only, and it is more quick, piercing, ardent. Few marriages succeed well, that have their beginnings and progress from beauty and amorous desires. Marriage hath need of foundations, more solid and constant, and we must walk more warily; this boiling affection is worth nothing, yea marriage hath a better conduct by a third hand.

7.  
*A description more exact.*

Thus much is said summarily and simply; but more exactly to describe it, we know that in marriage there are two things essential unto it, and seem contraries, though indeed they be not; that is to say, an equality sociable, and such as is between Peers: and an inequality, that is to say, superiority and inferiority. The equality consisteth in an entire and perfect communication and community of all things, souls, wills, bodies, goods, the fundamental law of marriage, which in some places is extended even to life and death, in such sort, that the husband being dead, the wife must incontinently follow. This is practised in some places by the Publick laws of the countries, and many times with so ardent affection, that many wives belonging to one husband, they contend, and publicly plead for the honour to go first to sleep with their Spouse (that is their word) alledging for themselves, the better to obtain, their suit and preferment herein, their good servive, that they were best.

## Of Marriage.

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beloved, had the last kiss of their deceased husband, and have had children by them.

*Et certamen habent lethi, quæ viva sequatur*

*Conjugium; pudor est non licuisse mori.*

*Ardent victrices, & flammæ pectora præbent,*

*Imponuntque suis ora perusta viris.*

*Strive (and give reasons) each one earnestly*

*To have the honour, with their husband dy;*

*To live is shame and loss, who doth obtain,*

*Imputes to pleasure, that which we count pain.*

*And is so ardent hot in her desire,*

*Fearing reversing judgment more then fire,*

*That she makes haste, &c.*

In other places it was observed, not by publick laws, but private compacts and agreements of marriage, as betwixt *Marc. Antony* and *Cleopatra*. This equality doth likewise consist in that power which they have in common over their family, whereby the wife is called the companion of her husband, the mistress of the house and family, as the husband, the Master and Lord: and their joynt authority over their family, is compared to *Aristocracie*.

The distinction of superiority and inferiority consisteth in this that the husband hath power over the wife, and the wife is sub-*Inequ.* ject to the husband. This agreeth with all laws and policies, but yet more or less, according to the diversity of them. In all things the wife, though she be far more noble, and more rich, yet is subject to the husband. This superiority and inferiority is natural, founded upon the strength and sufficiency of the one, the weakness and insufficiency of the other. The Divines ground it upon other reasons drawn from the Bible: Man was first made by God alone, and immediately, expressly for God, his head, and according to his Image, and perfect; for nature doth always begin with things perfect. The woman was made in the second place, after man, of the substance of man by occasion and for another thing, *mulier est vir occasionatus*, *A woman is a man occasionate, a mans occasion, and the occasion of a man*, to serve as an aid, and as a second to man, who is her head, and therefore imperfect. And this is the difference by order of generation. That of corruption and sin proveth the same, for the woman was the first in prevarication, and by her own weakness and will did sin, man the second, and by occasion of the woman; the woman, then the last in good and in generation, and by occasion, the first



in evil and the occasion thereof, is justly subject unto man, the first in good, and last in evil.

9.  
The power of  
the Husband.  
Dion. Halicar.  
l. 2.  
Lib. 2.  
Lib. 6. bel. Gal.

This superiority and power of the husband, hath been in some places such as that of the father, over life and death, as with the Romans, by the law of *Romulus*: and the husband had power to kill his wife in four cases, *Adultery, Suborning of children, counterfeiting of false keys, and drinking of wine*. So likewise with the Grecks, as *Polybius*, and the ancient French, as *Cæsar* affirmeth, the power of the husband was over the life and death of his wife. Elsewhere, and there too, afterwards this power was moderated; but almost in all places the power of the husband and the subjection of the wife doth infer thus much, That the husband is master of the actions and vows of his wife, and may with words correct her and hold her to the stocks (as for blows, they are unworthy a woman of honour and honesty, saith the Law) and the wife is bound to hold the condition, follow the quality, country, family, habitation and rank of her husband; she must accompany and follow him in all things, in his journeys if need be, his banishment, his imprisonment, yea a wandering person, a vagabond, a fugitive. The examples hereof are many and excellent: of *Sulpitia* who followed her husband *Lentulus* being banished into *Cicily*; *Erihrea* her husband *Phalaris*; *Ipsicrates* the wife of King *Mithridate* vanquished by *Pompey*, who wandered thorow the world. Some add unto this, That wives are to follow their husbands even in the wars, and into those Provinces, whither the husband is sent with publick charge. Neither can the wife bring any thing into question of law, whether she be plaintiff or defendant, without the authority of her husband, or of the Judge, if he refuse; neither can she call her husband into judgment, without the permission of the Magistrate.

10.  
The divers  
rules of marriage.

Marriage is not carried after one and the same fashion, neither hath it in every place the same laws, and rules, but according to the diversity of religions and countries, it hath rules either more easie, or more streight: according to the rules of Christianity, of all other the streightest, marriage is more subject, and held more short. There is nothing but the entrance left free, the continuance is by constraint, depending of something else then our own wills. Other nations and religions, to make marriage more easie, free and fertile, have received and practised *Polygamy* and repudiation, liberty to take and leave wives: they accute Christianity for taking away these

these two, by which means amity and multiplication, the principal ends of marriage, are much prejudiced, inasmuch as amity is an enemy to all constraint, and they do better maintain themselves in an honest liberty; and multiplication is made by the woman, as Nature doth richly make known unto us in wolves, of whom the race is so fertile in the production of their young, even to the number of twelve or thirteen, that they far excel all other profitable creatures: of these there are great numbers killed every day, by which means there are but few; and they, though of all others the most fertile, yet by accident the most barren: the reason is, because of so great a number as they bring, there is one only female, which for the most part beareth not, by reason of the multitude of males that concur in the generation, of which the greatest part die without fruit, by the want of females. So likewise we may see how much *Polygamy* helpeth to multiplication, in those nations that receive it; *Jews*, *Turks*, and other *Barbarians* who are able to raise forces, of three or four thousand fighting men fit for wars. Contrariwise, in Christendom there are many linked together in matrimony, the one of which, if not both, are barren, which being placed with others, both the one and the other may happily leave great posterity behind them. But to speak more truly, all this fertility consisteth in the fertility of one only woman. Finally they object, That this Christian-like restraint, is the cause of many lascivious pranks, and adulteries. To all which we may answer, That Christianity considereth not of marriage by reasons purely humane, natural, temporal; but it beholds it with another visage, and weigheth it with reasons more high and noble, as hath been said. Add unto this, That experience sheweth in the greatest part of marriages, that constraint increaseth amity, especially in simple and debonaire minds, who do easily accommodate themselves, where they find themselves in such sort linked. And as for lascivious and wicked persons, it is the immodesty of their manners that makes them such, which no liberty can amend. And to say the truth, Adulteries are as common, where *Polygamy* and repudiation are in force; witness the *Jews*, and *David*, who for all the wives that he had, could not defend himself from it: and contrariwise, they have been a long time unknown in policies well governed, where there was neither *Polygamy*, nor repudiation; witness *Sparta* and *Rome* a long time after the foundation. And therefore it is absurd to attribute it unto religion, which teacheth nothing but purity and continency.



II.  
Polygamy di-  
vers.

The liberty of Polygamy, which seemeth in some sort natural, is carried diversly according to the diversity of nations and policies. In some, all the wives that belong to one husband live in common, and are equal in degree, and so are their children. In others, there is one who is the principal, and as the mistress, whose children inherit the goods, honours, and titles of the husband: the rest of the wives are kept apart, and carry in some places the titles of lawful wives, in others of concubines, and their children are only pensioners.

12.  
Repudiation  
divers.

The use of repudiation in like sort is different: for with some, as the *Hebrews*, *Greeks*, *Armenians*, the cause of the separation is not expressed, and it is not permitted to retake the wife once repudiated, but yet lawful to marry another. But by the law of *Mahomet*, the separation is made by the Judge, with knowledge taken of the cause (except it be by mutual consent) which must be adultery, sterility, incompatibility of humours, an enterprise on his, or her part, against the life of each other, things directly and especially contrary to the state and institution of marriage: and it is lawful to retake one another, as often as they shall think good. The former seemeth to be the better, because it bridleth proud women, and over-sharp and bitter husbands. The second which is to express the cause, dishonoureth the parties, and discovereth many things which should be hid. And if it fall out that the cause be not sufficiently verified, and that they must continue together, poysonings and murders do commonly ensue, many times unknown unto men: as it was discovered at *Rome* before the use of repudiation, where a woman being apprehended for poysoning of her husband, accused others, and they others too, to the number of threescore and ten, which were all executed for the same offence. But the worst law of all others hath been, that the adulterer escapeth almost every where without punishment of death, and all that is laid upon him is divorce, and separation of company, brought in by *Justinian*, a man wholly possessed by his wife, who caused whatsoever laws to pass, that might make for the advantage of women. From hence doth arise a danger of perpetual adultery, desire of the death of the one party, the offender is not punished, the innocent injured remaineth without amends.

The duty of married folk, See *Lib. 3. Chap. 12.*

## CHAP. XLVII.

## Of Parents and Children.

There are many sorts and degrees of authority and humane power, Publick and Private, but there is none more natural, nor greater then that of the Father over his children, ( I say Father, because the Mother who is subject unto her husband cannot properly have her children in her power and subjection ) but it hath not been always and in all places alike. In former times almost every where it was absolute and universal, over the life and death, the liberty, the goods, the honour, the actions and carriages of their children, as to plead, to marry, to get goods; as namely with the *Romans* by the expresse law of *Romulus*; *Parentum in liberos omne jus esto, relegandi, vendendi, occidendi*: Let the Parents have full liberty to dispose of their children; yea, of banishing, selling or killing them. Except only children under the age of three years, who as yet could not offend either in word or deed: which Law was afterwards renewed by the Law of the twelve Tables, by which the Father was allowed to sell his children to the third time: with the *Persians*, according to *Aristotle*; the ancient *French*, as *Cæsar* and *Prosper* affirm; with the *Muscovites* and *Tartars*, who might sell their children in the fourth time. And it should seem from the fact of *Abraham* going about to kill his son, that this power was likewise under the Law of Nature: for if it had been against his duty, and without the power of the Father, he had never consented thereunto, neither had he ever thought that it was God that commanded him to do it, if it had been against Nature. And therefore we see that *Isaac* made no resistance, nor alledged his innocency, knowing that it was in the power of his Father: which derogateth not in any sort from the greatness of the faith of *Abraham*, because he would not sacrifice his son by virtue of his right or power, nor for any demerit of *Isaac*, but only to obey the commandment of God. So likewise it was in force by the law of *Moses*, though somewhat moderated. So that we see what this power hath been in ancient times, in the greatest part of the world, and which endured unto the time of the Roman Emperours. With the *Greeks* it was not so great and absolute, nor with the *Egyptians*: Nevertheless, if it fell out that the Father had killed his sons wrongfully, and without cause, he had no other punishment, but to be shut

1.  
Fatherly power

Dion. Halic.  
lib. 2. antiq.  
Rom. 1. in suis.  
ff. de lib. &  
post. Aul.  
Gel. lib. 20.  
Lib. 8. Eth.  
cap. 20.  
Lib. 6. Bel.  
Gal.  
Prosper.  
Aquit. in  
Epist. Sig.

Dent. 21.



2.  
The reasons  
and fruits  
thereof.

shut up three days together with the dead body.

Now the reasons and fruits of so great and absolute a power of Fathers over their Children, necessary for the culture of good manners, the chasing away of vice, and the publick good, were first to hold the children in awe and duty: and secondly, because there are many great faults in children, that would escape unpunished, to the great prejudice of the weal-publick, if the knowledg and punishment of them, were but in the hand of publick authority; whether it be because they are domestical and secret, or because there is no man that will prosecute against them: for the parents who know them, and are interested in them, will not discredit them; besides that, there are many vices and insolences, that are never punished by justice. Add hereunto, that there are many things to be tried, and many differences betwixt Parents and Children, Brothers and Sisters, touching their goods or other matters, which are not fit to be published, which are extinct and buried by this fatherly authority. And the Law did always suppose, that the father would never abuse this authority, because of that great love which he naturally carrieth to his children, incompatible with cruelty: which is the cause that instead of punishing them with rigour, they rather become intercessours for them, when they are in danger of the Law: and there can be no greater torment to them, then to see their children in pain. And it falleth out very seldom or never, that this power is put in practice without very great occasion; so that it was rather a scar-crow to children, and very profitable, then a rigour in good earnest.

3.  
The declination: Now this fatherly power (as over-sharp and dangerous) is almost of it self lost and abolished, ( for it hath rather hapned by a kind of discontinuance, then any expresse law ) and it began to decline, at the coming of the Roman Emperours: for, from the time of *Augustus*, or shortly after, it was no more in force, whereby children became so desperate and insolent against their parents, that *Seneca*, speaking to *Nero*, said, That he had seen more parricides punished in five years past, then had been in seven hundred years before; that is to say, since the foundation of *Rome*. In former times, if it fell out that the father killed his children, he was not punished, as we may see by the examples of *Fulvius* the Senatour, who killed his son, because he was a partner in the conspiracy of *Cataline*: and of divers other Senators, who have made criminal process against their children in their own houses, and have condemned

Lib. 1. de  
Clem.  
Salust. in bel.  
Catil.  
Val. Max.

demned them to death, as *Cassius Tullius*; or to perpetual exile, as *Manlius Torquatus* his Son *Sillanus*. There were afterwards laws ordained, that enjoined the Father to present unto the Judge his children offending, that they might be punished, and that the Judge should pronounce such a sentence as the Father thought fit, which is still a kind of foot-step of antiquity: and going about to take away the power of the Father, they durst not do it but by halves, and not altogether, and openly. These latter laws come somewhat neer the law of *Moses*, which would, That at the only complaint of the Father made before the Judge, without any other knowledg taken of the cause, the rebellious and contumacious child should be stoned to death; requiring the presence of the Judge, to the end the punishment should not be done, in secret or in choler, but exemplarily. So that according to *Moses*, this fatherly power was more free and greater, then it hath been after the time of the Emperours; but afterwards under *Constantine* the Great, and *Theodosius*, and finally under *Justinian*, it was almost altogether extinct. From whence it is, that children have learned to deny their obedience to their Parents, their goods, their aid, yea to wage law against them; a shameful thing to see our Courts full of these cases. Yea they have been dispensed herewith, under pretext of devotion and offerings, as with the Jews before Christ, wherewith he reproacheth them, and afterwards in Christianity, according to the opinion of some: yea it hath been lawful to kill them, either in their own defence, or if they were enemies to the Common-weal: although to say the truth, there should never be cause just enough for a Son to kill his Father. *Nulum tantum scelus committi potest à Patre, quod sit parricidio vindicandum, & nullum scelus rationem habet.* A Father cannot commit such a crime, as may be revenged with parricide, and no wickedness hath any reason. Mat. 15.

Now we feel not what mischief and prejudice hath hapened to the world, by the abolishing and extinction of this fatherly power. The Common-weals wherein it hath been in force, have always flourished. If there were any danger or evil in it, it might in some sort be ruled and moderated; but utterly to abolish it, as now it is, is neither honest nor expedient, but hurtful and inconvenient, as hath been said.

Of the reciprocal duty of Parents and Children, See L. 3. C. 14.



## CHAP. XLVIII.

## Lords and Slaves, Masters and Servants.

1.  
The use of  
slaves univer-  
sal and against  
nature.

THE use of slaves, and the full and absolute power of Lords, and Masters over them, although it be a thing common thorow-out the world, and at all times (except within these four hundred years, in which time it hath somewhat decayed, though of late it revive again) yet it is a thing both monstrous and ignominious in the nature of man, and such as is not found in beasts themselves, who consent not to the captivity of their like, neither actively nor passively. The law of *Moses* hath permitted this as other things, *ad duritiem cordis eorum*, for their hardness of heart, but not such as hath been else-where: for it was neither so great, nor so absolute, nor perpetual, but moderated within the compass of seven years at the most. Christianity hath left it, finding it universal in all places, as likewise to obey idolatrous Princes and Masters, and such like matters as could not at the first attempt & altogether be extinguished, they have abolished.

2.  
Distinctions.

Tacit. de mor.  
German.

There are four sorts, Natural, that is, slaves born; Enforced, and made by right of war; Just, termed slaves by punishment, by reason of some offence, or debt, whereby they are slaves to their Creditors, at the most for seven years, according to the law of the Jews, but always until payment and restitution be made in other places; Voluntaries, whereof there are many sorts, as they that cast the dice for it, or sell their liberty for money, as long sithence it was the Custom in *Almaigne*, and now likewise in some parts of Christendom, where they do give and vow themselves to another for ever, as the Jews were wont to practise, who at the gate, bored a hole in their ear, in token of perpetual servitude. And this kind of voluntary captivity, is the strangest of all the rest, and almost against nature.

3.  
The cause of  
slaves.

It is covetousness that is the cause of slaves enforced, and lewdness the cause of voluntaries. They that are Lords and Masters, have hoped for more gain and profit by keeping, then by killing them: and indeed, the fairest possessions and the richest commodities, were in former times slaves. By this means *Crassus* became the richest among the Romans, who had besides those that served him five hundred slaves, who every day brought gain and commodity, by their gainful Arts and Mysteries, and afterwards when

he

he had made what profit by them he could, he got much by the sale of them.

It is a strange thing to read of those cruelties practised by Lords upon their slaves, even by the approbation and permission of the Laws themselves: They have made them to till the earth being chained together, as the manner is in *Barbary* at this day, they lodge them in holes and ditches: and being old, or impotent, and so unprofitable, they sell them, or drown them, and cast them into lakes to feed their fish withal: They kill them not only for the least fault that is, as the breaking of a Glass, but for the least suspicion, yea for their own pleasure and pastime, as *Flaminius* did, one of the honestest men of his time. And to give delight unto the people, they were constrained in their publick Theatres to kill one another. If a Master hapned to be killed in his house by whomsoever, the innocent slaves were all put to death, insomuch, that *Pedonias* the Roman being slain, although the murderer were known, yet by the order of the Senate, four hundred of his slaves were put to death.

4.

*The cruelties of Lords against their slaves.*

On the other side, it is a thing as strange, to hear of the rebellions, insurrections, and cruelties of slaves against their Lords, when they have been able to work their revenge, not only in particular by surprise and treason, as it fell out one night in the City of *Tyre*, but in set battel both by Sea and Land: from whence the proverb is, *So many Slaves, so many enemies.*

5.

*The cruelties of slaves against their Lords.*

Now as Christian Religion, and afterwards *Mahumetism* did encrease, the number of slaves did encrease, and servitude did cease, insomuch that the Christians, and afterwards the *Turks*, like Apes imitating them, gave freedom and liberty to all those that were of their Religion; in such sort, that about the twelve hundred year, there were almost no slaves in the world, but where these two religions had no authority.

6.

*Diminution of slaves.*

But as the number of slaves diminished, the number of beggars and vagabonds increased: for so many slaves being set at liberty, came from the houses and subjection of their Lords, not having wherewithal to live, and perhaps having children too, filled the world with poor people.

7.

*The increase of poor people and vagabonds.*

This poverty made them return to servitude, and to become voluntary slaves, paying, changing, selling their liberty, to the end they may have their maintenance and life assured, and be quit of the burthen of their children. Besides this cause, and this voluntary servitude,

8.

*Return to servitude.*



servitude, the world is returned to the use of slaves, because the Christians and Turks always maintaining wars one against the other, as likewise against the Gentiles both oriental and occidental, although by the example of the *Jews* they have no slaves of their own nation, yet they have of others, whom, though they turn to their religion, they hold slaves by force.

The power and authority of Masters over their Servants, is not very great, nor imperious; and in no sort can be prejudicial to the liberty of Servants; only they may chastise and correct them with discretion and moderation. This power is much less over those that are mercenary, over whom they have neither power nor correction.

The duty of Masters and Servants, see *lib. 3. chap. 15.*

## CHAP. XLIX.

### Of the State, Sovereignty, Sovereigns.

1.  
The description  
and necessity  
of the state.

HAVING spoken of private power, we come to the publick, that of the state. The state, that is to say, Rule, dominion, or a certain order in commanding and obeying, is the prop, the cement, and the soul of humane things: It is the bond of society, which cannot otherwise subsist; It is the vital spirit, whereby so many millions of men do breath, and the whole nature of things.

2.  
The nature of  
the state.  
Tacit.

Now notwithstanding it be the pillar and prop of all, yet it is a thing not so sure; very difficult, subject to changes, *Arduum & subiectum fortune cuncta regendi onus*: The burthen of government is a hard matter and subject to fortune: which declineth, and sometimes falleth by hidden and unknown causes, and that altogether at an instant, from the highest step to the lowest, and not by degrees, as it useth to be long a rising. It is likewise exposed to the hatred both of great and small, whereby it is gauled, subject to ambushments, underminings, and dangers, which hapneth likewise many times by the corrupt and wicked manners of the Sovereigns, and the nature of the Sovereignty which we are about to describe.

3.  
The description  
of Sovereignty.

Sovereignty is a perpetual and absolute power, without constraint either of time or condition. It consisteth in a power to give laws to all in general, and to every one in particular, without the consent of any other, or the gift of any person. And as another saith (to derogate from the common law) Sovereignty is so called; and

and absolute, because it is not subject to any humane laws, no not his own. For it is against nature to give laws unto all, and to command himself in a thing that dependeth upon his Will. *Nulla obligatio consistere potest, quæ à voluntate promittentis statum capit*: No obligation can stand good, which hath his strength from the will of the promiser: nor of another, whether living; or of his predecessors, or the country. Sovereign power is compared to fire, to the Sea, to a wild beast; it is a hard matter to tame it, to handle it, it will not be crost, nor offended, but being, is very dangerous. *Potestas res est quæ moveri, doceri quæ non vult, & castigationem ægre ferat*: Power is a thing which will neither be admonished nor taught, and with great difficulty, suffereth any correction.

The marks and properties thereof, are, to judg the last appeals, to ordain laws in time of peace and war, to create and appoint magistrates and officers, to give graces and dispensations against the Law, to impose Tributes, to appoint mony, to receive homages, ambassages, oaths. But all this is comprehended under the absolute power, to give and make Laws according to their pleasure. Other marks there are of less weight: as the Law of the Sea and shipwrack, confiscation for Treason, power to change the Tongue, title of Majesty.

Greatness and Sovereignty is so much desired of all, because all the good that is in it appeareth outwardly, and all the ill is altogether inward: As also because to command others, is a thing as beautiful and divine, as great and difficult: and for this cause they are esteemed and revered for more then men. Which belief in the people, and credit of theirs, is very necessary and commodious to extort from the people due respect and obedience, the nurse of peace and quietness. But in the end they prove to be men cast in the same mould that other men are, and many times worse born, & worse qualified in nature then many of the common sort of people. It seemeth that their actions, because they are weighty and important, do proceed from weighty and important causes: but they are nothing, and of the same condition that other mens are. The same occasion that breeds a brawl betwixt us and our neighbour, is ground enough of a war betwixt Princes: and that offence for which a Lackey deserves a whipping, lighting upon a King, is the ruine of a whole province. They will as lightly as we, and we as they, but they can do more then we: the self-same appetites move a Flye and an Elephant. Finally, besides these passions, defects, and natural conditions, which

4.

The properties.

5.



which they have common with the meanest of those which do adore them, they have likewise vices and discommodities which their greatness and sovereignty bears them out in, peculiar unto themselves.

6.  
The manners of  
Sovereigns.

Seneca.  
Tacitus.

The ordinary manners of great Personages are, untamed pride, *Durus est veri insolens, ad recta flecti regius non vult tumor*: He that is insolent, is incapable of the truth, kingly pride will not yield to those that are true. Violence too licentious. *Id esse regni maximum pignus putant, si quicquid aliis non licet, solis licet: quod non potest, vult posse, qui nimium potest*: They think it the greatest testimony of their royalty, that that which is not permitted others, is not lawful for them, he that hath power to do much, will have power to do what he cannot: Their Motto that best pleaseth them is, *Quod libet licet*; What they list is lawful: Suspicion, Jealousie, *Suapte natura potentiae anxii*, They are naturally careful of their power, yea even of their own infants; *Suspensus semper invidusque, dominantibus quisquis proximus destinatur, adeo ut displiceant etiam civilia filiorum ingenia*: The next whosoever destined to succeed them, is always mistrusted and envied, insomuch that the civil demeanour of their own children doth also displease them. Whereby it falleth out, that they are many times in alarm and fear, *Ingenia regum prona ad formidinem*, Kings are naturally apt to fear.

7.  
The miseries,  
and discom-  
modities.

The advantages of Kings and Sovereign Princes above their people which seem so great and glittering, are indeed but light, and almost imaginary; but they are repayed with great, true, and solid advantages and inconveniencies. The name and title of a Sovereign, the shew and outside is beautiful, pleasant, and ambitious; but the burthen and the inside is hard, difficult, and irksome; There is honour enough, but little rest and joy, or rather none at all; it is a publick and honourable servitude, a noble misery, a rich captivity, *Aureæ & fulgidæ compedes, clara miseria*; witness that which *Augustus, Marcus, Aurelius, Pertinax, Dioclesian*, have said and done, and the end that almost all the first twelve *Cæsars* made, and many others after them. But because few there are that believe this, but suffer themselves to be deceived by the beautiful shew, I wil more particularly quote the inconveniencies and miseries that accompany great Princes.

8.  
1. In their  
charge,

First the great difficulty to play their part, and to quit themselves of their charge: for can it be but a great burthen to govern so many people, since in the ruling of himself there are so many difficulties?

difficulties? It is an easier matter, and more pleasant to follow, then to guide; to travel in a way that is already traced, then to find the way; to obey, then to command; to answer for himself only then for others too: *Ut satius multò jam sit parere quietum, quàm regere imperia res velle*: It is far better to procure peace and quiet, then to govern a Kingdom. Add hereunto, that it is required that he that commandeth, must be a better man then he that is commanded: so said Cyrus a great Commander. How difficult a thing this is, we may see by the paucity of those that are such as they ought to be. *Vespasian*, saith *Tacitus*, was the only Prince that in goodness excelled his Predecessors: another sticks not to say, that all the good Princes may be graven in a Ring.

Secondly, In their delights and pleasures, wherein it is thought they have a greater part then other men. But they are doubtless of a worse condition then the pleasures of private men: for besides that the lustre of their greatness makes them unfit to take joy in their pleasures, by reason that they are too clear and apparent, and made as a butt and subject to censure, they are likewise crost and pierced into, even to their very thoughts, which men take upon them to divine and judge of. Again, the great ease and facility that they have to do what pleaseth them, because all men apply themselves unto them, takes away the taste, and sowreth that sweet which should be in their pleasures, with delight to man, but those that taste them, with some scarcity and difficulty. He that gives no time to be thirsty, knows not what a pleasure it is to have drink: Satiety is noysom, and goes against the stomach.

*Pinguis amor nimiumque potens in tedia nobis*

*Vertitur: & stomacho dulcis ut esca nocet.*

*Extremity of Pleasure turns to pain.*

*So Venus satiates, and honey's bane.*

There is nothing more tedious and loathsome then abundance, yea they are deprived of all true and lively action, which cannot be without some difficulty and resistance. It is not going, living, acting in them, but sleeping, and an insensible sliding away.

The third inconvenience that followeth Princes, is in their Marriages. The marriages of the vulgar sort are more free and voluntary; made with more affection, liberty, and contentment. One reason hereof may be, that the common sort of men find more of their degree to chuse, whereas Kings and Princes, who are not of the rout, as we know, have no plentiful choice. But the other rea-



son is better, which is, that the common sort in their marriages look but into their own affairs, and how they may accommodate it best unto themselves; but the marriages of Princes are many times enforced for Publick necessity: they are great parts of the State, and instruments serving for the general good and quiet of the world. Great Personages and Sovereigns marry not for themselves, but for the good of the State, whereof they must be more amorous and jealous, then of their wives and children: for which cause they many times hearken unto marriages where there is neither love nor delight; and matches are made between persons, who never knew nor have seen one another, much less affect: yea such a great man takes such a great Lady, whom if he were not so great, he would not take: but this is to serve the Weal-publick, to assure the State, and to settle peace amongst the people.

II.  
4. *Attempt of men make one against the other in emulation of honour and valour.*  
The fourth is, That they have no true part in the attempts that men make one against the other in emulation of honour and valour, in the exercises of the mind and of the body, which is one of the most delightful things in the commerce and conversation of men. The reason hereof is, because all the world gives place unto them, all men spare them, and love rather to hide their own valour, to betray their own glory, then to hurt or hinder that of the Sovereign, especially where they know he affects the victory. This, to say the truth, is by force of respect to handle men disdainfully and injuriously; and therefore one said, That the children of Princes learned nothing by order and rule, but to manage a horse, because in all other exercises every one bows unto them, and gives them the prize: but the horse who is neither flatterer nor Courtier, casts as well the Prince to the ground as the Esquire. Many great Personages have refused the praises and approbations offered them, saying, I would accept and esteem of them, and rejoyce in them, if they came from free-men, that durst say the contrary, and tax me if there were cause.

12.  
9. *Liberty of travel.*  
The fifth is, That they are deprived of the liberty to travel in the world, being as it were imprisoned within their own Countries, yea, within their own Palaces, being always inclosed with people, suters, gazers, and lookers on, and that wheresoever they be, and in all actions whatsoever, prying even thorow the holes of the chair: whereupon *Alphonfus* the King said, That in this respect the state of an Als was better then the condition of a King.

The

*Of the State, Sovereignty, Sovereigns.*

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The sixth misery, That they are deprived of all amity and mutual society, which is the sweetest and perfectest fruit of humane life, and cannot be but betwixt equals, or those betwixt whom the difference is but small. This great disparity puts them without the commerce and society of men; all humble services, and base offices, are done unto them by those that cannot refuse them, and proceed not from love, but from subjection, or to increase their own greatness, or of custom and countenance; which is plain, because wicked Kings are as well served and revered as the good; they that are hated, as they that are beloved; there is no difference, the self-same apparel, the self-same ceremony. Whereupon *Julian* the Emperour answered his Courtiers, that commended him for his Justice, *Perhaps I should be proud of these praises, if they were spoken by such as durst to accuse me, and to dispraise my actions when they shall deserve it.*

13.

6. *Mutual and hearty amity.*

The seventh misery, worse perhaps than all the rest, and more dangerous to the Weal-publick, is, That they are not free in the choice of men, nor in the true knowledge of things. They are not suffered truly to know the state of their affairs, and consequently not to call and employ such as they would, and as were most fit and necessary. They are shut up, and beset with a certain kind of people, that are either of their own blood, or by the greatness of their Houses and Offices, or by prescription, are so far in authority, power, and managing of affairs before others, that it is not lawful, without putting all to hazard, to discontent, or in any sort to suspect them. Now these kind of people that cover, and hold, as it were, hidden the Prince, do provide that all the truth of things shall not appear unto him; and that better men, and more profitable to the State come not near him, lest they be known what they are. It is a pitiful thing not to see but by the eyes, not to understand but by the ears of another, as Princes do. And that which perfecteth in all points this misery, is, that commonly, and as it were, by destiny, Princes and great Personages are possessed by three sorts of people, the plagues of humane kind, Flatterers, Inventors of Impositions or Tributes, Informers, who under a fair and false pretext of zeal and amity towards the Prince, as the two first, or of loyalty and reformation, as the latter, spoil and ruinate both Prince and State.

14.

7. *Ignorance of things.*

The eighth misery is, That they are less free, and masters of their own wills than all other, for they are enforced in their proceedings

15.

8. *Not Masters of their wills.*



by a thousand considerations and respects, whereby many times they must captivate their designments, desires, and wills : *In maxima fortuna, minima licentia* ; *In the greatest honour, the least liberty.* And in the mean time instead of being Plaintiffs, they are more rudely handled and judged then any other : For men will not stick to divine of their designs, penetrate into their hearts and inventions, which they cannot do : *Abditos Principis sensus, & quid occultius parat exquirere ; illicitum anceps nec ideo assequare* : To pry into the hidden secret of the Prince, and to search if they can find any thing more secret ; neither will they herein forbear, although they know it unfitting : and looking into things with another visage, where they understand not sufficiently the affairs of the State, they require of their Princes what they think should be done, blame their actions, and refusing to submit themselves to what is necessary, they commonly proceed in their business rudely enough.

16.  
9. A miserable  
end.

Finally, It falleth out many times, that they make a miserable end, not only Tyrants and Usurpers, for it belongs to them, but such as have a true Title to their Crown ; witness so many Roman Emperours after Pompey the Great, and Caesar, and in our time Mary Queen of Scotland, who lost her life by the hand of an Executioner, and Henry the third, wilfully murdered in the middle of forty thousand armed men, by a little Monk ; and a thousand the like examples. It seemeth that as lightning and tempest oppose themselves against the pride and height of our buildings, so there are likewise spirits that envy and emulate greatness below upon earth.

*Usque adeo res humanas vis abditæ quædam  
Obterit & pulchros fasces, sævasque secures  
Proculcare, at ludibrio sibi habere videtur.  
So far some hidden Highness seems to frown  
On humane pride in Diadem or Crown,  
As it both laughs at it, and beats it down.*

17.  
The conclusion  
of their mis-  
eries.

To conclude, the condition of Sovereigns is hard and dangerous: Their life, if it be innocent, is infinitely painful, if it be wicked, it is subject to the hate and slander of the world, and in both cases exposed to a thousand dangers ; for the greater a Prince is, the less may he trust others, and the more must he trust himself. So that we see, that it is a thing, as it were, annexed to Sovereignty, to be betrayed.

Of their duty, See the third Book, Chap. 16.

## CHAP. L.

*Magistrates.*

**T**Here are divers degrees of Magistrates as well in honour as power, which are the two things to be considered in the distinction of them, and which have nothing common the one with the other, and many times they that are more honourable, have less power, as Counsellors of the Privy Council, the Secretary of the State. Some have but one of the two; others have both, and that of divers degrees, but they are properly called Magistrates that have both.

The Magistrates that are in the middle betwixt the Sovereign and the Particulars, in the presence of their Sovereigns have no power to command. As Rivers lose both their name and power at the mouth or entrance into the Sea, and the Stars their light in the presence of the Sun; so all power of Magistrates is but upon sufferance in the presence of their Sovereign: as also the power of inferiours and subalternate Magistrates in the presence of their Superiours. Amongst equals there is neither power nor superiority, but the one may hinder the other by opposition and prevention.

All Magistrates judge, condemn, and command either according to the Law, and then their sentence is but the execution of the Law, or according to equity, and such judgment is called the Office, or Duty of a Magistrate.

Magistrates cannot change nor correct their judgments, except the Sovereign permit it, under pain of injustice: they may revoke their commands, or make stay of them, but not that which they have judged and pronounced with knowledge of the cause.

Of the Duties of Magistrates, See *Lib. 3.*

## CHAP. LI.

*Lawyers, Doctors, Teachers.*

**I**T is one of the vanities and follies of man, to prescribe Laws and Rules that exceed the use and capacity of men, as some Philosophers and Doctors have done. They propose strange and elevated forms or images of life, or at leastwise so difficult and austere, that the practice of them is impossible at least for a long time, yea, the



attempt is dangerous to many. These are Castles in the air, as the Common-wealth of *Plato*, and *More*, the Orator of *Cicero*, the Poet of *Horace*, beautiful and excellent imaginations; but he was never yet found that put them in use. The sovereign and perfect Law-giver and Doctor took heed of this, who both in himself, his life and his doctrine, hath not sought these extravagancies and forms divided from the common capacity of men; and therefore, he calleth his yoke easie, and his burthen light: *Jugum meum suave, & onus meum leve; My yoke sweet, and my burthen light.* And they that have instituted and ordered their company under his name, have very wisely considered of the matter, that though they make special profession of virtue, devotion, and to serve the Weal-publick above all others, nevertheless they differ very little from the common and civil life. Wherein there is first great justice: for there must always be kept a proportion betwixt the commandment, and the obedience, the duty and the power, the rule and the work-master: and these bind themselves and others to be necessarily in want, cutting out more work then they know how to finish: and many times these goodly Law-makers, are the first Law-breakers: for they do nothing; and many times do quite contrary to that they enjoyn others, like the Pharisees, *Imponunt onera gravia, & nolunt ea digito movere: They impose great burdens, but will not themselves touch them with a finger.* So do some Physicians and Divines: so lives the World, rules and precepts are enjoyned, and men not only by an irregularity of life and manners, but also by contrary opinion and judgment follow others.

There is likewise another fall full of injustice, they are far more scrupulous, exact, and rigorous in things free and accidental then in necessary and substantial, in positive and humane, then in natural and divine; like them that are content to lend, but not to pay their debts; and all like the Pharisees, as the great and heavenly Doctor telleth them to their reproach. All this is but hypocrisie and deceit.

## CHAP. LII

## People or vulgar sort.

1.

**T**He people ( we understand here the vulgar sort, the popular rout, a kind of people under what covert soever, of base, servile, and mechanical condition) are a strange beast with many heads, and

and which in few words cannot be described, inconstant and variable, without stay, like the waves of the Sea ; they are moved and appeased, they allow and disallow one and the same thing at one and the same instant : there is nothing more easie then to drive them into what passion he will ; they love not wars for the true end thereof, nor peace for rest and quietness, but for varieties sake, and the change that there is from the one to the other : confusion makes them desire order, and when they have it, they like it not : they run always one contrary to another, and there is no time pleaseth, but what is to come : *Hi vulgi mores, odisse presentia, ventura cupere, præterita celebrare* : It is the custom of the vulgar sort to despise the present, desire the future, praise and extol that which is past.

They are light to believe, to gather together news, especially such as are most hurtful ; holding all reports for assured truths. With a whistle, or some sonnet of news, a man may assemble them together like Bees at the sound of the Bason.

Without judgment, reason, discretion. Their judgment and wisdom is but by chance, like a cast at dice unadvised and headlong of all things, and always ruled by opinion or custom, or the greater number, going all in a line, like sheep that run after those that go before them, and not by reason and truth. *Plebi non judicium, non veritas : ex opinione multa, ex veritate pauca judicat.* The common people have no judgment, no verity ; deem many things by opinion, few by the truth it self. Tacit. Cic.

Envious and malicious, enemies to good men, contemners of virtue, beholding the good hap of another with an ill eye, favouring the more weak and the more wicked, and wishing all ill they can to men of honour they know not wherefore, except it is because they are honourable and well spoken of by others.

Treacherous and untrue, amplifying reports, smothering of truths, and always making things greater then they are, without faith, without hold. The faith or promise of a people, and the thought of a child, are of like durance, which change not only as occasions change, but according to the difference of those reports that every hour of the day may bring forth.

Mutinous, desiring nothing but novelties and changes, seditious, enemies to peace and quietness. *Ingenio mobili, seditiosum, discordiosum, cupidum rerum novarum, quieti & otio adversum* : Of a mutable disposition, seditious, a breeder of discord, desirous of novelties, enemies to peace and quietness. 6. Salust.



leader : for then even as the calm Sea, of nature tumbleth, and foameth, and rageth, being stirred with the fury of the winds ; so do the people swell, and grow proud, wild, and outrageous : but take from them their Leader, they become deject, grow mild, are confounded with astonishment : *Sine Rectore præceptis, pavidus, socors, nil ausura plebs Principibus amotis*: Headlong without a Governour, fearful, careless, daring nothing in absence of their Princes.

7. Procurers and favourers of broyls and alterations in household affairs, they account modesty, simplicity ; wisdom, rusticity : and contrariwise, they give to fiery and heady violence, the name of valour and fortitude. They prefer those that have hot heads, and active hands, before those that have a settled and temperate judgment, and upon whom the weight of the affairs must lie ; boasters and praters before those that are simple and stayed.

8. They care neither for the Publick good nor common honesty, but their private good only ; and they refuse no base offices for their gain and commodity. *Privata cuique stimulatio, vile decus publicum* : Every one hath his private spur, contemning the publick honour.

9. Always muttering and murmuring against the State, always belching out slanders and insolent speeches against those that govern and command. The meaner and poorer sort have no better pastime, then to speak ill of the great and rich ; not upon cause and reason, but of envy, being never content with their Governours, nor the present State.

10. They have nothing but a mouth, they have tongues that cease not, spirits that bouge not : they are a monster, whose parts are all tongues ; they speak all things, but know nothing ; they look upon all, but see nothing ; they laugh at all, and weep at all ; fit to mutiny and rebel, not to fight. Their property is rather to assay to shake off their yoke, then to defend their liberty : *Procacia plebis ingenia, impigre lingue, ignavi animi* : The wits of the vulgar sort are shameless, talkative, base-minded.

Tacit.  
Salust.

11. They never know how to hold a measure, nor to keep an honest mediocrity. Either like slaves they serve over-basely, or like Lords they are beyond all measure insolent and tyrannical. They cannot endure a soft and temperate bit, nor are pleased with a lawful liberty ; they run always to extremities, either out of hope too much trusting, or too much distrusting out of fear. They will make you afraid if you fear not them : when they are frightened, you chock them under the chin, and you leap with both feet upon their bellies. They are

are audacious and proud, if a man shew not the cudgel; and therefore the Proverb is, *Tickle them, and they will prick thee; prick them, and they will tickle thee.* Nil in vulgo modicum terrere ni paveant, ubi pertimuerint impune contemni: audacia turbidum nisi ubi metuat, servit humiliter, aut superbe dominatur: libertatem quæ mediis, nec spernere, nec habere.

Very unthankful towards their benefactors. The recompence of all those that have deserved well of the Common-wealth, have always been banishment, reproach, conspiracy, death. Histories are famous, of *Moses*, and all the Prophets, *Socrates*, *Aristides*, *Phocion*, *Lycurgus*, *Demosthenes*, *Themistocles*. And the Truth it self hath said, That he being one that procured the good and health of the people, escaped not: and contrariwise, they that oppress them, are dearest unto them. They fear all, they admire all.

To conclude, the people are a savage beast, all that they think is vanity; all they say is false and erroneous; that they reprove, is good; that they approve is naught: that which they praise is infamous: that which they do and undertake is folly. *Non tam bene cum rebus humanis geritur, ut meliora pluribus placeant; argumentum pessimi turba est: It goes not so well in humane affairs, as that the best things do please the most; multitude is an argument of the worst.* The Vulgar multitude is the mother of ignorance, injustice, inconstancy, idolatry, vanity, which never yet could be pleased: their mott is, *Vox populi, vox Dei: The voice of the people is the voice of God:* but we may say, *Vox populi, vox stultorum: The voice of the people is the voice of fools.* Now the beginning of wisdom is for a man to keep himself clear and free, and not to suffer himself to be carried with popular opinions. This belongs to the second Book, Lib. 2. cap. 11. which is now near at hand.

*The fourth distinction and difference of men, drawn from their divers professions and conditions of life.*

# THE PREFACE.

**B**Ehold here another difference of men, drawn from the diversity of their professions, conditions, and kinds of life. Some follow the civil and sociable life, others flye it, thinking to save themselves in the solitary wildernesse: some love arms, others



*The distinction and comparison of the*

others hate them : some live in common, others in private : it pleaseth some best to have charge, and to lead a publick life ; others to hide and keep themselves private : some are Courtiers, attending wholly upon others, others court none but themselves: some delight to live in the City, others in the fields, affecting a Country-life ; whose choice is the better, and which life is to be preferred , it is a difficult thing simply to determine, and it may be impertinent. They have all their advantages and disadvantages , their good and their ill. That which is most to be looked into and considered herein, as shall be said, is, That every man know how to chuse that which best befits his own nature, that he might live the more easily and the more happily. But yet a word or two of them all, by comparing them together : but this shall be after we have spoken of that life which is common to all, which hath three degrees.

## CHAP. LIII.

*The distinction and comparison of the three sorts or degrees of life.*

**T**Here are three sorts of life, and as it were three degrees, one private of every particular man within himself, and in the closet of his own heart, where all is hid, all is lawful : the second, in his house and family, in his private and ordinary actions, where there is neither study nor art, and whereof he is not bound to give any reason ; the third, is publick in the eyes of the world. Now to keep order and rule in this first low and obscure stage, it is very difficult, and more rare then in the other two ; and in the second then in the third : the reason is, because where there is neither Judge nor Controller, nor regarder, and where we have no imagination either of punishment or recompence, we carry our selves more loosely and carelessly, as in private lives, where conscience and reason only is our guide, then in publick, where we are still in check, and as a mark to the eyes and judgment of all, where glory, fear of reproach, base reputation, or some other passion doth lead us (for passion commands with greater power then reason) whereby we keep our selves ready, standing upon our guard: for which cause it falleth out, that many are counted holy, great, and admirable in publick, who in their own private have nothing commendable. That which is done in publick is but a fable, a fiction, the truth in secret, and in private ; and he that will well judge of a man must converse every day

day with him, and pry into his ordinary and natural carriage ; the rest is all counterfeit ; *Univcrsus mundus exercet histrioniam : The whole world plays the Comedian* : and therefore said a wise-man, *That he is an excellent man, who is such within and in himself, which he is outwardly for fear of the Laws, and speech of the world.* Publick actions thunder in the ears of men, to which a man is attentive when he doth them ; as exploits in war, sound judgment in counsel, to rule a people, to perform an ambassage. Private and domestical actions are quick and sure, to chide, to laugh, to sell, to pay, to converse with his own, a man considers not of them, he doth them, not thinking of them : secret and inward actions much more, to love, to hate, to desire.

Again, there is here another consideration, and that is, that that is done by the natural hypocrisie of men, which we make most account of, and a man is more scrupulous in outward actions, that are in shew, but yet are free, of small importance, and almost all in countenances and ceremonies, and therefore are of little cost, and a little effect, then in inward and secret actions that make no shew, but are yet requisite and necessary, and therefore they are the more difficult : of those depend the reformation of the soul, the moderation of the passions, the rule of the life : yea, by the attainment of these outward, a man becomes careless of the inward.

Now of these three lives, inward, domestical, publick, he that is to lead but one of them, as Hermits, doth guide and order his life at a better rate, then he that hath two : and he that hath but two, his condition is more easie, then he that hath all three.

CHAP. LIV.

*A Comparison of the civil and sociable life with  
the solitary.*

They that esteem and commend so much the solitary and retired life, as a great stay and sure retrait from the molestations and troubles of the world, and a fit means to preserve and maintain themselves pure and free from many vices, in as much as the worse part is the greater, of a thousand there is not one good, the number of fools is infinite, contagion in a press is dangerous, they seem to have reason on their side; for the company of the wicked is a dangerous thing, and therefore they that adventure themselves upon the sea, are to take heed that no blasphemers, or dissolute and wicked person



on enter their ship; not only *Jonas* with whom God was angry, had almost lost all; *Bias* to those that were in the ship with him trying out in a great danger for help unto their gods, pleasantly said, Hold you your peace, for the gods perceive not that you are here with me. *Albuquerque* the Vice-roy of the *Indies* for *Emanuel* King of *Portugal*, in a great danger at Sea, took upon his shoulders a little child, to the end that his innocency might serve as a surety to God for his sins. But to think that a solitary life is better, more excellent and perfect, more fit for the exercise of virtue, more difficult, sharp, laborious, and painful, as some would make us believe, they grossly deceive themselves: for certainly it is a great discharge and ease of life, and it is an indifferent profession, yea, a simple apprenticeship and disposition to virtue. This is not to enter into business, troubles, and difficulties, but it is to flye them, and to hide themselves from them, to practise the counsell of the Epicures (Hide thy self) it is to run to death, to flye a good life. It is out of all doubt, that a King, a Prelate, a Pastour is a far more noble calling, more perfect, more difficult then that of a Monk, or a Hermit. And to say the truth, in times past the companies of Monks were but Seminaries and Apprentiships, from whence they drew those that were fit for Ecclesiastical charge, and their preparatives to a greater perfection. And he that lives civilly having a wife, children, servants, neighbours, friends, goods, business, and so many divers parts which he must satisfy, and truly and loyally answer for, hath without comparison far more business, then he that hath none of all these, hath to do with none but himself: Multitude and abundance is far more troublesome, then solitariness and want. In abstinency there is but one thing, in the conduct and use of many, divers things, there are many considerations, divers duties. It is an easier thing to part from goods, honours, dignities, charges, then to govern them well, and well to discharge them. It is easier for a man to live altogether without a wife, then in all points duely to live, and to maintain himself with his wife, children and all the rest that depend upon him: so is the single life more easie then the married state.

So likewise to think that solitariness is a sanctuary and an assured haven against all vices, temptations, and impediments, is to deceive themselves; for it is not true in every respect. Against the vices of the world, the stir of the people, the occasions that proceed from without, it is good; but solitariness hath its inward and spiritual affairs

affairs and difficulties : *Ivit in defertum, ut tentaretur à diabolo :* He went into the defart to be tempted of the Devil. To imprudent and unadvised young men, folitarinefs is a dangerous ftaff, and it is to be feared, that whilst he walks alone, he entertains worfe company then himfelf, as *Crates* faid to a young man who walked all alone far from company. It is there where fools contrive their wicked defignments, begin their own overthrows, sharpen their paffions and wicked defires. Many times, to avoid the gulf of *Charybdis*, they fall into *Scylla* ; to flye is not to efcape, it is many times to increafe the danger, and to lofe himfelf : *Non vitat, fed fugit : magis autem periculis patemur averfi.* He doth not efchew it, but flyeth it : we live more open to dangers being averted from them. A man had need be wife and ftrong, and well affured of himfelf, when he falls into his own hands ; for it falls out many times that there are none more dangerous then his own. *Guarda me dios de mi ;* God keep me from my felf, faith the *Spanifh* Proverb very excellently ; *Nemo eft ex imprudentibus qui fibi relinqui debeat ;* folitudo omnia mala perfuadet. No unwife man fhould be left alone to himfelf ; folitarinefs perfwadeth all evil. But for fome private and particular confideration, though good in it felf (for many times it is for idlenefs, weaknefs of fpirit, hatred, or fome other paffion) to flye and to hide himfelf, having means to profit another, and to do good to the Weal-publick, is to be a fugitive, to bury his talent, to hide his light, a fault fubject to the rigour of judgment.

CHAP. LV.

*A Comparifon betwixt the life led in common and in private.*

SOME have thought, that the life led in common, wherein nothing is proper to any man, whereby he may fay, that is mine, or that is thine, but where all things are common, tendeth moft to perfection, and hath moft charity and concord. This may take place in the company of a certain number of people, led and directed by fome certain rule, but not in a State and Common-weal, and therefore *Plato* having once allowed it, thinking thereby to take away all avarice and diffention, did quickly alter his opinion, and was otherwife advised : for as the practice fheweth, there is not only not any hearty affection towards that that is common to all, and as the Proverb is, *The common Aff is always ill faddled :* but



Luc.  
Acts 6.

also the community draweth unto it self contentions, murmurings, hatreds, as it is always seen, yea even in the Primitive Church : *Crescente numero discipulorum, factum est murmur Græcorum adversus Hebræos* : *The number of the Disciples increasing, there grew a murmur of the Grecians against the Hebrews.* The nature of love is such, as that of great rivers, which being over-charged with abundance of waters, being divided, are quit of that charge ; so love being divided to all men, and all things, loseth its force and vigour. But there are degrees of community ; to live, that is to say, to eat and drink together is very good, as the manner was in the better and most ancient Common-weals, of *Lacedemon* and *Crete* ; for besides that modesty and discipline is better retained amongst them, there is also a very profitable communication ; but to think to have all things common, as *Plato* for a while would, though he were afterwards otherwise advised, is to pervert all.

#### CHAP. LVI.

##### *The Comparison of the Country-life with the Citizens.*

**T**His comparison to him that loveth wisdom is not hard to make, for almost all the commodities and advantages are on one side, both spiritual and corporal, liberty, wisdom, innocency, health, pleasure. In the fields the spirit is more free, and to it self : in Cities, the persons, the affairs, both their own and other mens, the contentions, visitations, discourses, entertainments, how much time do they steal from us ? *Amici fures temporis* : *Friends steal away time.* How many troubles bring they with them, avocations, allurements to wickedness ? Cities are prisons to the spirits of men, no otherwise then cages to birds and beasts. This celestial fire that is in us, will not be shut up, it loveth the air, the fields, and therefore *Columella* saith, that the Country-life is the cousin of wisdom, *Consanguinea*, which cannot be without beautiful and free thoughts and meditations ; which are hardly had and nourished among the troubles and molestations of the City. Again, the Country-life is more neat, innocent and simple ; In Cities vices are hid in the root, and are not perceived, they pass and insinuate themselves pell-mell, the use, the aspect, the encounter so frequent and contagious, is the cause. As for pleasure and health, the whole Heavens lye open to the view, the Sun, the Air, the Waters, and all the Elements are free, exposed

exposed and open in all parts, always sustaining us, the earth discovereth it self, the fruits thereof are before our eyes; and none of all this is in Cities in the throng of houses: so that to live in Cities, is to be banished in the world, and shut from the world. Again, the Country-life is wholly in exercise, in action, which sharpeneth the appetite, maintaineth health, hardeneth and fortifieth the body. That which is to be commended in Cities, is commodity either private, as of Merchants and Artificers, or publick, to the managing whereof few are called, and in ancient times heretofore they were chosen from the Country-life, who returned, having performed their charge.

CHAP. LVII.

*Of the Military Profession.*

**T**He military Profession is noble in the cause thereof, for there is no commodity more just, nor more universal, then the protection of the peace and greatness of his Country; noble in the execution, for valour is the greatest, the most generous and heroicall virtue of all others: honourable, for all humane actions, the greatest and most glorious is the Warriors, and by which all others honours are judged and discerned; pleasant, the company of so many noble men, young, active, the ordinary view of so many accidents and spectacles, liberty and conversation without Art, a manly fashion of life without ceremony, the variety of divers actions, a courageous harmony of warlike musick, which entertains us, and stirs our blood, our ears, our soul; those warlike commotions which ravish us with their horror and fear, that confused tempest of sounds and cries, that fearful ordering of so many thousands of men, with so much fury, ardour, and courage.

But on the other side, a man may say, that the Art and experience of undoing one another, of killing, ruining, destroying our own proper kind, seems to be unnatural, and to proceed from an alienation of our sense and understanding; it is a great testimony of our weakness and imperfection, and it is not found in beasts themselves, in whom the image of Nature continueth far more entire. What folly, what rage is it, to make such commotions, to torment so many people, to run thorow so many dangers and hazards both by Sea and Land, for a thing so uncertain and doubtful as the issue of War, to run with such greediness and fierceness af-

ter



ter death, which is easily found every where, and without hope of sepulture, to kill those he hates not, nor ever saw? But whence proceedeth this great fury and ardor, for it is not for any offence committed? What phrensie and madness is this, for a man to abandon his own body, his time, his rest, his life, his liberty, and to leave it to the mercy of another? to expose himself to the loss of his own members; and to that which is a thousand times worse than death, fire and sword, to be trodden, to be pinched with hot iron, to be cut, to be torn in pieces, broken, and put to the gallies for ever? And all this, to serve the passion of another, for a cause which a man knows not to be just, and which is commonly unjust: for wars are commonly unjust, and for him whom a man knows not, who takes so little care for him that fights for him, that he will be content to mount upon his dead body, to help his own stature, that he may see the farther. I speak not here of the duty of Subjects towards their Prince and Country, but of Voluntaries and mercenary Souldiers.

*The fifth and last distinction and difference of men, drawn from the favours and disfavours of Nature and Fortune.*

#### THE PREFACE.

**T**His last distinction and difference is apparent enough, and sufficiently known, and hath many members and considerations, but may all be reduced to two heads, which a man may call with the vulgar sort, Felicity or good Fortune, and Infelicity or ill Fortune. Greatness or littleness. To Felicity and greatness belong health, beauty, and the other goods of the body, liberty, nobility, honour, dignity, science, riches, credit, friends. To Infelicity or littleness, belong all the contraries, which are privations of the other good things. From these things doth arise a very great difference, because a man is happy in one of these, or in two, or three, and not in the rest, and that more or less by infinite degrees: few or none at all are happy or unhappy in them all. He that hath the greatest parts of these goods, and especially three, Nobility, Dignity, or Authority and riches, is accounted great; he that hath not any of these three, little. But many have but one or two, and are accounted midlings betwixt the great and the little.

We

*Of Liberty and Servitude.*

We must speak a little of them all.

Of health, beauty, and other natural goods of the body, hath been  
spoken before; as likewise of their contraries, Sicknes, Grief.

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Chap. 6.

Chap. 11.

· CHAP. LVIII.

*Of Liberty and Servitude.*

**L**iberty is accounted by some a sovereign good, and Servitude an  
extream evil, insomuch, that many have chosen rather to die a  
cruel death, then to be made slaves, or to see either the publick good,  
or their own private, endangered. But of this there may be too  
much, and of these, too many, as of all other things. There is a two-  
fold liberty; the true, which is of the mind or spirit, and is in the  
power of every one, and cannot be taken away, nor indamaged by  
another, nor by fortune it felt: contrariwise, the servitude of the  
spirit is the most miserable of all others, to serve our own affecti-  
ons, to suffer our selves to be devoured by our own passions, to be  
led by opinions. O pitiful captivity! The corporal liberty is a good  
greatly to be esteemed, but subject to fortune: and it is neither just  
nor reasonable, (if it be not by reason of some other circumstance)  
that it should be preferred before life it self, as some of the ancients  
have done, who have rather made choice of death, then to lose it;  
and it was accounted a great virtue in them: so great an evil was  
servitude thought to be: *Servitus obedientia est fracti animi & abjecti,  
arbitrio carentis suo: Servitude is the obedience of a base and abject  
mind, which wanteth his due judgment.* Many great and wise men  
have served, *Regulus, Valerianus, Plato, Diogenes*, even those that  
were wicked, and yet dishonoured not their own condition, but  
continued in effect and truth more free then their masters.

CHAP. LIX.

*Nobility.*

**N**obility is a quality every where not common but honourable,  
brought in and established with great reason, and for publick  
utility.

<sup>1.</sup>  
*The description  
of Nobility.*

It is divers, diversly taken and understood, and according to di-  
vers nations and judgments, it hath divers kinds. According to

P

the



the general and common opinion and custom, it is a quality of a race or stock. *Aristotle* saith, that it is the antiquity of a race and of riches. *Plutarch* calleth it the virtue of a race, ἀρετὴ γένους, meaning thereby a certain habit and quality contained in the linage. What this quality or virtue is, all are not wholly of one accord, saving in this, that it is profitable to the weal-publick. For to some, and the greater part, this quality is military, to others it is politick, literary of those that are wise, palatine of the officers of the Prince. But the military hath the advantage above the rest: for besides the service that it yieldeth to the weal-publick as the rest do, it is painful, laborious, dangerous, whereby it is recounted more worthy and commendable. So hath it carried with us by excellency, the honourable title of Valour. There must then according to this opinion be two things in true and perfect nobility, profession of this virtue, and quality profitable to the common-weal, which is as the form; and the race as the subject and matter, that is to say, a long continuance of this quality by many degrees and races, and time out of mind, whereby they are called in our language Gentlemen, that is to say of a race, house, family, carrying of long time the same name, and the same profession. For he is truly and entirely noble, who maketh a singular profession of publick virtue, serving his Prince and Country, and being descended of parents and anceltours that have done the same.

<sup>3.</sup>  
The distinction.

There are some that separate these two, and think that one of them sufficeth to true nobility, that is, either only virtue and quality, without any consideration of race or anceltours. This is a personal and acquired nobility, and considered with rigour, it is rude that one come from the house of a Butcher or Vintner should be held for noble, whatsoever service he hath done for the Common-weal. Nevertheless this opinion hath place in many nations, namely, with the *Turks*, contemners of ancient nobility, and esteeming of no other but personal, and actual military valour; or only antiquity of race without profession of the quality; this is in blood and purely natural.

<sup>4.</sup>  
Natural Nobility.

If a man should compare these two simple and imperfect nobilities together, that which is purely natural (to judge aright) it is the less, though many, out of their vanity have thought otherwise. The natural is another mans quality and not his own: *Genus & proavos & quæ non fecimus ipsi, vix ea nostra puto: nemo vixit in gloriam nostram; nec quod ante nos fuit nostrum est: I scarce account those things*

things ours which descend from our linage or Ancestours, or any thing which we our selves have not done; no man hath lived for our glory and renown: Neither are we to account that ours which hath been before us. And what greater folly can there be, then to glory in that which is not his own? This honour may light upon a vicious man, a knave and one in himself a true villain. It is also unprofitable to another; for it communicateth not with any man, neither is any man bettered by it, as science, justice, goodness, beauty, riches do. They that have nothing else commendable in them but this nobility of flesh and blood, make much of it, they have it always in their mouths, it makes their cheeks swell and their heart too (they will be sure to manage that little good that they have) it is the mark by which they are known, and a token that they have nothing else in them, because they rest themselves wholly upon that. But this is vanity, for all their glory springeth from frail instruments, *Ab utero, conceptu, partu; From the womb, the conception, the birth;* and is buried under the tomb of their Ancestours. As offenders being pursued have recourse to Altars and the Sepulchres of the dead, and in former times to the statues of Emperours; so these men being destitute of all merit and subject of true honour, have recourse to the memory and armories of their Ancestours. What good is it to a blind man, that his parents have been well-fighted, or to him that stammereth, whose Grand-father was eloquent? and yet these kind of people are commonly glorious, high-minded, contemners of others; *Contemptor animus & Superbia commune nobilitatus malum: A contemptible and proud mind, are common vices accompanying Nobility.* Salust.

The personal and acquired honour hath conditions altogether contrary and very good. It is proper to the possessor thereof, it is <sup>S.</sup> *Acquired and* always a worthy subject and profitable to others. Again, a man <sup>personal ho-</sup> may say, that it is more ancient and more rare than the natural, <sup>nour.</sup> *Seneca.* for by it the natural began; and in a word, that is true honour which consisteth in good and profitable effects, not in dreams and imagination, vain and unprofitable, and proceedeth from the spirit, not the blood, which is the same in noble men that is in others. *Quis generosus? ad virtutem à natura bene compositus animus facit nobilem, cui ex quacunque e conditione supra fortunam licet surgere: Who is a gentleman? a mind well disposed to virtue maketh noble, who, upon what accident or condition soever is able to raise it self above fortune.*

But they are both oftentimes, and very willingly together, and



## Of Honour.

so they make a perfect honour: The natural is a way and occasion to the personal; for things do easily return to their first nature and beginning. As the natural hath taken his beginning and essence from the personal, so it leadeth and conducteth his to it; *Fortes creantur fortibus: hoc unum in nobilitate bonum, ut nobilibus imposita necessitudo videatur, ne à majorum virtute degenerent: The valiant beget those that are valiant, this is the only good of nobility, that necessity seemeth to be imposed on those that are noble, not to degenerate from the virtue of their Ancestors.* To know that a man is sprung from honourable Ancestors, and such as have deserved well of the Common-weal, is a strong obligation and spur to the honourable exploits of virtue. It is a foul thing to degenerate, and to belye a mans own race. The nobility that is given by the bounty and letters patent of the Prince, if it have no other reason, it is shameful, and rather dishonourable, then honourable; It is a nobility in parchment, bought with silver or favour, and not by blood as it ought. If it be given for merit, and notable services, it is personal and acquired, as hath been said.

## CHAP. LX.

## Of honour.

SOME say (but not so well) that honour is the price and recompence of virtue; or not so ill, an acknowledgment of virtue, or a prerogative of a good opinion, and afterwards of an outward duty towards virtue; It is a priviledge that draweth his principal essence from virtue. Others have called it, the shadow of virtue; which sometimes followeth, sometimes goeth before it, as the shadow the body. But to speak truly, it is the rumour of a beautiful and virtuous action, which reboundeth from our souls to the view of the world, and by reflection into our souls, bringing unto us a testimony of that which others believe of us, which turneth to a great contentment of mind.

Honour is so much esteemed and sought for by all, that to attain thereunto, a man enterpriseth, endureth, contemneth whatsoever besides, yea life it self, nevertheless it is a matter of small and slender moment, uncertain, a stranger, and as it were separated in the air, from him that is honoured; for it doth not only not enter into him, nor is inward and essential unto him, but it doth not

so much as touch him (being for the most part either dead or absent, who feeleth nothing) but settleth it self and stayeth without at the gate, sticks in the name, which receiveth and carrieth all the honours and dishonours, praises and dispraises, whereby a man is said to have either a good name or a bad. All the good or evil that a man can say of *Cæsar*, is carried by his name. Now the name is nothing of the nature and substance of the thing, it is only the image which presenteth it, the mark which distinguisheth it from others, a summarie which containeth in it a small volume, mounteth it, and carrieth it whole and entire, the mean to enjoy it and to use it (for without the names there would be nothing but confusion, the use of things would be lost, the world would decay, as the history of the tower of *Babel* doth richly teach us:) to be brief, the stickler and middle of the essence of the thing, and the honour or dishonour thereof, for it is that that toucheth the thing it self, and receiveth all the good or ill that is spoken. Now honour before it arrive to the name of the thing, it goes a course almost circular, like the Sun, performed and perfected in three principal sites or places, the action or work, the heart, the tongue: for it begins and is conceived, as in the matrix and root, in that beauty, goodness, profit of the thing honoured which comes to light and is produced, this is (as hath been said) the rumour of a beautiful or honourable action. *Cæli enarrant gloriam Dei: pleni sunt Cæli & Terra gloria tua: The Heavens declare the glory of God, the Heavens and Earth are full of thy glory* (for whatsoever valour, worth, and perfection the thing have in it self and inwardly, if it produce nothing that is excellent, it is altogether incapable of honour, and is as if it were not at all) from thence it entreth into the spirit and understanding, where it takes life, and is formed into a good, haughty, and great opinion, finally fallying forth from thence, and being carried by the word verbal or written it returns by reflection, and as it were dissolveth, and endeth in the name of the author of this beautiful work, where it had the beginning, as the Sun in the place from whence it departeth, and then it bears the name of honour, praise, glory, and renown.

But the question is, what those actions are to which honour is due. Some think that it is generally due to those that perform their duty in that which belongs to their profession, although it be neither famous nor profitable, as he that upon a Stage plays the part of a servant well, is no less commended, then he that presenteth the passion



of a King, and he that cannot work in statues of Gold, cannot want those of leather or earth, wherein he may as well shew the perfection of his Art. All cannot employ themselves, neither are they called to the managing of great affairs, but the commendation is, to do that well that he hath to do. This is too much to lessen and vilifie honour, which is not a common and ordinary guest for all persons; and all just and lawful actions. Every chaste woman, every honest man is not honourable. The wisest men require thereunto two or three things, the one is difficulty, labour or danger, the other is publick utility, and this is the reason why it is properly due to those that administer, and well acquit themselves of great charges, that be the actions as privately and generally good and profitable as they will, they shall have approbation and sufficient renown with those that know them, and the safety and protection of the laws, but not honour which is publick, and hath more dignity, fame, and splendour. Some add unto these a third, and that is, that it be not an action of obligation, but of supererogation.

*Desires of honour, chap. 20.*

*Lib. 3. in the  
virtue of Temperancy.*

The desire of honour and glory, and the approbation of another, is a vicious, violent, powerful passion, whereof we have spoken in the passion of ambition; but very profitable to the weal-publick, to contain men in their duty, to awaken and inflame them to honourable actions, a testimony of weakness and humane insufficiency, which for want of good mony useth light and false coin. Now in what, and how far forth it is excusable, and when not commendable, and that honour is not the recompence of virtue, shall be said hereafter.

*5.  
Marks of honour.*

The marks of honour are very divers, but the better and more beautiful are they that are without profit and gain, and are such as a man may not strain, and apply to the vicious, and such as by some base office have served the weal-publick. These are the better and more esteemed: they are in themselves more vain that have nothing of worth in them, but the simple mark of men, of honour and virtue, as almost in all policies, crowns, laurel garlands, oak, a certain form of accoutrements, the prerogative of some surname, precedency in assemblies, orders of Knighthood. And it falleth out sometimes, that it is a greater honour not to have the marks of honour, having deserved them, then to have them. It is more honourable unto me, said *Cato*, that every man should ask me, why I have not a statue erected in the market place, then they should ask why I have it.

## CHAP. LXI.

## Science.

Science, to say the truth, is a beautiful ornament, a very profitable instrument to him that knows well how to use it; but in what rank to place it, and how to prize it, all are not of one opinion: and therein they commit two contrary faults, some by esteeming it too much, some too little. Some make that account of it, that they prefer it before all other things, and think that it is a sovereign good, some kind and ray of Divinity, seeking it with greediness, charge and great labour; others condemn it, and despise those that profess it: the mediocrity betwixt both is the more just and most assured. For my part, I place it far beneath honesty, sanctity, wisdom, virtue, yea, beneath dexterity in affairs: and *See lib. 3. c. 14.* yet I dare to range it with dignity, natural nobility, military valour: and I think they may very well dispute of the precedency; and if I were called to speak my opinion, I should make it to march either side by side with them, or incontinently after. As sciences are different in their subjects, and matters, in the apprenticeship and acquisition, so are they in their utility, honesty, necessity, as also in their gain and glory: some are Theoricks and in speculations only; others are Practick & in action: again, some are Reals, occupied in the knowledge of things that are without us, whether they be natural or supernatural; others are particular, which teach the tongues to speak and to reason. Now without all doubt, those sciences that have most honesty, utility, necessity, and least glory, vanity, mercenary gain, are far to be preferred before others. And therefore the Practick are absolutely the better, which respect the good of man, teaching him to live well, and to die well, to command well, to obey well; and therefore they are diligently to be studied by him that endeavoureth to be wise: whereof this work is a brief and summary, that is to say, Moral Science, Oeconomical, Political. After these is Natural, which serveth to the knowledge of whatsoever is in the world fit for our use, as likewise to admire the greatness, goodness, wisdom, power of the chief work-master. All other knowledges are vain, and are to be studied cursorily, as appendents unto these, because they are no ways beneficial to the life of man, and help not to make us honest men. And therefore it is a loss and a folly to employ therein so much time, so much cost, so much labour as we do. It is true that they serve to heap up crowns



and to win reputation with the people, but it is in policies that are not wholly sound goods.

## CHAP. LXII.

*Of riches and poverty.*

1.  
*The cause of  
troubles.*

**T**Hese are the two sources and elements of all discords, troubles, and commotions that are in the world : for the excessive riches of some, do stir them up to pride, to delicacies, pleasures, disdain of the poor ; to enterprise and attempt : the extream poverty of others, provokes them to envy, extream jealousy, fury, despair, and to attempt fortunes. *Plato* called them the plagues of a Common-wealth. But which of the two is the more dangerous, is not thorowly resolved amongst all. According to *Aristotle* it is abundance, for a State needs not doubt of those that desire but to live, but of such as are ambitious and rich. According to *Plato* it is poverty, for desperate poor men are terrible and furious creatures ; for wanting either bread or work, to exercise their arts and occupations, or too excessively charged with imposts, they learn that of the mistress of the School, Necessity, which of themselves they never durst to have learned ; and they dare, because their number is great. But yet there is a better remedy for them, then for the rich, and it is an easier matter to hinder this evil : for so long as they have bread and employment, to exercise their mysteries, and live, they will never stir. And therefore the rich are to be feared for their own sakes, their vice and condition : the poor, by reason of the imprudency of governours.

2.  
*Against the e-  
quality, and in-  
equality of  
riches.*

Now many Law-makers, and great States-men, have gone about to take away these two extremities, and this great inequality of goods and fortunes, and to bring in a mediocrity and equality, which they called the nursing-mother of peace and amity ; and others likewise have attempted to make all things common, which could never be, but by imagination. But besides this, it is impossible to establish an equality, by reason of the number of children which increase in one family, and not in another ; and that it can hardly be put in practice, although a man be enforced, and it cost much to attain thereunto, it were also inexpedient, and to small purpose, and by another way to fall into the same mischief : for there is no hatred more capital then betwixt equals ; the envy and jealousy of equals is the seminary of troubles, seditions, and cruel wars.

wars. Inequality is good, so it be moderate. Harmony consisteth not of like sounds, but different and well according.

*Nil est æqualitate inæqualius :*

*Nothing can less equal be*

*Then it self, Equality.*

This great and deformed inequality of goods proceedeth from many causes, especially two : the one is from unjust lones ; as usuries and interests, whereby the one eat the other, and grow fat with the substance of another : *Qui devorant plebem sicut esum panis :* *Who devour the people as a morsel of bread.* The other from dispositions, whether amongst the living, as alienations, donations, endowments in marriages, or testamentaries by reason of death. By both which means some do excessively increase above others, who continue poor. The heirs of rich men marry with those that are rich, whereby some houses are dismembred and brought to nothing ; and others made rich and exalted : All which inconveniencies must be ruled and moderated by avoiding excessive extremities, and in some mediocrity and reasonable equality : for to have either intire, is neither possible, nor good, nor expedient as hath been said. And this shall be handled in the virtue of Justice.

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*FINIS.*

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OF  
**WISDOM,**  
 THE SECOND BOOK.

*Containing the general Instructions and Rules of  
 Wisdom.*

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THE PREFACE.

*Wherein is contained a general portrait of Wisdom, and the  
 sum of this Book.*

**H**AVING in the first Book laid open unto man many  
 and divers means to know himself, and our humane  
 condition, which is the first part, and a great intro-  
 duction to Wisdom, we are now to enter into the  
 doctrine, and to understand in this second Book,  
 the general rules and opinions thereof, reserving  
 the more particular to the third and last Book. It is worthiest con-  
 sideration, and as a Preamble to the rest, to call man unto himself,  
 to taste, sound, study himself, to the end he may know and under-  
 stand his defects and miserable condition, and so make himself ca-  
 pable of wholsome and necessary remedies, which are the advise-  
 ments and instructions of Wisdom.

But it is a strange thing, that the world should take so little care  
 of its own good and amendment. What wit is it for a man to be  
 utterly careless that his business be well done? Man would only  
 live

live, but he cares not to know how to live well. That which a man should especially and only know, is that which he knows least, and cares least to know.

Our inclinations, designments, studies, are (as we see) from our youth divers, according to the diversity of natures, companies, instructions, occasions, but there is not any that casteth his eyes to the other side, that endeavoureth to make himself wise, not any that ruminateth hereupon, or that doth so much as think thereon. And if perhaps sometimes he doth, it is but by chance, and as it were passing by, and he attendeth it, as news that is told, which concerneth him not at all. The word pleaseth some well, but that is all, the thing it self is neither accounted of, nor sought for in this world, of so universal corruption and contagion. To understand the merit and worth of Wisdom, some kind of air or tincture of nature is necessary: for men are willing to use, study, and endeavour, rather for those things that have their effects and fruits glorious, outward, and sensible, such as ambition, avarice, passion have, then for wisdom, whose effects are sweet, dark, inward, and less visible.

O how much doth the world erre in this account, it loveth better the wind with noise, then the body it self, the essence without it; opinion and reputation, then verity! Man (as hath been said in the first Book) is nothing but vanity and misery, incapable of wisdom. Every man hath a taste of that air which he breatheth, and where he liveth, followeth the train and custom of living, followed by all, how then should he advise himself of any other? We follow the steps of another, yea we press and inflame one another? we invest our vices and passions one into another; No man stays us, or cries *hola* unto it, so much do we fail and mistake our selves. We have need of some special favour from Heaven, and withal, a great and dangerous force and constancy of nature, to note that common error which no man findeth, in advising and consulting of that which no man considereth, and resolving our selves quite contrary to the course of other men.

There are some though rare, I see them, I understand them, I smell them with pleasure and admiration; but what, they are all *Democrites*, or *Heraclites*; the one sort do nothing but mock and gibe, thinking they shew truth and wisdom enough in laughing at error and folly. They laugh at the world, for it is ridiculous, they are pleasant, but not good and charitable. The other are weak and poor, they speak with a low voice, their mouths half open, they disguise  
their



their language, they mingle and stuff their propositions, to make them pass more currently, with so many other things, and with such Art, that they are hardly discerned. They speak not distinctly, clearly, assuredly, but doubtfully like oracles: I come after them, and under them, but I speak in good sooth that which I think, and believe clearly and perspicuously.

I give here a picture, with certain lessons of wisdom, which perhaps may seem to some new and strange, and such as no man in former time hath given in such a fashion; and I doubt not but malicious people, who have neither patience, nor power to judge truly and wisely of things, maliciously condemn whatsoever agrees not with their palate, and with that which they have already received. But that is all one, for who is he that can assure himself of the good opinion of all? but my hope is, that the simple and discrete, the Ætherian and sublime spirits will judge indifferently. These are the two extremities and stages of peace and serenity; In the middle are the troubles, tempests, and meteors, as hath been said.

Lib. I.

The division of  
this book into  
4 parts.

I.

Preparatives.

To the end we may have some rude and general knowledge of that which is handled in this book, and the whole doctrine of wisdom, we may divide this matter into four points or considerations. The first are preparatives to wisdom, which are two: the one an exemption and freedom from all that may hinder the attainment thereof, which are either the external errors and vices of the world; or inward, as passions: the other is a plain, entire, and universal liberty of the mind. These two first, and the more difficult, make a man capable and apt for wisdom, because they empty and cleanse the place, to the end it may be more ample and capable to receive a thing of so great importance as Wisdom is. *Magna & spatiosa res est Sapientia, vacuo illi loco opus est, supervacua ex animo tollenda sunt: Great and spacious is Wisdom, and had need of large room: the mind must be freed from things superfluous.* And this is the first. Afterwards they make him open, free, and always ready to receive it. This is the second.

2.

Foundations.

The second are foundations of wisdom, which are likewise two, true and essential probity, and to have a certain end and course of life. These two respect Nature, they rule and accommodate us thereunto, the first to the universal nature which is reason; for probity or honesty, as shall be said, is no other thing: the second to the particular of every one of us; for it is the choice of the kind of life proper and fit for the nature of every one.

The

The third belongs to the raising of this building, that is to say, Offices and functions of wisdom, which are six, whereof the three <sup>3.</sup> Offices. first are principally for every one in himself, which are piety, inward government of our selves and thoughts, and a sweet carriage in all accidents of prosperity and adversity : the other three respect another, which are such an observation as is necessary of Laws, Customs, and Ceremonies, a sweet conversation with another, and prudence in all affairs. These six do correspond and comprehend the four moral virtues, the first, fourth, and fifth, do properly appertain to *Justice*, and to that which we owe to God and our neighbour; the second and third, to *Fortitude* and *Temperance*, the sixth to *Prudence*. And therefore these six, are the matter and subject of the third Book, which handleth at large the four moral virtues, and in particular the offices and duties of a wise man, but in this Book they are handled in general.

The fourth, are the effects and fruits of wisdom, which are two: To be always ready for death, and to maintain a mans self in true <sup>4.</sup> Fruits. tranquillity of spirit, the crown of wisdom, and the sovereign good.

These are in twelve rules and lessons of wisdom, divided into so many Chapters, which are the proper and peculiar foot-steps and offices of a wise man, which are not found else-where. I mean in that sense wherein we take them, and now describe them : For although some of them, as honesty, the observation of the Laws, seem to be found in others of the common and profane sort, yet not such as we here require and decipher them to be. He then is wise, who maintaining himself truly free and noble, is directed in all things according to nature, accommodating his own proper and particular to the universal, which is God, living and carrying himself before God, with all, and in all affairs, upright, constant, chearful, content and assured, attending with one and the same foot, all things that may happen; and lastly death it self.

## CHAP. I.

*Exemption and freedom from errours, and the vices of the world, and from Passions. The first disposition to Wisdom.*

**I**T is here necessary for the first lesson and instruction unto Wisdom, to put the knowledge of our selves and our humane condition:



dition: for the first in every thing, is well to know the subject wherewith a man hath to do, and which he handleth and manageth to bring to perfection. But we hold that to be already done, for it is the subject of our first Book: We can only say here, as a summary repetition of all that hath been spoken, that a man aspiring unto wisdom, should above all things, and before all other works sufficiently know himself, and all men besides. This is the true science of man, very profitable, a matter of great study, fruit, and efficacy, for man is all in all. It is proper to a wise man: for, only he that is wise knows himself, and he that knows himself well is wise. It is very difficult, for a man is extreemly counterfeited and disguised, not only man with man, but every man with himself. Every one takes a delight to deceive himself, to hide, to rob, to betray himself, *Ipsi nobis furto subducimur*, flattering and tickling himself to make himself laugh, extenuating his defects, setting a high price of whatsoever is good in himself, winking of purpose lest he should too clearly see himself. It is very rare and sought for by a few, and therefore no marvel if wisdom be so rare; for they are very few that do well know this first lesson, or that do study it; there is not a man that is master to himself, much less to another. In things not necessary and strange, there are many Masters, many Disciples. In this point we are never with, nor within our selves, we always muse of outward things, and man better knoweth all things then himself. O misery! O madness! To the wise in this point, it is necessary that we know all sorts of men, of all airs, climates, natures, ages, estates, professions, (to this end serves the traveller and the history) their motions, inclinations, actions, not only publick, (they are least to be regarded, being all feigned and artificial) but private, and especially the more simple and peculiar, such as arise from their proper and natural jurisdiction; as likewise all those that concern them particularly, for in these two their nature is discovered: afterwards that we confer them all together to make an entire body and universal judgment; but especially that we enter into our selves, taste and attentively sound our selves, examine every thought, word, action. Doubtless we shall in the end learn, that man is in truth on the one side a poor, weak, pitiful, a miserable thing, and we cannot but pity him; and on the other, we shall find him swollen & puffed up with wind, presumption, pride, desires, and we cannot but disdain and detest him. Now he hath been sufficiently decyphered and presented unto us even unto the life, in the first Book,

Book, by divers means in all senses, and according to all his visages: and this is the reason why we speak no more of this knowledge of man, and of our selves in this place; but we set down here for the first rule of wisdom, the fruit of this knowledge, to the end, that the end and fruit of the first Book, might be the beginning and entrance of the second. This fruit is to defend and preserve men from the contagion of the world, and of themselves; these are the two evils and formal hinderance of wisdom, the one outward; as popular opinions and vices, the general corruption of the world; the other inward, that is our passions. Now we are to see how difficult this is, and how a man may defend himself against these two. Wisdom is difficult and rare, and the greatest, yea almost the only endeavour that we have to attain unto it, is to set at liberty, and to free our selves from that miserable double captivity, Publick and domestical, of another and of our selves: this being attained, the rest will be easie. Let us speak of these two evils distinctly and apart.

As concerning the outward, we have before sufficiently displayed the vulgar nature, and strange humours of the world, and the common sort of people: whereby it is easie enough to know what can proceed from them; for since they are worshippers of vanity, envious, malicious, unjust, without judgment, discretion, mediocrity, what can they deliberate, think, judge, resolve, speak, do well and justly? We have likewise as it were by example reported and quoted (in presenting the misery of mankind) many great faults, which the world doth generally commit in judgment and will, whereby it is easie to know that it is wholly composed of error and vice, whereunto all the sayings of the wisest in the world do accord, affirming that the worse part is the greater, of a thousand there is not one good; the number of fools are infinite, and contagion is most dangerous in a preass.

2.  
*Exemption of  
vulgar errors.*

And therefore they counsel us, not only to preserve our selves neat and cleer from popular opinions, delignments, and affections, as being all base, feeble, indigested, impertinent, and very often false, at the least imperfect: but also to fly above all things the multitude, the company and conversation of the vulgar sort, because a man cannot approach neer unto it, without some loss and impeachment. The frequentation of the people is contagious and very dangerous, even to the wisest and best settled men that are: for who is able to withstand the force and charge of vices, coming with so  
great

3.



great a troop? One example of covetousness or incontineny doth much harm. The company of one delicate, effeminate person, doth soften and make nice by little and little, those that live with him. One rich neighbour gives light and life to our covetousness. One dissolute person worketh (if I may so say) and applieth his vice, like rust, into the nearest and purest mind. What then can we look for from such manners, after which the world runneth, and as it were with a loose bridle?

4.

But what? it is very rare and difficult so to do. It is a plausible thing, and that hath great appearances of goodness and justice, to follow the way approved by all: the great beaten way doth easily deceive: *Lata est via ad mortem, & multi per eam; mundus in maligno positus*: Broad is the way to death, and many walk therein: *The world is given unto wickedness*: we go one after another like beasts for company; we never dive into the reason, the merit, the equity of the cause; we follow examples and customs, and as it were of envy and emulation, we stumble, and fall one upon another; we throng one another, and draw every one to a head-long downfall. We borrow our own overthrow, and perish upon credit: *Alienis perimus exemplis; We perish by other mens examples*. Now he that would be wise, must always suspect whatsoever pleaseth, and is approved by the people, by the greater number, and must look into that that is true and good in it self, and not into that which seemeth to them; and that is most used and frequented, and not suffer himself to be cunny-catcht and carried by the multitude, which should not be accounted but for one: *Unus mihi pro populo, & populus pro uno*: One is to me for the people, and the people for one. And when to stop his mouth, and to beat him down at a blow, it shall be said, That the whole world sayeth it, believes it, doth it; he must say in his heart, It is so much the worse, it is but a simple and wicked caution; I esteem it the less, because the world esteems it so much: likewise Phocion, who seeing the people higly to applaud something which he had spoken, turned to his friends that stood by him, and said unto them, *Hath any folly unwitting of myself escaped my mouth, or any loose or wicked word, that all this people do so approve me?* *Quis placere potest populo, cui placet virtus? malis artibus queritur popularis favor*: Who is he to whom virtue is pleasing, that can please the people? The favour of the people is attained by ill means. We must then as much as is possible fly the haunt and company of the sottish, illiterate, ill-composed people, but above all

all preserve our selves from their judgments, opinions, vitious behaviour, and without any stir keep always our own thoughts apart by themselves : *Quod scio non probat populus, quod probat populus ego nescio : Sapiens non respicit quid homines judicent : non it quâ populus, sed ut sidera mundi contrarium iter intendunt, ita hic adversus opiniones omnium vadit : What I know, the people allow not : what the people allow, I know not : A wise man respecteth not what men judge of him : He goes not the same way with the people, but, as the stars run a contrary course to the world, so he to the opinions of all men.* Remaining in the world, without being of the world, like the kidnies covered with fat, but have none themselves. *Non estis de mundo, ideo odit vos mundus : Odi profanum vulgus & arceo : You are not of the world, therefore the world hateth you : The profane multitude, I both hate and abandon.* This is that solitariness so much commended by the wise, which is to disburthen the soul of all vices and popular opinions, and to free it from this confusion and captivity, to draw it to it self, and to set it at liberty.

The other evil and hinderance to wisdom which a man must carefully avoid, and which is inward, and therefore the more dangerous, is the confusion and captivity of his passions, and turbulent affections, whereof he must disfurnish and free himself, to the end he may be empty and neat, like a white paper, and be made a subject more fit to receive the tincture and impressions of wisdom, against which the passions do formally oppose themselves : and therefore the wisest were wont to say, That it was impossible even for *Jupiter* himself to love, to be in choler, to be touched with any passion, and to be wise at one time. Wisdom is a regular managing of our soul with measure and proportion : It is an equability, and sweet harmony of our judgments, wills, manners, a constant health of our mind ; whereas the passions are contrariwise but the furious reboundings, accessions and recessions of folly, violent and rash fallies and motions.

We have sufficiently decyphered the passions in the first Book, and said enough to bring us into horreur, and detestation of them : the general means and remedies to overcome them ( for the particular in every one, are in the third Book, in the virtue of Fortitude and temperance ) are many and different, good and evil. And not to speak of that goodness and tendency of nature, so well tempered and seasoned, that it maketh us calm and clear, exempt and quit from strong passions and violent motions, and keepeth us in good  
5.  
The second  
part, Exemption  
of passions.  
6.  
General remedies  
against  
the passions.  
case,



case, equal, united, firm, and as strong as steel against the assault of our passions, a thing very rare : for this is not a remedy against this evil, but an exemption of evil, and health it self : but of the remedies against them we may note four.

7.  
Stupidity.

The first improper, and by no means commendable, is a kind of stupidity and insensibleness in not perceiving and apprehending of things, a brutish pampering food of base minds, or such as have their apprehension wholly dulled, a spiritual leprosie, which seemeth to have some shew of health, but it hath not : for it is not possible there should be wisdom and constancy, where there is not knowledge and understanding, and imployment in affairs : so that it is only a complexion, and not a virtue. This is not to feel the disease, and therefore not to cure it : nevertheless this state is nothing so bad, as to know and feel, and understand, and yet to suffer himself to be gulled and overcome.

—Prætulærim delirus inersque videri,  
Dum mea delectent me, vel denique fallant;  
Quàm sapere & ringi.—

*I rather chuse to seem a fool with ease,  
Then to be wise indeed, and yet displease.*

8.  
Counterpassion.

The second remedy is little better then the evil it self, but yet more in use, that is, when a man conquereth and extinguisheth one passion by a stronger then it : for passions are never of equal force, but there is always one or another (as in the humours of the body) which is the predominant, which ruleth and devoureth the rest, and we attribute many times very untruly that unto virtue and wisdom, which ariseth from passion : but it is not enough in these men, when those passions that bear sway in them, are not of the worst.

9.  
Precaution.

The third remedy and good (though it be not the best) is wise and artificial, whereby a man avoideth, flyeth, and hideth himself from all such accidents whatsoever, as may stir, awaken, or kindle his passions. This is a kind of study and Art, whereby a man prepareth himself before the occasions, in diverting of evils, and providing that we feel them not ; like that King, who brake a beautiful and rich cup that one gave him, to take away in a good hour all matter of brawl and anger that might happen about it. The prayer of these kind of people is, *Nè nos inducas in tentationem : Lead us not into temptation.* By this remedy, he that sets himself forward to the sport, sports not himself :

Men

Men of honour, prompt and cholerick, flye contentions, altercations, and stay themselves at the first onset and occasion of passion: For when a man is once entred, it is no easie matter to carry himself wisely and discreetly. We guide our affections in the beginning, and hold them at our mercy; but after they are once a foot, and throughly heated, they guide and carry us. Passions are far more easily avoided, then moderated, *excinduntur animo facilius quam temperantur*: because all things are in their first birth feeble and tender. In their weakness we discover not the danger, and in their full growth and strength we know not how to withstand them; as we may see in divers, who easily and lightly enter into quarrels, and law, and contentions, but are afterwards enforced to get out as they can, with shame enough, and to come to any agreement, be it never so base and dishonourable, yea to seek false interpretations, to belye themselves, to betray their own hearts, to plaister and cover the fact, which are all remedies a hundred times worse then the evil they go about to heal; *Melius non incipient, quam desinent*: They shall not begin better, then they end: from the want of wisdom, they fall into the want of heart: This is contrary to that saying of *Bis*, Enterprize coldly, pursue ardently. It is like fools, who, out of a vitious shame, are easily perswaded to agree to whatsoever a man demands, and as easily flye from their words, and revoke that they have spoken. We must therefore in all our affairs and commerce with men, from the beginning be prudent and advised.

The fourth and best remedy of all, is a lively Virtue, resolution, and constancy of the mind, whereby a man seeth and confronteth all accidents without trouble, he wrestleth and entereth into a combate with them. It is valiant, noble, and glorious impassibility, quite contrary to the first, which we have spoken of, base stupidity. Now, to form it, and to attain unto it, there is nothing more necessary then a precedent discourse. Discourse is the master of our Passions, premeditation is that which giveth the temper to the soul, and makes it hard, and steely, and impenetrable, against whatsoever would wound or hurt it. The proper means to appease and sweeten these passions, is, to know them well, to examine, to judge what power they have over us, and we over them. But above all, the sovereign remedy is to believe, and not to suffer himself to be carried with opinion, which is that which cherisheth and kindleth our passions, and is (as hath been said) false, foolish, in-



inconstant, and uncertain, the guide of fools and the vulgar sort; but to suffer himself to be sweetly led by reason and nature, which is the guide of the wiser sort, ripe, solid, and settled. But hereof, hereafter more at large.

II.  
*Presumption.*

But above all other passions, it is necessary that we do carefully guard and defend our selves from self-love, presumption, and foolish dotage of our selves, the plague of mankind, the capital enemy of wisdom, the true gangrene and corruption of the soul, whereby we adore our selves, and rest contented with our selves, we hearken to none other, and believe none other but our selves. Now we should know that we are not in greater danger in the hands of any, then of our selves. It is an excellent Motto originally come from the *Spanish* tongue, *O God keep my self from my self*. This presumption and foolish love of our selves, proceeds from the ignorance we have of our selves, of our weakness, and that little that is in us. Not only in general of the infirmity and misery of mankind, but also of our own proper and personal imperfections: but whosoever he be that hath the least grain or touch of this folly, shall never attain unto wisdom. Faith, modesty, a hearty and serious acknowledgment of that little that we have, is a great testimony of a good and sound judgment, of a right will, and is an excellent disposition unto wisdom.

CHAP. II.

*An universal and plain liberty of spirit, both in Judgment and Will, the second disposition to Wisdom.*

**T**He other disposition unto wisdom, which followeth the first (which doth quit us from this outward and inward captivity and confusion, popular and passionate) is a plain, entire, generous, and lord-like liberty of the mind which is twofold, that is to say, of Judgment, and Will.

1: *The first part, liberty of Judgment.*

The first, of Judgment, consisteth in the consideration, judgment, examination of all things, and not in tying himself to any one, but remaining free in himself, universal, ready, and open for all. And this is the highest point, the proper law and true privilege of a wise and active man. But few they are that will understand it, and acknowledge it, fewer that practise it as they should: and this is the reason why we must here establish it, against such as are

are incapable of wisdom. And first, to avoid all miscountings, we explain the words, and give the sense. There are here three things which maintain, cause, and conserve one the other, that is, to judge of all things, not to be married or bound to any, to continue open and ready for all. When I say, to judge, my meaning is not to resolve, affirm, determine: this were contrary to the second, which is, not to bind themselves to any thing: but it is to examine, and weigh the reasons and counter-reasons on all parts, the weight and merit of them, and thereby work out the truth. So likewise, not to bind our selves to any thing, is, not to settle our selves, and to remain short of what we should, bleating in the air, and to cease our endeavours, and to proceed in our necessary actions and deliberations: For I will that in all outward and common actions of our life, and in whatsoever is ordinarily used, a man should agree and accommodate himself to the common sort; for our rule extendeth not it self to that which is outward, and to the action, but to that which is within, the thought, and secret and inward judgment: yea and therein likewise I consent, that a man settle and apply himself to that which seemeth most agreeable to the truth, most honest and profitable; but yet that it be without determination, resolution, affirmation, or condemnation of contrary or divers judgments, old, and new, but always to hold himself ready to entertain better if it appear; yea, not to be offended, if another shall contest with him against that which he thinketh better, but rather desire to hear what may be said; for this is the mean, to exercise the first, which is to judge, and always to enter into the search of the truth. These three, I say, do maintain, and conserve one the other; for he that judgeth well, and without passions of all things, findeth in every thing appearances of reason, which hinder his resolution, whereby he feareth to settle his judgment, and so remaineth undetermined, indifferent, and universal; whereas contrariwise, he that resolveth, judgeth no more, but setteth and resteth himself upon that which he holdeth, and so makes himself a partaker, and a particular. To the former, fools, simple and weak people are contrary: to the second, obstinate opinative affirmers: to the third, both of them, which are particulars: but all three are practised by the wise, modest, discreet, and temperate searcher of the truth and true Philosophy. It remaineth for the explication of this our proposition, that I let you know, that by all things, and some thing, for it is said, to judge of all things, not to be assured of any,) we understand not those di-



vine verities which have been revealed unto us, which we are to receive simply with all humility and submission, and, without all controversy and discussion, submit our selves, and captivate our minds thereunto, *captivantes intellectum ad obsequium fidei*: Submitting our understanding to the obedience of faith: but we understand hereby, all other things without exception. This simple explication would be sufficient perhaps to perswade an indifferent spirit to receive this rule of wisdom: but I see and perceive a sort of people, glorious, affirmative, which would rule the world, and command it as it were with a rod; and, as others in former times have sworn to certain principles, and married themselves to certain opinions, so they would that all others should do the like, whereby they oppose themselves to this noble liberty of the spirit. It shall be necessary therefore to establish it more amply, and by order to confirm and handle these three points and members thereof.

2.  
First, To judge of all. The first is, To judge of all. It is the property of a wise and spiritual man, saith one of the first and wisest of the world, *Spiritualis omnia dijudicat, & à nemine judicatur*: The spiritual man judgeth all, and is judged of none. The true office of man, his most proper and natural exercise, his worthiest profession is, To judge. Why is he a man discoursing, reasoning, understanding? Why hath he a spirit? to build (as they say) Castles in the air, and to feed himself with fooleries and vanities, as the greatest part of the world doth? *Quis unquam oculos tenebrarum causâ habuit?* Who had ever eyes given him to keep them shut? No doubtless, but to understand, to judge of all things, and therefore he is called the governour, the superintendent, the keeper of nature, of the world, of the works of God. To go about to deprive him of this right, is to make him no more a man, but a beast; to do it singularly, excellently, is the part of a wise man; if, not to judge, hurts the simple and proper nature of man, what shall it do in a wise man, who is as far above the common sort of men, as a common man is above beasts? It is then strange that so many men (I speak not of idiots, and the weaker sort, who have not the faculty and mean to exercise it) who either are, or make shew of understanding and sufficiency, deprive themselves willingly of this right and authority so natural, so just, and excellent, who without the examining or judging of any thing, receive and approve whatsoever is presented, either because it hath a fair semblance and appearance, or because it is in authority, credit, and practice? yea, they think that it is not lawful

lawful to examine or doubt any thing ; in such sort do they debase and degrade themselves : they are forward and glorious in other things, but in this, they are fearful and submissive, though it do justly appertain unto them, and with so much reason. Since there are a thousand lies for one truth, a thousand opinions of one and the same thing, and but one that is true, why should not I examine with the instrument of reason, Which is the better, the truer, the more reasonable, honest and profitable ? Is it possible, that amongst so many laws, customs, opinions, different manners, and contrary to ours, as there are in the world, there are none good but ours ? Hath all the world besides been mistaken ? Who dares to say so ? and who doubteth but others say as much of ours, and that he that thus condemneth others, if he had been there born and brought up, would think them better, and prefer them before those he now accounteth the only good, and all because he hath been accustomed unto them ? To conclude, to him that shall be so fool-hardy to say it ; I answer, that this rule shall at the least be good for all others, to the end that they judging and examining all may find ours to be the better. Go to then, the wiseman shall judge of all, nothing shall escape him which he bringeth not to the bar, and to the ballance. It is to play the part of profane men and beasts, to suffer themselves to be led like oxen. I will that men live, and speak, and do, as others and the common sort do ; but not that they judge like the common sort, but judge them. What can a wise man, or a holy man have above a profane, if he must have his spirit, his mind, his principle and heroical part, a slave to the vulgar sort ? The publick and common should content it self, if a man conform himself thereunto in all apparent things ; what hath he to do with our inside, our thoughts, and judgments ? They shall govern as long as they will my hand, my tongue, but not my spirit ; for that, by their leave, hath another master. It is a hard thing to bridle the liberty of the spirit ; and if a man would do it, it is the greatest tyranny that may be : a wise man will take heed thereof actively and passively, will maintain himself in his liberty, and not trouble that of other men.

Now a wise man enjoying this his right to judge and examine all things, it many times comes to pass, that the judgment and the hand, the mind and the body, contradict one another, and that he will carry himself outwardly after one manner, and judge inwardly after another, will play one part before the world, and another in his mind, which he must do to preserve equity and justice

2.  
*The effect of  
this first treatise.  
A wise man is  
one within, an-  
other without.*



in all. That general saying, *Universus mundus exercet bistri-*  
*nem, All the world carrieth two faces in one hood,* should properly  
 and truly be understood of a wise man, who is another man with-  
 in, then he outwardly shews. If he were without, such as he is  
 within, he should not be accounted of, but in all things offend the  
 world: If he were within, such as without, he should be no more  
 a wise man, he should judge amiss, be corrupted in his mind. He  
 must do, and carry himself outwardly, for publick reverence, and  
 so as he offend no man, according to the law, customs, and cere-  
 mony of the Country; and inwardly judge of the truth as it is, ac-  
 cording to the universal reason, whereby it many times comes to  
 pass, that he condemneth that which outwardly he doth. *Sapiens*  
*faciet quæ non probabit, ut ad majora transitum inveniat, nec relinquet*  
*bonos mores, sed tempori aptabit omnia: quæ imperiti faciunt &*  
*luxuriosi, faciet; sed non eodem modo, nec eodem proposito: multa sa-*  
*pientes faciunt quia homines sunt, non quia sapientes.* A wise man  
 will do that which himself will not allow, to make a way unto greater  
 matters thereby: neither will he forsake good manners, but accommo-  
 date all things to the time: What unskilful and dissolute persons do,  
 that will he do; but not in the same manner, or to the same purpose.  
 Many things wise men do as they are men, but not as wise men. He  
 will carry himself in things and actions as Cicero in words, who  
 said, I leave the use or custom of speech to the people, and observe  
 the true science and knowledge of words: *Loquendum & extra*  
*vivendum ut multi, sapiendum ut pauci:* We must speak and carry  
 our selves outwardly as the greater number, and be wise as the smaller.  
 Some few examples hereof; and first of things of less moment. In  
 all humility I take off my hat, and keep my head uncovered before  
 my superiour; for so doth the custom of my Country require; but  
 yet I will not leave to judge, that the custom of the East is far bet-  
 ter, to salute and do reverence, by laying the hand upon the breast,  
 without uncovering the head, to the prejudice of our health, and  
 other inconveniencies. Contrariwise, if I were in the East, I would  
 take my repast sitting upon the earth, or leaning on the elbow, or  
 half-lying, looking upon the table side-ways as they do there, and as  
 our Saviour with his Apostles did use to do, *recumbentibus, discum-*  
*bentibus:* and yet I would not cease to judge, that the manner of  
 sitting upright at table, our faces towards it, as the custom is here,  
 is more honest, more fit, and commodious. These examples are of  
 small weight, and there are a thousand the like: let us take ano-  
 ther

ther of better importance. I will, and I yield my consent, that the dead be interred and left to the mercy of the worm of rottenness and stench, because it is now the common custom almost every where : but yet I will not cease to judge, that the ancient manner of burning them, and gathering their ashes together, is more noble, and more neat, to commit and commend to the fire, the excellentest element, enemy to putrefaction and stench, neighbour to heaven it self, a sign of immortality, a shadow of the Divinity, and whereof the use is proper and peculiar unto man, rather then to the earth, which is the ordure, lees, dregs of the elements, the sink of the world, the mother of corruption; and to the worms, which is the extremest ignominy and horreur, and so to couple and handle alike a man and a beast. Religion it self teacheth and commandeth to dispose after this manner, of all things, as of the paschal lamb which might not be eaten, and (where Popery beareth sway ) the consecrated host, and divers the like ; why then should not the like respect be had of our bodies ? What can a man do that is more dishonourable to the body, then to cast it into the earth there to corrupt ? It seemeth to me, to be the uttermost punishment that can be inflicted upon infamous persons and hainous offenders, and that the carcasses of honest and honourable men should be handled with better respect. Doubtless of all the manners in disposing of dead bodies, which may be reduced to five, that is, to commit them to the four elements, and the bowels of wild beasts ; the vilest, and basest, and most shameful, is to interre them ; the most noble and honourable, to burn them. Again, I will and consent, that this my Wife-man in things natural be modest, that he hide and cover those parts and actions that are called shameful, dishonourable ; and he that should do otherwise, I would detest, and think hardly of him, because it is almost the custom of the whole world ; but yet I will nevertheless, that he judge that simply in themselves, and according to nature, they are no more shameful then the nose or the mouth, to drink and to eat. Nature, that is, God, having made nothing shameful ; but it is from another cause, not from nature, that is to say, from the enemy of nature, which is Sin. Divinity also more chaste then Philosophy telleth us, that to entire nature, not yet altered by the sin of man, these parts and actions were not shameful, for then shame was not ; it is the enemy of nature, the fruit of sin. I consent to apparel my self like those of my Country and Profession, and if I had been born in those Countries where they



go naked, I would have gone so too; but yet I cease not to judge, that neither of the two fashions is very good; and if I were to chuse and ordain, I would chuse a fashion indifferent betwixt both, out of those Countries where they cover themselves with one only and simple covering, light and easie enough, without fashion, or cost; For our manner of attiring is not good, yea worse then to go naked, to be so fast wrapped and bound, with such a multitude and variety of coverings of divers stuffs, even to the number of four, five, six, one upon another, and whereof some are double, that they hold us prest and packt up with so many ties, bindings, butnings (not to speak of that dissolute and abominable excess condemned by all good laws) that we can hardly stir our selves in them. I will content my self with these examples. The self-same, a man may say of all laws, customs, manners, and of that which is *de facto*; and much more of opinions, and that which is *de jure*.

4.  
*An Objection.*

If any man shall say, that I have judged amiss in these examples, and that generally, if liberty be given to judge of all things, the spirit will wander and lose it self, filling and furnishing it self with follies and false opinions: I answer to the first, which toucheth me in particular, that it is very easie to erre in finding the truth in all these instances, and yet it is over-boldness to accuse any man; for it is as much as if he should say, that a man knows where and what the truth is in things, which who can perfectly know or judge of? Now not to find the truth, is not to judge amiss; to judge amiss, is to weigh and ballance, and compare amiss, that is to say, not to examine the reasons, and to ponder them according to the first and universal nature, (both which though a man do, yet it followeth not, that he must needs find out the truth.) Now I believe nothing that is but simply affirmed, if it be not likewise proved; but if any man by contrary reasons more strong and forcible, shall make good what he saith, of all others he is the welcomest man unto me, and the man I look for: Oppositions and contradictions well urged, and with reason, are the true means to exercise this judging-office. I had never set down these opinions, but that I looked that some one or other should abrogate them, and help me to better, and to answer more effectually, and to that general objection of the danger that there is in this liberty, besides that which hath been spoken, and shall more expressly be said in the third Lesson of Wisdom and Chapter following, that the rule which we ought to hold in judging, and in all things, is Nature, natural and universal Reason, following

ing which a man can never erre. See here the other member of this judicious liberty which we are about to handle, which will furnish us with a remedy against this pretended danger.

The other point of this lord-like liberty of spirit, is an indifference of taste, and a deferring of a settled resolution, whereby a wise man considering coldly, and without passion, all things; as is said, is not obstinate, doth not swear, tie, bind himself to any opinion; keeping himself always ready to receive the truth, or that which seems to him to have best semblance of truth, and saying in his inward and secret judgment, that which our Ancients were wont to say in their outward and publick, *Ita videtur*, It seemeth so; there is great appearance of truth on this side; and if any man do contradict and oppose himself, with patience he is ready to understand the contrary reasons, and to receive them; finding them more strong and better; and when he hath heard what he can hear, he still thinketh that either there is, or may be better, though as yet it appeareth not. This dilation and putting off of a mans judgment, is founded first upon those propositions so much celebrated among the wise, *That there is nothing certain, that we know nothing, that there is nothing in nature but doubt, nothing certain but incertainty.* *Solum certum, nihil esse certi; hoc unum scio, quod nihil scio:* The only thing certain, is that nothing is certain; this one thing know I, that I know nothing: That of all things a man may dispute alike; that we do nothing but search, inquire, and grope after appearances: *Scimus nihil, opinamur verisimilia:* We know nothing, and imagine likelihoods. That verity is not a thing of our own invention and purchase, and when it yields it self into our hands, we have nothing in our selves whereby we may challenge it, possess it, or assure our selves of it: That truth and falsehood enter into us by one and the same gate, and there hold the same place and credit, and maintain themselves by the same means: That there is no opinion held by all, or current in all places, none that is not bated and disputed, that another hath not held and maintained quite contrary unto it: That all things have two handles and two visages, and there is reason for all, and there is not any that hath not his contrary, it is of Lead, it turneth and accommodateth it self to whatsoever a man will have it: To be short, It is the doctrine and practice of all the wisest, greatest, and most noble Philosophers, who have made profession of ignorance; doubting, inquiring, searching. Others, notwithstanding they have been dogmatists, and affirmers; yet



yet it hath been of gestures and works only, and that to shew, how far they could wade in the purchase and search of the truth, *Quam docti fingunt magis quàm norunt*: Which the learned rather imagine, then know: giving unto all things no other nor stronger title, then probability and true likelihood, and handling them diversly, sometimes with one visage and in one sense, sometimes in another, by problematical questions, rather inquiring then instructing; and many times shewing that they speak not in earnest, but in sport and for exercise: *Nontam id sensisse quod dicerent, quàm exercere ingenia materiae difficultate voluisse videntur*. They will seem not so much to think what they say, as to exercise their wits with the difficulty of the matter. And who will believe that it was the purpose of Plato to tie men to his Common-wealth, and his *Idea's*; of Pythagoras, to his numbers; of Epicurus, to his *Atomes*, or to give them for current coin? They took pleasure to solace their spirits with pleasant and subtle inventions, *Quæ ex ingenio finguntur, non ex scientia vi*: Which they rather feign wittily, then know skilfully. Sometimes likewise they have studied after difficulty, to cover the vanity of their subject, and to employ the curiosity of their spirits. And Aristotle, the most resolute of all the rest, the Prince of Dogmatists, and peremptory affirmers, the God of Pedanties, how often hath he been cross in his opinions, not knowing what to resolve in that point of the Soul, wherein he is almost always unlike to himself; and in many other things more base, which he knew not how to find or understand, ingenuously confessing sometimes the great weakness of man in finding and knowing the truth.

6.  
Objects.

They that have come after, of a pedantical and presumptuous spirit, who make Aristotle and others say what they please, and are more obstinate in their opinions then ever they were, disavowing those for Disciples that faint in their opinions, hate and arrogantly condemn this rule of wisdom, this modesty, and Academical staidness, glorying in their obstinate opinions, whether they be right or wrong, loving better a heady froward affirmer against their own opinions, and against whom they may exercise their wit and skill, then a modest peaceable man, who doubteth and maketh stay of his judgment, against whom their wits are dulled, that is to say, a fool then a wise man: like to women, who love better to be contradicted, even with injury, then that a man either out of the coldness of his nature, or contempt, should say nothing to them, where-

whereby they imagine they are either scorned or condemned, wherein they shew their iniquity. For why should it not be as lawful to doubt, and consider of things as doubtful, not determining of any thing, as it is to them to affirm? Why should it not be lawful ingenuously to confess that which a man knoweth not, since in verity he knoweth it not, and to hold in suspense that which he is not assured of, and against which there are many reasons and oppositions? It is certain according to the opinion of the wisest, that we are ignorant of much more then we know, that all our knowledge is the lesser part, and almost nothing in regard of that we know not: the causes of our ignorances are infinite, and both in respect of the things themselves, either too far from us, or too near, too great, or too little, too durable, or not durable enough, perpetually changing, and in respect of our selves, and the manner of knowing them, which as yet is not sufficiently learned. And that which we think we know, we know not, neither can we hold it well, for with violence it is got from us; and if it may not be gotten because our obstinacy in opinion is strong, yet we are discontented with it, and much troubled. Now how should we be capable to know more or less, if we grow resolute in our opinions, settle and repose our selves in certain things, and in such manner, that we seek no farther, nor to examine any more that which we think to hold? They think this suspension a shame and a weakness, because they know not what it is, and they perceive not that the greatest men that are, have made profession thereof; they blush, and have not the heart freely to say, I know not; so much are they possessed with the opinion and presumption of science: and they know not that there is a kind of ignorance and doubt, more learned, and more certain, more noble and generous, then all their science and certainty. This is that that hath made *Socrates* so renowned, and held for the wisest man: It is the science of sciences, and the fruit of all our studies: it is a modest, mild, innocent, and hearty acknowledgment of the mystical height of truth, and of the poverty of our humane condition full of darkness, weakness, uncertainty, *Cogitationes mortalium timidae, incertae inventiones nostrae; Deus novit cogitationes hominum, quoniam vanae sunt.* *Man's thoughts are fearful, and our inventions uncertain: God knows the thought of man, how vain it is.* Here I would tell you, that I caused to be graven over the gate of my little house which I built at *Condom*, in the year 1600. this word, *I know not.*

But



But they will needs that we submit our selves in all duty to certain principles, which is an unjust tyranny. I yield my consent, that a man employ them in all judgment, and make use of them, but yet not so, as that a man may not spurn against them, for against that opinion I oppose my self. Who is he in the whole world, that hath right to command, and give Laws to the world, to subject the spirits of men, and to give principles, which may be no more examined, that a man may no more deny or doubt of; but God himself, the sovereign Spirit, and true principle of the world, who is only to be believed, because he saith it? All other things are subject to tryal and opposition, and it is weakness to subject our selves unto it. If they will that I submit my self to principles, I will say to them, as the Curate said to his Parishioners in a matter of time, and as a Prince of ours to the Secretaries of this age in a point of Religion; Do you first agree to these principles, and then I will submit my self unto them. Now there is as great doubt and dispute in the principles, as in the conclusions; in the *Theses*, as in the *Hypotheses*, whereby there are so many sects amongst them, that if I yield my self to the one, I offend all the rest. They say likewise, that it is a great affliction, not to be resolved, to remain always in doubt, yea, that it is a matter of difficulty for a man to continue long in that state. They have reason to say it, for they find it so in themselves, being the property of fools, and weak minds, of presumptuous fools, passionate and obstinate in certain opinions, who condemn all others; and although they be overcome, never yield themselves, vexing and putting themselves into choler, never acknowledge any reason. If they be constrained to change their opinions, being altered they are as resolute and obstinate in their new, as they were before in their first opinion, not knowing how to hold any thing without passion, and never disputing to learn and find the truth, but to maintain that which they have sworn and bound themselves unto. These kind of people know nothing, neither know they what it is to know, because they think to know and to hold the truth in their sleeves. Because thou thinkest thou seest, thou seest nothing, saith the Doctor of truth to the glorious and presumptuous man; *Si quis existimet se scire aliquid, nondum cognovit quemadmodum oporteat eum scire: He that thinks he knows something, knows not yet what he ought to know.* It is fit that weak men that have not strength to keep themselves upright upon their feet, be kept up with props; they cannot live but in bonds, nor maintain themselves

*John 9.*

*2 Cor. 8.*

themselves free, a people born to servitude, they fear Bug-bears, or that the Wolf will eat them if they be alone. But in wise, modest, and staid men, it is quite contrary, the surest stay and most happy estate of the spirit, which by this means keepeth it self firm, upright, constant, inflexible, always free and to it self: *hoc liberiores & solutiores sumus, quia integra nobis judicandi potestas manet*: Herein we are free, because in our selves we have full power to judge. It is a very sweet, peaceable, and pleasant sojourn or delay, where a man feareth not to fail or miscount himself, where a man is in the calm, under covert, and out of danger of participating so many errours produced by the phantasie of man, and whereof the world is full, of entangling himself in complaints, divisions, disputes, of offending divers parties, of belying and gainsaying his own belief, of changing, repenting, and re-advising himself. For how often hath time made us see that we have been deceived in our thoughts, and hath enforced us to change our opinions? To be brief, it is to keep the mind in peace and tranquillity, far from agitations and vices, which proceed from that opinion of science which we think to have in things; for from thence do spring pride, ambition, immoderate desires, obstinacy in opinion, presumption, love of novelties, rebellion, disobedience. From whence come trouble, sects, heresies, seditions, but from men fierce, obstinate, and resolute in opinion? not from Academicks, neuters, modest, indifferent, staid, that is to say, wise men. Moreover let me tell them, that it is a thing that doth more service to Piety, Religion, and Divine operation, then any thing whatsoever: I say, service as well in the generation and propagation, as the conservation thereof. Divinity, yea, the mystical part thereof, teacheth us, that well to prepare our souls for God and the receiving of his holy Spirit, we must empty, cleanse, purifie them, and leave them naked of all opinion, belief, affection; make them like a white paper, dead to it self and to the world, that God might live and work in it, drive away the old master, to establish the new; *Expurgate vetus fermentum, exuite veterem hominem*: Purge the old leaven, and put off the old man. So that it seemeth, that to plant and establish Christianity among Infidels, or misbelieving people, as in these days in *China*, it were a very excellent method to begin with these propositions and perswasions: That all the wisdom of the world is but vanity and leasing: That the world is wholly composed, torn, and vilified with the forged phantastical opinions of every private mans brain: That God hath created



man to know the truth, but that he cannot know it of himself, nor by any humane means : And, that it is necessary that God himself, in whose bosom it resideth, and who hath wrought a desire thereof in man, should reveal it as he doth. But, The better to prepare himself for this revelation, man must first renounce and chafe away all opinions and beliefs, wherewith the spirit is already anticipated and besotted, and present himself white, naked, and ready to receive it. Having well beaten and gained this point, and made men as it were Academicks and Pyrrhonians, it is necessary that we propose the Principles of Christianity as sent from Heaven, brought by the Embassadour and perfect Messenger of the Divinity, authorized and confirmed in his time by so many marvellous proofs and authentical testimonies. So that we see that this innocent and modest delay from resolution, is a great means to true piety, not only to receive it, as hath been said, but to preserve it ; for with it there never are heresies, and selected particular extravagant opinions. An *Academick* or *Pyrrhonian* was never heretick, they are things opposite. It may be some man will say, that he will never be either good Christian or Catholick, because he will as well be a neuter and irresolute in the one, as the other. This is to understand amiss that which hath been spoken, because there is no delay to be made, nor place to judge, nor liberty in that which concerneth God ; but we must suffer him to put and engrave that which pleaseth him, and none other. I have made here a digression for the honour of this our rule against such as contradict it. Let us now return to the matter.

7.  
3. The third  
part, universality of Spirit.

After these two, To judge of all, To be slow in determining, there cometh in the third place, the Universality of spirit, whereby a wise man taketh a view, and entreth into consideration of the whole Universe : he is a Citizen of the world, like *Socrates*, he containeth in his affection all humane kind, he walketh through all, as if they were near unto him, he seeth like the Sun, with an equal, settled, and indifferent regard, as from a high Watch-Tower, all the changes and interchangeable courses of things, not changing himself, but always continuing one and the same, which is a livery of the Divinity, and a high priviledge of a wiseman, who is the image of God upon earth ; *Magna & generosa res animus humanus, nullos sibi poni nisi communes & cum Deo terminos patitur. Non idem sapientem, qui ceteros, terminus includit ; omnia illi secula, ut Deo, serviunt. Nullum seculum magnis ingenii clausum, nullum*

non

*non cogitationi pervium tempus. Quam naturale in immensum mentem suam extendere, in hoc à natura formatus homo, ut paria disvelit, ac se in spatium suum extendat.* Great and generous is the mind of man; it endureth no bounds, but such as belong to God himself. The same holdeth not a wise man, which includeth all other things; all times obey him as God himself. No times are hid from great wits, nor any not subject to their thoughts. It is natural for mans mind to reach beyond the moon, wherein nature hath framed in man a desire to be equal to the gods, and to extend himself to his greatness. The most beautiful and greatest spirits are the more universal, as the more base and blunt are the particular. It is a sottish weakness to think that a man must believe, do, live, in all respects as at home in his own village and countrey; or that the accidents that fall out here, concern, and are common with the rest of the world. A fool, if a man tell him that there are divers manners, customs, laws, opinions, contrary to those which he seeth in use, either he will not believe them, and saith they are fables, or he presently refuseth and condemneth them as barbarous, so partial is he, and so much enthralled with those his municipal manners; which he accounteth the only true, natural, universal. Every man calleth that barbarous, that agreeth not with his palate and custom; and it seemeth that we have no other touch of truth and reason, then the example and the *Idea* of the opinions and customs of that country where we live. These kind of people judge of nothing, neither can they; they are slaves to that they hold, a strong prevention and anticipation of opinions, doth wholly possess them, they are so besotted, that they can neither say, nor do, otherwise. Now partiality is an enemy to liberty, and over-ruleth the mind already tainted and preoccupied with a particular custom, that it cannot judge aright of others; an indifferent man judgeth all things. He that is fastned to one place, is banished and deprived from all others. The paper that is blurred with another colour, is no more capable of any other, whereas the white is fit to receive any. A Judge that hears a cause with a prejudicate opinion, and inclineth to one part more then to another, cannot be a just, upright, and true Judge. Now a wise man must free himself from this brutish blockishness, and present unto himself as in a table this great image of our Mother-nature in her entire majesty, mark and consider her in a realm, an empire, yea in this whole visible world, as in the figure of a small point, and there read that general and constant variety in all things, so many humours, judgments,



ments, beliefs, customs, laws, so many alterations of States, changes of fortune ; so many victories and conquests buried and forgotten, so many pomps and greatneses vanished, as if they had never been. Hereby a man may learn to know himself, to admire nothing, to think nothing new, or strange, to settle and resolve himself in all things. For the better attaining of this universal spirit, this general indifferency, we are to consider these four or five points.

1. The great inequality and difference of men in their nature, form, composition, whereof we have spoken.

2. The great diversity of laws, customs, manners, religions, opinions, whereof we will speak hereafter.

3. The divers opinions, reasons, sayings of Philosophers, touching unity and plurality, the eternity and temporality, the beginning and end, the durance and continuance, the ages, estates, changes, and interchangeable causes of the world, and the parts thereof: The *Egyptian* Priests told *Herodotus*, that since their first King, (which was above eleven thousand years before; the picture and statue of whom, and of all that succeeded him, they shewed him drawn to the life) the Sun had changed his course four times. The *Chaldeans* in the time of *Diodorus* (as he saith) and *Cicero*, had a register of seven hundred thousand years. *Plato* saith, they of the City of *Sais* had memorials in writing of eight thousand years, and that the City of *Athens* was built a thousand years before the said City of *Sais*. *Zoroaster*, *Pliny*, and others have affirmed, that *Socrates* lived six thousand years before the time of *Plato*. Some have said, that the world hath been from all eternity, mortal, and growing, and being again by interchangeable courses. Others, and the more noble Philosophers, have held the world for a god, made by another god greater then it; or as *Plato* averreth, and others argue from the motions thereof, that it is a creature composed of a body, and of a soul, which soul lodging in the center thereof, disperseth and spreadeth it self by musical numbers into the circumference, and parts thereof, the heaven, the stars, composed of bodies, and of a soul, mortal, by reason of their composition; immortal, by the decree and determination of the Creator. *Plato* saith, that the world changeth countenance in all respects, that the heaven, the stars, the sun change and quite alter by turns their motion, in such sort, that that which was first, is last, the East is made the West; and according to the ancient and most authentical opinion, and of the more famous

famous spirits, worthy the greatness of God, and founded upon reason, there are many worlds, insomuch that there is nothing one and only in this world, all kinds are multiplied in number, whereby it seemeth not to have semblance of truth, that God hath made this only world, without companion, and that all is concluded in this one *individuum*; at the least Divinity saith, that God could make many, and infinite worlds; for if he could make no more but this one visible, his power should be finite, because the world is such.

By that which we have learned of the discovery of the new world, the East and West-Indies, we see first, that all our ancient Writers have been deceived, thinking to have found the measure of the habitable earth, and to have comprehended the whole *Cosmography*, except some scattered Islands, doubting of the *Antipodes*: for now behold another world, almost such as ours is, and that all upon firm land inhabited, peopled, politickly governed, distinguished by Realms, and Empires, beautified with Cities, that excell in beauty, greatness, opulency, all those of *Asia, Africa, Europe*, many thousand years ago: And who doubteth, but that in time hereafter, there will be discovered divers others? If *Ptolomy*, and other our ancient Writers, have been heretofore deceived, why should not he be likewise deceived that affirmeth, that all is already found and discovered: Say it he that will, I will believe him as I list.

Secondly, we see that the *Zones*, which were thought inhabitable by reason of their excessive heat and cold, are habitable.

Thirdly, that in these new countries, almost all things which we so much esteem of here, and hold that they were first revealed and sent from Heaven, were commonly believed and observed, (from whence they came, I will not say, who dares determine it?) Yea many of them, were in use a thousand years before we heard any tydings of them, both in the matter of Religion, as the belief of one only Man, the father of us all, of the universal deluge, of one God who sometimes lived in the form of a man undefiled and holy, of the day of judgment: the resurrection of the dead, circumcision like to that of the *Jews*, and *Mahomet*: And in the matter of policy, as that the elder son should succeed in the inheritance, that he that is exalted to a dignity, loseth his own name, and takes a new; tyrannical subsidies, armouries, tumblers, musical instruments, all sorts of sports, Artillery, Printing. From all these discourses, we may easily draw these conclusions: That this great body which we call



the world, is not that which we think and judge it to be; That neither in the whole, nor parts thereof, it is always the same, but in perpetual flux and reflux; That there is nothing said, held, believed at one time, and in one place, which is not likewise said, held, believed in another, yea and contradicted, reproved, condemned elsewhere, the spirit of man being capable of all things, the world always tumbling, sometime the same, sometimes divers; That all things are settled and comprehended in their course and revolution of nature, subject to encrease, changing, ending, to the mutation of times, places, climates, heavens, airs, countries. And from these conclusions we learn, to marry our selves, to swear to nothing; to admire, to trouble our selves at nothing; but whatsoever shall happen, whatsoever men talk of and trouble themselves about, to resolve upon this point, that it is the course of the world, that it is nature that worketh these things; but yet wisely to provide that nothing hurt us by our own weakness and dejection of mind. Enough is said of this perfect liberty of judgment, established by these three parts, To judge of all, To judge nothing, To be universal: wherein I have the rather insisted, because I know that it pleaseth not the palate of the world; it is an enemy to pedantry as well as wisdom, but it is a fair flower or ornament of wisdom, which preserveth us from two contrary rocks, whereon the vulgar sort do commonly lose themselves, that is to say, from being heady, opinative, shameful gainfayers, repenters, mutable; and a man maintaineth himself in a sweet, peaceable, and assured modesty, and great liberty of spirit, noble and magnificent universality. This is that great quality and sufficiency of *Socrates*, the *Coryphaeus* of the wise, by the confession of all, of whom it is said, as *Plutarch* discourseth, That he never brought forth, but serving as a Midwife, he made others to bring forth. This is very neer, and in some sense, the disorder of the *Pyrrhonians*, the neutrality and indifferency of the *Academicks*, from whence proceedeth, not to be astonisht at any thing, not to admire any thing, the sovereign good of *Pythagoras*, the magnanimity of *Aristotle*.

*Nil admirari, prope res est una, Numici,  
Solâque, quæ possit facere, & servare beatum.*

*One thing, at nothing wonder up to take,  
It is, that may you happy keep and make.*

It is a strange thing that man will not so much as taste it, yea is offended to hear speech thereof, loveth better to continue a slave, to

run from one part to another, then to be to himself, to live of his own, to be above all, and to pass equally thorow all. 5. Hath he not reason to cry with *Tiberius*, and far more justly, *O homines ad servitutem nati ! O men born to servitude !* What monster is this, to desire to have all things free, his body, his members, his goods, and not his spirit, which nevertheless is only born unto liberty ? A man will willingly make benefit of whatsoever is in the world, that comes from the East or the West, for the good and service of his body, nourishment, health, ornament, and accomodate it all unto his use, but not for the culture of his spirit, benefit, and enriching ; giving his body the liberty of the fields, and holding his spirit in close prison.

The other liberty which is of the Will, must likewise be in high esteem with a wise man. We speak not here of the free will of man, according to the manner of Divines : we say, that a wise man to maintain himself in rest and liberty, must manage his will and his affections, in giving himself to and affecting but few things, and those just (for the just are but few in number, if a man judge well) and that without violence and asperity. There enter here into combat ( or to speak more mildly, there are to be explicated and understood ) two popular and plausible opinions in the world ; the one teacheth to be ready and willing in the service of another, to forget our selves for our neighbour, and principally for the Weal-publick, in respect whereof, the particular is not to be respected ; the other to carry our selves courageously with activity, zeal, affection. He that doth not the first, is accused not to have any charity : He that doth not the second, suspected to be cold, not to be a friend, and not to have that zeal of sufficiency that he ought. Some would have these two opinions to prevail beyond reason and measure, and there is not any thing which hath not been spoken hereof : for the heads or chieftains many times preach things according to that use for which they serve, not according as they are : And many times the truest opinions are not the more profitable. And afterwards seeing we hold our selves too much to our selves, and with a tie too natural, they would distract us and draw us along, as they that go about to streighten a crooked staff, bend it as much more the contrary way.

But these opinions ill understood and ill taken, as they are by divers, bring with them injustice, trouble, pain, and much evil, as a man may see in those who back-bite, and detract from all, giving themselves

7.  
2. The second  
part, the liber-  
ty of Will.



themselves to hire, and the service of another : They do not only suffer themselves to be carried, and seized upon, but they likewise thrust themselves into all matters, as well into those that concern them not, as those that do ; as well into small as great, and many times for no other cause, but to employ and busie themselves ; *In negotiis sunt, negotii causa* : They busie themselves, because they would be busie : And because they cannot hold and stay themselves, as if they had nothing to do, with and within themselves, and that for want of inward, essential, proper, and domestical affairs, they seek and undergo those that are strange unto them. They are good husbands and frugal enough of their purse, but prodigal of their souls, their lives, their time, affection, and wills, the good husbandry whereof is only profitable and commendable. And if they give themselves to any thing, it is with such passion and violence, that they are no more their own men, so wholly do they engage and insinuate themselves thereinto. Great men seek after such people, that will grow into passion and kill themselves for them, and they allure them with fair promises and much Art, to win them unto them ; and they always find fools enough that believe them : but they that are wise will take heed of them.

9. This is first unjust, it wholly troubleth the State, drives away the rest and liberty of the spirit. It is, not to know that which every one ought to know, and by how many offices every man is obliged unto himself ; whilst they seek to be officious and serviceable to another, they are unjust to themselves. We have all business enough with and within our selves, and need not seek means to lose our selves without, and to give our selves unto others : every man must hold him to himself. He that knows not how to live honestly, healthfully, and merrily, is ill-advised, and takes an ill and unnatural course, if he think to do it by serving another. He must affect and tye himself but to a few things, and those just.

10. Secondly, This sharp intention and passionate affection, troubleth all, and hindreth the conduct of those affairs to which he so much giveth himself ; as in a precipitate pace, too much haste makes a man stumble and enterfere, and so stays him whether he will, or no ; *Ipsa se velocitas implicat, unde festinatio tarda est. Qui nimium properat, serius absolvit* : Haste makes waste, and hinders it self : He that makes too much speed, dispatcheth too late. So likewise a man being drunken with this violent intention, he entangleth and fettereth himself, commits many indiscretions and wrongs, grows into  
hard

hard conceits and suspicions of others, becomes impatient in cross or slow occurrents, that fall not out according to his own desire: *Mile cuncta ministrat impetus: Violence doth nothing well.* This is seen not only in serious affairs, but also vain and frivolous; as in play, where he that is carried with an ardent thirst of gaining, troubleth himself; and the more he troubleth himself, the more he loseth. He that walks moderately, is always with himself, directeth his business with better advantage, and more siredly and cheerfully: he directeth, applyeth, deferreth all to his own leisure, and as his occasions shall fall out: if he chance to be contradicted in a matter, it is without torment and affliction, being always ready for a new change: he always marcheth with the bridle in his hand. *festinat lentè.*

11.

Thirdly, This violent affection infecteth and corrupteth even the judgment it self: for following one part, and desiring the advantage thereof, they wax mad if they be contradicted, attributing to their party false praises and conditions, and to the contrary false accusations; interpreting all prognostications and occurrents at their own pleasure, and making them serve their own designments. All that are of the contrary part, must needs be wicked and of contrary conditions; yea, and they that speak any good, or descry any good thing in them, are likewise suspected to be of their part. Can it not possibly be, that a man honest in all things else, or at least in some thing, may follow a wicked person, maintain a wicked cause? It is enough that passion enforce the will, but that it carry likewise the judgment, and make that a fool, this is too much. It is the soveraign and last part that should always maintain its own authority: and we must ingenuously, and in good sooth acknowledge the good that is in our adversaries, and the evil that is in those whom we follow. The ground and foundation of the controversie being laid aside, we must keep moderation and indifferency, and out of the business it self banish all choler, all discontent. And thus we see the evils that this over-great affection to any thing whatsoever bringeth with it; of all, yea of goodness and wisdom it self, a man may have too much.

But for a rule herein, we must remember, that the principal and most lawful charge, that we have, is, in every man, the conduct and guide of himself. The reason why we are here, is, that we should maintain our selves in tranquillity and liberty. And to do this, the best remedy is, to lend our selves to others, and to give

12.

An Advertisement.



our selves to none, but to our selves, to take our affairs into our hands, not to place them in our hearts; to take business upon us, but not incorporate them into us; to be diligent, not passionate; not to tie our selves but to a few, but rather always to reserve our selves unto our selves. This counsel condemneth not those offices due to the Weal-publick, to our friends, our neighbours; yea it is so far from it, that a wise man must be officious and charitable, apply unto himself the customs of other men and the world. And the rather to do it, he must contribute to publick society, those offices and duties which concern him. *Qui sibi amicus est, hunc omnibus scito esse amicum*: He that is a friend to himself, is a friend to all. But I require a double moderation and discretion herein; the one, that a man apply not himself to all that is presented unto him, but to that which is just and necessary; and that is not hard to be done: the other, that it be without violence and trouble. He must desire little, and that little moderately; busie himself little, and that peaceably: and in those charges that he undertaketh, employ his pate, his speech, his attentions, his sweatings, his means, and if need be, his blood, his life: but yet without vexation and passion, keeping himself always to himself, in health and tranquillity. A man may perform his duty sufficiently without this ardency, and this so great contention of Will. And they deceive themselves very much, that think that a business is not well done, and there is no manner of affection, if it be not done with tempest, clamour, and clatter: for contrariwise it is, that that hindreth and troubleth the good guide and conduct thereof, as hath been said. O how many men hazard their lives every day in those wars which no way concern them, and thrust themselves into the danger of that battel, the loss whereof doth no way trouble their sleep: and all to the end they may not fail in their duty! whilst there is another in his own house, that dares not enter the danger, or look the enemy in the face, is more affected with the issue of that War, and hath his mind more troubled, then the souldier that adventureth his blood and life in the field.

Finally, We must know how to distinguish and separate our selves from our publick charges: Every one of us playeth two parts, two persons; the one strange and apparent, the other proper and essential: we must discern the skin from the shirt. An active man will perform his charge, and yet withal not leave to judge of the folly, vice, deceit that is therein: he will conform himself to every thing,  
because

because the custom of his Country requireth it, it is profitable to the Weal-publick; the world lives so; and therefore it must be done. A man must serve and make use of the world such as he findeth it; in the mean time, he must likewise consider it as a thing estranged from it self, know how to keep and carry himself apart, and to communicate himself to his own trusty good, howsoever things fall out with himself.

### CHAP. III.

*True and essential Honesty, the first and fundamental part of Wisdom.*

HAVING prepared and disposed our Scholar to wisdom, by these precedent adviselements, that is to say, having purified and freed him from all evils, and placed him in a good estate, of a full and universal liberty, to the end he may have a perfect view, knowledge, and power over all things (which is the priviledge of a wise and spiritual man: *Spiritualis omnia judicat: The spiritual man judgeth all things:*) it is now time to give him instructions and general rules of wisdom. The two first shall be as preambles and foundations; whereof the first and principal is Honesty or Probity.

It will not be, perhaps, any matter of difficulty, to make good this Proposition, *That honesty is the first principal and fundamental part of Wisdom:* for all (whether in truth and good earnest, or in outward shew, for shame or fear to say the contrary) do applaud it; they always honour it in the first place, confessing themselves servitors and affectionate followers thereof: but it will cost me some labour to shew and perswade, Which is that true and essential probity we here require. For that which is in authority and credit, wherewith the whole world contenteth it self; that which is only known, sought for, and possessed, (except some few of the wiser) is bastardly, artificial, false, and counterfeit.

First, we know that many times we are led and pricked forward to virtue and honourable actions, by wicked and condemned means *1.* by default and natural impotency, by passion, and vice it self; chastity, sobriety, temperance may be in us, by reason of our corporal imbecillity: the contempt of the world, patience in adversity, constancy in danger; proceed many times from want of apprehension and judgment: valour, liberality, justice it self; from ambition: discretion, prudence; from fear, from avarice. *2.* And how many beautiful



*True and essential honesty, the first*

beautiful actions hath presumption and temerity brought forth? So that the actions of virtue are many times no other but masks; they carry the outward countenance, but they have not the essence; they may very well be termed virtuous, in consideration of another, and of the visage they carry outwardly and in publick, but in truth and with the actor himself they are nothing so; for it will appear at the last, that profit, glory, custom, and other the like strange causes, have induced him to do them.

Sometimes they arise from stupidity and brutish sottishness, and therefore it is said, that wisdom and sottish simplicity do meet in one and the same point, touching the bearing and suffering of humane actions. It is then very dangerous to judge of the probity or improbity of a man by his actions: we must sound him within, from what foundation these motions do arise: wicked men perform many times many good and excellent actions, and both good and evil persevere themselves alike from doing evil: *Oderunt peccare boni & mali: Both good and evil fear to offend.* To discover therefore, and to know which is the true Honesty, we must not stay in the outward action; that is but the sign, the simplest token, and many times a cloak and mask to cover villany: we must penetrate into the inward part, and know the motive which causeth the strings to play, which is the soul and the life that giveth motion to all. It is that whereby we must judge, it is that wherein every man should provide to be good and entire, and that which we seek.

3.  
*Vulgar honesty  
and according  
to the style of  
the world.*

That honesty which is commonly accounted true, and so much preached and commended of the world, whereof they make express profession, who have the title and publick reputation to be men of honesty, and settled constancy, is scholastical, and pedantic, servant to the laws, enforced by hope and fear, acquired, learned, and practised out of a submission to, and a consideration of, the religion, laws, customs, commands of superiours, other mens examples; subject to prescript forms, effeminate, fearful, and troubled with scruples and doubts: *Sunt quibus innocentia nisi metu non placet: Innocency without fear likes not some;* which is not only in respect of the world divers and variable, according to the diversity of religions, laws, examples, forms, (for the jurisdictions changing, the motions must likewise alter) but also in it self unequal, wavering, deambulatory, according to the access, recess, success of the affairs, the occasions which are presented, the persons with whom a man hath

hath to do, as a ship driven with the winds and the oars, is carried away with an unequal tottering pace, with many blows, blasts, and billows. To be brief, these are honest men by accident and occasion, by outward and strange events, and not in verity and essence : they understand it not, and therefore it is easie to discover them, and to convince them, by shaking off a little their bridle, and founding them somewhat nearer ; but above all, by that inequality and diversity which is found in them : for in one and the same action they will give divers judgments, and carry themselves altogether after a divers fashion, going sometimes a slow pace, sometimes running a main gallop. This unequal diversity proceedeth from this, that the outward occasions which move and stir them, do either puff them up, multiply and increase them, or make them lukewarm, and deject them, more or less, like accidents, *Quæ recipiunt magis & minus.*

Now that true honesty, which I require in him that will be wise, is free, manly, and generous, pleasant, and cheerful, equal, uniform, and constant, which marcheth with a staid pace, stately and haughtily, going always his own way, neither looking on this side, or behind him, without staying or altering his pace, or gate for the wind, the times, the occasions, which are changed ; but that is not, I mean in judgment and will, that is in the soul, where honesty resideth and hath its seat. For outward actions, especially the publick, have another jurisdiction, as shall be said in his place ; This honesty I will describe in this place, giving you first to understand, that following the designment of this Book declared in the Preface, I speak of humane honesty and wisdom, as it is humane, whereby a man is called an honest man and a wise, not of Christian, though in the end I may chance to speak a word or two thereof.

The jurisdiction of this honesty is nature, which bindeth every man to be, and to make himself such as he ought, that is to say, to conform and rule himself according unto it. Nature is together both a mistress which enjoyneth and commendeth honesty, & a law and instruction which teacheth it unto us. As touching the first, there is a natural obligation inward, and universal in every man to be honest, just, upright, following the intention of his Author and Maker. A man ought not to attend or seek any other cause, obligation, instinct, or motive of this honesty ; and he can never know how to have a more just and lawful, more powerful, more ancient ; it is altogether as soon as himself, born with himself.

Every

4.  
*The description  
of true honesty.*

5.  
*Nature enjoineth honesty.*



Every man should be or should desire to be, an honest man, because he is a man, and he that takes no care to be such, is a monster, renounceth himself, belyeth, destroyeth himself; by right he is no more a man, and in effect should desire to be a man. It is necessary that honesty grow in him by himself, that is to say, by that inward instinct which God hath put in him, and not from any other outward and strange cause, any occasion, or induction. A man will not, out of a just and regular will, any thing that is depraved, or corrupt, or other then its own nature requireth, it implyeth a contradiction to desire or accept a thing, and nothing to care whether it be worth the caring for; a man would have all his parts good and sound, his body, his head, his eyes, his judgment, his memory, yea his hose and shoes; and why will he not likewise have his will, and his conscience good, that is to say, be wholly good and sound? I will therefore that he be good, and have his will firm and resolved to equity and honesty for the love of himself, and because he is a man, knowing that he can be no other, without the renouncing and destruction of himself; and so his honesty shall be proper, inward, essential, even as his own essence is unto him, and he to himself. It must not then be for any outward consideration, and proceeding from without, whatsoever it be, for such a cause being accidental and outward, may happen to fail, grow weak, and alter, and consequently all that honesty that is grounded thereupon, must do the like. If he be an honest man, for honour, or reputation, or other recompence, being in a solitary place, where he hath no hope to be known, he either ceaseth to be honest, or putteth it in practice very coldly and negligently. If for fear of the laws, magistrates, punishments; if he can deceive the laws, circumvent the Judge, avoid or disprove the proofs, and hide himself from the knowledge of another, there is an end of his honesty. And this honesty is but frail, occasioned, accidental, and miserable; and yet it is that which is in authority and use, no man knows of any other, there is not an honest man, but such as is enforced or invited by some cause, or occasion; *Nemo gratis bonus est: No man is freely good.* Now I would have in this my wise man, an essential and invincible honesty, which dependeth of it self, and ariseth from its own root, and may as hardly be separated, and rooted out, as humanity from a man. I will that he never consent unto evil; and though his honesty be not made known to any, yet if he know himself, what needs any more? If all the world besides should know it, it is not so much: *Quid tibi prodest*

*non habere consciunt, habenti conscientiam?* What is it to thee that hast a conscience, not to have a witness of thy conscience? And what though he receive no great recompence for it? For what may it be that concerneth him so near, as his own proper essence? This were, not to care how bad the horse is; so the saddle be fair. I will then that these things be inseparable, to be, and to consent to live a man; to be, and to be willing to be an honest man. This first hath been sufficiently pressed. Let us come to the second.

Now the pattern and rule to be honest, is this nature it self, which absolutely requireth that we be such; It is, I say, this equity and universal reason which shineth in every one of us. He which worketh according to it, worketh truly according to God; for it is God, or at least his first fundamental and universal law, which hath brought it into the world; and which came first from God, for God and nature are in the world, as in a State; the King, the author and founder, and the fundamental law which he hath made for the preservation and government of the said estate. This is a lightning and ray of the divinity, a fire and dependance of the eternal law, which is God himself and his will: *Quid est natura nisi Deus, & divina ratio toti mundo, & partibus ejus inserta?* What is nature but God, and divine reason inserted to the whole world, and all the parts thereof? He worketh also according to himself, for he worketh according to the stern, and animated instinct; which he hath within himself moving and stirring him: and so he is an honest man essentially, and not by accident and occasion. For this law and light is essential and natural in us, and therefore it is called Nature, and the law of nature. He is also by consequent an honest man always and perpetually, uniformly and equally at all times and in all places: for this law of equity, and natural reason is perpetual in us, *Edictum perpetuum*, A perpetual edict, inviolable, which can never be extinct nor defaced, *Quam nec ipsa delet iniquitas; vermis eorum non morietur;* Which neither iniquity it self may deface; their worm shall never die. Universal and constant in all things, and always the same, equal, uniform, which neither time nor place can alter nor disguise, receiveth neither access nor recess, more nor less, *Substantia non recipit magis & minus*. What seekest thou else-where either law or rule in the world? What may a man say or alledge which thou hast not about thee and within, if thou wilt but feel and hearken to thy self? a man may say to thee, as to a bad debtor, who asked for what the debt is, and will see the bill which he hath about.



*True and essential honesty, the first*

Rom. I:  
August.

about him, *Quod petis intus habes*; What thou demandest is within thy self; Thou demandest that which thou hast in thy own bosom. *Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui. Gentes naturaliter quæ legis sunt faciunt: ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis; Lex scripta in cordibus nostris.* The light of thy countenance is sealed in us. People naturally observe the law: they shew the work of the law written in their hearts: the law is written in our hearts. The law of Moses in his decalogue, is an outward and publick copie; the law of the twelve tables, and the Roman law, the moral instructions of Divines and Philosophers, the advisements and counsels of Lawyers, the edicts and ordinances of Princes are no other but piety and particular pourtraies thereof: so that if there be any law, that strayeth the least that may be from this first and original mistriss; it is a monster, falshood, and errour. To be brief, all the laws of the world, are no other but copies and abstracts brought forth into judgment against thee that holdest hidden the original, and makest as if thou knewest it not, extinguishing as much as in thee lyeth, this light, which enlightneth thee within, *Qui veritatem Dei detinent in injustitia, Who detain the truth of God in unrighteousness*; for these laws had never been published abroad, but because that law which was inward, wholly celestial and divine, hath been too much contemned and forgotten. These are all rivers, but such as neither have so much water, nor so pure as the source and invisible fountain, which is within thee, if thou suffer it not to perish, and to be lost: I say, not so much water, *Quàm multa pietas, humanitas, liberalitas, fides exigunt, quæ extra tabulas sunt!* Piety, humanity, liberality, and faith require many things that are not in the tables. O the miserable honesty of formalists, who hold themselves to the words of the law, and so think themselves discharged! How many duties are there required besides? *Quàm angusta innocentia ad legem bonum esse: latius officiorum patet quàm juris regula.* What a strict innocency is required, according to the law; the rule of duty extendeth it self further then the rule of the law. The rule of our duty is far larger then that of the law, which is neither so strong, nor so lively, witness this one thing, that well to understand and know their intention, to quit our selves of ambiguity, difficulty, contrariety, we must bring them to the source, and re-entring into the inward part, put them to the touch and rule of nature: *Anima legis, ratio; Reason is the life of the law.* Behold then an essential, radical, and fundamental honesty, sprung in us from its own proper roots by the

the seed of that universal reason which is in the soul, as the spring and ballance in a clock, as the natural heat in the body, maintaining it self strong of it self and invincible, whereby a man worketh according to God, according to himself. Nature, the universal order and policy of the world, quietly, sweetly and as silently without noise, as a Ship that is not driven but by the natural and ordinary course of the water: All other is ingrafted by Art and accidental discipline, as the heat and cold of fevers, acquired and conducted by strange occasions and considerations, working with clamour and clatter, ambitiously.

This is the reason why the doctrine of all the Sages doth teach, that to live well, is to live according to nature, that the chiefest <sup>7.</sup> *We must follow* good in this world is to consent to nature, that in following nature *nature.* as our guide, and mistress, we can never erre, *Naturam si sequaris ducem, nusquam aberrabis: bonum est quod secundum naturam; omnia vitia contra naturam sunt: Idem beatè vivere & secundum naturam: If thou follow Nature as thy guide, thou shalt not erre. All goodness is natural; vices unnatural: it is one and the same thing to live blessedly and according to Nature: understanding by nature, that equity and universal reason which shineth in us, which containeth and hatcheth in it the seeds of all virtues, probity, justice, and is the matrix from whence all good and excellent laws do spring and arise, yea those true and just judgments that are sometimes pronounced by the mouth of an Idiot. Nature hath disposed all things in the best state that they could be, and hath given them the first motion to good, and the end which they should seek, in such sort, that he that will follow her, need not obtain and possess his own good and his own end, *Sapientia est in naturam converti, & ea restitui unde publicus error expulerit: Ab illa non deerrare, ad illius legem exemplumque formari, sapientia est. It is wisdom to be conformable to Nature, and to yield unto it, whereby he may expel all publick, and gross error; From which not to wander, but to fashion and apply himself thereto, is wisdom.* Men are naturally good, and follow not evil but for profit or pleasure, and therefore Law-makers, to induce them to follow their natural and good inclination, and not to inforce their wills, have proposed two contrary things, punishment and reward.*

Doubtless, Nature in every one of us is sufficient, and a sweet <sup>8.</sup> *As a good and sufficient mistress* mistress and rule to all things, if we will hearken unto her, employ *sufficient mistress* and awaken her; and we need not seek else-where, nor beg of *Art* Art.



Art, and the Sciences, the means, the remedies, and the rules which we have need of: every one of us, if he will, may live at his pleasure, of his own. To live content and happy, a man need not be wise, a Courtier, nor so active; all his sufficiency that is beyond the common and natural is vain and superfluous, yea it bringeth more evil with it then good. We see ignorant people, idiots, and simple men, lead their lives more sweetly and cheartully, resist the assaults of death, of want, of sorrow, more constantly and contentedly, then the wisest men and most active. And if a man mark it well, he shall find among peasants and other poor people, examples of patience, constancy, equanimity, more pure then all those that are taught in Schools; they follow simply the reason and conduct of nature, they travel quietly and contentedly in their affairs, not inflaming or elevating themselves, and consequently more soundly: Others mount themselves upon their great horses, play the light horseman, bandy themselves one against the other, keep their brains always in work and agitation. A great master and admirable Doctor in Nature was *Socrates*, as *Aristotle* in Art and Science. *Socrates* by simple and natural discourses, by vulgar similitudes and inductions, speaking like a Country Swain, did furnish us with precepts and rules of good life, and remedies against all evils, so substantial and strong, that all the Art and Science of the world could not devise better, or the like.

By Art.

But we do not only not hearken unto it, believe and follow it according to the counsel of the wise, but also (not to speak of those monsters who by the violence of their vices, inordinate and perverse delights and pleasures, suffocate and extinguish, as much as in them lieth, the light, mortifie the seed thereof) we endeavour to avoid it, we suffer it to sleep and to cease, loving better to beg elsewhere our first rudiments, to run to study any Art, then to content our selves with that which is bred within us. We have a busie troublesome spirit, which offereth it self to rule and govern in all things, and which carrieth it self after our own wills, disguiseth, changeth, and troubleth all, will add, invent, alter, and cannot stay it self in home-born simplicity; it thinketh nothing good wherein there is not craft and subtilty. *Simplex illa & aperta virtus in obscuram & solertem scientiam versa est: That simple and open virtue is ever turned into obscure and crafty cunning.* And it is a vice common amongst us, not to account of any thing that is in us, we esteem only of that which is bought, which is costly, and is brought from far:

far : we prefer Art before Nature, we shut the windows at high-noon, and light candles. This fault and folly proceedeth from another ; that is, that we esteem not of things according to their true and essential value, but according to the shew and report. How many are there more scrupulous and exact in those things that belong to the positive and municipal law, then the natural ? Truly almost all, yea even in the ceremonial, and law of civility, which we *By Ceremony.* have framed, to our selves, in respect whereof we disdain and are ashamed of nature. We speak little, we make a fair shew, and carefully keep a *decorum* or decency ; and make no difficulty to go directly against nature, duty, conscience. So that the shadow is more unto us then the body, the root, the countenance more then the substance and sound verity. That we may not offend a ceremony, we cover and hide things natural ; we dare not name, and we blush at the sound of things, which we do in no sort fear to do, both lawful and unlawful. We dare not speak that which is permitted to do, we dare not directly to name our own proper members, and yet we fear not to employ them in all manner of wickedness : we pronounce, speak, and do, without fear and without shame, wicked things, and such as are against nature and reason, forswear, betray, assail, kill, deceive ; and we blush to speak of things good, natural, necessary, just, and lawful. There is not a husband, which is not more ashamed to embrace his wife in the open view of the world, then to kill, lye, assail ; nor a woman that will not rather utter any wickedness in the world, then name that wherein she taketh most delight, and may lawfully do. Even to treasons and murders, they tie themselves to the laws of a ceremony, and there fasten their devoirs. A strange thing that injustice should complain of incivility, malice of indiscretion ! The act of a ceremony doth it not prevail against nature ? The Ceremony forbiddeth us to express natural things and lawful, and we give credit thereunto : Nature and reason forbiddeth us things unlawful, and no man believes it : A man sends his conscience to the Brothel-house, and keeps his outward countenance in order. All this is monstrous, and the like is not found among beasts. I will not for all this say, ( as I perceive malice doth already mutter ) that Ceremony and decency ought not carefully to be kept, which is the salt and seasoning of our actions and conversations. *Amo verecundiam ; in eâ, ornatus* Cicero.  
*vite, & vis decori : I love modesty, for in it, is the ornament of our life, and the force of comeliness.* But I say to them, as our Saviour  
S to



Math. 23.

to men of the like spirit : *O hypocrite, excolantes culicem, camelum deglutientes, qui minima curatis, graviora spernitis. Hæc oportet primum facere, tum illa non omittere.* O ye hypocrites, that strain a gnat, and swallow a Camel, which are careful for small things, and despise greater matters : These ought ye first to do, and also not to omit the rest.

10.  
In such sort,  
that it is no  
more known in  
man.

From this general and universal alteration and corruption it is come to pass, that there is nothing of nature known in us. If we must say what the laws thereof are, and how many they are, we are much hindred. The ensign and mark of a natural law is the universality of approbation : for that which Nature shall have truly ordained for us, we with a common consent shall follow without doubting, and not only every Nation, but every particular person.

Now there is not any thing in the world which is not denied and contradicted, not by one Nation, but by divers : and there is not any thing so strange and unnatural in the opinion of divers, which is not approved and authorized in many places by common use. The little care of having children, the murder of parents, of children, of himself, marriage of the nearest in blood, theft, publick merchandise of their liberty and bodies, as well of males as females, are received by publick use in many Nations.

11.  
And we must  
seek it else-  
where.

Doubtless there remaineth no more any image or trace of Nature in us, we must go seek it in beasts, where this troublesome and unquiet spirit, this quick-silver, neither Art, nor beautiful ceremony hath power to alter it ; they have it pure and entire, if it be not corrupted by our usage and contagion, as sometimes it is. All the world followeth nature, the first and universal rule which the Author thereof hath given and stablished, except man only ; who troubleth the policy and state of the world with his gentle spirit, and his free will to wickedness, he is the only irregular creature, and enemy of nature.

12.  
True honesty.

So then the true honesty (the foundation and pillar of wisdom) is to follow nature, that is to say, reason. The good and the end of man, in whom consisteth his rest, his liberty, his contentment, and in a word, his perfection in this world, is, to live and do according to nature, when that which is the most excellent thing in him commandeth, that is to say, reason. True honesty is a right and firm disposition of the will to follow the counsel of reason : And as the Needle touched with the Adamant never resteth it self until he

see

see the North-point, and thereby ordereth and directeth the navigation ; so a man is never well, yea, he is as it were undone, and dislocated until he see this law, and directeth the course of his life, his manners, his judgments and wills, according to the first, divine, natural law which is an inward domestical light, whereof all the rest are but beams.

But to effect it, and to come to the practice, it is far more easie to some, then to others. There are some that have their particular nature, that is to say, their temper, and temperature so good and pleasing (which especially proceedeth from the first formation in the womb of the mother, and afterwards from the milk of the nurse, and this first and tender education) that they find themselves, without endeavour, and without Art or discipline, wholly carried and disposed to goodness and honesty, that is to say, to follow and conform themselves to the universal nature, whereby they are termed well-born ; *gaudeant bene nati.*

13.

*The distinction of true honesty.*

This kind of natural and easie honesty, and as it were born with us, is properly called goodness, a quality of a soul well-born and well-governed ; it is a sweetness, faculty, and debonair mildness of nature : and not (lest any body should be deceived) a softness, a feminary, sottish calmness, and vicious facility, whereby a man delighteth to please all, and not to displease or offend any, although he have a just and a lawful cause, and it be for the service of reason and justice ; whereby it comes to pass, that they will not employ themselves in lawful actions, when it is against those that take offence thereat ; nor altogether refuse the unlawful, when they please thereby those that consent thereunto. Of these kind of people it is said (and this commendation is injurious) He is good, since he is good even to the wicked ; and this accusation true, How should he be good, since he is not evil to those that are evil ? We should rather call this kind of goodness innocency, as men call little children sheep, and the like innocent creatures. But an active, valiant, manly, and effectual goodness is that I require, which is a ready, easie, and constant affection unto that which is good, right, just, according to reason and nature.

*Natural goodness.*

There are others so ill-born and bred, that it seems that (like monsters) their particular natures are made, as it were, in despite of the universal nature, so cross and contrary are they thereunto. In this case the remedy to correct, reform, sweeten, make tame, and amend this evil, rough, savage, and crooked nature, to bend it and



Acquired virtue.

apply it to the rule of this general and great Mistress the universal Nature, is, to have recourse to the study of Philosophy (as *Socrates* did) and unto virtue, which is a combate and painful endeavour against vice, a laborious study, which requireth time, labour, and discipline. *Virtus in arduo & circa difficile: ad januam virtutis excubant labor & sudor. Dii mortalibus virtutem laboris pretio venderunt. Virtue is always employed about things difficult; at whose gate attends labour and pain. God for great pain and travel hath sold virtue unto men.* This is not to bring in a new, strange, or artificial honesty, and so accidental, and such, as I have said before, is not the true; but it is by taking away the lets and hindrances, to stir up and enlighten this light almost extinct and languishing, to revive those seeds almost choaked by the particular vice, and ill temperature of the particular person; as, by taking away the moat from the eye, the sight is recovered; and the dust from off the glass, a man seeth the clearer.

14.  
Three degrees of perfection.

By all this that hath been said, it appeareth that there are two sorts of true honesty; the one natural, sweet, easie, just, called goodness; the other acquired, difficult, painful, and laborious, called virtue. But to say the truth, there is also a third, which is, as it were, composed of the two, and so there should be three degrees of perfection. The lowest of the three is a facile and debonair nature, distasted by it self, by reason of vice; we have named it goodness, innocency. The second more high, which we have named virtue, is with a lively force to hinder the progress of vice, and having suffered himself to be surpris'd, with the first motions of the passions, to arm and bind himself to stay their course, and to overcome them. The third and chiefeft is out of an high resolution, and a perfect habit, to be so well framed, that temptations cannot so much as grow in him, and the seeds of vice are wholly rooted out, inso-much that this virtue is turned into a complexion, and into nature. This last may be called, Perfection. That and the first, which is called goodness, do resemble one another, and differ from the second, in that they are without stir, pain, or endeavour. This is the true tincture of the soul, her natural and ordinary course, which costeth nothing. The second, is always in care and aw. The last and perfect, is acquired by the long study and serious exercise of the rules of Philosophy, joyned to a beautiful and rich nature. For both are necessary, the natural and the acquired. This is that, those two Sects did so much study, the *Stoicks*, and much more the *Epicure* (which

(which would have seemed strange, if *Seneca* and other ancient Philosophers did not testify it, who are rather to be credited, then all the other more modern) who made a sport and play-game of shame, want, sickness, griefs, tortures, death: They did not only contemn, patiently endure and vanquish all asperities and difficulties; but they sought them, they took pleasure and delight in them; and all to keep their virtue in breath, and in action, which made them not only firm, constant, grave, and severe, as *Cato* and the *Stoicks*; but cheerful, merry, wanton, and if a man may so say, fool-hardy too.

By the comparison of these three together, it seemeth to some (who understand not the height and value of the third) that the second, which we call Virtue, by reason of the difficulties, dangers, endeavours thereof, carrieth the honour; and that, as *Metellus* said, to do evil is an idle and a base thing; to do good where there is neither pain nor danger, is a common thing and too easie; but to do good where there is danger and pain, is the part of an honest man, and of virtue: it is the Motto of that divine Philosopher, χαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ. But to speak in truth that which it is; besides, that difficulty (as elsewhere hath been said) is no true, nor just, and lawful cause, why a thing should be the more esteemed; it is certain, that in the like thing the natural is more worth then the acquired; that it is far more noble, more excellent, and divine to work by Nature then by Art; easily, equally, uniformly, then painfully, unequally, with doubt and danger. God is good after the first manner, that is, the natural and essential goodness; we dare not call him virtuous, nor the Angels and Spirits fortunate; they are called good. But because virtue maketh a greater clamor and stir, and worketh with greater vehemency and goodness, it is more admired and esteemed of the vulgar sort (who are but foolish Judges) but wrongfully. For these great exalters and extravagant productions, which seem to be all zeal and fire, are no part of the Play, and do not in any sort appertain to true honesty; they are rather maladies and furious entrances, far distant from that wisdom we here require, which is sweet, equal, and uniform.

Thus much be spoken in gross, of honesty; for the parts thereof, and the duties, shall be handled in the third Book, especially in the virtue of Justice. I will here adde a word or two (according to promise) to rebate and blunt the point of detraction, and to stay the complaints of those, that dislike, that I attribute so much to nature,



Art. 14.

(although it be God, as hath been said, and this Book speaketh not but of the natural and humane) as if that were all, and there were nothing else to be required. Wherefore besides all that hath been said, there remaineth yet one thing to make this work compleat and perfect, and that is the grace of God, whereby this honesty, goodness, virtue, hath life, is brought forth in his due time, and receiveth its last and perfect portraict, it is elevated, christened, crowned, that is to say, accepted, verified, approved by God, and made (after a sort) worthy its due reward. Honesty is like to a good Organist, who toucheth well and truly according to Art: the grace and spirit of God, is the blast and wind which expresth the touch, giveth life, and maketh the instrument to speak, and to make a pleasant melody. Now this good consisteth not in long discourse, precepts and instructions, neither is it attained by our own proper act and labour, it is a free gift from above, whereof it taketh the name, Grace: but we must desire it, ask, implore it, both humbly and ardently. O God, vouchsafe of thy infinite goodness to look upon me with the eye of thy clemency, to accept and to like of my desire, mine essay, my little work, which comes originally from thee, by that obligation and instruction, which thou hast given me in the law of nature, which thou hast planted in me, to the end it may return unto thee, and that thou maist end that thou hast begun, that so thou maist be both my *a* and *o*. Sprinkle me with thy grace, keep me, and account me thine, and so forth. The better to obtain it, that is to say, to incline God unto us, is this honesty. (as hath been said in the Preface, whither (that I may not iterate it) I refer the Reader) the matter being well prepared, is the fitter for the form; the grace is not contrary, neither doth it enforce or destroy nature, but sweetly it relieveth and perfecteth it, so that it must not oppose it self thereunto as to its contrary, but put it on as a Crown. They are both of God, they must not therefore be confounded, every one hath his jurisdiction, his action apart: The Organist, and he that worketh at the bellows, are two, so are honesty and grace, the action good in it self naturally, morally, humanely, and that by grace made acceptable. That may well be without this, and hath his worth, as in those Philosophers and great men in times past, admirable in nature, and in all kind of moral virtue, and is likewise found in misbelievers or infidels; but this cannot be without that, no more then the covering, the Crown and perfection can be without the entire body. The Player or Organist.

ganist may in every point exercise his Art, without the bellows-blower; and so likewise honesty without grace. It is true that this cannot be but *as sonans*, and *cymbalum tinniens*, but this requireth that, wherein I see many to mistake themselves very grossly, who never have any taste, or do ever conceive the image of true honesty, and continue puffed up with a perswasion of grace, which they think to practise, to attract, to attain by certain easie and idle means; after the manner of the Pharisees, wherewith they rest contented, not troubling themselves any further for the true honesty, *Promoti per saltum*, Masters without apprenticeship, Doctors and Nobles in parchment. Now I see many of these kind of people in the world, but very few such as *Aristides*, *Phocion*, *Cato*, *Regulus*, *Socrates*, *Scipio*, *Epaminondas*, that is to say, professors of an exact, true, and solid moral virtue, and Philosophical probity. That complaint and reproach so frequent of the sovereign Doctor of the truth, against hypocritical Pharisees, will always have place, for such people will never be wanting, no not amongst the Censors and Reformers of the world. Now having spoken much of honesty, we must likewise in a word or two touch the contrary thereunto.

Wickedness is against nature, it is foul, deformed, and unprofitable, it offendeth every good judgment, it breedeth a hatred of it self being well known; whereupon some have said, that it was bred and brought forth by idleness and ignorance. Again, wickedness ingendreth offence and repentance in the soul, which like an ulcer in the flesh, eateth and fretteth it, malice and mischief buildeth up torments against it self: *Militia ipsa maximam partem veneni sui bibit: malum consilium consultori pessimum: Malice it self suppeth up the greatest part of his own poyson: Evil counsel is worst to him that giveth it*: like the Wasp, which with his sting offendeth another, but much more himself, for he leaveth behind him, and that for ever, both his sting and his strength: vice hath pleasure in it, otherwise it would not be received, nor find place in the world, *Nemo enim animi causa malus est; No man is wicked for his minds sake*; but it doth withal ingender displeasure and offence, pain following sin, saith *Plato*; yea it groweth with it, saith *Hesiodus*: which is quite contray to the will and to vertue, which rejoyceth and contenteth. There is a congratulation, a pleasing contentment, and satisfaction in well-doing; it is the true and essential reward of a good soul, which can never fail him, and wherewith he must content himself in this world.

17.  
The description  
of wickedness.



18.  
*Whether it be  
never permit-  
ted to sin.*

There is no man maketh a doubt, whether vice be to be avoided, and hated above all things ; but it is a question whether there may be any such profit or pleasure, as may carry with it a sufficient excuse for the committing of such or such a sin. It seemeth to divers, that there may : Touching profit, if it be publick there is no doubt, (but yet with limitation, as shall be said in the virtue of politick prudence):but some will say as much of particular profit and pleasure. A man might speak and judge hereof more certainly, if some certain fact or example were proposed. But to speak simply, we are firmly to hold the negative.

19.  
*Whether all sin  
ingender re-  
pentance.  
The distinction  
of vice or  
wickedness.*

That sin cannot inwardly furnish us with such pleasure and content, as honesty doth, there is no doubt, but that it tormenteth (as hath been said) it is not universally and in all senses true : we must therefore distinguish it. There are three sorts of wickedness and wicked people : some are incorporated into evil, by discourse and resolution, or by long habit, in such sort, that their understanding it self approveth it and consenteth thereunto. This falleth out, when sin having met with a strong and vigorous heart, is in such sort rooted therein, that it is there formed, and as it were naturalized, and the soul infected and wholly tainted therewith. Others contrariwise do ill by impulsions, according as the violent wind of temptation troubleth, stirreth, and precipitateth the soul unto sin, and as they are surpris'd and carried by the force of passion. The third, as midlings betwixt these two, account their vice such as it is, they accuse and condemn it, contrary to the first ; and they are not carried by passion or temptation, as the second ; but in cold blood, having well thought thereof, they enter into the market, they ballance it with some great pleasure or profit, and in the end at a certain price and measure they yield thereunto, and they think they have some excuse to do it. Of this sort of sins are usuries, obscenities or venereous pleasures, and other sins many times resumed, consulted, deliberated ; as also the sins of complexion.

20.  
*Their compari-  
son.*

Of these three, the first do never repent, without some extraordinary touch from heaven: for being settled and hardned in wickedness, they feel not the prick and sting thereof: for since the understanding approveth it, and the soul is wholly tainted therewith, the will hath no will to gainsay it. The third repent, or seem in a certain fashion, that is to say, simply considering the dishonest action in it self ; but afterwards weighing it with profit or pleasure, they repent not at all : and to say the truth, and to speak properly, they do

do not repent, since both their reason and conscience willeth and consenteth to the fault. The second, are they that repent and re-advise themselves, and of whom properly it is called repentance: whereof I will here take occasion to speak a word or two.

Repentance is a disavowing or denial, and a retraction of the will, that is, a sorrow or grief ingendred in us by reason, which driveth away all other sorrows and griefs, which proceed from outward causes. Repentance is inward, inwardly ingendred, and therefore more strong then any other, as the heat and cold of a fever, is more violent then that which is outward. Repentance is the medicine of the soul, the death of sin, the cure of our wills and consciences; but it is necessary, that we well know it. First, it is not of every sin, as hath been said; not of that which is inveterate, habituated, authorized by the judgment it self; but of the accidental, and that which happeneth either by surprise, or by force: nor of things that are not in our power, whereof we are sorry we cannot repent: neither can it be in us, by reason of bad issues, and contrary to our counsels and designments. If a matter fall out besides a mans thought, conceit, and advice; for that he must not repent him of his counsel and advice, if he therein carry himself as he ought; for a man cannot divine of events, and if a man did know them, yet hath he no place to consult of them; and we never are to judge of counsels by their issues; neither must it grow in him by age, impotency, and distaste of things; this was to suffer his judgment to be corrupted: for the things are not changed, because we are changed, by age, sickness, or other accidents. The growing wise, or amendment, which comes by anxiety, distaste, or feebleness, is not true and religious, but idle and languishing. The weakness of the body is no fit Post to carry us to God, and to our duty, and repentance; but true repentance is the gift of God, which toucheth our heart, and must grow in us, not by the weakness of the body, but by the force of the soul, and of reason.

21.  
*Of Repentance.*

Now from true repentance there ariseth a true, free, and religious confession of our faults. As in the maladies of the body we see two kinds of remedies; the one which healeth, taking away the cause, the root of the malady; the other which doth only cover it, and bring it asleep: and therefore the former is more forcible, and more wholesome. So likewise in the maladies of the soul, the true remedy which cleanseth and healeth, is a serious and modest confession of our faults; the other false, which doth only disguise and cover.

22.  
*Of Confession  
and excuse.*



cover, is excuse, a remedy invented by the Author of evil it self, whereof the Proverb is, *That sin seweth it self a garment*, that is, Excuse, the garment made of fig-leaves by the first offenders, who covered themselves both with words and deeds, but it was a garment without warmth. We should therefore learn to accuse our selves, boldly to confess all our actions and thoughts: for besides that it were a fair and generous liberty, it were likewise a mean not to do or think any thing, which were not honest and fit to be published: for he that will be content to be bound to tell all, will be likewise content to bind himself to do nothing that a man is constrained to hide; but contrarily, every man is discreet and secret in confession, but not in actions. Boldness to sin, is in some sort bridled by boldness to confess. If it be undecent to do a thing, it is far more undecent not to dare to avouch it. Many great and holy men, as *S. Austin, Origen, Hippocrates*, have published the errors of their opinions, and we should do the like of our manners. But going about to hide them, a man falleth many times into great evils, as he that solemnly denieth that he hath abused his body with another, by thinking to mend the matter, marres it, at leastwise multiplies his sin. This is not to excuse vice, but to adde thereunto.

## CHAP. IV.

*To have a certain end and form of life, the second foundation of Wisdom.*

**A**fter this first foundation of true and inward honesty, there cometh, as it were by way of Preamble, a second foundation, necessary for the government of our life; which is, to prepare and frame our selves to a certain and assured course of life, to make choice of that calling which doth best besit us, and is proper unto us; that is to say, which our particular nature (following always the universal, our great and general Mistress and Governour) doth willingly accommodate and apply it self unto. Wisdom is a sweet and regular conduct and carriage of our soul, guiding it with measure and proportion, and consisteth in an equality of life and manners.

2. This choice then is a matter of great difficulty, wherein a man carrieth himself very diversly, and wherein he findeth himself hindered by divers considerations, which draw him into divers parts, and many times hurt and hinder one another. Some are happy there-  
*This choice, a difficult thing, wherein a man carrieth himself diversly.*

therein, who by a great goodness and felicity of nature, have known both speedily and easily how to chuse, and either by a certain good hap, without any great deliberation, are, as it were, wholly carried into that course of life, which doth best befit them; in such sort that fortune hath been their chuser, and led them unto it, or by the friendly and provident hand of another, they have been guided and directed. Others contrarily are unhappy, who having failed even from the entrance, and wanting the spirit, or industry to know themselves, and in a good hour to be re-advised, how they might cunningly withdraw their stake in the midst of the game, are in such sort engaged, that they can no more recall themselves, and so constrained to lead a life full of inconvenience and repentance.

But it likewise proceedeth many times from the great default of him that deliberateth, either in not knowing himself well, and presuming too much of himself; whereby it falleth out, that he must either shamefully desist from that which he hath undertaken, or endure much pain and torment in persisting therein. He must remember that to carry a burthen, it is necessary there be more strength then burthen; otherwise, a man is constrained either to leave it, or to sink under it. A wise man doth never charge himself with more business, then he knoweth how to go through: or in not settling himself in any thing, but changing from day to day, as they do that are never pleased nor satisfied with any thing, but that which they have not; every thing discontenteth them, as well ease, as business, to command, as to obey. These kind of people live miserably, and without rest, as men constrained. The other likewise cannot hold themselves quiet, they cease not to go and come to no purpose, they seem to do much and do nothing; the actions of a wise man do always tend to some certain end. *Magnam rem puta, unum, hominem agere; præter sapientem nemo unum agit, multiformes sumus.* Think it a great matter for a man to do one thing: No man, but a wise man, doth one thing: for we are of many and divers fashions and shapes. But the most part do not deliberate, and consult of any thing, they suffer themselves to be led like oxen, or carried according to the times, company, occasion, and then know not how to give a reason, why they are rather of this calling then another, except it be because their father profest the same, or that they were unawares carried into it, and so have continued therein, in such sort, that as they did never well consider of their entrance, so they know not



not which way to get out. *Pauci sunt qui consilio se suaque disponunt; ceteri, eorum more qui fluminibus innatant, non eunt sed feruntur.* Few dispose advisedly of themselves or their affairs: others do it in that manner as men swim, who go not, but are carried with the water and course of the stream.

3.  
Counsel in those  
affairs.

Now, that a man may carry himself well herein, chuse well, and well acquit himself, he must know two things, and two natures: his own, that is his complexion, his port and capacity, his temperature, in what a man excelleth, in what he is feeble, what he is fit for, for what he is unfit; For to go against his own nature, is to tempt God, to spit against the heavens, to leave the business undone because he cannot do it: (*Nec quidquam sequi quod assequi nequeas: Attempt not any thing, that thou canst not attain to*) and to expose himself to laughter and mockery. Afterward he must know that which belongs to his affairs, that is to say, the state, profession, and kind of life that is proposed. There are some, wherein the affairs are great and weighty; others, where they are dangerous; others, where they are not so great, but are mingled and full of entanglements, and that draw after them many other businesses: These charges do much afflict the spirit. Every profession requireth more especially one certain faculty of the soul; one the understanding, another the imagination, another the memory. Now, to know these two natures, his own, and that of the profession and course of life, that which hath been said of the divers temperatures of the inward parts and faculties, will help much. Knowing these two natures, we must compare them together, to see whether they can well joyn and endure together; for it is necessary that they agree: if a man be to contest with his own nature, and to enforce it for the service and performance of a function and charge which he undertaketh; or contrarily, if to follow his nature, whether willingly, or that by force and insensibly it draw him, a man happen to fail or erre in his duty, what disorder is there? Where is equity? Where is decency? *Si quicquam decorum, nihil profectio magis quam æquabilitas vite universæ, & singularum actionum; quam conservare non possis, si aliorum imiteris naturam, omittas tuam.* If any thing be comely, nothing is more comely then the equability of the whole life, and of every particular action; which thou canst not preserve, if thou wilt follow the nature of other men, and omit thine own. This is the account we must make when we think to do any thing

*the second foundation of Wisdom.*

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thing that hath worth or grace in it, if nature it self be wanting.

*Tu nihil invitâ dices faciesue Minervâ.*

*If thy nature bend not to,*

*Never think to speak or do.*

*Id quemque decet quod est suum maximè : sic est faciendum, ut contra naturam universam nil contendamus, cæ servatâ propriam sequimur.* That becomes every man best, that is his own : so ought we to carry our selves, as we contend not against universal nature, but being kept, follow our own. And if it fall out, that by mishap, prudence, or otherwise, a man find himself engaged in a vocation, and course of life painful and unprofitable, and that a man cannot flye back ; it is the part of wisdom, to resolve to bear it, to sweeten it, to accommodate it unto himself as much as he can, doing as in a game at hazard, according to the counsel of *Plato*, wherein if the Die or Card fall not out to be good, a man taketh it patiently, and endeavoureth to mend his ill chance by his good play ; and like Bees, who from Thyme, a sharp and dry herb, gather sweet honey, and as the Proverb is, Make a virtue of necessity.

CHAP. V.

*To study true Piety, the first office of Wisdom.*

**T**He preparatives made, and the two foundations laid, it is time to build, and to set down the rules of Wisdom, whereof the first and most noble concerneth the Religion and Worship of God. Piety holdeth the first place in the rank of our duties, and it is a thing of great importance, wherein it is dangerous and very easie to erre and be mistaken. It is necessary therefore to be advised, and to know how he that studieth wisdom should govern himself, which we purpose to do, having a little discoursed of the state and success of Religions in the world, referring the rest unto that which I have said in my three Verities.

It is first a very fearful thing, to consider the great diversity of Religions which have been and are in the world, and much more of the strangeness of some of them, so fantastical and exorbitant, that it is a wonder that the understanding of man should be so much besotted and made drunken with impostures ; for it seemeth, that there is nothing in the world, high or low, which hath not been deified in some place or other, and that hath not found a place wherein to be worshipped.

*Diversity of Religions.*

*They*



2.  
*That all agree  
 in many prin-  
 ciples.*

They all agree in many things, and have likewise taken their beginning in the same climate. *Palestina* and *Arabia* which joy together ( I mean the more renowned and famous Mistress of the rest ) have their principles and foundations almost alike : The belief of one God the Author of all things, of his providence and love towards mankind, the immortality of the soul, reward for the good, chastisement for the wicked after this life, a certain outward profession of praying, invoking, honouring, and serving God. To win them credit, and that they may be received, they alledge and furnish themselves, whether in deed and in verity, as the true, or by imposture and fair semblance, with revelations, apparitions, prophets, miracles, prodigies, holy mysteries, Saints. All have their fountain and beginning small, feeble, humble ; but by little and little, by the imitation and contagious acclamation of the people, with some fictions as fore-runners, they have taken footing, and been authorized ; insomuch that they all are held with affirmation and devotion, yea, the absurdest among them. All hold and teach, that God is appeased and won by prayers, presents, vows, and promises, and the like : All believe that the principal and most pleasant service of God, and the powerfulest means to appease him, and to obtain his grace, is to punish, to cut themselves, to impose upon themselves some painful and difficult labour: witness throughout the world, and almost in all Religions, and rather in the false than in the true, in Mahumetism, then Christianity, so many orders, companies, hermitages, and Friories, destinated to certain and divers exercises, very painful, and of a strict profession, even to the lancing and cutting of their bodies, thinking thereby to merit much more than the common sort, who purifie not themselves with afflictions and torments as they do, and every day they provide new : and the nature of man doth never cease to invent means of pain and torment, which proceedeth from the opinion, that God taketh pleasure, and is pleased with the torment and ruine of his creatures, which opinion is founded upon the sacrifices, which were universal throughout the world, before the birth of Christianity, and exercised not only upon innocent beasts, which were massacred with the effusion of their blood, for a precious present unto God ; but (a strange thing that man should be so sottish) upon infants, innocents, and men, as well good and honest, as offenders ; a custom practised with great Religion almost in all Nations : As the *Getae*, a people of *Sybia*, who among others ceremonies and sacrifices dis-

patched

patched unto their god *Zamolxis*, from five years to five, a man amongst them to demand things necessary for them. And because it was thought necessary that one should die suddenly, at an instant, and that they did expose themselves unto death after a doubtful manner, by running themselves upon the points of three Javelins, whereby it fell out, that many were dispatched in their order until there came one that lighted upon a mortal wound, and died suddenly, accounting him the fittest messenger, and in greatest favour with their god, and not the rest: as the *Persians*, witness the fact of *Amestris* the mother of *Xerxes*, who at an instant buried alive fourteen young men of the best houses, according to the Religion of the Country: As the ancient *Gauls*, the *Carthaginians*, who sacrificed to *Saturn* their children, their fathers and mothers being present: the *Lacedemonians*, who flattered their goddess *Diana*, by whipping their youths in favour of her, many times even to death: the *Greeks*, witness the sacrifice of *Iphigenia*: the *Romans*, witness the two *Decii*: *Que fuit tanta iniquitas deorum ut placari pop. Rom. non possent, nisi tales viri occidissent?* Was the offence of the gods so great and so unjust, as it could not be appeased, but by the death of such men as these? *Turks*, who so massacre their visage, their breasts, their members, to gratifie their Prophet: the new East and West *Indies*; and in *Themistitan*, where they cement their Idols with the blood of children. What madness was this, to think to flatter the Divinity with inhumanity; to content the Divine goodness with our affliction, and to satisfy the justice of God with cruelty! Justice then thirsting after humane blood, innocent blood, drawn and shed with so much pain and torment: *Ut sic dii placentur quemadmodum ne homines quidem seviunt*: As if the Divinity should be satisfied by our inhumanity. From whence can this opinion and belief spring, that God taketh pleasure in torment, and in the ruine of his works, and humane nature? Following this opinion, of what nature should God be? But all this hath been abolished throughout Christendom, as before hath been said.

Seneca.

They have also their differences, their particular articles, whereby they are distinguished among themselves, and every one prefers it self above the rest, assuring himself it is the better, and more true than the rest, reproaching the one the other with some things, and so condemn and reject one another.

3.

They differ.

But no man doubteth, neither is it a matter of labour to know which is the truest; the Christian Religion having so many advantages and priviledges, so high and so authentical above others, and  
et special.

4.  
Christian Religion above all.



*To study true piety, the first office of Wisdom.*

especially these. It is the subject of my second verity, where is shewed how far all others are inferior unto it.

5.  
*The latter are  
built upon the  
former.*

Now as they spring up one after another, the younger doth always build upon the more ancient, and next precedent, which from the top to the bottom it doth not wholly disprove and condemn; for then it could not be heard or take footing; but it only accuseth it either of imperfection, or of the end, and that therefore it cometh to succeed it, and to perfect it, and so by little and little overthroweth it, and enricheth it self with the spoils thereof: as the Judaical, which hath retained many things of the Gentile Egyptian Religion the elder, the Hebrews not being easily purified of their customs: the Christian built upon the verities and promises of the Judaical: the Turkish upon them both, retaining almost all the verities of Christ Jesus, except the first and principal, which is his Divinity: so that if a man will leap from Judaism to Mahometism, he must pass by Christianity: and such there have been among the Mahometists as have exposed themselves to torments, to maintain the truth of Christian Religion, as a Christian would do to maintain the truth of the Old Testament. But yet the elder and more ancient do wholly condemn the younger, and hold them for capital enemies.

5.  
*All are strange  
to nature.*

All Religions have this in them, that they are strange and horrible to the common sense: for they propose and are built and composed of part, whereof some seem to the judgment of man base, unworthy, and unbecoming, wherewith the spirit of man, somewhat strong and vigorous, jesteth and sporteth it self; others too high, bright, wonderful, and mystical, where he can know nothing, wherewith it is offended. Now the spirit of man is not capable but of indifferent things, it contemneth and disdaineth the small, it is astonished and confounded with the great; and therefore it is no marvel, if it be hardly perswaded at the first onset, to receive all Religion, where there is nothing indifferent and common, & therefore must be drawn thereunto by some occasion: for if it be strong, it disdaineth and laugheth at it; if it be feeble and superstitious, it is astonished and scandalized: *Prædicamus Jesum crucifixum, Judæis scandalum, gentibus stultitiam: We preach Jesus crucified, a scandal to the Jews, to the people folly.* Whereof it comes to pass, that there are so many misbelievers and irreligious persons, because they consult and hearken too much to their own judgments, thinking to examine and judge of the affairs of Religion, according to their

own capacity, and to handle it with their own proper and natural instrument. We must be simple, obedient, and debonair, if we will be fit to receive religion, to believe and live under the law, by reverence and obedience to subject our judgement, and to suffer our selves to be led and conducted by publick authority; *Captivantes intellectum ad obsequium fidei: Submitting our understanding to the obedience of faith.*

But it was required so to proceed, otherwise religion should not be respected, and had in admiration as it ought, now it is necessary that be received and sworn to, as well authentically and reverently, as difficultly; If it were such as were wholly pleasing to the palate and nature of man without strangeness, it would be thought more easily; yet less reverently received.

Now the religions and beliefs being such as hath been said, strange unto the common sense, very far exceeding all the reach and understanding of man, they must not, nor cannot be gotten nor settled in us, by natural and humane means, (for then among so many great minds as there have been rare and excellent, some had attained thereunto) but it must needs be, that they be given us by extraordinary and heavenly revelation, gotten and received by divine inspiration, and as sent from heaven. In this manner likewise all do affirm, that they hold their religion and believe it, not from men, or any other creature, but from God.

7.  
Why they are  
not to be got-  
ten by humane  
means.

But to say the truth, and not to flatter or disguise, this is nothing they are, whatsoever some say, held by humane hands and means; which is true in every respect, in false religions, being nothing but prayers, and humane or diabolical inventions: The true, as they have another jurisdiction, so are they both received and held by another hand; neverthelesse we must distinguish. As touching the receiving of them, the first and general publication and installation of them hath been, *Domino co-operante, sermone confirmante, sequentibus signis; God working, his word confirming, and signes following,* divine and wonderful: the particular is done by humane hands and means; the nation, country, place, gives the religion, and that a man professeth which is in force in that place, and among those persons where he is born, and where he liveth: He is circumcised, baptised, a Jew, a Christian, before he knowes that he is a man, for religion is not of our choice or election, but man without his knowledge is made a Jew or a Christian, because he is born in Judaisme or Christianity: and if he had been both elsewhere among the Gen-

8.  
And yet they  
are gotten by  
humane means.



tiles, or Mahumetans, he had been likewise a Gentile or a Mahumetan. As touching the observation, the true and good professors thereof, besides the outward profession, which is common to all, yea to mis-believers, they attribute to the gift of God, the testimony of the Holy Ghost within: but this is a thing not common nor ordinary, what fair colour soever they give it, witnesses the lives and manners of men, so ill agreeing with their belief, who for humane occasions, and those very light, go against the tenour of their religion. If they were held and planted with a divine hand, nothing in the world could shake us, such a tie would not be so easily broken. If it had any touch or ray of divinity, it would appear in all, it would produce wonderful effects that could not be hid, as Truth it self hath said; *If you have but as much faith as a mustard-seed, you should remove mountains.* But what proportion or agreement is there betwixt the perswasion of the immortality of the soul, and a future reward so glorious and blessed, or so inglorious, and accursed, and the life that a man leadeth? The only apprehension of those things that a man saith he doth firmly believe, will take his senses from him: The only apprehension and fear to dye by justice, and in publick place, or by some other shameful and dishonourable action, hath made many to lose their senses, and cast them into strange trances: and what is that in respect of the worth of that which religion teacheth us is to come? But it is possible in truth to believe, to hope for that immortality so happy, and yet to fear death a necessary passage thereunto? to fear and apprehend that infernall punishment, and live as we do? These are things as incompatible as fire and water. They say they believe it, they make themselves believe they believe it, and they will make others believe it too; but it is nothing, neither do they know what it is to believe. For a belief, I mean such as the Scripture calleth historical, is diabolical, dead, informed, unprofitable, and which many times doth more hurt than good. Such believers (saith an ancient Writer) are mockers and impostors; and another saith, that they are in one respect, the most fierce and glorious, in another the most loose, dissolute, and villanous of the world; more than men in the articles of their belief, and worse than swine in their lives. Doubtless if we hold our selves unto God, and our religion, I say not by a divine grace as we should, but only after a simple and common manner, as we believe a history, or a friend, or companion, we should place them far above all other things for that infinite goodness that

that shineth in them, at the least, they should be put in the same rank or degree with honour, riches, friends. Now there are very few that do not fear less to commit an offence against God, and any point of his religion, than against his father, his master, his friend, his equals. All this hurteth not the dignity, purity, and height of Christianity, no more than the dunghil infecteth the beams of the Sun, which shines upon it; for as one saith, *Fides non à personis, sed contra*. But a man cannot pronounce so great a *Væ* against those false hypocrites, whom Verity it self so much condemneth, as they belch out of their own mouthes against themselves.

Mat. 23.

9.  
A distinction  
betwixt the  
true and false  
religion,

The better to know true piety, it is necessary first to separate it from the false, fained and counterfeit, to the end, we may not equivocate as the most part of the world doth. There is nothing that maketh a fairer shew, and that taketh greater pains to resemble true piety and religion; and yet that is more contrary an enemy thereunto than superstition: like the Woolf, which doth not a little resemble the dog, but yet hath a spirit and humour quite contrary; and the flatterer who counterfeiteth a zealous friend and is nothing less: or like false coin, which maketh a more glittering shew than the true; *Gens superstitioni obnoxia, religionibus adversa*: The people is subject to superstition, contrary to true religion. It is likewise envious and jealous, like an amorous adulteress, who with her smooth speeches makes shew of greater affection, and care of the husband, than the true and lawful wife, whom she endeavoureth to make odious unto him. Now the notable differences of these two are, that religion loveth and honoureth God, setteth a man in peace and rest, and lodgeth in a liberal, free, and generous soul: Superstition troubleth a man, and makes him wild, and injureth God himself, teaching to fear with horror and astonishment, to hide himself, and to fly from him, if it were possible; it is a weak, poor, and base malady of the soul; *Superstitio error insanus, amandos timet, quos colit violat: morbus pusilli animi, qui superstitione imbutus est, quietus esse nusquam potest. Varro ait Deum à religioso vereri, à superstizioso timeri*: Superstition is a frantick error, it feareth friends; corrupteth those that love it: It is the disease of a weak mind, which being infected with superstition, can never be at rest, Varro saith, religious men fear God for love, the superstitious for punishment. Let us speak of them both apart.

Tacit.

August.

A superstitious man suffereth neither God nor man to live in peace. He apprehendeth God as one anxious, spiteful, hardly contented, <sup>10.</sup> Superstition described.



*To study true Piety, the first office of Wisdom.*

tented, easily moved, with difficulty appeased, examining our actions after the humane fashion of a severe Judge, that watcheth our steps; which he proveth true by his manner of serving him, which is all after one fashion. He trembleth for fear, he is never secure, fearing he never doth well enough, and that he hath left something undone, by the omission whereof all is worth nothing that he hath done; he doubteth whether God be well content, and laboureth to flatter him, to the end he may appease and win him; he importuneth him with prayers, vows, offerings: he faineth to himself miracles, easily believeth and receiveth such as are counterfeited by others, and interpreteth all things though purely natural, as expressly sent and done by God, and runneth after whatsoever a man saith with all the care that may be; *Duo superstitionis propria, nimius timor, nimius cultus: Two things are proper to superstition, too much fear, too much honour.* What is all this but by punishing himself, vilely, basely, and unworthily to deal with God, and more mechanically, than a man would do with a man of honour? Generally all superstition, and fault in religion, proceedeth from this, that we make not that account of God that we should, we revoke him, and compel him into order, we judge of him according to our selves, we put upon him our humours. O what blasphemy is this!

11.  
*It is natural.*

Now this vice and malady is almost natural unto us, and we have all a kind of inclination thereunto. *Plutarch* deploreth the infirmity of man, who never knoweth how to keep a measure, or to settle himself upon his feet: for it leaneth and degenerateth either into superstition and vanity, or into a contempt and carelesnesse of divine things. We are like to an ill advised husband, besotted and couzened with the coyning subtilties of a light woman, with whom he conversed more by reason of her artificial flatteries, than with his honest spouse who honoureth and serveth him with a simple and natural shamefastness: and even so, superstition pleaseth us more than true religion.

12.  
*Popular.*

*Plutarch in  
Sextorio.*

It is likewise vulgar, it proceedeth from a weakness of the soul, and ignorance or mis-knowledg of God, and that very grosse, and therefore it is most commonly found in Children, women, old men, sick, and such as have been assaulted with some violent accident. To be brief, it is in barbarous natures; *Inclinat naturam ad superstitionem barbari: Barbarous natures incline soonest to superstition.* Of this then it is said, and not of true religion, that it is true that *Plato* affirmeth, that the weakness and idleness of men hath brought  
in

in religion, and made it prevail, whereby children, women and old men, should be most capable of religion, more scrupulous, and devout: this were to wrong true religion, to give it so poor and frail a foundation.

Besides these seeds of natural inclination and superstition, there are many that shake hands with it, and favour it greatly for the great gain and profit they receive by it. Great men likewise and mighty, though they know what it is, will not trouble nor hinder it, because they know it is a very fit instrument to lead a people withall, and therefore they do not only inflame and nourish that which is already grafted in nature, but when need requires, they forge and invent new, as *Scipio, Sertorius, Sylla*, and others; *Qui faciunt animos humiles formidine Divum, Depressoque premunt ad terram. Nulla res multitudinem efficacius regit, quam superstitio:* Which makes their minds humble for offending the gods, and lowly prostrate themselves to the ground. Nothing more forcibly carrieth a multitude than superstition.

13.  
Nourished and maintained by human reason. Curtius.

Now quitting your selves of this base and foul superstition, (which I would have him to abhor whom I desire to instruct unto wisdom) let us learn to guide our selves to true religion and piety, whereof I will give some grounds and pourtraits, as lesser lights thereunto. But before they enter thereinto, let me here say in general, and by way of preface, that of so many divers religions, and manners of serving God, which are or may be in the world, They seem to be the most noble, and to have greatest appearance of truth, which without great external and corporal service, draw the soul into it self, and raise it by pure contemplation, to admire and adore the greatnesse and infinite majesty of the first cause of all things, and the essence of essences, without any great declaration or determination thereof, or prescription of his service; but acknowledging it indefinitely, to be goodness, perfection, and infiniteness, wholly incomprehensible and not to be known, as the *Pythagorians*, and most famous Philosophers do teach. This is to approach, unto the religion of the Angels, and to put in practice that word of the Son of God, To adore in spirit and truth; for God accounteth such worshippers the best. There are others on the other side, and in another extremity, who will have a visible Deity, capable by the senses. Which base and gross error hath mocked almost all the world, even *Israel* in the desert, in framing to themselves a molten Calf. And of these they that have chosen the Sun for their god,

14.  
An entrance to the discourse of true religion.



seem to have more reason than the rest, because of the greatnesse, beauty, and resplendent and unknown virtue thereof, even such as enforce the whole world to the admiration and reverence of it self. The eye seeth nothing that is like unto it, or that approacheth neer unto it in the whole universe, it is one Sun, and without companion. Christianity, as in the middle, tempereth the sensible and outward with the insensible and inward, serving God with spirit and body, and accommodating it self to great and little, whereby it is better established, and more dureable. But even in that too, as there is a diversity, and degrees of souls, of sufficiency and capacity of divine grace; so is there a difference in the manner of serving God: the more high and perfect incline more to the first manner, more spiritual and contemplative, and lesse external; the lesse and imperfect, *Quasi sub pedagogo, As it were under a Tutor*, remain in the other, and do participate of the outward and vulgar deformities.

14.  
Divers descriptions of Religion.

Religion consisteth in the knowledge of God, and of our selves; (for it is a relative action between both) the office thereof is to extol God to the uttermost of our power, and to beat down man as low as may be, as if he were utterly lost; and afterwards to furnish himself with means to rise again, to make himself his misery and his nothing, to the end he may put his whole confidence in God alone.

16.

The office of religion is to joyn us to the Author and Principall cause of all our good, to re-unite, and fasten man to his first cause, as to his root, wherein so long as he continueth firm and settled, he preserveth himself in his own perfection; and contrariwise when he is separated, he instantly fainteth and languisheth.

17.

The end and effect of religion is faithfully to yield all the honour and glory unto God, and all the benefit unto man. All good things may be reduced to these two; The profit, which is an amendment, and an essential and inward good, is due unto poor, wretched, and in all points miserable man: The glory, which is an outward ornament, is due unto God alone, who is the perfection and fulnesse of all good, whereunto nothing can be added: *Gloria in excelsis Deo, & in terra pax hominibus: Glory be to God on high, and peace with men upon earth.*

18.  
An instruction to Piety.  
1. To know God.

Thus much being first known, our instruction to piety is first to learn to know God: for from the knowledg of things proceedeth that honour we do unto them. First then we must believe that he is, that he hath created the world by his power, goodnesse, wisdom, and

and that by it he governeth it that his providence watcheth over all things, yea the least that are; that whatsoever he sendeth us, is for our good, and that whatsoever is evil proceedeth from our selves. If we account those fortunes evil that he sendeth us, we blaspheme his holy name, because naturally we honour those that do us good, and hate those that hurt us. We must then resolve to obey him, and to take all in good part which cometh from his hand, to commit and submit our selves unto him.

Secondly, we must honour him: and the most excellent and devoutest way to do it, is first, to mount up our spirits from all carnal, earthly, and corruptible imagination; and by the chastest, highest, and holiest conceits, exercise our selves in the contemplation of the Divinity; and, after that we have adorned it with all the most magnifical and excellent names and praises that our spirit can imagine, that we acknowledg that we have presented nothing unto it worthy it self: but that the fault is in our weakness and imbecility, which can conceive nothing more high. God is the last endeavour and highest pitch of our imagination, every man amplifying the *Idea*, according to his own capacity: and to speak better, God is infinitely above all our last and highest endeavours and imaginations of perfection.

19.  
2. To honour him.

Again, we must serve him with our heart and spirit, it is the service answerable to his nature: *Deus spiritus est: si Deus est animus, sit tibi pura mente colendus: God is a Spirit; if God be a Spirit, worship him in purity of spirit.* It is that which he requireth, that which pleaseth him: *Pater tales querit adoratores: the Father desireth such worshippers.* The most acceptable sacrifice unto his Majesty, is a pure, free, and humble heart: *Sacrificium Deo spiritus purus: A pure heart is a sacrifice unto God.* An innocent soul, an innocent life: *Optimus animus, pulcherrimus Dei cultus: religiosissimus cultus imitari: unicus Dei cultus, non esse malum: A pure mind is the best service of God; the most religious worshipping of God is to follow him; the only honouring of God, is not to be evil.* A wise man is the true sacrifice of the great God, his spirit is his temple, his soul is his image, his affections are his offerings, his greatest and most solemn sacrifice is to imitate him, to serve and implore him: for it is the part of those that are great, to give; of those that are poor, to ask: *Beatius dare quam accipere: It is better to give than to take.*

20.  
3. To serve him in spirit.

Senec.  
Lactan.  
Mere.  
Trism.

Nevertheless, we are not to contemn and disdain the outward and publick service, which must be as an assistant to the other, by

21.  
4. To serve him with our bodies.



*To study true Piety, the first office of Wisdom.*

observing the ceremonies, ordinances, and customes, with moderation, without vanity, without ambition, or hypocrisie, without avarice, and alwaies with this thought, That God will be served in spirit: and that that which is outwardly done, is rather for our selves, than for God; for humane unity, and edification, than for divine verity: *Quæ potius ad morem quàm ad rem pertinent; Which rather belong to manners and custome, than to the thing it self.*

22.  
5. To pray unto  
him.

Our vows and prayers unto God should be all subject unto his will: we should neither desire nor ask any thing, but as he hath ordained, having alwaies for our bridle, *Fiat voluntas tua.* To ask any thing against his providence, is to corrupt the judge and Governour of the world; to think to flatter him, and to win him by presents and promises, is to wrong him. God doth not desire our goods; neither (to say the truth) have we any: all is his. *Non accipiam de domo tua vitulos, &c. meus est enim orbis terræ, & plenitudo ejus: I will not take the calves from thy house, &c. for the whole world is mine, and all that is therein.* But his will is, that we onely make our selves fit to receive from him, never expecting that we should give unto him, but ask and receive: for it is his office to give, as being great, and it belongs to man as being poor and needy to beg and to receive: to prescribe unto him that which we want, and we will, is to expose our selves to the inconveniences of *Midas*; but that is alwaies best, which pleaseth him best. To be brief, we must think, speak, and deal with God; as if all the world did behold us; we must live and converse with the world, as if God saw us.

23.  
Well to use his  
name.

It is not with respect to honour the name of God as we ought, but rather to violate it, lightly and promiscuously to mingle it in all our actions and speeches, as it were by acclamation or by custome, either not thinking thereof, or cursorily to passe him over: we must speak of God and his works soberly, but yet seriously, with shamefastness, fear, and reverence, and never presume to judge of him.

24.  
The conclusion.

And thus much Summarily of piety, which should be in high esteem; contemplating alwaies God, with a free, chearful and filiall soul; not wild, nor troubled, as the superstitious are. Touching the particularities as well of the belief as observation, it is necessary that we tie our selves to the Christian, as to the True, more rich, high, and honourable to God, commodious and comfortable to man, as we have shewed in our second verity; and therein remaining, we must

must with a sweet submission submit and settle our selves to that which the Catholick Church in all times hath universally held, and holdeth, and not intangling our selves with novelties, or selected and particular opinions, for the reasons set down in my third Verity, and especially in the first and last Chapters, which may suffice unto him, that cannot, or will not read the whole book.

Let me onely give this one advice, necessary for him that intendeth to be wise, and that is, not to separate piety from true honesty, whereof we have spoken before, and so content himself with one of them; much lesse to confound and mingle them together. These are two things very different, and which have divers jurisdictions; piety and probity, religion and honesty, devotion and conscience: I will that both of them be joyntly in him whom I here instruct, because the one cannot be without the other entire and perfect, but confused. Behold here two rocks whereof we must take heed, and few there be that know them, to separate them, and to rest contented with the one, to confound and mingle them, in such sort, that the one be the jurisdiction of the other.

The first that separate them, and that have but one of them, are of two sorts; for some do wholly give themselves to the worship and service of God, taking no care at all of true virtue and honesty, whereof they have no taste; a vice noted as natural to the Jews especially, (a race above all other, superstitious, and for that cause odious to all) and much displayed by their Prophets, and afterwards by the *Messias*, who reproached them, that of their Temple they had made a den of thieves, a cloak and excuse for many wickednesses, which they perceived not; so were they besotted with this outward devotion, wherein putting their whole confidence, they thought themselves discharged of all duty; yea, they were made more hardy to do any wickedness. Many are touched with this feminine and popular spirit, wholly attentive to those small exercises of outward devotion; whereby they are made never the better, from whence came the Proverb, *An angel in the Church, a devil in the house*: they lend the shew and outward part unto God, like the Pharises; they are sepulchres, white walls: *Populus hic labiis me honorat, cor eorum longe à me*: This people honour me with their lips, but their heart is far from me: yea, they make piety a cover for impiety, they make it (as they say) an occupation of a merchandise, and alledge their offices of devotion, to extenuate and recompence their sin and iniquity. Others quite contrary make no account but of

virtue

27.  
An advisement  
to joyn piety  
and probity  
together.

25:  
Of those which  
have piety  
without pro-  
bity.

Matth. 15. and  
22.



*To study true Piety, the first office of Wisdom:*

27.  
*A comparison.*

virtue and honesty, little caring for any thing that belongs to religion, a fault of many Philosophers, and which is likewise too common among our Atheists. These are two vicious extremities; but which is the more or the lesse extreme, or which of the two is the more worthy, Religion or Honesty, it is not my purpose to determine; I will onely say, (to compare them in three points) that the first is far more easy, of greater shew, of simple and vulgar spirits: the second is far more difficult and laborious in the performance, of lesse shew, of spirits valiant and generous.

28.  
*Against those  
that confound  
piety and pro-  
bity.*

I come to others, who differ not much from the first, who take no care but of religion. They pervert all order, and trouble all, confounding honesty, religion, the grace of God, (as hath been said before) whereby it comes to passe, that they have neither true honesty, nor true religion, nor consequently the Grace of God, as they think: a people onely content with themselves, and ready to censure and condemn others; *Qui confidunt in se, & aspernant alios: Who trust in themselves, and contemn others.* They think that religion is a generality of all good, and of all virtue; that all virtues are contained in it, and necessarily follow it, whereby they acknowledge no other virtue, and honesty, but that which is opened with the key of religion. Now it is quite contrary; for religion, which is the latter, is a special and particular virtue, distinguished from all other virtues, which may be without them, and without probity, as hath been said of the Pharisees, religious and wicked: and they without religion, as in many Philosophers good and virtuous, but yet irreligious. It is likewise, as all divinity teacheth, a moral humane virtue, appertaining to justice, one of the four cardinal virtues, which teacheth us in general, to give unto every one that which belongeth unto him, reserving to every one his place. Now God being above all, the universal author and master, we must give unto him all Sovereign honour, service, obedience, and this subaltern Religion, and the *Hypothesis* of justice, which is the generall *Thesis*, more ancient and natural. They on the other side, will that a man be religious before he be honest, and that religion (which is acquired and gotten by an outward cause, *ex auditu*; *Quomodo credent sine prædicante?* by hearing, how can they believe, without preaching?) ingendreth honesty, which we have shewed should proceed from nature, from that law and light which God hath put into us, from our first beginning. This is an inverted order, These men will that a man be an honest man, because there is a Paradise and a hell: so that

*Thom. p. 2.2.  
2.81.*

if

*To study true Piety, the first office of Wisdome.*

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if they did not fear God, or fear to be damned (for that is often their language) they would make a goodly piece of work. O miserable honesty ! What thanks deservest thou, for what thou doest ? O cowardly and idle innocency ; *quæ nisi metu non placet !* which pleaseth not without fear ! Thou keepest thy self from wickednesse, because thou darest not be wicked, and thou fearest to be beaten, and even therein art thou wicked. *Oderunt peccare mali formidine pænæ* : The wicked forbear to offend, for fear of punishment. Now I will that thou dare, but yet that thou wilt not, though thou be never chidden : I will that thou be an honest man, not because thou would'st go to Paradise ; but because nature, reason, God willeth it ; because the Law, and the general policy of the world, whereof thou art a part, requireth it ; so as thou canst not consent to be any other, except thou go against thy self, thy essence, thy end. Doubtlesse such honesty occasioned by the spirit of religion, besides that it is not true and essential, but accidentall ; it is likewise very dangerous, producing many times very base and scandalous effects (as experience in all times hath taught us) under the fair and glorious pretext of piety. What execrable wickednesses hath the zeal of Religion brought forth ? Is there any other subject or occasion, that hath yielded the like ? It belongeth to so great and noble a subject, to work great and wonderfull effects.

*Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum,  
Quæ peperit sepe scelerosa atque impia facta :*

*So ill is God abus'd, and so accurst,  
As the corruption of the best is worst :  
For the unjustest warre we undertake,  
Incontinent religion's brought to stake,  
So Luther, Hungary was cause to lose,  
So Christ himself became a block to Jews,*

Not to love him, yea to look upon him with a wicked eye, as a man should look upon a monster, that believeth not as he believeth. To think to be polluted by speaking, or conversing with him, is one of the sweetest and most pleasing actions of these kind of people. He that is an honest man by scruple, and a religious bridle, take heed of him, and account of him as he is. And he that hath religion without honesty, I will not say, he is more wicked, but farre more dangerous than he that hath neither the one nor the other : *Omnis qui interficiet vos, putabit se obsequium præstare Deo* : Who so killeth you, thinks he doth an acceptable service unto God : not because religion teach-



teacheth or any way favoureth wickedness, as some very foolishly, and maliciously from this place do object; for the most absurd and falsest religion that is, doth it not; but the reason is, that having no taste, nor image, nor conceit of honesty, but by imagination, and for the service of religion, and thinking, that to be an honest man is no other thing, than to be careful to advance religion, they believe all things whatsoever, be it reason, treachery, sedition, rebellion, or any other offence to be not onely lawful and sufferable, being coloured with zeal and the care of religion, but also commendable, meritorious, yea, worthy canonization, if it serve for the progresse and advancement of religion, and the overthrow of their adversaries. The Jews were wicked and cruel to their parents, unjust towards their neighbours, neither lending, nor paying their debts, and all because they gave unto the Temple, thinking to be quit of all duties, and rejecting the whole world by saying, *Corban*.

I will then (to conclude this discourse) that there be in this my wife man, a true honesty, and a true piety, joyned and married together, and both of them compleat and crowned with the grace of God, which he denieth none that shall ask it of him. *Deus dat spiritum bonum omnibus petentibus eum. God giveth a good spirit to all that ask it of him:* as hath been said in the Preface, article the 14.

Matt. 15. 5.

Mark 7. 11.

S. Hierome.

#### CHAP. VI.

#### To govern his desires and pleasures.

It is a principal duty of a wise man, to know well how to moderate and rule his desires and pleasures; for wholly to renounce them, I am so farre from requiring it in this my wife man, that I hold this opinion to be not onely fantastical, but vitious and unnatural. First then we must confute this opinion, which banisheth and wholly condemneth all pleasures, and afterwards learn how to govern them.

**I.**  
The first part: It is a plausible opinion, and studied by those that would seem to be men of understanding, and professors of singular Sanctity, generally to contemn and tread under foot all sorts of pleasures, and all care of the body, retiring the spirit unto it self, not having any commerce with the body, but elevating it self to high things, and so to passe this life as it were insensibly, neither tasting it, nor attending it. With these kind of people, that ordinary phrase of  
passing.

An opinion of  
the contempe  
of the world.

passing the time, doth very well agree : for it seemeth to them, that well to use and employ this life, is, silently to passe it over, and as it were to escape it, and rob themselves of it, as if it were a miserable, burthenfome, and tedious thing, being desirous so to slide thorow the world, as that not onely recreation and pastimes are suspected, yea odious unto them, but also naturall necessities, which God hath seasoned with some pleasure. They come not where any delight is, but unwillingly; and being where it is, they hold their breath till they be gone, as if they were in a place of infection : and, to be brief their life is offensive unto them, and death a solace, pleasing themselves with that saying, which may be as well ill taken and understood, as well, *Vitam habere in patientia, mortem in desiderio* : Not impatient of life, but rather to desire death.

But the iniquity of this opinion may many wayes be shewed. First, there is nothing so fair and lawfull, as well and duly to play the man, well to know how to lead this life. It is a divine knowledge and very difficult, for a man to know how he should lawfully enjoy his own essence, lead his life according to the common and naturall model, to his proper conditions, not seeking those that are strange; for all those extravagances, all those artificiall and studied endeavours, those wandring waies from the naturall and common, proceed from folly and passion : these are maladies, without which whilst these men would live, not by playing the men, but the divines, they play the fools; they would transform themselves into Angels, and they turn themselves into beasts : *aut Deus, aut bestia : homo sum, humani à me nihil alienum puto* : Either a God or a beast; I am a man, and I account my self no other than humane. Man is a body and a soul, and it is not well done to dismember this building, to divide and separate this brotherly and natural conjunction; but contrariwise, we should renew it by mutual offices, the spirit must awaken and revive the heavy body, the body must stay the lightness of the spirit which many times proves but a trouble-feast; the spirit must assist and favour the body, as the husband the wife, and not reject it, not hate it. It must not refuse to participate the natural pleasures thereof, which are just, and such as besit that marriage that is betwixt them, alwaies holding therein, as the more wise, a true moderation. A man must study, know and meditate on this life, to the end he may return condign thanks unto him who hath lent it. There is Nothing which God hath made for us in this present life unworthy our care, and we are accountable for them, even to the very



very hairs of our head; for it is no frivolous warrant or commission, for a man to direct himself and his life according to his natural condition, but God hath given it him seriously and expressly.

3. But what great folly is there, and more against nature, than to  
 Lib. 3. cap. 38. account our actions vicious, because they are natural; unworthy, because they are necessary? Now this necessity and pleasure is an excellent marriage, made by God himself. Nature willeth very wisely, that those actions which it hath enjoyed us for our necessity be also delightful, inviting us thereunto not only by reason, but also by appetite; and these rules these kind of men go about to break. It is an equall fault and injustice, to loath and condemn all pleasures, and to abuse them, by loving them overmuch; we must neither run to them, nor fly from them, but receive them, and use them discreetly and moderately, as shall presently be said in the rule. Temperance, which is the rule of our pleasures, condemneth as well the insensibility and privation of all pleasure, *stuporem naturæ*, which is the failing extremity, as intemperance, *Libidinem*, which is the exceeding extremity. *Contra naturam est torquere corpus suum, faciles odisse munditias et squallorem appetere: delicatas res cupere, luxuria est: usitatas & non magno parabiles fugere, dementia est*: It is against nature, to enforce our selves to hate and condemn neat and necessary things, and to desire filthyness and deformities: It is wantonness to desire delicate things; and meer madness to avoid those that are common and needfull.

4. He that desireth to discard his soul, let him boldly do it if he can when his body is not in health, but endureth some torment, to the end he may disburthen himself, of that contagion: but he cannot do it; as likewise he ought not to do it: for to speak according to right and reason, it should never abandon the body; it is apishness to do it, it should behold pleasure and sorrow with a like settled countenance; in the one live severely, in the other chearfully: but in all cases it should assist the body, and maintain it alwaies in order.

5. To condemn the world, is a brave proposition, and many delight, nay glory to speak, to discourse thereof, but I cannot perceive that they well understand it, much lesse that they practise it: what is it to condemn the world? What is this world? Is it the heaven, the earth, and in a word, the creatures that are therein? No, I think not so: What then? Is it the use, the profit, the service, and commodity that we gather thereby? If so, what ingratitude is this against the  
 the

the author that hath made them to these ends? What accusation against nature? What reason to condemn them? If (in the end) thou wilt say, that it is neither the one, nor the other, but it is the abuse of them, the vanities, folly, excess, and wickedness that is in the world; I may answer, that it were well said, if this were of the world, but they are not so; but against the world, and the policy thereof; they are thine own additions, not natural, but artificial. To preserve thy self from them, as wisdom and the rule following teacheth, is not to condemn the world, which remaineth wholly entire without it; but it is well to use the world, well to govern thy self in the world, and as Divinity teacheth, to make use and benefit of the world, and not to enjoy it, *uti, non frui*. Now these kind of people think to practise the contempt of the world, by certain outward particular manners and fashions, separated by the common course of the world; but this is but mockery. There is nothing in the world so exquisite, the world laugheth not, and is not so wanting within it self, as without; in those places where men make profession of flying it, and trampling it underfoot, which is spoken against hypocrites, who have so much degenerated from their beginning, that there remaineth nothing but the habit, and is also very much changed, if not in form, at the least in matter, which serveth them for no other use, than to puff them up, to keep them more bold and impudent, which is quite contrary to their institution; *Ve vobis qui circumitis mare & aridam, ut faciatis unum pro felitum, & cum factus fuerit, facitis filium Gehenne*: Wo be to you that compass sea and land to make one of your profession; and when he is made, ye make him twofold more the Child of hell: and not against the good, much lesse against the estate in it self, which is the school of true and holy Philosophy. It is then a fantastical and unnaturall opinion, generally to reject and condemn all desires and pleasures. God is the Creatour and authour of pleasure; *Plantavit Dominus Paradisum voluptatis, posuit hominem in paradiso voluptatis, protulit omne lignum pulchrum, suave, delectabile*: God planted the Paradise of pleasure, wherein he placed man, which brought forth all kind of beautiful, sweet, and delectable trees, as shall be said. But we must first learn how to carry our selves therein.

This instruction may be reduced to four points (which if these mortified men, and great contemnners of the world did know how to put in practice, they would work wonders) to know little, naturally, moderately, and by a short relation to himself. These four go almost

6.  
The second  
part of the rule  
in our pleasures  
& desires.



To desire little.  
ale.

almost alwayes together, and make an entire, and perfect rule, and he that will, may gather and comprehend all these four in this world, Naturally; for nature is the fundamental and sufficient rule for all. But yet to make the matter more clear and easie, we will distinguish these four points. The first point of this rule, is to desire little: a short good, but an assured means to brave fortune, taking from it all accidents, and all power over us to hinder the happy content of our life: and in a word, to be wise, is to shorten our desires, to desire either little, or nothing at all. He that desireth nothing, although he have nothing, is as rich as he that possesseth the whole world, for both come to one end: *Nihil interest an habear, an non concupiscas: It is all one whether thou hast it, or no, if thou desirest it not*: and therefore it was well said, That it is not multitude and abundance that contenteth and enricheth, but want, yea nothing. It is the want of desire, for he that is poor in desires, is rich in contentment, *Summe spes, inopia cupiditatum: The want of desires, is great riches*. To be brief, he that desireth nothing is in some sort like unto God, and those that are already blessed, who are happy and blessed, not because they have and possess all, but because they desire nothing: *Qui desiderium suum clausit, cum Jove de felicitate contendit: Who bridleth his desire, contendeth even with Jupiter in felicity*. Contrarily, if we let loose the bridle to our appetite to follow abundance and delicacy, we shall continue in perpetual pain and labour; superfluous things will become necessary, our souls will be made slaves to our bodies, and we can live no longer, than that we live in pleasure and delight. If we moderate not our pleasures and desires, and measure them not by the compass of reason, opinion will carry us into a headlong downfall, where there is neither bottom nor brink: as for example, we will make our shoes of velvet, afterwards of cloth of gold, and lastly of embroidery with Pearls and Diamonds; we will build our houses of marble, afterwards of jasper, and porphyrie. Now this mean for a man to enrich himself, and to make him content, is very just, and in the power of every man: he need not to seek his contentment elsewhere and without himself, let him but ask it, and he presently obtaineth it of himself. Let him stay the course of his desires, it is injustice to importune God, Nature, the world, by vows and prayers, to give him any thing, since he hath so excellent a mean in his own power to attain thereunto. Why should I rather desire another to give unto me, than my self not to desire? *Quare potius à fortuna*

*fortunâ impetrem ut det, quàm à me ne petam? quare autem petam oblitus fragilitatis humanæ? Wherefore should I rather desire fortune to give unto me, than I seek it of my self? but wherefore should I desire the oblivion of humane fragility? If I cannot or will not obtain of my self not to desire, how and with what face can I presse another to give, over whom I have no right nor power? The first rule then touching our desires and pleasures is, that this (little) or at least a mediocrity and sufficiency is that which doth best content a wise man, and keeps him in a peace. And this is the reason why I have chosen for my device, Peace and Poverty. With a fool nothing sufficeth, nothing hath certainty or content: he is like the moon, who asketh a garment that may fit it; but it was answered, That that was not possible, because it was sometimes great, sometimes little, and alwayes changeable.*

Plutarch.

The other point consen-germain to this, is (naturally): for we know that there are two sorts of desires and pleasures, the one natural, and these are just and lawful, and are likewise in beasts limited and short, whose end a man may see: according to these, no man is indigent, for every thing yields something to content. Nature is contented with little, & hath so provided, that in all things, that which sufficeth is at hand and in our own power, *Parabile est quod natura desiderat & expositum; ad manum est, quod sat est. Ready and at hand is it, that nature desires; and at hand also, that which sufficeth.* It is this which nature demandeth for the preservation of its own essence, it is a favour for which we are to thank nature, that those things that are necessary for this life, it hath made easie to find; and such as are hardly obtained, are not so necessary; and that seeking without passion, that which nature desireth, fortune can no way deprive us of it. To these kind of desires a man may adde (though they be not true nor natural, yet they come very neer) those that respect the use and condition of every one of us, which are somewhat beyond, and more at large than those that are exactly natural, and so are just and lawful in the second place. The other desires are beyond nature, proceeding from an opinion and phantacy, artificial, superfluous; and truly passions, which we may, to distinguish them by name from others, call cupidities or lusts, whereof we have spoken before at large in the passions: from which a wise man must wholly and absolutely defend himself.

7.  
Naturally.

Seneeca.

The third, which is moderately and without excesse, hath a large field, and divers parts, but which may be drawn to two heads; that

8.  
Moderately  
See lib. 3. c. 38.



*To carry himself moderately and equally*

is to say, to desire without the hurt of another, of himself: of another without his scandal, offence, losse, prejudice; of himself, without the losse of his health, his leasure, his functions and affairs, his honour, his duty.

By relation.

The fourth, is a short and essential relation to himself; besides that the career of our desires and pleasures must be circumscribed, limited, & shortned; their course likewise must be managed, not in a right line, which makes an end elsewhere and without it self; but in a circle, the two points whereof do meet and end in our selves. Those actions that are directed without this reflection, and this short and essential turning, as of covetous and ambitious men, and divers others, who run point-blank, and are alwayes without them, are vain and unsound.

## CHAP. VII.

*To carry himself moderately and equally in prosperity, and adversity.*

1. **T**HERE is a twofold fortune, wherewith we are to enter the list, good and ill, prosperity and adversity; these are the two combats, the two dangerous times, wherein it standeth us upon to stand upon our guard, and to gather our wits about us: they are the two schools, essayes, and touch-stones of the spirit of man.

2. *The opinion of the vulgar.* The vulgar ignorant sort do acknowledge but one: they do not believe that we have any thing to do, that there is any difficulty, any fight or contradiction with prosperity and good fortune, wherein they are so transported with joy, that they know not what they do, there is no rule with them: and in affliction, they are as much astonished and beaten down, as they that are dangerously sick, and are in continual anguish, not being able to endure either heat or cold.

3. *Which of the two is more difficult to bear, prosperity or adversity.* Arist. Senec. The wise men of the world acknowledge both, and impute it to one and the same vice and folly, not to know how to command in prosperity, and how to carry our selves in adversity: but which is the more difficult and dangerous, they are not wholly of one accord, some saying it is adversity, by reason of the horreur and bitterness thereof: *Difficilius est tristitiam sustinere, quam à delectabilibus abstinere: majus est difficilia perstringere, quam leta moderari.* Harder it is to sustain grief, than to abstain from pleasures, but more hard to pass through difficult things, than to moderate our pleasures.

*Sures.* Some affirming it to be prosperity, which by her sweet and pleasing flattery, doth abate and mollifie the spirit, and sensibly robbeth it of its due temperature, force, and vigour, as *Dalila* did *Samson*; in such sort, that many, that are obdurate obstinate and invincible in adversity, have suffered themselves to be taken by the flattering allurements of prosperity; *Magni laboris est ferre prosperitatem: segetem nimia sternit ubertas, sic immoderata felicitas rumpit.* Great labour it is to live in prosperity: too much plenty plasheth down the corn! so too much felicity casteth us down. And again, affliction moveth even our enemies to pitty, prosperity our friends to envy. In adversity, a man seeing himself abandoned by all, and that all his hopes are reduced unto himself, he taketh heart at grasse, he rouzeth himself, calls his wits about him, and with all his power adds his own endeavours to his own help: In prosperity seeing himself assisted by all that laugh at him, and applaud all he doth, he groweth lasie and careless, trusting in others, without any apprehension of danger or difficulty, and perswading himself that all is in safety, when he is many times therein much deceived. It may be, that according to the diversity of nature and complexions both opinions are true: but touching the utility of either, it is certain that adversity hath this preheminance, it is the seed, the occasion, the matter of well-doing, the field of heroical virtues, *Virescit vulnere virtus: egræ fortunæ sana consilia melius in malis sapimus: secunda rectum auferunt.* Virtue flourisheth by adversity: we better know sound advice by the difficult fortune of dysastrous things; prosperity blindeth the truth.

Now wisdom teacheth us to hold our selves indifferent and upright in all our life, and to keep alwayes one and the same countenance, pleasing and constant. A wise man is a skilful artificer, who maketh profit of all; of every matter he worketh and formeth virtue; as that excellent Painter *Phidias*, all manner of Images: whatsoever lighteth into his hands he maketh it a fit subject to do good, and with one and the same countenance he beholdeth the two different faces of Fortune. *Ad utrosq; casus sapiens apius est, bonorum rector, malorum victor: In secundis non confidit, in adversis non deficit; nec avidus periculi, nec fugax, prosperitatem non expectans, ad utrumque paratus; adversus utrumque intrepidus, nec illius tumultu, nec huius fulgore percussus. Contra calamitates fortis & contumax, luxuriæ non adversus tantum, sed & infestus: hoc præcipuum, in humanis rebus erigere animum supra minas & promissa fortune.* A wise man

4.  
The advice of  
the wise upon  
both.



*To carry himself moderately and equally*

fitteth himself for all fortunes; he governeth the good, subdueth the evil; He presumes not in prosperity, nor despairs in adversity; he neither desires danger, nor shuns it; he expecteth not prosperity, but is ready at all assaies; fearing neither felicity nor adversity: not moved with the clamour of the one, nor the glory of the other. Strong and despising all miseries, not only against all superfluity and excesse, but even an enemy unto it; who in worldly things, hath a spirit erected above fortune's threats or promises. wisdom furnisheth us with arms and discipline for both combats; against adversity with a spur, teaching us to raise, to strengthen, to incite our courage; and this is the virtue of fortitude: against prosperity, it furnisheth us with a bridle, and teacheth us to keep and clap down our wings, and to keep our selves within the bounds of modesty; and this is the virtue of temperancy: these are the two moral virtues, against the two fortunes, which that great Philosopher *Epicurus* did very well signifie, containing in two words all moral Philosophy, *Sustine & abstine*, bear the evil, that is, adversity; abstain from the good, that is, from pleasure and prosperity. The particular advisements against the particular prosperities and adversities shall be in the third book following, in the virtues of Fortitude and Temperancy. Here we will onely set down the general instructions and remedies against all prosperity and adversity; because in this book we teach the way in general unto wisdom, as hath been said in the preface thereof.

5  
*Of prosperity.*

Against all prosperity, the common doctrine and counsel consisteth in three points: the first, that honours, riches, and the favours of fortune, are ill and wrongfully accounted and called goods, since they neither make a man good, nor reform a wicked man, and are common both to good and wicked. He that calleth them goods, and in them hath placed the good of man, hath fastened our felicity to a rotten cable, and ankred it in the quick-sands. For what is there more uncertain and inconstant, than the possession of such goods, which come and go, passe and run on like a river? like a river they make a noise, at their coming in, they are full of violence, they are troubled; their entrance is full of vexation, and they vanish in a moment; and when they are quite dryed up, there remaineth nothing in the bottome but the mud.

6.

The second point is to remember, that prosperity is like a horned poyson, sweet and pleasant, but dangerous, whereof we must take very good heed. When fortune laugheth, and every thing falleth out according to our hearts, then should we fear most, and stand

stand upon our guard, bridle our affections, compose our actions by reason, above all avoid presumption, which ordinarily followeth the favour of the time. Prosperity is a slippery pace, wherein a man must take sure footing, for there is no time wherein men do more forget God. It is a rare and difficult thing to find a man who doth willingly attribute unto him the cause of his felicity. And this is the cause why in the greatest prosperity we must use the counsel of our friends, and give them more authority over us, than at other times; and therefore we must carry our selves as in an evil and dangerous way, go with fear and doubt, desiring the hand and help of another. In these times of prosperity, adversity is a medicine, because it leadeth us to the knowledge of our selves.

The third is to retain our desires, and to set a measure unto them. Prosperity puffeth up the heart, spurreth us forward, findeth nothing difficult, breedeth alwayes a desire of great matters (as they do, that by eating get an appetite) and it carrieth us beyond our selves, and in this state it is where a man loseth himself, drowneth and maketh a mockery of himself. He plaieth the Monky, who leapeth from bough to bough, till he come to the top of the tree, and then sheweth his tail. O how many have been lost, and have perished miserably, by the want of discretion to moderate themselves in their prosperity! We must therefore either stay our selves, or go forward with a slower pace, if we will enjoy the benefit of our prosperity, and not hold our selves alwayes in chase and purchase. It is wisdom to know how to settle our own rest, our own contentment; which cannot be where there is no stay, no end. *Siquæ finire non possunt, extra sapientiam sunt: What cannot be determined is beyond wisdom.*

Against all adversity, these are the general advisements. In the first place, we must take heed of the common and vulgar opinion, erroneous and alwayes different from true reason: for, to discredit and to bring into hatred and horreur all adversity and afflictions, they call them evils; disasters, mischiefs, although all outward things be neither good nor evil. Never did adversity make a man wicked but hath rather served as a means to amend those that are wicked, and are common both to the good and to the wicked.

Doubtlesse, crosses and heavy accidents are common to all, but they work divers effects, according to that subject whereupon they light. To fools and reprobate persons they serve to drive them into despair, to afflict and enrage them: Perhaps they enforce them

7.

8.

*Of adversity and that it is no evil.*

9.

*It is common to all, but differently.*



(if they be heavy and extreme) to stoop, to cry unto God, to look up unto heaven; but that is all: To sinners and offenders they are so many lively instructions, and compulsions to put them in mind of their duty, and to bring them to the knowledge of God: To virtuous people, they are the lists and theaters wherein to exercise their virtue, to win unto themselves greater commendations and a neerer alliance with God: To wise men, they are matter of good and sometimes stages and degrees whereby to pass and mount up to all heighth and greatness, as we see and may read of divers, who being assailed by such and so great crosses, as a man would have thought them their utter overthrow and undoing, have been raised by the self-same means to the highest pitch of their own desires, and contrariwise without that infelicity, had still remained under hates; as that great *Athenian* Captain knew well, when he said, *Periissemus nisi periissemus: We should utterly have perished, if we had not perished.* A very excellent example hereof was *Joseph* the son of *Jacob*. It is true that these are blows from heaven, but the virtue and wisdom of man serveth as a proper instrument; from whence came that wise saying of the Sages, *to make of necessity a virtue.* It is a very good husbandry, and the first property of a wise man, to draw good from evil, to handle his affaires with such dexterity, and so to win the wind, and to set the bias, that of that which is ill, he may make good use, and better his own condition.

10.  
It hath three  
causes, and  
three effects.

Afflictions and adversities proceed from three causes, which are the three authors and workers of our punishment: sin the first inventor which hath brought them into nature: the anger and justice of God, which setteth them a-work as his Commissaries and Executioners: the policy of the world troubled and changed by sin; where, as in a general revolt, and civil tumult, things not being in their due places, and not doing their office; all evils do spring and arise; as in a body the dis-joynting of the members, and dislocation of the bones, bringeth great pain, and much unquietness. These three are not favourable unto us: the first is to be hated of all as our enemy, the second to be feared as terrible, the third to be avoided as an impotter. That a man may the better defend and quit himself from all three, there is no better way then to use their own proper arms, wherewith they punish us, as *David* cut off *Goliath's* head with his own sword, making of necessity a virtue, profit of pain and affliction, turning them against themselves. Affliction is the

the true fruit or science of sin, being well taken, is the death and ruine thereof; and it doth that to the author thereof, which the viper doth to his dam that brought him forth. It is the oyl of the Scorpion, which healeth his own sting, to the end it may perish by its own invention: *perit arte sua: patimur quia peccavimus; patimur ut non peccemus*: He perisheth by his own Art: we suffer because we have sinned; we suffer that we should not sin. It is the file of the soul, which scoureth, purifieth and cleanseth it from all sin. And consequently it appeaseth the anger of God, and freeth us from the prisons and bands of Justice, to bring us into the fair and clear sun-shine of Grace and mercy. Finally, it weaneth us from the world, it plucketh us from the dug, and maketh us distaste with the bitterness thereof (like worm-wood upon the teat of the nurse) the sweet milk and food of this deceitful world.

A great and principal mean for a man to carry himself well in adversity, is to be an honest man. A virtuous man is more peaceable in adversity, than a vicious in prosperity: like those that have a fever, who feel and find more harm and violence in the heat and cold thereof, and in the extremity of their fits, than such as are sound, in the heat and cold of Summer and Winter. And even so they that have their consciences sick, are much more tormented, than they that are sound, that are honest men: For having the inward part whole and healthful, they can no way be endamaged by the outward, especially opposing against it a good courage.

11.  
*A general advice.*

Adversities are of two sorts: some are true, natural; as sickness, griefs, loss of those things we love: others are false and fained, either by a common or particular opinion, and not in verity that it is so. Man hath his spirit and body, as much at command, as before they happened. To these kind of men, only this one word; That which thou complaineest of, is neither painful nor troublesome, but thou makest it such, and makest thy self to believe it.

12.  
*An advice more special.*

As touching the true and natural, the more prompt and popular and more sound opinions are, the more natural and more just. First we must remember, that a man indureth nothing against the humane and natural law, since even at the birth of man all these things are annexed, and given as ordinary. In whatsoever doth afflict us, let us consider two things, the nature of that that happeneth unto us, and that which is in our selves: and using things according to nature, we can receive no tediousness or offence thereby.

13.  
*Natural.*  
*To endure is natural and humane.*



For offence is a malady of the Soul contrary to nature, and therefore should by no means come near unto us. There is not any accident in the world which may happen unto us, wherein nature hath not prepared an aptness in us to receive it, & to turn it to our contentment. There is no manner of life so strait, that hath not some solace and recreation. There is no prison so strong and dark, that gives not place to a song sometimes to comfort a prisoner. *Jonas* had leisure to make his prayer unto God even in the belly of the whale, and was heard. It is a favour of nature that it findeth a remedy and ease unto our evils in the bearing of them, it being so that a man is born to be subject to all sorts of miseries, *Omnia ad quæ gemimus, quæ expaviscimus, tributa vitæ sunt*: All things that afflict are grievous, are the tributes of life.

14.

*It toucheth  
but the lesser  
part of man.*

Secondly, we must remember, that there is only the lesser part of man subject to fortune; we have the principal in our own power, and it cannot be overcome without our own consent. Fortune may make a man poor, sick, afflicted; but not vicious, dissolute, dejected; it cannot take from us probity, courage, virtue.

15.

*It is against  
reason and  
justice.*

Afterwards we must come to fidelity, reason, justice. Many times a man complaineth unjustly, for though he be sometimes surprised with some ill accident, yet he is more often with a good, and so the one must recompence the other. And if a man consider well thereof, he shall find more reason to content himself with his good fortunes, than to complain of his bad. And as we turn our eyes from those things that offend us, and delight to cast them upon green and pleasant colours, so must we divert our thoughts from heavy and melancholick occurrents, and apply them to those that are pleasant and pleasing unto us. But we are malicious, resembling cupping glassses, which draw the corrupt blood, and leave the good; like a covetous man who selleth the best wine, and drinks the worst; like little children, from whom if you take away one of their play-games, in a fury they cast away all the rest. For if any misfortune happen unto us; we torment our selves, and forget all the rest that may any way comfort us: yea, some there are that for small losses term themselves unfortunate in all things, and forget that they ever received any good, in such sort, that an ounce of adversity brings them more hearty grief than ten thousand of prosperity, pleasure or delight.

16.

*It is both in  
comparison.*

We must likewise cast our eyes upon those that are of a far worse condition than our selves, who would think themselves happy if they were in our place.

Cum

*Cum tibi displiceat rerum fortuna tuarum.*

*Alterius specta, quo sis discrimine peior.*

*If thou griev'st thou art not such*

*As thy neighbour, over much;*

*Sreight reflect upon the poor,*

*Think the rest, and grieve no more.*

It were good and necessary that these complainers did practise the saying and advice of a wise man, that if all the evils that men suffer should be compared with the blessings they enjoy; the division being equally made, they may see by the over-plus of that good they enjoy, the injustice of their complaint.

After all these opinions, we may conclude that there are two great remedies against all evils and adversities, which may be reduced almost to one; Custom for the vulgar and baser sort, and Meditation for the wiser. Both of them have their force from time, the common and strongest salve against all evils; but the wise take it before hand, this is his fore-sight; and the feeble and vulgar sort, after-hand. That custom prevaieth much it doth plainly appear, in that those things that are most tedious and offensive, are made thereby easie and pleasing. *Natura calamitatum mollimentum consuetudinem invenit: Custome mitigateth calamitie.* Slaves weep when they enter into the gallies, & before three months be ended they sing. They that have not been accustomed to the Sea, are afraid though it be the calmest, when they weigh anker; whereas the Mariners laugh in the midst of a tempest. The wife groweth desperate at the death of her husband, and before a year be expired she loves another. Time and custome bring all things to passe; that which offendeth us, is the novelty of that which happeneth unto us; *Omnia novitate graviora sunt: All new and unexpected crosses, are intolerable.*

Meditation performeth the same office with wise men, and by the force thereof things are made familiar and ordinary: *Quæ alii diu patiendæ levia faciunt, sapiens levia facit diu cogitando; That which some make light by long suffering, a wise man makes light and easie by long cogitation.* He considereth exactly the nature of all things that may offend him, and presenteth unto himself whatsoever may happen unto him most grievous and insupportable, as sicknesse, poverty, exile, injuries; and examineth in them all that which is according to nature or contrary to it. For forelight or providence is a great remedy against all evils, which cannot bring any great alteration

17.

18.

Fore-sight  
providence.



alteration or change, happening to a man that attendeth them; whereas contrarily they wound and hurt him greatly, that suffereth himself to be surpris'd by them. Meditation and discourse is that which giveth the true temper to the soul, prepareth it, confirmeth it against all assaults, makes it hard, steely, impenetrable against whatsoever would wound or hurt it. Sudden accidents how great soever, can give no great blow to him that keeps himself upon his guard, and is alwayes ready to perceive them. *Premeditati mali molis icūs venit: quicquid expectatum est diu, levius accidit:* The hurt is small, if the karm before be known; whatsoever we do long expect, doth happen the lighter. Now to attain this fore sight, we must first know, that nature hath placed us here as in a thorny and slippery places; that that which is happened unto another, may also light upon us; that that which hangeth over all, may fall upon every one of us; and that in all the affairs that we undertake, we premeditate the inconveniencies & evil encounters which may happen unto us, to the end we be not surpris'd unawares. O how much are we deceived, and how little judgement have we, when we think, that that which happeneth to others, cannot likewise fall upon us! When we will not be wary and provident, for fear lest we should be thought fearfull. Contrariwise, if we take knowledge of things as reason would have us, we would rather wonder that so few crosses happen upon us; and that those accidents that follow us so near, have stay'd so long before they catch us, and having caught us, how they should handle us so mildly. He that taketh heed, and considereth the adversity of another, as a thing that may happen unto himself, before it shall happen is sufficiently armed. We must think of all, and expect the worst; they are fools and ill-advised, that say, I had not thought it. It is an old saying, That he that is suddenly surpris'd, is half beaten; and he that is warned is half armed, nay it is two against one. A wise man in time of peace, makes his preparation for war: A good mariner before he go forth of the haven makes provision of what is necessary to resist the violence of a tempest: it is too late to provide against an evil, when it is already come. In whatsoever we are prepared before-hand, we find our selves apt and admirable, what difficulty soever it have; and contrariwise, there is not any thing so easie that doth not hurt and hinder us, if we be but novelists therein: *Id videndum ne quid inopinatum sit nobis, quia omnia novitate graviora sunt:* We ought to foresee that nothing happen unto us unlooked for, because all novelities are the more

more grievous. Doubtless it seemeth, that if we were so provident as we should and may be, we should wonder at nothing. That which thou sawest before it came, is happened unto thee, why then wondrest thou? Let us then take a course that accidents do not surprize us; Let us ever stand upon our guard and foresee what is to come. *Animus, adversus omnia firmandus; ut dicere passimus, Non ulla laborum, O virgo, nova mihi facies inopinave surgit: Omnia percepi, atque animum mecum ante peregi. Tu hodie ista denuncias; ego semper denunciavi mihi: hominem paravi ad humanum.* The mind must be armed for all things, that we may hold nothing tedious or painful. O virgin, there seems to me no new and unexpected countenance to appear. I have considered of all things, and am resolved thereof in mind. To day hast thou shewed me all these things, which alwayes I foretold to myself: I have framed man for humane things.

CHAP. VIII.

To obey and observe the Laws, Customs, and Ceremonies of the Countrey, how and in what sense.

**E**VEN as a savage and untamed beast, will not suffer himself to be taken, led, and handled by man, but either flyeth and hideth himself from him, or armeth himself against him, and with farie assaulteth him, if he approach neer unto him; in such sort that a man must use force mingled with art and subtilty to take and tame him: So folly will not be handled by reason, or wisdom, but striveth and stirreth against it, and addeth folly unto folly: and therefore it must be taken, and lead, like a wild beast, (that which a man is to a beast, a wise man is to a fool) astonished, feared, and kept short, that with the more ease it may be instructed and won. Now the proper mean or help therunto, is a great authority, a thundering power and gravity, which may dazle it with the splendour of his lightning, *Sola auctoritas est que cogit stultos ut ad sapientiam festinent: It is only authority that inforceth fools to apply themselves to wisdom.* In a popular fight or sedition, if some great, wise, ancient, and virtuous personage come in presence, that hath won the publick reputation of honour and virtue, presently the mutinous people being stricken and blinded with the bright splendour of his authority, are quieted, attending what he will say unto them.

I.  
The beginning,  
institution and  
authority of  
the Laws.

August.



— *Veluti magno in populo cum saepe coorta  
Seditio est, sevitque animis ignobile vulgus,  
Jamque faces & saxa volant, furor arma ministrat:  
Tum pietate gravem ac meritis, si forte virum quem  
Conspexere, silent, arrectisque auribus astant,  
Ille regit dictis animos, & pectora mulcet.*

Even as when tumults to sedition grow,  
And Hobborn mad though cause he none do know  
Without himself: example so encharms  
This headlong rout, whose fury gives it arms;  
As fire-brands, stones, and all things flie about,  
Their rage encounters: so there is no doubt  
Of certain harm; unless (as sent from God)  
Some grave, censorious Cato with his rod  
Appear in time, at whose authority  
They silent stand, and bear him speak, well nigh  
An hour together, till their fury die,  
So all is hush: the same that now do sing,  
Each to his tent, now cry, God save the King.

There is nothing greater in this world than authority, which is an image of God, a messenger from Heaven: if it be sovereign, it is called Majesty; if subaltern, Authority: and by two things it is maintained, admiration and fear mingled together. Now this Majesty and Authority is first and properly in the person of the Sovereign Prince and Law-maker, where it is lively, actual, and moving; afterwards in his commandments and ordinances, that is to say, in the Law, which is the head of the work of the Prince, and the image of a lively and original Majesty. By this, are fools reduced, conducted, and guided. Behold then of what weight necessity, and utility, Authority and the Law is in the world!

2.  
of Customs.

The next authority, and that which is likest to the Law, is Custom, which is another powerful and imperious Mistress: It seizeth upon this power, and usurpeth it traiterously and violently, for it planteth this authority by little and little, by stealth, as it were insensibly, by a little pleasing, and humble beginning; having settled and established it self, by the help of time, it discovereth afterwards a furious and tyrannicall visage, against which there is no more liberty or power left, so much as to lift up ones eyes: It taketh its authority from the possession and use thereof; it encreaseth and ennobleth it self by continuance like a river; it is dangerous to bring it back to his original fountain.

Law

Law and Custome established their authority diversly. Custome by little and little, with long time, sweetly and without force, by the common consent of all, or the greater part; & the author thereof are the people. The Law springeth up in a moment with authority and power, and taking his force from him that hath power to command all, yea many times against the likeing of the subject, whereupon some compare it to a Tyrant, and Custome to a King. Again, custome hath with it neither reward nor punishment; the law hath them both, at least punishment; neverthelesse they may mutually help and hinder one another. For custome, which is but of sustenance, authorized by the Sovereign, is better confirmed: and the law likewise setteth its own authority by possession & use; and contrariwise custome may be cashiered by a contrary law, and the law loseth force thereof by suffering a contrary custome: but ordinarily they are together, that is, law and custome; wise and spiritual men considering it as a law, and simple men as a custome.

3.  
*A comparison  
of them both.*

There is not a thing more strange, than the diversity of strangeness of some laws and customes in the world; Neither is there any opinion or imagination so variable, so mad, which is not established by laws and customes in some place or other: I am content to recite some of them, to shew those that are hard of belief herein, how far this proposition doth go. Yet omitting to speak of these things that belong to religion, which is the subject where the greatest wonderments and grossest impostures are: but because it is without the commerce of men, and that it is not properly a custome, and where it is easie to be deceived, I will not meddle with it. See then a brief of those that for the strangeness are best worth the noting. To account it an office of piety in a certainage, to kill their parents and to eat them. In Innes to pay the shot, by yielding their Children wives and daughters, to the pleasure of the host: publick brothel-houses of males: old men lending their wives unto young: women common: an honour to women to have accompanied with many men; and to carry their locks in the hemmes of their garments: daughters to go with their privy parts uncovered, and married women carefully to keep them covered: to leave the daughters to their pleasures, and being great with child to enforce an abort in the sight and knowledge of all men; but married women to keep themselves chaste and faithfull to their husbands: women the first night before they company with their husbands, to receive all the males of the estate and profession of their husbands, invited to the marriage

4.  
*Their diversity  
and strangeness.*

*Of laws and  
customes in the  
world.*



marriage, and ever after to be faithful to their husband: young married women to present their virginity to their Prince, before they lie with their husbands: marriages of males: women to go to war with their husbands: to die and kill themselves at the decease of their husbands, or shortly after: to permit widows to marry again, if their husbands die a violent death, and not otherwise: husbands to be divorced from their wives without alledging any cause: to sell them if they be barren, to kill them for no other cause but because they are women, and afterwards to borrow women of others at their need: women to be delivered without pain or fear: to kill their children because they are not fair, well featured, or without cause: at meat to wipe their fingers upon their privities and their feet: to live with mans flesh: to eat flesh and fish raw: many men and women to lye together to the number of ten or twelve: to salute one another by putting the finger to the ground, and afterwards lifting it towards heaven: to turn the back when they salute, and never to look him in the face whom a man will honour: to take into the hand the spittle of the Prince: not to speak to the King but at a peep-hole: in a mans whole life never to cut his hair nor nails: to cut the hair on one side, and nails of one hand, and not of the other: men to pisse sitting, women standing: to make holes and pits in the flesh of the face, and the dugs, to hang rings and jewels in: to contemn death, to receive it with joy, to sue for it, to plead in publick for the honour thereof, as for a dignity and favour: to account it an honourable burial to be eaten with dogs, birds, to be boyled, cut in pieces and pounded, and their powder to be cast into their ordinary drink.

5.  
*Examination  
and judgment.*

When we come to judge of these customs, that is the complaint and the trouble: the vulgar sort and Pedants, are not troubled herewith; for every seditious rout condemneth as barbarous and beastly whatsoever pleaseth not their palate, that is to say, the common use and custom of their countrey. And if a man shall tell them, that others do speak and judge the same of ours, and are as much offended with ours, as we with theirs; they cut a man short after their manner, terming them beasts and barbarians, which is alwaies to say the same thing. A wise man is more advised, as shall be said; he maketh not such halte to judge, for fear lest he wrong his own judgement: and to say the truth, there are many laws and customs which seem at the first view to be savage, inhumane, and contrary to all reason, which if they were without passion and soundly considered

sidered of, if they were not found to be altogether just and good yet at the least they would not be without some reason and defence. Let us take amongst the rest for example the two first which we have spoken of, which seem to be both the strange stand farthest off from the duty of piety : to kill their own parents at a certain age, and to eat them. They that have this custome, doake it to be a testimony of piety and good affection, endeavouring thereby first of mere piety to deliver their old Parents, not only unprofitable to themselves and others, but burthensome, languishing, and leading a painful and troublesome life, and to place them in rest and ease : afterwards giving them the most worthy and commendable sepulchre, lodging in themselves and in their bowels, the bodies and reliques of their Parents, in a manner reviving them again, and regenerating them by a kind of transmutation into their living flesh, by the means of digestion and nourishment. These reasons would not seem over-light to him that is not possessed with a contrary opinion : and it is an easie matter to consider, what cruelty and abomination it had been to those people, to see their parents before their own eyes to suffer such grief and torment, and they not able to succour them, and afterwards to cast their spoiles to the corruption of the earth, to stench and rottenness and the food of Worms, which is the worst that can be done unto it. *Darius* made a tryal, asking some Greeks, for what they would be perswaded to follow the custome of the Indians, in eating their dead fathers. To whom they answered, That they would not do it for any thing in the world. And on the other side assaying to perswade the Indians to burn the bodies of their dead Parents, as the Greeks did, it seemed to them a matter of such difficulty and horroure, as that they would never be drawn unto it. I will adde only one other, which concerneth only matter of decency and comlineffe, and is more light and more pleasant : One that alwaies blew his nose with his hand, being reprehended for incivility, in the defence of himself, asked what priviledge that filthy excrement had that a man must afford it a fair handkerchief to receive, and afterwards carefully wrap and fold it up, which he thought was a matter of greater loathsomness, than to cast it from him. So that we see that for all things there may be found some seeming reason, and therefore we are not suddenly and lightly to condemn any thing.

But who would believe how great and imperious the authority of custome is? He that said it was another nature did not sufficiently

6.  
The authority  
thereof.



Gen. 11. 20.

29. 35.

Exodus. 6.

Levit. 28.

Deut. 25.

2 Reg. 12.

3 Reg. 2.

*Chrift.**Ambros.**August.**In Apolog.*

ently expresse it; for it doth more than nature, it conquereth nature: for hence it is that the most beautifull daughters of men draw not unto love their natural parents; no brethren, thought excellent in beauty, win not the love of their sisters. This kind of chastity is not properly of nature, but of the use of laws, and customes which forbid them, and make of incest a great sinne, as we may see in the fact not only of the children of *Adam*, where there was an enforced necessity, but of *Abraham* and *Nachor* brethren; of *Jacob* and *Judas* Patriarchs, *Amram* the father of *Moses*, and other holy men: And it is the law of *Moses* which forbad it in these first degrees; but it hath also sometimes dispensed therewith, not only in the collateral line, and betwixt brothers, and their brothers wives which was a commandment, and not a dispensation: and which is more, between the natural brother and sister of divers wombs; but also in the right line of alliance, that is to say, of the son with the mother in law; for in the right line of blood, it seemeth to be altogether against nature, notwithstanding the fact of the daughters of *Lot* with their father, which neverthelesse was produced purely by nature, in that extreme apprehension, and fear of the end of humane kind, for which cause they have been excused by great and learned Doctors. Now against nature there is not any dispensation, if God the onely superiour thereunto give it not. Finally, of casual incests and not voluntary the world is full, as *Tertullian* teacheth. Moreover, custome doth inforce the rules of nature, witnesse those Physitians who many times leave the natural reasons of their Art by their own authority, as they that by custome do live and sustain their lives with poyson, Spiders, Emmets, Lizards, Toads, which is a common practice amongst the people of the *West Indies*. It likewise dulleth our senses, witnesse they that live near the fall of the river *Nilus*, near clocks, armories, mills; and the whole world according to some Philosophers, with the sound of a heavenly king of musick, & the continual and divers motions of the heavens dulleth our senses, that we hear not that which we hear. To conclude, (and it is the principal fruit thereof) it overcometh all difficulty, maketh things easie that seem impossible, sweetneth all sower; and therefore by the means hereof a man lives in all things content, but yet it mastereth our selves, our beliefs, our judgements, with a most unjust and tyrannical authority. It doeth and undoeth, authoriseth and dis-authoriseth whatsoever it please, without rhythme or reason, yet many times against all reason. It establisheth

eth in the world against reason and judgment all the opinions, religions, beliefs, observances, manners, and sorts of life, most phantastical and rude, as before hath been said. And contrarily, it wrongfully degradeth, robbeth, beateth down in things that are truly great and admirable, their price and estimation, and maketh them base and vile.

*Nil adeo magnum, nec tam mirabile quidquam*

*Principio, quod non cessent mirari omnes*

*Paulatim. ———*

*Nine days a wonder; nought so wonderful*

*At first; but time and frequencie will dull,*

*And so the Rainbow, Manna, Moon and Sun,*

*Have not the same respect, that first was done,*

So that we see that custom is a thing great and powerful. *Plato* having reprehended a youth for playing at cob-nut, or cherry-pit, and receiving this answer from him; That he controlled him for a matter of small moment, replied; My child, custom is not a matter of small moment. A speech well worth the noting, for all such as have youth to bring up. But it exerciseth its power with so absolute authority, that there is no striving against it, neither is it lawful to reason, or call into question the ordinances thereof: it enchanteth us in such sort, that it maketh us believe, that what is without the bounds thereof, is without the bounds of reason, and there is nothing good and just, but what it approveth; *ratione non componimur, Seneca. sed consuetudine abducimur: honestius putamus quod frequentius: recti apud nos locum tenet error, ubi publicus factus: We are not made by reason, but misled by custom; we hold that most honest, that is most used. Error hath place in us before Right.* This is tolerable with idiots, and the vulgar sort, who wanting sufficiency to look into the depth of things, to try and to judge, do well to hold and settle themselves to that which is commonly held and received: but to wise men, who play another part, it is a base thing to suffer themselves to be carried with customs.

Now the advice which I here give unto him, that would be wise, is to keep and observe, both in word and deed, the Lawes and Customs which he findeth established in the Countrey where he is: and in like manner, to respect and obey the Magistrates, and all Superiours; but alwayes with a noble spirit, and after a generous manner, and not servilely, pedantically, superstitiously; and withall, not taking offence, nor lightly condemning other strange Laws and Customs



stomes, but freely and soundly judging and examining the one and the other, as hath been said and not binding his judgement and belief, but unto reason only. Hereof, a word or two.

I.  
Laws and  
Customs are to  
be observed.

In the first place, according to all the wisest, the rule of rules, and the general Law of Laws is to follow and observe the Laws and Customs of the Countrey where he is νόμοις ἑταίου τίσιν ἐγκρίσθαι καλόν, avoiding carefully all singularity, and strange extravagant particularity, different from the common and ordinary; for whatsoever it be, it alwayes hurteth and woundeth another, is suspected of folly, hypocrisie, ambitious passion, though perhaps it proceed from a sick and weak soul. *Non conturbabit sapiens publicos mores, nec populum in se novitate vita convertet.* He that is wise, will not seek to alter the manners of the people; neither pull men upon him with his innovations. We must alwayes walk under the covert of the Laws, Customs, Superiours without disputation or tergiversation, without undertaking sometimes to dispence with the Laws, sometimes like a frugal servant, to enhance the price.

2.  
Not for their  
justice and  
guilty.

But that it be (which is the second rule) out of a good minde, and after a good manner, nobly and wisely, neither for the love nor fear of them, nor for the justice or equity that is in them, nor for fear of that punishment that may follow for not obeying them: to be brief, not of superstition, nor constrained, scrupulous, fearful servitude, *Eadem quæ populus, sed non eodem modo, nec eodem proposito faciet sapiens.* A wise man that doth those things that other men do, but not in that fashion, nor to the same end, but freely and simply for publick reverence, and for their authority. Laws and Customs are maintained in credit, not because they are just and good, but because they are Laws and Customs: this is the mystical foundation of their authority, they have no other; and so is it with Superiours, because they are Superiours: *Quia supra cathedram sedent: Because they sit in the Chair of Authority, not because they are virtuous and honest: quæ faciunt, nolite facere: what they do, do not you.* He that obeyeth them for any other cause, obeyeth them not because he should; this is an evil and a dangerous subject, it is not true obedience, which must be pure and simple. *Unde vocatur depositio discretionis mera executio, abnegatio sui:* From whence it is named, a putting off of his own reason, a mere obediense in the execution, and a denying of himself. Now to go about to measure our obedience by the justice and goodness of Laws and Superiours, were by submitting them to their judgment, to serve them with process, and to call our obedience into doubt and

and disputation; and consequently, the State and Policy, according to the inconstancy and diversity of judgements. How many unjust and strange Laws are there in the World, not only in the particular judgements of men, but of universal reason wherewith the World hath lived a long time in continual peace and rest, with as great satisfaction, as if they had been very just and reasonable? And he that should go about to change or mend them, would be accounted an enemy to the Weal-publick, and never be admitted: The nature of man doth accommodate it self to all with the times, and having once caught his fish, it is an act of hostility, to go about to alter any thing: we must leave the world where it is; these trouble-houses, and new-fangled spirits, under a pretext of reformation marre all.

All change and alteration of Laws, Beliefs, Customes, and observances, is very dangerous, and yieldeth alwayes more evil then good; it bringeth with it, certain and present evils, for a good that is uncertain and to come. Innovators have alwayes glorious and plausible Titles, but they are but the more suspected, and they can not escape the note of ambitious presumption, in that they think to see more cleerly then others, and that to establish their opinions, the State, Policy, Peace, and publick quiet, must be turned topsie turvy.

Against Innovators.

I will not say for all this that hath been said before, that we must absolutely obey all Laws, all Commandments of Superiours: for such as a man knoweth evidently to be either against God or nature, he is not to obey, and yet not to rebel and trouble the State; how he should govern himself in such a case, shall be taught hereafter, in the obedience due unto Princes: for to say the truth, this inconvenience and infelicity, is rather, and more common in the commandments of Princes, then in the Laws: neither is it sufficient to obey the Laws and Superiours, because of their worth and merit, nor servilely and for fear, as the common and prophane sort do; but a wise man doth nothing by force or fear; *Soli hoc sapienti contingit, ut nil faciat invitus; recta sequitur, gaudet officio*: This is only incident to wise men, that they do nothing by constraint; they follow the right, and perform their duty: he doth that which he should, and keeps the Laws, not for fear of them, but for the love of himself, being jealous of his duty; he hath not to do with the Laws, to do well; that is that wherein he differeth from the common

3  
Strange things  
are not lightly  
to be condemn'd



sort, who cannot do well, nor know what they ought to do, without Laws; *At iusto et sapienti non est lex posita: The Law was not ordained for the just and righteous.* By right a wise man is above the Laws, but, in outward and publick effect, he is their voluntary and free obedient subject. In the third place therefore, it is an act of lightness, and injurious presumption; yea, a testimony of weakness, and insufficiency; to condemn that which agreeth not with the law and custom of his Countrey. This proceedeth either from want of leisure, or sufficiency to consider the reasons and grounds of others; this is to wrong and shame his own judgment, whereby he is enforced many times to recant; and not to remember, that the nature of man is capable of all things; It is to suffer the eye of his spirit to be hood-winked, and brought asleep by a long custome, and prescription to have power over judgement.

4. *Wisely to examine all things.* Finally, it is the office of a generous and a wise man (whom I here endeavour to describe) to examine all things, to consider apart, and afterwards to compare together, all the Laws and customs of the World, which shall come to his knowledge, and to judge of them (not to rule his obedience by them, as hath been said, but to exercise his office, since he hath a spirit to that end) faithfully and without passion, according to the rule of truth and universal reason, and nature, whereunto he is first obliged, not flattering himself, or staining his judgement with error: and to content himself to yield obedience unto those, whereunto he is secondly and particularly bound, whereby none shall have cause to complain of him. It may fall out sometimes, that we may do that, by a second particular, and municipal obligation (obeying the Laws and customs of the Country) which is against the first and more ancient, that is to say, universal nature and reason; but yet, we satisfy nature by keeping our judgements and opinions true and just according to it. For we have nothing so much ours, and whereof we may freely dispose; the World hath nothing to do with our thoughts, but the outward man is engaged to the publick course of the World, and must give an account thereof; so that many times, we do justly that, which justly we approve not. There is no remedy, for so goes the World.

5. *of Ceremonies.* After these two Mistresses, Law and Custom, comes the third, which hath no lesse authority and power with many; yea, is more rough and tyrannical to those that too much tie themselves thereunto. This is the ceremony of the world, which to say the truth, is for the

the most part but vanity, yet holdeth such place, and usurpeth such authority, by the remifness and contagious corruption of the world, that many think that wisdom consisteth in the observation thereof and in such sort do voluntarily enthral themselves thereunto. that rather then they will contradict it, they prejudice their health, benefit, businesse, liberty, conscience and all; which is a very great folly, and the fault and infelicity of many Courtiers, who above others are the idolaters of Ceremony. Now my will is that this my wise man, doe carefully defend himself from this captivity; I do not mean, that out of a kind of loose incivility, he abuse a ceremony, for we must forgive the world in something, and as much as may be outwardly conform our selves to that which is in practice; but my will is, that he tie not, and inthral himself thereunto, but that with a gallant and generous boldnesse he know how to leave it when he will, and when it is fit, and in such manner, as that he give all men to know, that it is not out of carelesnesse, or delicacy, or ignorance, or contempt, but because he would not seem ignorant how to esteem of it as is fit, nor suffer his judgement and will to be corrupted with such a vanity; and that he lendeth himself to the world when it pleaseth him, but never giveth himself.

## CHAP. IX.

*To carry himself well with another.*

**T**His matter belongeth to the virtue of justice, which teacheth how to live well with all, and to give to every one that which appertaineth unto him, which shall be handled in the book following, where shall be set down the particular and divers opinions according to the diversitie of persons. Here are only the general, following the purpose and subject of this book.

There is here a twofold consideration (and consequently two parts in this Chapter) according to the two manners of conversing with the world, the one is simple, general and common, the ordinary commerce of the world, whereunto the times, the affairs, the voyages, and encounters do daily lead, and change acquaintance from those we know, to these we know not, strangers, without our choice, or voluntary consents: the other special is unaffected and desired company and acquaintance, either sought after and chosen, or being offered and presented, hath been embraced; and that either for spiritual or corporal profit or pleasure, wherein there is



conference, communication, privacy, and familiarity: each of them have their advisements apart. But before we enter into them, it shall not be amisse by way of preface, to give you some general and fundamental advise of all the rest.

3.  
Facility and  
universality of  
humours.

It is a great vice (whereof this our wise man must take heed) and a defect inconvenient both to himself and to another, to be bound and subject to certain humors and complexions to one only course; that is, to be a slave to himself, so to be captivated to his proper inclinations, that he cannot be bent to any other, a testimony of an anxious scrupulous mind, and ill breed, too amorous, and too partial to it self. These kind of people have much to endure and to contest: and contrariwise it is a great sufficiency and wisdom to accommodate himself to all. *Istud est sapere qui ubicunque opus sit animum possis flectere: It is wisdom to frame the mind, as occasion shall still require.* To be supple and maniable, to know how to rise and fall, to bring himself into order, when there is need. The fairest minds, and the best born, are the more universal, the more common, applicable to all understandings, communicative and open to all people. It is a beautifull quality, which resembleth and imitateth the goodness of God, it is the honour which was given to old *Ca-ro. Huic versatile ingenium, sic pariter et omnia fuit, ut natum ad id unum diceret, quodcunque ageret: Whose mind was apt for all things; which generally was such, as whatsoever he did, he was said to be born to the same purpose.*

4.  
The first part.  
Advice touch-  
ing simple and  
common con-  
versation.

Let us see the advisements of the first consideration, of the simple and common conversation, I will here set down some, whereof the first shall be, to keep silence and modesty.

The second, not to be over-formal, in not applying himself to the follies, indiscretion, and lightness, which may be committed in his presence: for it is an indiscretion to condemn all that pleaseth not our palat.

6.

The third, to spare, and thriftily to order that which a man knoweth, and that sufficiency that he hath attained, and to be more willing to hear than to speak, to learn than to teach: for it is a vice to be more ready and forward to make himself known, to talk of himself, and to shew all that is in him, than to learn knowledge of another; and to spend his own stock than to get new.

7.

The fourth, not to enter into discourse and contestation against all, neither against great men to whom we owe a duty and respect, nor against our inferiours, where the match is not equal.

The

*To carry himself well with another.*

299

The fifth, to be honestly curious in the enquiry of all things, and knowing them, to order them frugally, to make profit by them.

8.

The sixth and principal is, to employ his judgement in all things, which is the chief part which worketh, ruleth and doth all : without the understanding all other things are blind, deaf, and without a soul, it is least to know the history, the judgement is all.

9.

The seventh is never to speak affirmatively, and imperiously, with obstinacy and resolution ; That hurteth and woundeth all.

10.

Peremptory affirmation and obstinacy in opinion, are ordinary signs of senslesness and ignorance. The style of the ancient Romans was, that the witnesses disposing, and the Judges determining that which of their own proper knowledge they knew to be true, they expressed their mind by this word, It seemeth (*Ita videtur.*) And if these did thus, what should others do? It were good to learn to use such words as may sweeten and moderate the temerity of our propositions; as, It may be, It is said, I think, It seemeth, and the like; and in answering, I understand it not, What is that to say? It may be, It is true. I will shut up this general part in these few words: To have the countenance and the outward shew open and agreeable to all, his mind and thought covered and hid from all, his tongue sober and discreet, alwayes to keep himself to himself, and to stand on his guard, *frons aperta, lingua parca, mens clausa, nulli fidere* : His face open, his tongue silent, his mind secret, and to trust none : to see and hear much, to speak little, to judge of all, *Vide, audi, judica.*

*The conclusion.*

Let us come to the other consideration, and kind of conversation more special, whereof the instructions are these. The first is to seek, to confer, and converse, with men of constancy and dexterity; for thereby the mind is confirmed and fortified, and it is elevated above it self, as with base and weak spirits it is debased, and utterly lost: the contagion herein is, as in the body, and also more.

11.

*The second part.*

*Of special conversation.*

The second is, not to be astonished at the opinions of another; for how contrary soever the common sort, how strange, how frivolous or extravagant they seem, yet they are suitable to the spirit of man, which is capable to produce all things, and therefore it is weakness to be astonished at them.

12.

The third is, not to fear or to be troubled with the rude incivility and bitter speeches of men, whereunto he must harden and accustom himself. Gallant men bare them with courage, this tenderness, and fearful and ceremonious mildness, is for women. This

13.



Society and familiarity must be valiant and manly, it must be courageous both to give hard speeches, and to endure them, to correct and to be corrected. It is a fading pleasure, to have to do with a people that yeild, flatter, and applaud a man in all things.

14. The fourth is, to aim alwaies at the truth, to acknowledge it, ingeniously and chearfully to yeild unto it, of what side soever it be, using alwaies and in all things sincerity, and not as many, especially pedanties, by right or by wrong to defend himself and to quell his adversary. It is a fairer victory to range himself according to reason, and to vanquish himself, then to overcome his adversary, whereunto his own weekness doth many times help, being far from all passion. To acknowledge his fault, to confesse his doubt and ignorance, to yeild when there is occasion, are acts of judgement, gentlenesse, and sincerity, which are the principal qualities of an honest and wise man; whereas obstinacy in opinion accuseth a man of many vices and imperfections.

15. The fifth is, in disputation not to employ all the *medium's* that a man may have, but such as are best and fittest, that are more pertinent and pressing, and that with brevity; for even in a good cause a man may say too much: for long discourses, amplifications, and repetitions, are a testimony of ostentation, of a desire to speak, and tedious to the whole company.

16. The sixth and principal is, in all things to keep a form, order and aptnesse. O what a troublesome thing it is to dispute and conferre with a fool, a trisler, that uttereth nothing but matter impertinent to the matter! It is the only just excuse to cut off all conference: for what can a man gain but torment, that knows not how, nor what to speak as he should? Not to understand the argument that is made to wed himself to his own opinion, not to answer directly, to tie himself to words, and to leave the principal, to mingle and trouble the conference with vain amplifications, to denie all, not to follow the form of disputation, to ute unprofitable prefaces and digressions, to be obstinate in opinion, and to mouth it out, to tie himself to forms, and never to dive into the bottome; are things that are ordinarily practised by pedanties and Sophisters. See here how wisdom is discerned from folly; this is presumptuous, raw, obstinate, absurd, that never satisfieth it self, is fearfull, advised, modest: this pleaseth it self, goes forth of the lists merily and gloriously, as having wonne the victory, when it never came near it.

*To carry himself wisely in his affairs.*

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17.

The seventh, If there be a place of contradiction, he must take heed that he be not bold, obstinate, bitter; for either of these three makes it unwelcome, and doth more hurt himself, then another. That it may winne good entertainment of the company, it must arise from that very hour of the controverſie that it handled, from the present occasion, and not from elsewhere, not from any former precedent ground; neither must it touch the person, but the matter onely, with some commendation of the person if there be cause.

CHAP. X.

*To carry himself wisely in his affairs.*

**T**His doth properly belong to the virtue of prudence, whereof we shall speak in the beginning of the book following, where shall be set down in particular divers counsels and adviſements according to the divers kinds of prudence and occurrents in our affairs. But I will here set down the principal points and heads of wiſdome, which are general and common adviſements, to instruct in groſſe our diſciple, to carry himself well and wisely in the traffick and commerce of the world, and the managing of all affairs; and they are eight.

The first consisteth in understanding, that is, well to know the persons with whom a man hath to deal, their proper and particular nature, their humour, their spirit, inclination, delignment, and intention, their proceedings: to know likewise the nature of the business which he hath in hand, and which is proposed unto him, not onely in their superficial and outward appearance, but to penetrate into the inside thereof; not onely to see and know things in themselves, but the accidents and consequents that belong thereunto. The better to do this, he must look into them with all manner of viſages, consider them in all senses; for there are some that on one side are very precious or pleasing, and on the other, base and pernicious. Now it is certain, that according to the divers natures of the persons and affairs, we must change our style and manner of proceeding, like a Sea-man, who according to the divers state of the sea, and the diversity of the winds, doth diversly turn and guide his sails and his oars. For he that in all things shall direct and carry himself after one and the same fashion, would quickly marre all, play the fool, and make himself ridiculous. Now this twofold knowledge

I.  
*Knowledge of  
the persons  
and affairs.*

of



of the persons and affairs is no easie matter, so much is man disguised and counterfeited; but the way to attain thereunto, is, to consider them attentively and advisedly, resolving them many times in our mindes, and that without passion.

2. We must likewise learn to esteem of things according to their  
*Estimation of things.* of true worth, giving unto them that price and place which appertaineth unto them, which is the true office of wisdom and sufficiency. This is a high point of Philosophy; but the better to attain thereunto, we must take heed of passion, and the judgement of the vulgar sort. There are six or seven things which move and lead vulgar spirits, and make them to esteem of things by false ensigns, whereof wise men will take heed; which are, novelty, rarity, strangeness, difficulty, Art, invention, absence, and privation, or denial, and above all, report, shew and provision. They esteem not of things if they be not polished by art and science, if they be not pointed and painted out. The simple and natural, of what value soever they be, they attend not; they escape and drop away insensibly, or at least are accounted plain, base, and foolish, a great testimony of humane vanity and imbecility, which is paid with wind, with false and counterfeit money, instead of current; from whence it is, that a man preferreth art before nature, that which is studied and difficult, before that which is easie; vehement motions and impulsions, before complexion, constitution, habit; the extraordinary before the ordinary; ostentation and pomp before true and secret verity; another mans, and that which is strange, which is borrowed, before that which is proper and natural. And what greater folly can there be than all this? Now the rule of the wise is, not to suffer themselves by all this, to be caught and carried, but to measure and judge and esteem of things, first by their true, natural, and essential value, which is many times inward and secret, and then by their profit and commodity; the rest is but deceit or mockery. This is a matter of difficulty, all things being so disguised and sophisticated: many times the false and wicked being more plausible, than the true and good. And Aristotle saith, That there are many falsehoods, which are more probable, and have a better outward appearance, than verities. But as it is difficult, so is it excellent and divine. *Si separaveris preciosum a vili, quasi os meum eris*: If thou wilt separate the precious from those things that are base and vile, thou shalt be as it were my mouth: And necessary before all works; *quam necessarium precia rebus imponere*? how necessary

*Not according to the vulgar judgements.*

*But according to the wise.*

*Difficult. Excellent. Necessary. Seneca.*

sary.

sary is it to put a price upon things? for to small purpose doth a man endeavour to know the precepts of a good life, if first he know not in what rank to place things; riches, health, beauty, nobility, science, and so forth, with their contraries. This precedency and preheminance of things, is a high and excellent knowledge, and yet difficult; especially when many present themselves: for plurality hindereth, and herein men are never of one accord. The particular tastes and judgements of men are divers, and it is fit and commodious it should be so, to the end that all run not together after one and the same thing, and so be a let or hindrance to another. For example let us take the eight principal heads of all goods spiritual and corporal, four of each kind, that is to say, *Honesty, Health, Wisdome, Beauty, Ability or Aptness, Nobility, Science, Riches*. We do here take the words according to the common sense and use; wisdome for a prudent and discreet manner of life and carriage with and towards all; Ability for sufficiency of affairs; Science for the knowledge of things acquired out of Books: the other are clear enough. Now touching the ranging of these eight, how many divers opinions are there? I have told my own, and I have mingled, and in such sort interlaced them together, that after and next unto a spiritual, there is a corporal correspondent thereunto, to the end we may couple the soul and body together. Health is in the body, that which honesty is in the soul; the health of the soul, is the honesty of the body: *Mens sana in corpore sano: A perfect mind in a sound body*: Beauty, is as Wisdome, the measure, proportion, and comeliness of the body; and wisdome a spiritual beauty. Nobility is a great aptness and disposition to virtue. Sciences are the riches of the spirit. Others do range these parts otherwise, some place all the spiritual first, before they come to the first corporal, and the least of the spirit above the greatest of the body: some place them apart, and all diversly, every one aboundeth in his own sense.

From hence cometh the knowledge of things.

Eight principal heads of goods spiritual and corporal.

After and from this sufficiency and part of prudence, to know well how to esteem of things, doth spring and rise another, that is, to know well how to choose, where not only the conscience, but also the sufficiency and prudence is likewise many times shewed. There are choices very easie, as of a difficulty, and of a vice, of that which is honest, and that which is commodious, of duty and of profit: for the preheminance of the one is so great above the other, that when they come to encounter, honesty alwaies winneth the field, except (it may be) some exception very rare, and with great circumstance,

3.  
Choice and election of things.



stance, and in publick affairs onely, as shall be said hereafter in the virtue of Prudence: but there are other choices far more hard and troublesome, as when a man is caught and driven into a narrow strait between two vices, as was that Doctor, *Origen*, either to become an Idolater, or to prostitute himself to the carnal pleasures of a base impure Ethiopian. The rule is, that when a man findeth himself in any doubt or perplexity, touching the choise of those things that are not evil, he must choose that part that hath most honesty and justice in it: for though it fall out otherwise than well, yet it shall be alwaies some comfort and glory to a man, to have chosen the better; and besides, a man knoweth not (if he had chosen the contrary part) what would have hapened, or whether he had escaped his destiny: when a man doubteth which is the better and shortest way, he must take the straightest. And in those things that are evil, (whereof there is never any choice) a man must avoid the more base and unjust; this is a rule of conscience, and belongeth to honesty. But to know which is the more honest, just, and profitable; which the more dishonest, unjust, and unprofitable; it is many times very difficult, and belongeth to prudence and unction. It seemeth that in such like straits and extremities, the surer and better way is to follow Nature, and to judge that the more just and honest, which cometh nearest unto nature, that the more unjust and dishonest which is farthest from it. Before we leave this discourse of the choice and election of things, in two words let us remove this question: From whence, cometh in our souls the choice of two indifferent things in all things alike? The *Stoicks* say, from an extraordinary, immoderate, strange, and rash operation of the soul. But a man may say, That never do two things present themselves unto us, wherein there is not some difference or other, be it never so little; and that there is alwaies something in the one, which moveth us to that choice, although it be unsensible, and such as we cannot expresse. He that is equally ballanced betwixt two desires, can never choose; for every choice and inclination doth inferre an inequality:

4.  
*Consulation.*

Another precept in this matter, is to take advice and counsel of another; for, for a man to believe himself, and to trust onely in himself, is very dangerous. Now here are required two advertisements of Prudence, the one is in the choice of those, to whom a man must addressse himself for counsel; for there are some whose counsel we should rather avoid, and fly from. First, they must be honest

honest and faithful men (which is here all one): and secondly, men sensible, advised, wise, and of experience. These are the two qualities of good counsellors, honesty, and sufficiency. A man may add a third, and that is, That neither they, nor their nearest, and inward friends, have any particular interest in the business: for although a man may say, that this cannot hinder them to give good counsel, being, as it is said, honest men: yet I may answer, that besides that this so great and philosophical honesty, which is no way touched with its own proper interest, be very rare; it is also a great point of folly, to bring it into doubt and anxiety, and as it were to put the finger betwixt two stones. The other advertisement, is well to hear and entertain the counsels, receiving them without attending the event with judgement and gentleness, delighting in the free delivery of the truth. Having entertained and followed it as good, and coming from a good hand and a friendly, he must not repent himself of it, although it succeed not well, and according to expectation. Many times good counsels have bad events. But a wise man must rather content himself to have followed good counsel, which hath brought forth bad effects, then bad counsel, which hath had a happy event, as *Marius*: *Sic correcti Marii temeritas gloriam ex culpa invenit*: So the rashness and temerity of *Marius*, received glory and honour, even from his faults: and not to do like fools, who having advisedly deliberated and chosen, think afterwards to have chosen the worse, because they weigh only the reasons of the contrary opinion, never counterpoising them with those which first induced them thereunto. Thus much briefly be said of those that seek counsel: of those that give it, we shall speak in the virtue of Prudence, whereof the counsel is a great and sufficient part.

Lib. 3. cap. 2.  
art. 17.

The fifth advice which I here give, to carry himself well in his affairs, is a temperature and mediocrity betwixt two great confidence and distrust, fear and assurance. To trust and secure himself, doth many times hurt, and to distrust, offendeth; he must take special heed of making any shew of distrust, even when there is cause; for it displeaseth, yea, offendeth much, and many times maketh a friend an enemy. But yet a man is not to be over-credulous, and confident, except it be of his best assured friends; he must always keep the bridle in his hands, holding it neither too loose, nor too strait. He must never speak all, and let that which he speaketh be ever true. He must never deceive, but yet let him take heed he be not deceived. He must ever temper and moderate that columbine

5.  
Temperance  
betwixt fear  
and assurance.

innoc.



innocency and simplicity, in not offending any man with his serpentine wisdom and subtilty, and keeping himself upon his guard and preserving himself from the deceits, treasons, and ambushments of another. Subtilty to defend is as commendable, as it is dishonest to offend. He must never therefore advance and engage himself so far but that he have alwayes a mean when he will, and when it shall be necessary to retire himself without great damage or dislike. He must never forsake his own hold, nor so much despise another, and presume of himself, that he fall into a kind of presumption and carelesnes of his affairs, like those that think that no man sees so clear as themselves, that look that every man should yield unto them, that no man should dare to entertain a thought to displease them; and by that meanes become dissolute, and cast away care, and in the end, they are blinded, surpris'd, and deceived.

6.

To take time  
and occasion.

Against precipi-  
tation.

Idlen esse.

Another advice and very important, is to take all things in their times and seasons, and to good purpose, and for that cause, he must above all things avoid precipitation, an enemy to wisdom, the step-mother to all good actions, a vice much to be feared in young and youthful people. It is in truth the work of a skilful and active man, to apply every thing to his true end, well to manage all occasions and commodities, to make use both of the times and the meanes. All things have their seasons, and even the good which a man may do without purpose. Now too much speed and precipitation is contrary hereunto, which troubleth, marreth, and confoundeth all: *Canis festinans cecos parit catulos*: A forward Bitch bringeth forth blind Whelps; It proceedeth commonly from that passion which carrieth us; *Nam qui cupit, festinat: qui festinat, evertit: unde festinatio improvida & ceca: duo adversissima rella menti, celeritas & ira*: For who so desires, doth hasten; who hasteth, destroyeth; hastiness therefore is improvident and blind: hastiness and anger, are two of the greatest adversaries to a discreet minde: and often enough, from insufficiency. The contrary vice, laziness, sloth, carelesness which seemeth sometimes to have some air of maturity and wisdom, is likewise pernicious and dangerous, especially in the execution. For it is said, That it is lawful to be slow and long in deliberation and consultation, but not in the execution; and therefore the wisest say, that a man must consult slowly, execute speedily, deliberate with leisure, and with speed accomplish. It falleth out sometimes, that the contrary is practis'd with good success, and that a man is happy in the event, though he have been sudden and rash in his deliberation;

Idleness

ration; *Subiti consilii, eventus felices*: Sudden counsels, happy events. But this is very seldom, and by chance or fortune, according to which we must not rule and direct our selves, but take heed, lest envy and emulation overtake us, for commonly, a long and unprofitable repentance, is the reward of headlong hastiness. Behold then two Rocks and extremities which we must equally avoid; for it is as great a fault to take occasions before they be ready, whilst they be green and raw, as to suffer them to grow till they be over-ripe, and past the taking. The first fault, young men, and forward hot-spurs commit, who for want of patience, give no leisure to time and the Heavens to do any thing for them; they run, but they catch nothing: The second, heavy, lasie, and dull-spirited men do commonly fall into. To know the occasion, and to take it, a man must know his spirit valiant and vigilant. and likewise patient: he must foresee it watch, attend it, see it comming, and prepare for it, and so take it just at that instant when it is ready.

The seventh advice is, well to carry himself with these two Masters, and Superintendents of the affairs of the World, which are industry or vertue, and Fortune. It is an ancient question, which of these two hath the most credit, force, and authority: for it is out of all doubt, that both have; and it is clearly false, that one only doth all, and the other nothing: It were perhaps to be wished, that it were true, and that one only had the whole Empire, the business would go the better, a man would wholly attend that, whereby it would be the more easie; the difficulty is to joyn them together, and to attend them both. Commonly, they that settle themselves unto the one, contemn the other; the younger and bolder sort, respect and trust to fortune, hoping much good from it, and many times by them it worketh great matters, insomuch, that it seems to favour them; the more ancient and itaid, trust to their industry; and these of the two, have the more reason. If we should compare them, and chuse one of the two, industry is the more honest, the more certain, glorious; for though fortune be contrary to it, and shall make all industry and diligence vain, yet neverthelesse, there remaineth great contentment, in that a man hath not kept holy day, hath performed his office or duty, hath carried himself like a man of courage. They that follow the other part, are in danger to attend in vain, and though perhaps, things succeed according to their own desires, yet they want that honour and glory that the former hath. Now the advice of wisdom, is not wholly, and so much to

7.  
*Industry and Fortune.*

Little



settle our selves to the one, that we contemn, and exclude the other; for they have both a good part, yea many times they help, and do mutually attend one the other. A wise man then, must carry himself with them both, but yet unequally, for the advantage and preeminence must be given, as hath been said, to virtue, indutry; *Virtue duce, & mine fortuna: Virtue the guide, fortune the companion, the follower.* This advice likewise, is required to keep discretion; which seasoneth, and giveth a taste or relish to all things; this is not a particular quality, but common, which mingleth it self in all; Indiscretion marreth all, and taketh away the grace from the best actions, whether it be to do good to another, for all gratifications are not well bestowed upon all sorts of people; or to excuse himself, for inconsiderate excuses serve for accusations; or to play the part of an honest and courteous man, for a man may exceed and degenerate into rusticity; or whether it be to offer, or to accept.

## CHAP. XI.

To keep himself alwayes ready for death, a fruit of wisdom.

I.  
The day of  
death.

**T**He day of death is the master-day, & Judge of all other dayes, the tryal and touch-stone of all the actions of our life. Then do we make our greatest assay, & gather the whole fruit of all our studies. He that judgeth of the life of a man, must look how he carrieth himself at his death: for the end crowneth the work, and a good death honoureth a mans whole life, as an evil defameth and dishonoureth it: A man cannot well judge of any, without wronging of him, before he hath played the last act of his Comedy, which is without all doubt, the most difficult. *Epaminondas*, one of the wise men of Greece, being demanded, whom of three men he esteemed most, Himself, *Chabrias*, or *Ephicrates*, answered; We must first see all three dye, before we resolve that question: the reason is, because in all the rest, a man may be masked, but in this last part, it is to no purpose to dissemble,

*Nam veræ voces tum demum pectore ab imo*

*Ejiciuntur, & eripitur persona, manet res.*

*Then only, only then, and then no doubt*

*Do men unmask, and now the truth comes out.*

Fortune from far seemeth to watch, and lie in wait for us, against this last day, as a day long since named and appointed, to shew her

her power, and in a moment overthrow all that we have built, and gathered together in many years, and to make us cry out with *Laberius*; *Nimirum hac die una plūs vixi, mihi quā vivendum fuit*: Surely I have lived more to my losse in this one day, than in all the time before. And so was it well and wisely said of *Solon* to *Cræsus*; *Ante obitum nemo beatus*: Before death no man is happy.

It is an excellent thing to learn to die, it is the study of wisdom, which aimeth wholly at this end: he hath not spent his life ill that hath learned to die well; and he hath lost his whole time, that knows not well how to end it. *Male vivit, quisquis nescit bene mori: non frustra nascitur qui bene moritur: nec inutiliter vixit, qui feliciter desit*: Mori totā vitā discendum est; & præcipuum ex vitæ officiis est. He liveth badly, that knoweth not how to die well; he was not born in vain, that dieth well; neither hath he lived unprofitably, that departeth happily: To die is the study and learning of all our life, and the chiefest thing, and duty of life. He shoots not well, that looks not on the mark; and he cannot live well that hath not an eye to his death. To be brief, the science of dying is the science of liberty; the way to fear nothing, is to live well, contentedly and peaceably: without this knowledge there is no more pleasure in life, than in the fruition of that thing which a man feareth alwaies to lose.

First, and above all, we must endeavour that our sins die before our selves: Secondly that we be alwaies ready and prepared for death. O what an excellent thing is it for a man to end his life before his death, in such sort, that at that hour he have no other thing to do, but to die! that he have no more need of any thing, not of time, not of himself, but sweetly and contentedly departeth this life, saying:

*Vixi, & quem dederat cursum fortuna peregi*:

I have done, my task is set: or

*Scilicet videlicet.*

To live's a gift; to die's a debt.

Thirdly, we must endeavour, that our death be voluntary; for to die well, is to die willingly.

It seemeth that a man may carry himself in death five divers wayes: he may fear and shie it, as a very great evil, attend it sweetly and patiently, as a thing natural, inevitable, reasonable: contemn it as a thing indifferent, and of no great importance; desire and seek after it, as the onely haven for rest from all the torments of this life;

Y

yea,

2.

To know how to die.

Seneca.

3.

4.

A five fold manner of carriage in death.



yea, a very great gain; give it to himself, by taking away his own life. Of these five, the three middle most are good, befitting a good and settled soul, although diversely, and in a different condition of life; the two extremes are vitious and out of weakness, though it be with divers vilages. A word or two of them all.

5.  
*To fear death.*

*It is opinion.*

The first is not approved by men of understanding, though by the greater part it be practised: a testimony of great weaknesse. Against these kind of men, and for your better comfort, either against your own death, or the death of another, thus much briefly. There is not a thing that men fear more, or have more in horroure then death: neverthelesse, there is not a thing where there is lesse occasion or matter of fear, or that contrarily yeildeth greater reasons to perswade us with resolution to accept of it. And therefore we must say, that it is a meer opinion, and a vulgar error that hath wonne the world thus to think of it. We give too much credit to the inconsiderate vulgar sort, who tell us, That it is a very great evil: and too little credit to wisdom it self which teacheth us, That it is a freedome from all evils and the haven of life. Never did a present death do hurt to any man; and some that have made trial, and partly knew what it is, complain not of it: And if death be counted an evil, it is of all the evils the onely that doth no harm, that hath no evil in it: It is the imagination onely of death before it comes, that maketh us to fear it when it is come. It is then but opinion, not verity; and it is truly where opinion bandeth it self most against reason, and goeth about to deface it in us, with the mask of death. There cannot be any reason to fear it, because no man knows what it is, that he should fear it: for why, or how should a man fear that he knoweth not? And therefore wisely said he, that of all others was counted the wisest, That to fear death is to make shew of greater understanding and sufficiency than can be in a man, by seeming to know that, that no man knoweth: and what he spake he practised himself, for being solicited at his death by his friends, to plead before the Judges, for his justification, and for his life, this oration he made unto them: My masters and friends, if I should plead for my life, and desire you that I may not die, I doubt I may speak against my self, and desire my own losse and hinderance because I know not what it is to die, nor what good or what ill there is in death: they that fear to die presume to know it; as for my self, I am utterly ignorant what it is, or what is done in the other world; perhaps death is a thing indifferent, perhaps a good thing, and to be desired.

desired. Those things that I know to be evil, as to offend my neighbour, I fly and avoid; those that I know not to be evil as death, I cannot fear. And therefore I commit my self unto your selves; and because I cannot know whether it is more expedient for me to die, or not to die, determine you thereof as you shall think good.

For a man to torment himself with the fear of death, it is first great weakness and cowardliness: There is not a woman that in few daies is not appeased and content with the death, yea the most painful that may be, either of her husband or her child. And why should not reason and wisdom do that in an hour, at an instant (as we have a thousand examples) which time performeth in a fool, in the weakest sex? What use is there of wisdom and constancy in man? to what end serve they, if they speed him not in a good action, if he can do no more with their help, then a fool with his folly? From this weakness it is, that the most part of men dying, cannot resolve themselves, that it is their last hour, and there is not any thing where this deceitful hope doth more busy man, which it may be, doth likewise proceed from this, that we account our death a great matter, and that all things have an interest in us, and at our death must suffer with us: so much do we esteem our selves.

Again, a man sheweth himself herein unjust; for if death be a good thing, as it is, why doth he fear it? If an evil thing, why doth he make it worse, and add unto death evil upon evil, sorrow and grief where there is none? like him that being robbed of a part of his goods by the enemy, casteth the rest into the sea, to let men know how little he is grieved with his losses.

Finally, to fear death, is for a man to be an enemy to himself, and to his own life: for he can never live at ease and contentedly, that feareth to die. This man is onely a free-man, which feareth not death: and contrarily, life is but a slavery, if it were not made free by death: For death is the onely stay of our liberty, the common and ready receptacle of all evils: It is then a misery (and miserable are all that do it) to trouble our life with care and fear of death, and our death with the care of life.

But to say the truth, what complaints and murmuring would there be against nature, if death were not; if we should have continued here, will we, nill we, with and against our own wills? doubtless men would have cursed nature for it. Imagine with thy self how much more insupportable, and painful, a durable life would have been, then a life with a condition to leave it. *Chiron* refused



immortality, being informed of the conditions thereof by the god of Time, *Saturn* his father. Doubtlesse death is a very beautiful and rich invention of nature: *Optimum naturæ inventum, nusquam satis laudatum*: The best invention of nature, never sufficiently to be praised; and a very proper and profitable, necessary to many things. If it were quite taken from us, we should desire it more than now we fear it; yea, thirst after it more than life it self; such a remedy is it against so many evils, such a mean to so many goods. What were it on the other side, if there were not mingled with death some little bitternesse? doubtlesse men would run unto it with great desire and indiscretion. To keep therefore a moderation, that is, that men might neither love life too much, nor flie it; fear death, nor run after it; both of them, sweetnesse and sharpnesse, are therein tempered together.

To.  
Remedies not to  
fear death.

The remedy that the vulgar sort do give herein, is too simple; and that is, Never to think or to speak thereof. Besides, that such a kind of carelesnesse cannot lodge in the head of a man of understanding, it would likewise at the last cost him dear: for death coming unawares, and unexpected, what torments, out-cries, furies, and despairs are there commonly seen? Wisdome adviseth much better; that is, to attend and expect death with a constant foot, and to encounter it: And the better to do this, it giveth us contrary counsel to the vulgar sort, that is, to have it alwaies in our thoughts; to practise it, to accustom our selves unto it, to tame it, to present it unto us at all hours, to expect it, not onely in places suspected and dangerous, but in the midst of feasts and sports: that the burden of our song be, *Remember thy end*, that others are dead, that thought to have lived as long as our selves; that that which happened then to them, may happen now to us; following therein the custome of the *Egyptians*, who in their solemn banquets placed the image of death before their eyes, and of the *Christians* and all other, who have their Church-yards near their temples and other publick and frequented places, that men might alwaies (as saith *Lycurgus*) be put in mind of death. It is uncertain in what place death attends us, and therefore let us attend death in all places, and be alwayes ready to receive it.

*Omnem crede diem tibi diluxisse supremum,  
Grata superveniet quæ non sperabitur hora.  
Think every day thy last; each ready be,  
And so th' uncertain hour shall welcome thee.*

But

*for death, a fruit of wisdom.*

313

II.

*The grievances  
and excuses of  
fearful men  
answered.*

I.

But let us consider the excuses and grievances that these poor people alledge to cover and colour their complaints, which are all vain and frivolous: It grieveth them to die young, and they complain as well in regard of others as themselves, that death prevented them, and cutteth them off in the flower and strength of their years. The complaint of the vulgar sort, who measure all by the ell, and account nothing precious, but that which is long and durables whereas contrarily, things exquisite and excellent are commonly thin, fine, and delicate. It is the mark of a skilful work-master to enclose much in a little space: and a man may say, that it is fatal to great and glorious men, not to live long: Great virtue and great or long life do seldome or never meet together. Life is measured by the end, provided that that be good, and all the rest hath a proportion thereunto: the quantity is nothing to make it more or lesse happy, no more than the greatnesse of a circle makes the circle more round than the lesse; the figure here doth all; a little man is as perfect a man as a greater: Neither men nor their lives are measured by the ell.

Again, it troubleth them to die farre from their friends, or to be slain, and to remain unburied; they desire to die in peace, in their beds, amongst their friends being comforted by them, and comforting them. All they that follow the warrs, and ride post to be in the battell, are not of this mind: these men run willingly to their end, and seek a tombe amongst the dead bodies of their enemies. Little children fear men when they are masked: discover their faces and they fear them no more: And even so, believe it, fire and sword astonish us, when we think of them; take off their mask, the death wherewith they threaten us, is but the same death wherewith women and children die.

They are troubled to think they must leave all the world. And why? They have seen all, one day is like another, there is no other light, nor other night, no other Sun, nor other course of the world. One year telleth us that all things grow every year worse and worse, they have seen the childhood, the youth, the virility, the old age of the world: there is no art, no way to begin again.

Yea, but they leave their parents and their friends. Where they go they shall find more, and such as they have never yet seen, and those they leave behind them and desire so much, shall shortly follow them.

But what shall become of their small children and orphans left without

2.

3.

4.

5.



without guide, without support? As if those their children were more theirs than Gods, or as if they could love them more than he that is their first and their truest father: and how many such so left have risen to higher place and greater ability than other men.

6. But it may be they fear to go alone. This is great simplicity, so many people dying with them, and at the self-same hour.

7. Finally, they go into a place where they shall not desire this life. How desire it? If it were lawful to resume it, they would refuse it, and if a man were worthy to know what it is before he receive it, he would never accept of it: *Vitam nemo acciperet, si daretur scientibus*: No man would accept of life, if he knew what he received: Why, or how should they desire it, since they are either wholly nothing, as miscreants believe, or in far better state than before, as the wisest of the world do affirm? why then are they offended with death, since it quits them of all grief? The self-same journey they have made from death, that is to say, from nothing to life, without passion, without fear, they make again from life unto death, *Reverti unde veneris, quid grave est?* To return from whence thou comest, what burthen, what grief is it?

8. But it may be that the spectacle of death displeaseth them, because they that dye look ghastly. It is true, but this is not death, but the mask of death, that which is hid under it, is very beautiful, for death hath nothing in it that is fearful: we have sent idle and poor spies to know it; who report not what they have seen, but what they have heard, and what they fear.

9. But it taketh out of our hands so many things, or rather taketh us from them, and us from our selves; it taketh us from that we know, and have been accustomed unto, and bringeth us to an estate unknown: *At horremus ignota*: But we abhor things unknown; it taketh us from the light, to bring us into darknesse; and to conclude, it is our end, our ruine, our dissolution: These are the weightiest objections: whereunto in a word a man may answer, That death being the inevitable law of nature (as shall be said hereafter) we need not dispute so much thereof; for it is a folly to fear that which a man cannot avoid, *Dementis est timere mortem, quia certa expectantur, dubia metumur, mors habet necessitatem æquæ et invictam*: It is mere folly to fear death, because things certain are expected; doubtfull things are feared; the necessity of death is most just and invincible. But these kind of people make not their count well; for it is quite contrary to that which they say; for instead of taking

any thing from us, it giveth us all; in stead of taking us from our selves, it sets us in liberty, and makes us free to our selves; in stead of bringing us into darknesse, it taketh it from us, and puts us into the light; and it doth the same to us, that we do to all fruits, spoiling them of their barks, their shels, their foldings, their speres, their skins, to bring them into sight, use, nature; *Ita solet fieri, pereunt semper velamenta nascentium*: So it was wont to be done, for alwayes the veil and covering of every thing doth perish. It taketh us from a strait, incommodious, rheumatick, dark place, where we see but a small part of the heavens, and the light but a farre off, through the two narrow holes of our eyes, to bring us into an open liberty, an assured health, a perpetual light; into such a place, such an estate where we may wholly see the whole heavens, and the light in his natural place. *Aqualiter tibi splendebit omne cali latus, totam lucem suo loco propè totus aspicias quam nunc per angustissimas oculorum vias procul intueris & miraris*: Every part of heaven shall together shine upon thee, who wholly shalt behold all the glory thereof in his due place, which now through the straight and narrow passage of the sight, thou dost but see and discern afar off. To conclude, It taketh us from that death, which began in the wombe of our mother, and now endeth; to bring us to that life which shall never end. *Dies iste quem tanquam extremum reformidas, aeterni natalis est*: This day which thou fearest as thy last, is the birth day of Eternity.

The second manner of carriage of men in this matter of death, is of a good, sweet, and moderate soul, and is justly practised in a common and peaceable life, by those that with reason make account of this condition of life, and content themselves to endure it, by governing themselves according to reason, and accepting of death when it cometh. This is a well tempered mediocrity, suitable to such a condition of life, between the extremities (which are to desire and fear, to seek and to flie, vicious and faulty: *Summum nec metuas diem, nec optes mortem concupiscentes, & timentes aequè objurgat Epicurus*): Fear not thy last day, neither wish for it: (for both to desire death, and to fear it, is alike condemned by Epicurus) if they be not covered and excused by some reason, not common and ordinary, as shall be said in his place. To seek and desire death is ill; it is injustice to desire death without a cause, and to be out of charity with the world, which our lives may be beneficial unto. It is to be unthankful to nature, to condemn it, and not to make the best

II  
To attend death  
is good.



use thereof: to be over anxious and scrupulous, and not to endure that state that is not burthensome, and we are called unto. To flie and fear death on the other side, is against nature, reason, justice, and all duty.

13  
Death is natu-  
ral.

For to die, it is a thing natural, necessary, and inevitable, just, and reasonable: Natural, for it is a part of the order of the whole Universe, and of the life of the world: wilt thou then that the world be ruinated, and a new made for thy self? Death holdeth a high place in the policy and great common-wealth of the world, and it is very profitable for the succession and continuance of the works of nature: the fading or corruption of one life, is the passage to a thousand others: *Sic rerum summa novatur*: And it is not onely a part of this great whole Universe, but of our particular essence, not lesse essential than to live to be born. In flying death thou fliest thy self; thy essence is equally parted into these two, life and death, it is the condition of thy creation. If it grieveth thee to die, why wert thou born? Men come not into the world with any other purpose but to go forth again; and therefore he that is not willing to go forth, let him not come in. The first day of thy birth bindeth thee, and setteth thee as well in the way to death, as to life.

*Nascentes morimur, finisque ab origine pendet.*

*Man born to die, doth oftentimes do so,*

*Even (if he could) before he can say, no:*

*His birth and death, concurring so together,*

*As do a dogs two ends in coldest weather.*

*Sola mors ius æquum est generis humani; vivere nolit qui mori non vult; Vita cum exceptione mortis data est; tam est stultus qui timet mortem, quam qui senectutem: Death onely is mans due right: he should not desire to live, that would not desire to die; life is given to us with exception of death; As foolish is he that feareth to die, as to be old.*

To be unwilling to die, is to be unwilling to be a man; for all men are mortal; and therefore a wise man said, and that without passion; having received news of the death of his sonne; I knew I begot, and bred him up a mortal man. Death being then a thing so natural and essentiall, both for the world in grosse, and for thy self in particular, why should it be horrible unto thee? Thou goest against nature, the fear of grief and pain is natural, but not of death: for being so serviceable to nature, and nature having instituted

tuted it, to what end should it imprint in us a hatred and hor-  
rour thereof? Children and beaſts fear not death, yea, many times  
they ſuffer it chearfully: it is not then nature that teacheth us to  
fear it, but rather to attend or receive it, as being ſent by it.

Secondly, it is neceſſary, fatal, inevitable; and this thou knoweſt,  
that feareſt and weepſt. What greater folly can there be, than for <sup>14.</sup> *Necceſſary.*  
a man to torment himſelf for nothing, and that willingly and of  
purpose, to pray and importune him, whom he knows to be inexo-  
rable; to knock at that door that cannot be opened? What is there  
more inexorable and deaf than death? We muſt therefore fear  
things uncertain; do our beſt endeavours in things that are not re-  
medieſſe; but ſuch as are certain, as death, we muſt attend, and  
grow reſolute in things paſt remedy. The ſot feareth and ſlieth  
death; the fool ſeeks and runs after it; the wiſe man attendeth  
it: It is folly to grieve at that, that cannot be mended; to fear  
that, that cannot be avoided: *Feras, non culpes, quod vitari non po-  
teſt? Wilt thou not bear the blame thou canſt not avoid?* The exam-  
ple of David is excellent, who underſtanding of the death of his  
dear child, put on his beſt apparel, and made himſelf merry, ſaying  
to thoſe that wondered at this kind of carriage, that whiſt his  
ſonne lived, he importuned God for his recovery; but being dead,  
that care was ended, and there was no remedy. The fool thinks he  
maketh a better answer, to ſay, that that is the cauſe of his grief,  
and that he tormenteth himſelf, becauſe there is no remedy; but he  
doubleth and perfecteth his own folly thereby. *Scienter fruſtrarii  
extrema demenſie eſt: It is extreme madneſſe to labour wit:ingly, and on  
ſet purpoſe, in vain.* Now death being ſo neceſſary and inevitable,  
it is not onely to no purpoſe to fear, but making of neceſſity a virtue,  
we muſt welcome it and receive it kindly; for it is better for us to  
go to death, than that death ſhould come to us; to catch that, before  
that catch us.

Thirdly, to die is a thing reaſonable and juſt, it is reaſon to arrive  
to that place, towards which we are alwaies walking, and if a man <sup>15.</sup> *Juſt and rea-  
ſonable.*  
fear to come thither, let him not walk, but ſtay himſelf or turn back  
again, which is impoſſible to do. It is reaſon that thou give place  
to others, ſince others have given place to thee; If thou have made  
thy commodity of this life, thou muſt be ſatiſfied and be gone, as  
he that is invited to a banquet, takes his reſection and departeth.  
If thou have not known how to make uſe and profit thereof,  
what needeſt thou care if thou loſe it? or to what end wouldſt thou



thou keep it? It is a debt that must be paid, a pawn that must be restored, whensoever it is demanded. Why pleadest thou against thy own scedule, thy faith, thy duty? It is then against reason to spurn against death, since that thereby thou acquittest thy self of so much, and dischargest thy self of so great an account. It is a thing general and common to all, to die; why then troublest thou thy self? Wilt thou have a new priviledge, that was yet never seen, and be a lone man by thy self? Why fearest thou to go whither all the world goeth? Where so many millions are gone before thee, and so many millions shall follow thee? Death is equally certain to all, and equality is the first part of equity; *Omnes eodem cogimur, omnium versatur urna; serinus cecus sors exitura, &c.* We all are driven thereunto: men daily die, even as their lot falls forth, &c.

I.  
To contemn  
death is good,  
if it be for a  
thing that de-  
serves it.

The third is the part of a valiant and generous mind, which is practised with reason, in a publick, elevated, difficult, and busie condition of life, where there are many things to be preferred before life, and for which a man should not doubt to die. In such a case howsoever matters go, a man must more account thereof than of his life, which is placed upon the stage and scaffold of this world: he must runne his race with resolution, that he may give a lustre to his other actions, and perform those things that are profitable and exemplary. He must lay down his life, and let it runne his fortune. He that knoweth not how to contemn death, shall never not only perform any thing of worth, but he exposeth himself to divers dangers; for whilest he goeth about to keep his life safe and sure, he layeth open and hazardeth his devoir, his honour, his virtue and honesty. The contempt of death is that which produceth the boldest, and most honourable exploits whether in good or evil. He that feareth not to die fears nothing; he doth whatsoever he will, he makes himself a master both of his own life and of anothers: the contempt of death, is the true and lively source of all the beautiful and generous actions of men; from hence are derived the brave resolutions and free speeches of virtue uttered by so many great personages. *Elvidius Priscus*, whom the Emperour *Vespasian* had commanded not to come to the Senate; or coming to speak as he would have him, answered, That he was a Senatour, it was fit he should be at the Senate; and if being there, he were requited to give his advice, he would speak freely that which his conscience commanded him. Being threatned by the same

same man, that if he spake he should die. Did I ever tell you (saith he) that I was immortal? Do you what you will, and I will do what I ought: it is in your power to put me unjustly to death, and in me to die constantly. The *Lacedemonians* being threatned with much hard dealing, if they did not speedily yield themselves to *Philip* the father of *Alexander*, who was entred into their country with a great power; one for the rest answered, *What hard dealing can they suffer that fear not to die?* And being told by the same *Philip* that he would break and hinder all their designments; What, say they, will he likewise hinder us from dying? Another being asked by what means a man may live free, answered, *By contemning death.* And another youth being taken and sold for a slave, said unto him that bought him, *Thou shalt see what thou hast bought, I were a fool to live a slave whilest I may be free, and whilst he spake, cast himself down from the top of the house.* A wise man said unto another, deliberating with himself how he might take away his life, to free himself from an evil that at that time pressed him sore; *Thou dost not deliberate of any great matter, it is no great thing to live: thy slaves, thy beasts do live, but it is a great matter to die honestly, wisely, constantly.* To conclude and crown this article, Our religion hath not had a more firm and assured foundation, and wherein the author thereof hath more insisted, than the contempt of this life. But many there are that make a shew of contemning death, when they fear it. Many there are that care not to be dead, yea they wish they were dead, but it grieveth them to die: *Enori nolo, sed me esse mortuum nihil astito*; I would not die, but I make little account of death. Many deliberate in their health and soundest judgements to suffer death with constancy, nay to murder themselves, a part played by many, and for which end *Helioabalus* made many sumptuous preparations, but being come to the point, some were terrified by the bleeding of their nose, as *Lucius Domitius*, who repented that he had poisoned himself. Others have turned away their eyes and their thoughts, as if they would steal upon it, swallowing it down, insensibly as men take pills, according to that saying of *Cassius*. *That the best death was the shortest:* and of *Pliny*, *That a short death was the happiest hour of mans life.* Now no man can be said to be resolute to die, that feareth to confront it, and to suffer with his eyes open, as *Socrates* did, who had thirty whole daies to ruminate & to digest the sentence of his death, which he did without any passion or alteration, yea without any shew of endeavour, mildly



and chearfully, *Pompon. Atticus, Tullius Marcellinus* Romans, *Cleantes* the Phylosopher, all three almost after one manner: for having assaiied to die by abstinence, hoping thereby to quit themselves of those Maladies that did torment them; but finding themselves rather cured thereby, neverthelesse they would not desist till they had ended that they went about, taking pleasure by little and little to pine away, and to consider the course and progresse of death. *Orto* and *Cato* having prepared all things fit for their death, upon the very point of the execution settled themselves to sleep, and slept profoundly, being no more astonished at death, than at any other ordinary and light accident.

17.  
To desire death.

The fourth is the part of a valiant and resolute mind, practised in former times by great and holy personages, and that in two cases: the one the more natural and lawful, is a painful and troublesome life, or an apprehension of a farre worse death. To be brief, a miserable estate which a man cannot remedy. This is to desire death as the retrait and onely haven from the torments of this life, the soveraign good of nature, the onely stay and pillar of our liberty. It is imbecillity to yield unto evils, but it is folly to nourish them. It is a good time to die, when to live is rather a burthen than a blessing, and there is more ill in life than good; for, to preserve our life to encrease our torment, is against nature. There are some that say, that we should desire to die, to avoid those pleasures that are according to nature; how much more than to flee those miseries that are against nature? There are many things in life farre worse than death, for which we should rather die and not live at all, than live. And therefore the *Lacedemonians* being cruelly threatned by *Antipater*, if they yielded not to his demand, answered, If thou threaten us with any thing that is worse than death, death shall be welcome unto us. And the wisest were wont to say, *That a wise man liveth as long as he should, not so long as he can*, death being more at his command and in his power, than life. Life hath but one entrance, and that too dependeth upon the will of another. Our death dependeth on our own wills, and the more voluntary it is the more honourable; and there are a thousand wayes unto it. We may want means whereby to live, but not to die. Life may be taken away from every man, by every man, but not death: *Ubique mors est, optimè hoc cavit Deus; eripere vitam nemo non homini potest, as nemo mortem: mille ad hanc aditus patent: Death is every where: God best foresaw this; one man may bereave another of life, but of death*

death no man; whereunto there are infinite wayes and means: The most favourable present that nature hath bestowed upon us, and that taketh away from us all means of complaint is, that it hath left unto us the key of the closet, liberty to die when we will. Wherefore complaineest thou in this world? it holdeth thee not; if thou live in pain, thy idlenesse and fear is the cause; for to die, there is nothing necessary, but a will.

The other case is a lively apprehension and desire of life to come, which maketh a man to thirst after death, as after a great gain, the seed of a better life, the bridge unto Paradise, the way to all good, and an earnest penny of the resurrection. A firm belief and hope of these things is incompatible with the fear and horreur of death: it perswadeth us rather to be weary of this life, and to desire death, *Vitam habere in patientia, & mortem in desiderio*; To endure our life with patience, but rather to desire death: To have life in affliction, and death in affection: their life is a crosse, their death a comfort, and therefore their vowes and their voices are; *Cupio dissolvi: mihi mors lucrum: quis me liberabit de corpore mortis hujus?* I desire to be dissolved: for death is profitable unto me; who shall then free me from death? and for this cause those Philosophers and Christians have been justly reproached (which is to be understood of those that are weak and idle, and not of all) that play the publick dissemblers, and do not in verity believe that which they so much talk of, and so highly commend, touching that happy immortality, and those unspeakable pleasures in the second life, since they doubt, and fear death so much, the necessary passage thereunto.

The fifth and last, is the execution of this precedent desire, which is for a man to be his own executioner, and the author of his own death. This seemeth to proceed from virtue and the greatnesse of a mans courage, having been anciently practised by the greatest and most excellent men and women of every nation and religion, *Greeks, Romans, Egyptians, Persians, Medes, French, Indians*. Philosophers of all sects: *Jews*, witnesse that good old man *Razis*, called the father of the *Jews* for his virtue; and his wives, who under *Antiochus*, having circumcised their children, cast themselves head-long from the rock with them: And Christians too, witnesse those two canonized Saints, *Pelagius* and *Sophronia*, whereof the first, with his mother and sisters, cast himself into the river, and the other killed her self with a knife, to avoid the violence of *Maxentius* the Emperour: 18.



Emperour: Yea witness divers people and whole cities, as *Capua* in *Italy*, *Astupa*, *Numania* in *Spain* besieged by the *Romans*; the *Abideens* enforced by *Philip*, a city in *India* besieged by *Alexander*. But this resolution hath been likewise approved and authorized by many common weals, by laws and rules established thereupon, as at *Marseilles*, in the *Ile of Gea*, in *Nigropont*, and other nations, as in the *Hyperborean* Islands; and justified by many great reasons, drawn from the precedent article, which is of the just desire of death. For if it be permitted to desire, to ask, to seek after death, why should it be an ill act to give it unto our selves? If a Mans own death be just in the will, why should it not be as just in the hand, and the execution? Why should I expect that another, from which I can do my self? and why should it not be better to give it, then to suffer another to give it; to meet, than to attend it? for the fairest death is the more voluntary. Finally, I offend not the law made against thieves and robbers, when I take but my own goods, and cut but my own purse; neither am I guilty of the laws made against murderers by taking away my own life. But this opinion is reproved by divers, not onely Christians, but Jewes, as *Josephus* disputeth against his Captains in the cave *du Puis*: and Philosophers, as *Plato*, *Scipio*, who held this proceeding not onely for a vice of cowardlinesse and impatiencie; for it is for a man to hide himself from the blowes of fortune. Now a true and lively virtue must never yeild, for evils and crosses are nourishments thereunto; and it is greater constancy well to use the chain wherewith we are tied, then to break it; and more settled resolution in *Regulus*, than in *Cato*.

*Rebus in adversis facile est contemnere vitam,*

*Fortius ille facit, qui miser esse potest.*

*Si fractus illabatur orbis*

*Impavidum ferient ruinae.*

*'Tis no virtue to despise*

*A life long lead in miseries:*

*But to smile in fortune rude.*

*Is the mot of fortitude.*

*The ruinous world, should it on this man fall,*

*Kill him it may, dant him it never shall.*

But also for a fault of desertion; for a man ought not to abandon his charge without the expresse commandement of him that gave it him; we are not here for our selves, not our own masters. This then

then is not a matter beyond all doubt or disputation.

It is first Beyond all doubt, that we are not to attempt this last exploit without very great and just cause, (nay I cannot see how any cause should be great and just enough) to the end that it be as they say, *ἔυλογος εἰσαγωγή*, an honest and reasonable departure. It must not then be for any light occasion, whatsoever some say, that a man may die for light causes, since they that hold us in life are not weighty. It is ingratitude to nature, not to accept and use her present, it is a sign of lightnesse to be too anxious and scrupulous, to break company for matters of no moment, and not for such as are just, and lawful, if there be any such. And therefore they had not a sufficient excuse, and just cause of their death, of whom I made mention before *Pomponius*, *Atticus*, *Marcellinus* and *Cleantes*, who would not stay the course of their death, for this only reason, because they were already neer unto it. The wives of *Petrus*, of *Scaurus*, of *Labio*, of *Fulvius* the friend of *Augustus*, of *Seneca*, and divers others, who died only to accompany their husbands in death, or rather to encourage them therein. *Cato* and others, who died because their businesse succeeded not well, and because they would not fall into the hands of their enemies, notwithstanding they feared no ill usage at their hands. They that have murdered themselves because they would not live at the mercy, and by the grace and favour of those whom they hated; as *Gravius Silvanus*, and *Staius Proximus*, being pardoned by *Nero*. They that die to recover a shame and dishonour past, as that Roman *Lucretia*, *Sparzapizes* the son of *Queen Tomiris*, *Boges* the Lieutenant of King, *Xerxes*. They that for no particular cause, but only because they see the weal-publick in a bad and declining estate, murder themselves, as *Nerva* that great Lawyer, *Vibius Viricus*, *Jubelicus*, in the taking of *Capona*. They that are weary with living, or for private cause loath to live any longer. Neither is it sufficient that the cause be great and just but that it be necessarily and remediable, and that all manner of means to preserve life be first put in practise. For precipitation and anticipated despair is very vicious, as in *Brutus* and *Cassius*, who killing themselves before the time and occasion, lost the reliques of the Roman liberty whereof they were protectors. A man, saith *Cleomenes*, must manage his life, and make use thereof to the uttermost? for to take it away, a man never wants time, it is a remedy which he hath alwaies in his own hands; but the estate of things may change and grow better. *Joseph* and divers others have to their great

19.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

2.

7.



great benefit practised this counsel: things that seem altogether desperate, do many times change, and have a happy successe; *Aliquis carnifici suo superstes fuit: Some men have out-lived their miseries.*

*Multa dies variisque labor mutabilis avi  
Retulit in melius.*

*Have patience, man, and be content to live;  
That which a day denies, a day may give.*

A man must carry himself in his place and calling, as a defendane against him that assaileth him, *cum moderamine inculpate tutele: with the government of blamelesse protection*: he must try all manner of means before he come to this extremity. Secondly and without doubt it is far better, and more commendable to suffer, and to continue constant and firme to the end, than fearfully and cowardly to flie or die; but forasmuch as it is a gift not given unto all, no more than continence is: *Non omnes capiunt verbum istud, unde melius nubere quam uri: All men take not this saying. Better to marry than to burn*: the question is, whether an insupportable and remediable evil happening, which may utterly undo and turn topsie turvey our whole resolution, and drive us into despair, despight, and murmuring against God, be more expedient, or a lesse evil for a man courageously to deliver himself having his senses sound and settled, than by standing to it, for fear of failing in his duty, expose himself to the danger of sinking, and being utterly lost. It is not a lesse evil to quit the place, than to be obstinate and perish; to flie, than to be taken. It is true that it seemeth by all humane and philosophical reason to be practised, as hath been said, by so many famous people of all countries and climates. But Christianity doth no way approve it, nor alloweth therein any dispensation.

20.

Finally, it is a great point of wisdom to learn to know the point and period, to choose a fit hour to die: Every man hath his time and season to die; some prevent it, others prolong it: there is weaknesse and valour in them both; but there is required discretion. How many men have survived their glory, and by a desire to lengthen their life but a little, have darkned it again, and lived to help to bury their own honour? And that which lastly sticketh by them, hath no relish or feeling of what is past, but continueth like an old filthy clout sowed to the hem of a rich and beautiful ornament. There is a time to gather fruit from the tree, which if it hang too long, it rotteth and grows worse and worse; and the losse

is

is as great too, if it be gathered too soon. Many Saints and holy men have fled from death, because they are yet profitable to the Church and Weal-publick, though in respect of their own particular they could be content to die. It is an act of charity to desire to live for the benefit of another; *Si populo tuo sum necessarius, non recuso laborem*: If I am needfull to thy people, I refuse not labour.

Death hath divers forms, some more easie than other, and taketh divers qualities according to the fantasie of every one. Among those that are naturall, that they proceed from weaknesse and a numness of the members are the sweetest and the easiest: among those that are violent, the best is the shortest, and the least premeditated. Some desire to make an exemplary and demonstrative death of constancy and sufficiency; this is to consider another thing, and to seek their own reputation: but this is vanity, for this is an act of society, but of one only person, who hath enough to do with himself, to minister to himself inward comfort, and hath no need to trouble himself with what belongeth to another, especially all the interest he hath in his reputation ceasing with his death. That is the best death which is well recollected in it self, quiet, solitary, and attendeth wholly to that which at that time is fitt. That great assistance of parents and friends, bringeth a thousand discommodities; it oppresseth and smothereth him that is dying, one tormenteth his ears, another his eyes, another his mouth; their cries and complaints if they be true, stifle the heart; if feigned, afflict and torment it. Many great personages have sought to die far from their friends, to avoid this inconvenience, accounting it a childish thing, & a foolish humor, to be willing by their miseries to move sorrow and compassion in their friends; we commend constancy to suffer bad fortune, we accuse and hate it in our friends, and when it is our own case, it is not sufficient that they suffer with us, but they must afflict themselves too: A wise man that is sick, should content himself with the settled countenance of his assistants.

I.  
Forms of  
death, divers

## CHAP. XII.

To maintain himself in true tranquillity of spirit, the fruit and crown of wisdom, and the conclusion of this Book.

THE tranquillity of the spirit is the sovereign good of man. This is that great and rich treasure, which the wisest seek by sea and  
Z by

I.



by land, on foot, and a horseback; all our care should tend thereunto, it is the fruit of all our labours and studies, the crown of wisdom. But lest a man should mistake himself herein, you must know that this tranquility is not a retrait or vacation from all affairs, a delightful solitariness and corporally pleasant, or a profound carelessness of all things: if it were so, many women, idle, dissolute and voluptuous persons, would at their pleasure enjoy as great a good as the wisest can aspire unto with all their study: Neither multitude nor scarcity of business doth any thing herein. It is a beautiful, sweet, equal, just, firm and pleasant estate of the soul, which neither business nor idleness, nor good accidents, nor ill, nor time, can any way trouble, alter, mend, or depress; *Vera tranquillitas non concutitur: Nothing troubles true tranquility.*

2.

The means to attain thereunto, to get and preserve it, are the points that I have handled in this second Book, whereof this is a brief collection. They consist in freeing and disfurnishing of a man from all lets and impediments, and furnishing him with those things that entertain and preserve it. The things that do most hinder and trouble the rest and tranquility of the spirit, are common and vulgar opinions, which for the most part are erroneous; and secondly desires and passions, which ingender in us a kind of delicacy and difficulty: which are the cause that a man is never content, and these are kindled and stirred in him by those two contrary fortunes, prosperity and adversity, as with two violent and mighty winds: and finally, that vile and base captivity, wherewith the spirit (that is to say, the judgement and will) is enthralled like a beast under the yoke of certain local and particular rules and opinions. Now he must emancipate and free himself from the stocks and unjust subjections, and bring his spirit into liberty, restore himself to himself, free, universal, open, seeing into all; and wandering through the beautiful and universal circuit of the world and of nature. *In commune genitus, mundum ut unam domum spectans, toti se inferens mundo, & in omnes ejus actus contemplationem suam mittens: He that is begotten generally, holds this world but as one house, applying himself to the whole world, and exercising his contemplation in all the actions thereof.*

3.

The places being thus trimmed and made ready, the first foundations that are to be laid, are, a true honesty, and to live in such an estate and vocation whereunto a man is fit. The Principal parts wherewith he must raise, assure, and settle this building, are first true piety,

piety, whereby, with a soul not astonished, but settled, pure, free, devout, a man contemplateth God, the great Sovereign, and absolute work-master of all things, who can neither be seen, nor known: but yet he must be known, adored, worshipped, served with the whole heart, from whom he is to hope for all manner of good, and to fear no evil: afterwards he must walk roundly in simplicity and truth, according to the laws and customes, live with a heart open both to the eyes of God and the world; *Conscientiam suam aperiens, semper tanquam in publico vivens, se magis veritus, quam alios*: Shewing his conscience, and alwayes living as it were in publick, more afraid of himself, than of others. Again, he must keep in himself and with others, and generally with all things, in his thoughts, speeches, designments, actions, a moderation the mother or nurse of tranquillity, laying aside all Pomp and vanity, rule his desires, content himself with a mediocrity and sufficiency: *Quod sit esse velit, nihilque malit*: Would be as he is, and rather nothing than so; rejoyce in his fortunes. A tempest hath a great deal lesse force, and doth less hurt when the sails are taken down, than when they are hoised up, and laid open to the winds. He must be constant against whatsoever may wound or hurt him, raise himself above and beyond all fear, contemning all the blows of fortune, of death, holding it as the end of all evils, and not the cause of any, *Contemptor omnium, quibus torquetur vita, supra omnia que contingunt acciduntque eminens, Imperturbatus, intrepidus*: A contemner or despiser of all things, wherewith mans life may be afflicted, raising himself above all things that may change or happen, without perturbation, without fear. And so hold himself firm unto himself, agree with himself, live at ease without any pain or inward contention, full of joy, of peace, of comfort and content in himself: *Sapiens plenus gaudio, hilaris, placidus cum diis ex pari vivit: Sapientiae effectus gaudii aequalitas, solus sapiens gaudet*: A wiseman is full of joy, merry, peaceable, liveth in equal pleasure with the Gods: the effect of wisdom, is the equality of joy, wherein onely a wise man delighteth. He must I say entertain himself, and continue content in himself which is the proper fruit and effect of wisdom: *Nisi sapienti sua non placent: omnis stultitia laborat fastidio sui. Non est beatus, esse sequi non putat*: No man, but a wise man is content with his own: everyfools travels dislike him. No man is happy, but he that so thinketh himself.

To conclude, to this tranquility of spirit two things are necessary, innocency and a good conscience; this is the first and princi-



*To maintain himself in true tranquility, &c.*

pall part which doth marvellously arm and confirm him with assurance; but this is not alwayes sufficient, in the force of the tempest, as it is many times seen in divers that are troubled and lost: *Erit tanta tribulatio ut seducantur iusti*: There shall be so great tribulation: that even the righteous shall be seduced. And therefore the other is likewise necessary, which is force and constancy of courage, as likewise this alone were not sufficient: for the force and resistance of the conscience is marvellous, it makes us to betray, to accuse our selves, and for want of other witnesses, it is as a thousand witnesses against us.


*Oculum quatiente animo tortore flagellum.*

*Shaking a double relish with a whip*

*That strikes the soul, where at the devils skip.*

It frameth an enditement, condemneth, and executeth us, there is no closet close enough for wicked men, saith *Epicurus*, because they never can assure themselves to be hid, their own conscience alwayes discovering, them to themselves. *Prima est hac ultio, quod, se iudice nemo nocens absolvitur*: This is the first revenge of sin, that every man being his own Judge, no sinner is quit. So likewise neither a weak and fearful soul, be it never so holy, nor a strong and courageous, if it be not sound and pure, can never enjoy this so rich and happy tranquility; but he that hath them all worketh wonders; as *Socrates*, *Epaminondas*, *Cato*, *Scipio*, of whom there are three admirable exploits touching this subject. These two Romans being publickly accused, made their accusers to blush, won the Judges and the whole assembly, being stricken with an admiration.

He had a heart too great by nature, saith *Titus Livius* of *Scipio*, to know how to be faulty, and to debase himself so much, as to defend his own innocency.



O F  
W I S D O M E,  
The third Book.

Wherein are handled,

*The particular Advisements of Wisedome,  
by the four Moral Virtues.*

T H E P R E F A C E.

**F**Orasmuch as our purpose in this Book, is, by piece-meal to instruct unto Wisdome, and to give the particular advisements after the general, handled in the second Book; that we may the better hold a certain course and order therein, we have thought that we cannot do better, than to follow the four Mistresses of moral Virtues, *Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance*: for in these four, almost all the duties of our life are comprehended. *Prudence*, is as a general guide and conduct of the other Virtues, and of our whole life, though properly it be exercised in the affairs that belong thereunto. *Justice* concerneth the persons of men; for it is to give unto every one that which belongeth unto him. *Fortitude* and *Temperance*, concern all accidents good and evil, pleasant & painful, good & ill fortune. Now in these three, persons, affairs, and accidents,



accidents, is contained all our life and humane condition, and the traffick of this world.

## Of Prudence, the first Virtue.

## CHAP. I.

## Of Prudence in general.

1.  
The excellency thereof.

PRudence is with Reason put in the first Rank, as the general Queen, superintendent, and guide of all other Virtues, *Auriga virtutum*; without which there is nothing good, beautiful, fit, and decent; it is the salt of our life, the lustre, the ornament, the sauce or seasoning of our actions, the square and rule of our Affairs, and in a word, the Art of our Life, as Physick the Art of our Health.

2.  
The definition.

It is the knowledge and choice of those things we must either desire or fly; it is the just estimation or tryal of things; it is the Eye that seeth all, that directeth and ordaineth all. It consisteth in three things, which are all of one rank; to consult and deliberate well, to judge and resolve well, to conduct and execute well.

3.  
It is universal.

It is an universal Virtue, for it extendeth it self generally to all humane things, not onely in grosse, but by peice-meal to every particular thing, and is as infinite, as are the Individuals.

4.  
Difficult.  
Senec.

It is very difficult, both by Reason of the aforesaid infiniteness, for the particulars are without knowledge, as without number; *Siquæ finiri non possunt, extra sapientiam sunt*: Things infinite, and that cannot be defined are beyond wisdom: And of the great uncertainty and inconstancy of humane things, which are the greater, by reason of their accidents, circumstances, appurtenances, dependencies, times, places, persons; in such sort, that in the change of one onely, and that the least circumstance, the whole thing it self is altered, And likewise in the office thereof, which is the gathering together, and temperature of contrary things, the distinction and trial of those that are like one another; the contrariety and resemblance hindreth much.

5.  
Obscure.  
Plin. in paneg.

It is very obscure, because the causes and jurisdictions of things are unknown, the seeds and roots are hidden, and such as the Nature of man cannot find, nor ought to seek after. *Occultat eorum semina Deus, & plerumque bonorum malorumque cause sub diversa specie latent*: Their seeds God keepeth unknown and for the most part the causes of good and evil lie hid under divers similitudes. Moreover fortune

fortune, destiny, (use what words you will) a soveraign, secret, and unknown power and authority, hath alwaies the advantage, and maintaineth it against all Counsels, foresights, and preventions whatsoever: whereby it many times comes to pass, that the best Counsels have the worst issues, that one and the same Counsel doth very happily succeed to one, unhappily to another, in one and the same case, and with one and the same man, things went luckily yesterday, unluckily to day. It is an opinion justly received, that we ought not to judge of Counsels, nor of the sufficiency and capacity of Persons by the events. And therefore one answered those well, that marvelled and astonished at the ill success of their business, considering with how wise and mature deliberation they were undertaken, That they were masters of their deliberations, not of the success of their Affairs; for that was in the power of Fortune, which seemeth to sport it self with all our fairest designments and counsels: overthrewed in a moment that which hath a long time been projected and deliberated, and seemeth to be strongly fortified, chocking, as they say, our Artillery. And indeed, Fortune to shew its Authority in all things, and to abate their presumption, not being able to make men wise, that are not apt thereunto, maketh them nevertheless happy in despite of Virtue, whereby it many times comes to pass, that simple men bring to a happy end great matters both publick and private. Prudence then is a Sea without either bottome or brink, and which cannot be limited and prescribed by Precepts and Adviselements. It doth but compass things, and goeth about them, like a dark Cloud, many times vain and frivolous.

Nevertheless, it is of such weight and necessity, that alone, and of it self, it cannot do much, and without it all the rest is nothing, no not riches, means, force: *Vis consilii experts mole ruit sua: mens una sapiens plurium vincit manus: Et multa quæ naturâ impedita sunt, consilio expediuntur*: Strength void of Counsel falleth to ruine even of it self; One wise mind overcome the hands of many: And many things that are hindred by Nature, are ended by Counsel. And the principal cause of this necessity is the perverse Nature of man, the roughest and hardest to tame of all other Creatures; *Impatiens æqui, nedum servitutis*; Impatient of equity, much more of servitude; and which must be handled with art and industry, for it doth not more willingly set it self against any, than against those that would contemn it. Now Prudence is the Art to handle it, and a gentle Bridle that holdeth it within the compass of Obedience.

6.  
Necessary.  
Horat. 3. od.  
Euripid.  
Livius.

Senec. 1. de  
clement.

Xenophon in  
Pædag.



7.  
The acquisition  
thereof.

Now though the seed of Prudence, as of other Virtues, be in us by Nature, yet it is acquired and learnt more than any other, and that in some sort by precepts and advisements; this is the Theorick: but much more and principally (though with more time) by experience and practice, which is twofold: the one, and the true, is that which is proper and personal whereof it takes the name; this is the knowledge of those things which we have seen and handled: the other is strange by the act of another, this is History, which we know by relation or by reading. Now Experience and use is more firm and more assured; *Usus efficacissimus omnium rerum magister: Use and Experience is a most effectual master of all things*, the Father and Mistress of all the Arts, but more long; it is old, *Seris venit usus ab annis: Experience cometh in a mans latter dayes*; more difficult, painful, rare the knowledge of History, as it is lesse firm and assured, so it is more easy, more frequent, open and common to all. A man is made more resolute and assured at his own charges, but it is more ealie to the charge of another. Now from these two properly, Experience, and History, doth Prudence arise: *Usus me genuit mater, peperit memoria; sen, memoria anima & vita, Historia: Experience begat me, my Mother memory bare me; the soul and life of Memory, is History.*

8.  
The distinction.

Now prudence may and must be diversly distinguished according to the persons and the affairs. In regard of the persons there is private Prudence, whether it be solitary and individual, which can hardly be termed prudence, or sociable and Oeconomical, among a small company; and Prudence publick and politick. This more high, excellent, difficult, and unto which those aforesaid qualities do properly belong, and it is two-fold, Peaceable and Military.

In regard of the Affairs, soasmuch as they are of two sorts, the one ordinary easie; the more extraordinary. These are accidents which bring with them some new difficulty and ambiguity. A man may likewise say, that there is an ordinary and easie prudence, which walketh according to the Laws, Customes, and course already established; another extraordinary and more difficult.

Hesiod.  
Livius.  
Cicero.

There is likewise another distinction of Prudence, both in respect of the persons and of the affairs, which concerneth rather the degrees, than the kinds thereof; that is to say, proper prudence, whereby a man is wise, and taketh counsel of himself: the other borrowed, whereby a man followeth the counsel of another. The wise say, that there are two sorts and degrees of wise men: the first  
and

and chieftest is of those that have a clear insight into all things, and know of themselves how to find the remedies and helps : but where are these to be found ? Doubtless they are rare and singular. The other is of those that know how take, to follow, to make use of the good counsels of another, for they that know neither how to give, nor to take counsel, are Fools.

The general and common adviselements, which belong to all sorts of prudence, all sorts of persons and affairs, hath been touched and briefly delivered in the second Book, and they are eight : first, knowledge of the persons and affairs : Secondly, estimation of things : Thirdly, choice and elections : Fourthly, from them to take counsel upon all : Fifthly, temperature between fear and assurance, confidence and diffidence : Sixthly, to take all things in their season, and to seize upon the occasion : Seventhly, to carry himself well, with industry and fortune : Lastly, discretion in all. We must now handle the particulars, first of publick wisdom which respecteth the persons, afterwards of that which respecteth the affairs.

Chap. 10.

*Of the Politick Prudence of a Sovereign, to govern States.*

THE PREFACE.

THIS Doctrine belongeth to Sovereigns and Governours of States. It is uncertain, infinite, difficult, and almost impossible to be ranged into order, to be limited and prescribed by Rules and Precepts : but we must endeavour to give some small light, and brief instruction thereof. We may referre this whole Doctrine to two principal heads, which are the two duties of a Sovereign. The one comprehendeth and intreateth of the props and pillars of a State, Principal and essential parts of publick Government, as the bones and sinews of this great Body, to the end that a Sovereign may provide for himself and his State ; which are seven principal, that is to say, knowledge of the State, virtue, manners, and fashions, counsels, treasure, forces, and arms, alliances. The three first are in the person of the sovereign ; the fourth in him, and near him, the three latter without him. The other is to act, well to employ, and to make use of the foresaid means, that is to say, in grosse, and in a word, well to govern and maintain himself in Authority, and the love both of his subjects and of strangers, but distinctly : This part is twofold, Peaceable and Military. Behold here summarily, and



*The first part of this Politick Prudence*

and grossly the work cut out, and the first great draughts that are to be handled hereafter. We will divide then this politick matter, and of State, into two parts; the first shall be of provision, that is to say, of the seven necessary things: the second, and which presupposeth the first, shall be of the action of the Prince. This matter is excellently handled by *Lipsius*, according as he thought good: the marrow of his book, is here. I have not taken nor wholly followed his method, nor his order as you may already see in this general division, and more you shall hereafter: I have likewise left somewhat of his, and added something of mine own, and other mens.

## CHAP. II.

*The first part of this Politick prudence and Government  
of State, which is of Provision.*

I.  
*The chief  
point of this  
provision, to  
know the  
State.*

THE first thing that is required before all others, is the knowledge of the State: for the first rule of all Prudence consisteth in Knowledge, as hath been said in the second Book. The first in all things is to know with whom a man hath to deal. For inasmuch as this ruling and moderating prudence of *States*, which is a knowledge and sufficiency to govern in publick, is a thing relative, which is handled between the Sovereign and the subjects; the first duty and office thereof, is in the knowledge of the two parts, that is, of the People, and the Sovereignty, that is to say, of the *State*. First, then the Humours and Natures of the People must be known. This Knowledge formeth, and giveth Advice unto him that should govern them. The Nature of the People in general hath been described at large in the first book, (light, inconstant, mutinous, vain, a lover of novelties, fierce and insupportable in prosperity, cowardly and dejected in adversity) but must it likewise be known in particular; so many Cities and Persons, so many divers humours, There are People cholerick, audacious, Warriors, fearful, given to wine, subject to women, some more than others: *Noscenda natura vulgi est & quibus modis temperanter habeatur*: The nature of the vulgar sort is to be known and by what means it may be temperately ruled. And in this sense is that saying of the wise to be understood: He that hath not obeyed, cannot tell how to command. *Nemo bene imperat, nisi qui anteparuerit imperio.*

Senec.

Not because Sovereigns should or can alwaies take upon them the name

name of Subjects; for many are born Kings and Princes, and many States are successive: but that he that will well command, should acquaint himself with the humours and wills of his Subjects, as if himself were of their Rank, and in their place. He must likewise know the nature of the State, not onely in general, such as it hath been described; but in particular, that which he hath now in hand, the Form, Establishment, Birth thereof, that is to say, whether it be old or new; fallen by Succession, or by Election; obtained by the Laws, or by Arms; of what extent it is, what neighbours, means, power it hath: for according to these, and other circumstances, he must diversly manage the Scepter, loosen and straiten the Reins of his Government.

After this knowledge of the state, which is as a Preamble, the first of those things that are required, is virtue, necessary in a Sovereign, as well for himself, as for the State. It is first necessary and convenient that he that is above all should be better than all, according to the saying of *Cyrus*: and then it standeth him upon for his credit and reputation. For common fame and report gathereth and spreadeth abroad the speeches and actions of him that governeth. He is in the Eye of all, and can no more hide himself than the Sun: and therefore what good or ill soever he doth, shall not want means to blazon it, shall be talked of enough. And it importeth him much, both in respect of himself and his State, that his Subjects have a good opinion of him. Now a Sovereign ought not onely in himself, and in his life and conversation to be virtuous, but he must likewise endeavour that his subjects be like unto himself. For as all the wisest of the world have ever taught, a State, a City, a Company cannot long continue nor prosper, where Virtue is banished; and they do grossly equivocate, who think that Princes are so much the more assured in their States by how much the more wicked their Subjects are, because, say they, they are more proper, and as it were born to servitude and the yoke; *Patientiores servitutis quis non decet nisi esse servos*: very patient of servitude whom it becometh not to be other than servants. For contrarily, wicked men bare their yoke impatiently; and they that are good and debonaire fear much more than their cause is, *Pessimus quisque asperissime rectorem patitur*: contra facile imperium in bonos qui merentes magis quam merendi. The most wicked are most impatient of Authority: contrarily the best men are most obedient, fearing others more than they are feared themselves. Now the most powerful means to induce them, and to form them unto virtue, is the example of the Prince; for as experience

2.  
The second  
head of this  
provision, is  
virtue.

Salust. ad Cass.

Plin. Pan.  
Salust. ad Cass.



Pli. Paneg.

tellet us, all men do frame themselves to the pattern and model of the Prince. The reason is, because example preffeth more than Law. It is a mute Law which carrieth more credit than a command, *Næ tam imperio nobis opus quàm exemplo: & minus jubetur exemplo: Neither do we so much need commandment, as example; and it is more gentle to command by example.* Now the eyes and thoughts of the lesser are always upon the great; they admire and simply believe, that all is good and excellent that they do: and on the other side, they that command, think they sufficiently enjoin and bind their Inferiours to imitate them by acting onely. Virtue then is honourable and profitable in a Sovereign, yea, all virtue.

3.  
Especially four  
virtues.

But especially and above all, Piety, Justice, Valour, Clemency. These are the four principal and princely virtues in principality. And therefore that great Prince *Augustus* was wont to say, that Piety and Justice did deifie Princes. And *Seneca* saith, that Clemency agreeth better with a Prince, than any other. The piety of a Sovereign consisteth in his care for the maintenance and preservation of Religion, as the Protector thereof. This maketh for his own honour and preservation of himself: for they that fear God dare not attempt, nay think of any thing, either against their Prince, who is the Image of God upon Earth, or against the State. For as *Lactantius* doth many times teach, it is Religion that maintaineth humane Society, which cannot otherwise sublist, and would soon be filled with all manner of wickednesse and savage cruelties, if the respect and fear of Religion did not bridle men, and keep them in order. The state of the Romans did encrease and flourish more by Religion, saith *Cicero* himself, than by all other means. Wherefore a Prince must take care and endeavour that Religion be preserved in its purity, according to the ancient Laws and Ceremonies of the Countrey, and hinder all innovation, and controversies therein, roughly chastising those that go about to break the peace thereof. For doubtless change in Religion, and a wrong done thereunto, draweth with it a change and a declination, of the common-wealth, as *Mecenas* well discourseth to *Augustus*.

Dion.

4.  
Justice.

After Piety, cometh Justice, without which States are but Robberies, which a Prince must keep and practise both in himself and others: In himself, for he must detest all those tyrannical and barbarous speeches, which dispense with Sovereigns, quitting them from all Laws, Reason, Equity, Obligation; which tell them that they are not bound unto any other duty, than to their own wills and plea-

lures

cures, that there is no law for them ; that all is good and just that  
 serveth their turns ; that their equity is their force ; their duty is in  
 their power. *Principi leges nemo scripsit : licet, si libet. In summa*  
*fortuna, id equius quod validius : nihil injustum quod fructuosum :* Plin. Pan.  
*Sanctitas, pietas, fides, privata bona sunt : quæ juvat, reges eant :* Tacitus.  
 None hath written lawes for the Prince : his will is his law. *In the* Senec. in tra.  
*highest degree of fortune, that is most just, which is of most force :*  
*Nothing is unjust, which is profitable : Sanctity, piety, faith, are pri-*  
*vate goods, and go that way that may benefit the Prince. And he must*  
*oppose against them those excellent and holy counsels of the wise,*  
*that he that hath most power in him to break lawes, should take*  
*most care to keep them, and live most in order. The greatest power*  
*should be the straightest bridle, the rule of power is duty ; mini-* Senec.  
*mum decet libere, cui nimium licet ; non fas potentes posse, fieri quod* Euripides.  
*nefas :* he that hath power to do too much, ought to be least free ; It is  
*not lawfull that mighty men should do that, which is unlawful to be*  
*done. The Prince then must first be just, keeping well and inviola-*  
*bly his faith, the foundation of justice, to all and every one who-*  
*soever he be. Then he must cause that his justice be kept and main-*  
*tained in others, for it is his proper charge, and for that cause he is*  
*installed. He must understand the causes and the persons, give unto*  
*every one that which appertaineth to him, justly according to the*  
*laws, without delay, labyrinths of suits and controversies, involu-*  
*tion of processe, abolishing that villanous and pernicious mystery*  
*of pleading, which is an open Fair, or Merchandise, a lawfull and*  
*honourable robbery, concessum latrocinium ; avoiding the multipli-*  
*city of laws and ordinances, a testimony of a sick Common-weal,*  
*Corruptissime reipublice plurime leges : the most corrupted Common-* Colum.  
*wealths abound with most laws ; as medicines and plaisters of a* Tacit.  
*body ill disposed : and all this to the end that that which is esta-* Plin. Pan.  
*blished by good laws be not destroyed by too many laws. But* An advertise-  
*you must know, that the justice, virtue, and probity of a sovereign* ment.  
*goeth after another manner, than that of private men : it hath a*  
*gate more large and more free by reason of the great weight and*  
*dangerous charge which he carrieth and swayeth, for which cause it*  
*is fit to march with a pafe, which seemeth to others uneasy and irre-*  
*gular, but yet it is necessary and lawfull for him. He must sometimes*  
*step aside, and go out of the way, mingle prudence with justice, & as*  
*they say, cover himself with the skin of the Lion, if that of the Fox*  
*serve not the turn. But this is not always to be done, and in all cases,*  
 but:



*The first part of this Politick Prudence**For the weal-  
publick.*

but with these three conditions, that it be for the evident & important necessity of the weal-publick, (that is to say, of the State and the Prince, which are things conjoynd) unto which he must run; this is a natural obligation, and not to be dispensed with: and to procure the good of the common-wealth, is but to do his duty.

*Salus populi suprema lex esto.  
Princes counsels, love and hate,  
Do homage to the law of state,  
That peoples safety have no mate.  
Other laws do very well,  
But peoples safety bears the bell.*

*For defence  
and conserva-  
tion,*

That it be to defend, and not to offend; to preserve himself, and not to encrease his greatness, to save and shield himself either from deceits and subtilties, or from wicked and dangerous enterprises and not practise them. It is lawful by subtilty to prevent subtilty, and among Foxes to counterfeit the Fox. The world is full of Art and malicious couzenage; and by deceits and cunning subtilties, States are commonly overthrown, saith *Aristotle*. Why then should it not be lawful, nay why should it not be necessary to hinder, and to divert such evil, and to save the weal publick by the self-same means that others would undermine and overthrow it? Always to deal simply and plainly with such people, and to follow the streight line of true reason and equity, were many times to betray the State, and to undo it.

*5.  
Discreetly  
without wick-  
ednesse.*

Thirdly, it must be with discretion, to the end that others abuse it not, and such as are wicked take from thence occasion to give credit and countenance to their own wickednesse. For it is never permitted to leave virtue and honesty, to follow vice and dishonesty. There is no composition or compensation betwixt these two extremities. And therefore away with all injustice, treachery, treason, and disloyalty. Curfed be the doctrine of those, who teach (as hath been said) that all things are good and lawful for Sovereigns: but yet it is sometimes necessary and required, that he mingle profit with honesty, and that he enter into composition with both. He must never turn his back to honesty, but yet sometimes go about and coast it, employing therein his skill and cunning, which is good, honest and lawful, as saith that great Saint *Basil*, καλῶς καὶ ἐπιμετρώ πανουργίας; and doing for the weal-publick like as mothers and physitians, who feed their children, and patients, with fair speeches, and deceive them for their health. To be brief, doing that closely

closely which he may not do openly, joyn wisdom to valour, art and spirit where nature and the hand sufficeth not; be, as *Pindarus* saith, a Lion in his blows, a Fox in his counsels; a Dove and a Serpent, as divine verity speaketh.

And to this matter more distinctly, there is required in a Sovereign, distrust, and that he keep himself close, yet so, as that he be still virtuous and just. Distrust which is the first, is wholly necessary, as the contrary, which is credulity, and a careless trust or confidence is vicious, and very dangerous in a Sovereign. He watcheth over all, and must answer for all; his faults are not light, and therefore he must be well advised. If he trust much, he discovereth himself, and is exposed to shame and many dangers, *Opportunus fit injurie*, yea, encourageth such as are false and treacherous, who may with little danger, and much recompence commit great wickedness, *Aditum nocendi perfido præstat fides: Trust maketh way for the treacherous to do mischief.* It is necessary therefore that he cover himself with his buckler of distrust, which the wisest have thought to be a great part of prudence, and the sinews of wisdom, that is to say, that he watch, believe nothing, take heed of all: and hereunto doth the nature of the world induce him, wholly composed of lies, coloured, counterfeit, and dangerous, namely such as are neer unto him in the court and houses of great personages. He must then trust but few, and those known by long experience and often tryals: Neither is it necessary that he abandon them, and in such sort leave all the cord, that he still hold it not by one end, and have an eye unto them: But he must cover and disguise the diffidence, yea, when he distrusteth, he must make a shew and countenance of great trust and confidence. For open distrust wrongeth, and inviteth, as much to deceive, as an over-carelesse confidence; and many by making too great a shew of fear to be deceived, shew the way how they may be deceived. *Multi fallere docuerunt dum timent falli: Many have taught to deceive, whilst they fear to be deceived:* as contrarily, a professed and open trust hath taken away the desire to deceive, hath obliged loyalty, and ingendred fidelity; *Vult quisque sibi credi, & habita fides ipsam plerumque obligat fidem: Every man would be believed; and, to be credited for the most part bindeth trust the more.*

6.  
Distrust required in a Prince.

Ephichar.  
Euripid.  
Cicero.

7.  
And dissimulation.

From distrust comes dissimulation the science or seed thereof; for if that were not, and that there were trust and fidelity in all, dissimulation which openeth the front, and covereth the thought, could have



have no place. Now dissimulation which is vicious in private persons, is very necessary in Princes, who otherwise could not know how to reigne, or well to command: And they must many times dissemble, not only in warre, with strangers and enemies; but also in time of peace, and with their subjects, though more sparingly. Simple and open men, and such as carry (as they say) their hearts in their foreheads are not in any sort fit for this mysterie of commanding, and betray many times both themselves and their State: But yet he must play this part with art and dexterity, and to the purpose, neither so openly or so simply as that it may be discerned. For to what purpose dost thou hide and cover thy self, if a man may see thee obliquely or side-ways? Wily devices and cunning subtilties, are no more deceits and subtilties, when they are known and vented out. A Prince then the better to cover his art, must make profession of loving simplicity, must make much of free and open minded men, as being enemies to dissimulation: and in matters of lesse importance, he must proceed openly, to the end he may be taken for such as he seemeth.

8.  
*Practice.*

All this is in omission, in retaining himself, not acting: but it is likewise required sometimes, that he passe farther, and come to action, and this is twofold. The one is to make and frame secret practices and intelligences cunningly to win and draw unto him the hearts and services either of the officers, servants, and trustiest friends of other Princes and forrein Lords or of his own subjects. This is a subtilty which is much in request and authority, and very common among Princes, and a great point of prudence, saith *Cicero*. It is wrought in some sort by perswasion, but especially by presents and pensions, means so powerfull, that not only the Secretaries, the chief of the Counsel, the most inward friends and favourites, have been thereby drawn to give advice, and to divert the designments of their Master; yea, great Captains to give their helping hand in the warre, but also wives have been won to discover the secrets of their husbands. Now this subtil policy is also allowed, and approved by many, without difficulty or scruple. And to say the truth, if it be against an enemy, against a subject whom he suspecteth, and likewise against any stranger, with whom he hath no alliance nor league of fidelity and amity, it is not greatly to be doubted. But against his alliance, his friends and confederates, it cannot be good; and it is a kind of treachery, which is never permitted:

9.  
*Subtilties.*

The other is to win some advantage, and to obtain his purpose,  
by

by close and covert means, by equivocations and subtilties, to circumvent by fair speeches and promises, letters, embassages, working and obtaining by subtil means, that which the difficulty of times and affairs will not permit him otherwise to do, and to do that closely which he cannot do openly. Many great and wise men say, *Plato.* that this is lawful and to be permitted : *Crebro mendacio & fraude Plin.* *uti imperantes debent ad commodum subditorum. Decipere pro moribus temporum, prudentia est : Great commanders ought to use lying and fraud for the commodity of their subjects. To deceive according to the state and condition of time, is wisdom.* *Val. Max.* It were over-boldnesse simply to affirm that it is permitted. But a man may say, that in case of great necessity, in a troublesome and tumultuous time, when it is not only to procure a great good, but to divert a great mischief from the State and against such as are wicked and traiterous, that is no great fault, if it be a fault.

But there is a greater doubt and difficulty in other things, because they have a smell of much Injustice in them. I say *much* and not *wholly*, because with their Injustice there are mingled in them some grains of justice. That which is wholly and apparently unjust, is reproved of all, even of the wicked, at leastwise in word and shew, if not in earnest and in deed. But of these actions ill mingled, there are so many reasons and authorities on the one side and the other, that a man hardly knoweth how to resolve himself, I will reduce them here to certain heads. To dispatch, and secretly to put to death, or otherwise, without form of justice, some certain man that is troublesome and dangerous to the state, and who well deserveth death but yet cannot without trouble and danger be enterprised & repressed by an ordinary course : herein there is nothing violated but the form, and the Prince, is he not above the form ? *IO. Injustice profitable to the weal publick.*

To cut the wings, and to lessen the great means of any one that shall raise and fortifie himself too much in the State, and maketh himself fearfull to his Sovereign ; not staying till he be invincible, and able to attempt any thing against the state, and the head of his Sovereign when it pleaseth him.

To take by authority the riches of the richest in a great necessity and poverty of the state.

To weaken and cancel the laws and priviledges of some subjects, who hold them to the prejudice and diminution of the authority of the Sovereign.

To take by prevention, and to possesse himself of a place, city, or a



province, very commodious for the State, rather than to suffer another strong and fearfull neighbour to take and possesse it, to the great hurt, subjection, and perpetual alarm of the said State.

Plutarch.  
Tacit.

Plutarch. in  
Flam.

Senec.

Aristot. in  
Politic.  
Democrit.

All these things are approved as just and lawfull by many great and wise men, provided that they succeed well and happily, of whom these are the sayings and sentences: *To do justice in great matters, a man may sometimes go astray in small: and, To execute justice in grosse, it is permitted to do wrong by retail*: for commonly the greatest actions and examples have some Injustice, which satisfieth particular men, by the profit which ariseth to all in general: *Omne magnum exemplum habet aliquid ex iniquo, quod adversus singulos utilitate publica rependitur*. That a prudent and wise Prince should not onely know how to command according to the Laws, but also the Laws themselves, if necessity require; and they must make the Laws to will it, when they cannot do what they would. In confused and desperate affairs, a Prince must not follow that which may be well spoken of, but that which is necessary to be executed. Necessity, a great support and excuse to humane fragility, infringeth all law, and therefore he is not very wicked, that doth ill by constraint: *Necessitas magnum imbecillitatis humane patrocinium, omnem legem frangit: non est nocens quicumque non sponte est nocens*. If a Prince cannot be wholly good, it sufficeth if he be half good, and that he be not wholly wicked; That it cannot possible be, that good princes should commit no Injustice. To all this, I would add for their justification, or diminution of their faults, that Princes finding themselves in such extremities, they ought not to proceed in such actions, but with great unwillingnesse and grief of mind, acknowledging that it is an infelicity and a disfavour from heaven, and so carrying themselves therein as a father, when he is enforced to cauterise or cut off a member of his child, to save his life; or to pluck out a tooth to purchase ease. As for other speeches more bold, which refer all to profit, which they either equall or prefer before honesty, an honest man must ever abhor them.

We have stayed long upon this point of the virtue of Justice, because of the doubts and difficulties that arise from the accidents and necessities of States, and which do many times hinder the most resolute and best advised.

II.  
Valour.

After justice cometh Valour; I mean that military virtue; wisdom, courage, and sufficiency to play the warriour; necessary in a Prince for the defence and safety of himself, the State, his subjects,  
of

of the publick peace and liberty; and without which he can hardly deserve the name of a Prince.

But let us come to the fourth princely virtue, which is Clemency, <sup>12.</sup> a virtue which inclineth the Prince to a sweet kind of mildnesse and lenity, whereby he lesseneth and qualifieth the rigour of justice with judgement and discretion, it moderateth, and sweetly manageth all things, delivereth those that are faulty, relieveth those that are fallen, saveth those that are like to be lost. It is that in a Prince, which humanity is in a common person. It is contrary to cruelty, and extreme rigour, not to justice; from which it differeth not much, but it sweeteneth and moderateth it. It is necessary by reason of our humane infirmity, and frequency of offences, the facility to offend: for an over-great and continuall rigour and severity, ruinateth all, and maketh chastisements contemptible; *Severitas amittit assiduitate auctoritatem*: It stirreth malice and rancor, moveth rebellions, and men by despight are made wicked. For fear, that keepeth men in their duty, must be sweet and temperate; if it be too sharp and continual, it is changed into rage and revenge: *Temperatus timor est qui cohibet, assiduus & acer in vindictam excitat*: Temperate fear is that which restraineth, but continuall fear stirreth up revenge. It is likewise very profitable to a Prince and State, it winneth the love and good will of his subjects, and consequently confirmeth and assureth the State, *Firmissimum id imperium quo obedientes gaudent*: That Empire is most firm, where the subjects so obey, as they rejoyce, as cap. 3. shall be said hereafter. It is likewise very honourable to a sovereign, begin. for his subjects will honour and adore him as a god, as their tutour, their father; and in stead of fearing him, they will fear all for him, lest any ill happen unto him. This then shall be the lesson of the Prince, to know all that passeth, not to believe all; yea, many times to dissemble, wishing rather to be thought to have found good subjects, than to have made them such; to pardon light faults, to lessen the rigour of the great; not to be over-streight and exact in punishing (Which is as great a dishonour and intamy to a Prince, as to a Physician many Patients that die under his hand) to content himself many times with repentance as a sufficient chastisement.

—ignoscere pulchrum

*Jam misero, paenae genus vidisse precantem.*

*Tis foul and fair enough: for them and thee,*

*To pardon, where the Lord afflicts, not we.*

And let him not fear that which some object very untruly, that it



Salust. ad  
Cæsar.

debaseth, vilifieth, and weakneth the authority of the Sovereign and of the State, for it contrarily fortifieth it, and gives credit and vigour thereunto: And a Prince beloved, shall do more by love; than by fear, which makes men fear and tremble, but not obey: and as *Salust* discoursed to *Cæsar*, Those states that are governed with fear, are never durable. No man can be feared by many, but he must likewise fear many, and that fear which he would put upon all, falleth upon his own head. That life is doubtfull wherein a man neither before nor behind, nor on any side is covered, but is alwayes in agitation, in danger, in fear. It is true, as hath been said in the beginning, that it must be with judgement; for, as tempered and well conducted it is very venerable, so being too loose, too remisse, it is very pernicious.

13.  
After which  
are required  
also liberality.

After these four principal and royal virtues, there are also others though lesse worthy and necessary, yet in a second place very profitable, and requisite in a Sovereign; that is to say, liberality, so fit and necessary for a Prince, as it is lesse befitting him to be vanquished by arms, than by magnificence. But yet there is herein required a great discretion, otherwise it will be more hurtfull than commodious.

Liberality  
twofold.

There is a twofold liberality, the one consisteth in charge and shew, and this serves to small purpose. For it is an idles thing in Sovereigns, and to little end, to endeavour by great and excessive charges to make shew of themselves, or to increase their credit, especially with their subjects, where they have power to do what they list. It is a testimony of pusillanimity, and that they understand not what they are; and besides that, it seemeth to their subjects, the spectators of these triumphs, that they make this glorious shew with their own spoils, that they feast it at their charges, that they feed their eyes with that, that should feed their bellies.

And again a Prince should think that he hath nothing properly his: he oweth himself to another. The other liberality consisteth in gifts bestowed upon another, and this is farre more commodious and commendable, but then it must be well governed, and he must be well advised to whom, how, and how much he must give. He must give to those that have deserved it, that have done service to the weal publick, that have run their fortunes, and spent themselves in the warres. No man will envy them, if they be not very wicked. Whereas contrarily, great gifts, bestowed without respect and merit, shame the giver, and purchase envy to the receiver, and is received

without

without thankfulness and acknowledgement. Some tyrants have been sacrificed to the malice of the people, even by those whom they have advanced, railing on them with the rest of the people, and securing their goods, by making known how much they contemn and hate him, from whom they received them. Again, this liberality must be with measure; for if it be not, and that he give unto all, and upon all occasions, the ruine of the State and Sovereign must needs ensue: This is to play and to lose all. For men will never be satisfied, but be as excessive in asking, as the Prince shall be in giving, framing themselves not according to reason, but example; so that when the common treasury shall fail, he shall be enforced to lay hands upon the goods of another, and supply by Injustice that which ambition and prodigality did dissipate, *quod ambitione exhaustum, per scelera supplendum*. Now it is far better not to give at all, than to take away to give: for a man shall never enjoy in so high a degree the love and good will of those whom he hath clothed, as the hatred and ill will of those whom he hath robbed and spoiled. And again, this liberality without measure, worketh the ruine of himself: for a fountain drieth up, if it be overmuch drawn. Hieronym

*Liberalitate liberalitas perit: By liberality liberality perisheib.* Liberality likewise must be spun with a gentle thread by little and little and not altogether: for that which is done over-speedily, be it never so great, is in a manner insensible, and soon forgotten. Pleasant and pleasing things must be exercised with ease and leisure, that a man may have time to taste them: Things rude and cruel (if they must needs be done) must contrarily be executed speedily. There is then Art and prudence in giving, and in the practice of liberality. *Falluntur quibus luxuria specie liberalitatis imponit: perdere multi sciunt, donare nesciunt.* They are deceived whom riot blinds in shew of liberality: many know how to waste, but not how to give. And to say the truth, liberality is not properly any of the royal virtues; for it agreeth and carrieth it self well with tyranny itself. And such as are the governours of young Princes do wrong, in working so strong an impression of this virtue of bounty in their minds and wills, that they should refuse no means to put it in practice, and think nothing well employed, but that which they give (this is their common language); but they do it either for their own benefit, or else they know not to whom they speak it. For it is a dangerous thing to imprint liberality in the mind of him that hath means to furnish himself as much as he will at the charges of ano-

Tacit.



ther. A prodigal or liberal Prince without discretion and measure, is worse than a covetous : but if this liberality be well ruled and ordered, as hath been said, it is well befitting a Prince, and very profitable both to himself and the estate.

14  
Magnanimity  
and moderati-  
on of choler.  
Senec.

Tacit.

Tacit.

15  
The third head  
of this provi-  
sion. The man-  
ners of the  
Prince.

Another virtue requisite in a Prince, in a second degree, is Magnanimity, and greatnesse of courage, to contemn injuries and bad speeches, and to moderate his choler; never to vex himself for the outrages and indiscretions of another: *Magnam fortunam magnus animus decet; injurias & offensiones supernè despicere, indignas Caesaris iræ; a great mind becometh a great fortune; and highly to despise injuries, and offences, which be unworthy the anger of Caesar.* For a man to afflict himself, and to be moved, is to confesse himself to be faulty, whereas by neglect and light account it easily vanissheth. *Convitiis, si irascere, agnita videntur; si spreta exolescunt. Thou seemest to confesse those accusations being angry; which contemned, either vanish of themselves, or return upon the Author.* And if there be fit place, and a man must be angry, let it be openly and without dissimulation, in such sort that he give not occasion to suspect a hidden grudge, and purpose of revenge: this is a token of a bad and incurable nature, and best befitting the baser sort: *Obscuri & irrevocabiles reponunt odia: Sæva cogitationis indicium secreto odio satiari. Base persons and unrecovorable do conceal their hatreds. It is a token of a barbarous and cruel mind, to be glutted with secret grudge.* It doth better become a great personage to offend, than to hate. The other virtues are lesse royal and more common.

After virtue come the manners, carriages, and countenances that become and belong unto Majesty, very requisite in a Prince. I will not stand upon this point: I onely say, as it were passing by, that not onely nature helpeth much hereunto, but also art and study. Hereunto do appertain the good and beautiful composition of the visage, his port, pace, speech, habiliments. The general rule in all these points, is a sweet, moderate, and venerable gravity, walking betwixt fear and love, worthy of all honour and reverence. There is likewise his residence, and conversation or familiarity. Touching his residence or abode, let it be in some glorious, magnificent, and eminent places, and as neer as may be in the middle of the whole state, to the end he may have an eye over all, like the Sun which from the middle of heaven giveth light to all: for keeping himself at one end, he giveth occasion to those that are farthest from him to rise against him, as he that standeth upon one end of the table,

maketh

make h the other end to rise up. His conversation and company, let it be rare; for to shew and to communicate himself too much, breedeth contempt and dejecteth majesty: *Continuus aspectus minus verendos magnos homines ipsa satietate facit: Majestati major ex longinquo reverentia, quia omne ignotum pro magnifico est.* Often and day'y spect causeth great men the lesse to be feared: But the rarenesse of their presence procures the greater reverence; because all strange and unknown things seem lately and magnificent.

Lucius.  
Tacit.

After these three things, knowledge of the state, virtue, and manners, which are in the person of the Prince, come those things which are neer and about the Prince: That is to say, in the fourth place Counsel, the great and principal point of this politick Doctrine, and so important, that it is in a manner all in all, It is the soul of the state, and the spirit that giveth life, motion and action to all the other parts: and for that cause it is said, that the managing of affairs consisteth in prudence. Now it were to be wished that a Prince had in himself counsel and prudence sufficient to govern and to provide for all. Which is the first and highest degree of wisdom, as hath been said; and if so it were, the affaires would go far better: but this is rather to be wished than hoped for, whether it be for want of good nature, or a good institution; and it is almost impossible that one onely head should be sufficiently furnished for so many matters. *Nequit princeps sua scientia cuncta completi, nec unius mens tanta molis est capax.* The Prince cannot comprehend all things by his own knowledge, neither is the mind of one alone capable of so much greatnesse. A lone man seeth and heareth but little. Now Kings have need of many eyes, and many ears; and great burdens, and great affaires have need of great helps. And therefore it is requisite that he provide and furnish himself with good counsel, and such men as know how to give it: for he whosoever he be, that will take all upon himself, is rather held to be proud, than discreet or wise. A Prince then had need of faithfull friends and servitours to be his assistants, *quos assumit in partem curarum, whom he may take to bear part of his cares.* These are his true treasures, and profitable instruments of the state: In the choice whereof he should especially labour and employ his whole judgement, to the end he may have them good. There are two sorts of them; the one aid the Prince with their duty, counsel, and tongue, and are called Counsellors; the other serve him with their hands and actions, and may be called Officers. The first, are farre more honourable: For

16

The fourth  
head of this  
provision,  
counsel.

Chap. 1.

Tacit.

Tit. Livius.  
Tacit:

Plin.



the two greatest Philosophers say, that it is a sacred and divine thing; well to deliberate, and to give good counsel.

2.

The condition  
of good coun-  
sellors, Fide-  
lity. Plin.  
Sufficiency.  
Plin.

Curtius.

Liberty.

Tacit.

Now Counsellors must first be faithful, that is to say in a Word, honest men. *Optimum quemque fidelissimum puto*: Every man that is truly honest, I hold to be most faithful. Secondly, they must be sufficient in this point, that is to say, skilful in the State, diversly experimented and tryed (for difficulties and afflictions are excellent lessons and instructions; *Mibi fortuna multis rebus ereptis usum dedit bene suadendis*: Fortune having taken from me many things, hath given me the faculty of well perswading.) And in a word, they must be wise and prudent, indifferent quick, and not over sharp; for such kind of men are too moveable; *novandis quam gerendis rebus aptiora ingenia illa ignea*: These fiery wits are fitter for innovation, than admiration. And that they may be such, it is requisite, that they be old and ripe; for, besides that young men by reason of the soft and delicate tenderneffe of their age, are easily deceived, they do easily believe and receive every impression. It is good that about Princes there be some wise, some subtil; but much more such as are wise, who are required for honour and for all times, the subtil onely sometimes for necessity. Thirdly, it is necessary that in proposing and giving good and wholesome counsel, they carry themselves freely and courageously without flattery, or ambiguity, or disguise, not accommodating their language to the present state of the Prince; *Ne cum fortuna potius principis loquamur quam cum ipso*: Let they speak rather with the fortune of the Prince than with himself; but without sparing the truth, speak that which is fit and requisite. For although liberty, roundneffe of speech and fidelity, hurt and offend for the time, those against whom it opposeth it self, yet afterwards it is revered and esteemed. *In presentia quibus resistis, offendis; deinde illis ipsis suspiciuntur laudanturque*: For the present thou offendest them whom thou contradicest, but afterwards thou art even of them respected and praised. And fourthly, Constantly, without yielding, varying and changing at every meeting to please and follow the humour, pleasure, and passion of another; but without opinative obstinacy, and a spirit of contradiction which troubleth and hindereth all good deliberation, he must sometimes change his opinion, which is not in constancy, but Prudence. For a wise man marcheth not alwaies with one and the same pafe, although he follow the same way; he changeth not, but accommodateth himself;

Non.

*Non semper in uno gradu, sed una via; non se mutat, sed aptat*: As a good mariner ordereth his sailes according to the times, and the Senec. wind; it is necessary many times to turn and wind, and to arrive to that place obliquely, by fetching a compass, when he cannot do it directly, and by a streight line. Again; a religious dexterity to Silence. keep secret the counsels and deliberations of Princes, is a thing very necessary in the managing of affairs; *Res magnæ sustineri ne- Curtius. quunt ab eo cui tacere grave est: Great affairs cannot be sustained by him, who cannot be secret.* And it sufficeth not to be secret, but he must not pry and search into the secrets of his Prince; that is an ill, and a dangerous thing, *Exquirere abditos principis sensus, illicitum Tacit. & anceps*: yea he must be unwilling and avoid all means to know them. And these are the principal good conditions and qualities of a Counsellor, as the evils which they must warily avoid, are presumptuous confidence, which maketh a man to deliberate and determine over boldly and obstinately; for a wise man in deliberating thinketh and rethinketh, doubting whatsoever may happen, that he may be the bolder, to execute. *Num animus vereri qui scit, scit Presumptuous tuto aggredi: For the mind that knoweth how to fear, knoweth how confidence. with safety to execute.* Contrarily the fool is hardy and violent in Tit. Livius. his deliberation: but when he comes to the issue, his nose falls a bleeding: *Consilia calida & audacia primâ specie leta sunt, tractatu dura, eventu tristia*: Hasty and audacious counsels at the first shew, are plausible, but in the managing prove hard, and in the end full of Passion. discontent. Secondly, all passion of choler, envy, hatred, avarice, concupiscence, and all private and particular affection, the deadly Tacit. poison of judgment and all good understanding; *Privata res semper offecere, officientque publicis consiliis, pessimum veri affectus & judicii venenum sua cuique utilitas*: Private affaires have ever been hurtful, and do hinder the publick counsels: and every mans particular Precipitation profit is the worst pyson of true affection and judgement. Lastly, pre- See l. 2. cap. 10. Tacit. cipitation, an enemy to all good counsel, and onely fit to do mischief. And thus you see what manner of men, good Counsellors ought to be.

Now a Prince must make choice of such as are good, either by his own knowledge and judgement, or if he cannot so do, by their reputation which doth seldome deceive, whereupon one of them said to his Prince. Hold us for such as we are esteemed to be. *Nam singuli decipere & decipi possunt: nemo omnes, neminem omnes fefellerunt*: For every one may deceive and be deceived: no man all; all have.



have deceived none: And let him take heed that he choose not his minions and favourites, Courtiers, flatterers, slaves, who shame their masters and betray them. There is nothing more dangerous than the counsel of the cabinet. And having chosen and found them, he must wisely make use of them, by taking counsel of them at due times and houres, not attending the event and execution, and losing the time whilst he hearkeneth to them; and this must he do with judgement, not suffering himself to be carried over-loosly by their counsels, as that simple Emperour *Claudius* was; and with mildnesse, without roughnesse, it being more reasonable, as that wife *Ma. Antonius* was wont to say, to follow the counsel of a good number of friends, than such as are constrained to bend unto his will. And making use of them, to do it with an indifferent authority, neither rewarding them with presents for their good counsel, lest by the hope of the like presents he draw such as are wicked unto him, nor use them over-roughly for their bad counsels; for he shall hardly find any to give him counsel, if there be danger in giving it: and again many times bad counsel hath a better successe than good, by the provident care and direction of the Sovereign. And such as give good counsel, that is to say, happy and certain, are not therefore alwayes the best, and most faithfull servitors, not for their liberty of speech neither, which he should rather agree unto, looking into such as are fearfull and flatterers with a wary eye. For miserable is that Prince with whom men hide or disguise the truth. *Cujus aures ita formatae sunt, ut aspera quae utiuntur, & nil nisi jucundum & laesurum accipiant*: Whose ears are so framed, that they will not hearken to profitable things that are harsh, nor any thing but what is pleasing though hurtfull. And lastly, he must conceal his own judgement and resolution, secrecy being the soul of counsel: *Nulla meliora consilia, quam quae ignoraverit adversarius antequam fierent*: They are the best counsels which the adversary knoweth not before they be effected.

Curtius.

Tacit.

Veget.

19  
Of Officers.

As touching officers which are in the next place, and who serve the Prince and State in some charge, he must make choice of honest men, of good and honest families: It is to be thought that such as serve the Prince, are the best sort of people, and it is not fit that base people should be neer him, and command others, except they raise themselves by some great and singular virtue, which may supply the want of nobility: but by no means let them be infamous, double, dangerous, and men of some odious condition. So likewise they should be men of understanding, and employed according to their natures.

natures. For some are fit for the affairs of the War, others for peace. Some are of opinion, that it is best to choose men of a sweet carriage, and indifferent virtue: for those excellent surpassing spirits, that keep themselves alwaies upon the point, and will pardon nothing, are not commonly fit for affaires; *Ut pares negotiis, neque supra sint; recti non erecti*, Men sufficient for their employment, not fastidious; equal in their affaires, and not much above them.

After counsel, we place Treasure, a great and puissant mean. This is the sinews, the feet, the hands of the state. There is no sword so sharp and penetrable, as that of silver, nor master so imperious, nor oratour that winneth the hearts and wills of men, or conquers castles and cities, as riches. And therefore a Prince must provide that his treasury never fail, never be dried up. This science consisteth in three points, to lay the foundation of them, to employ them well to have alwaies a reservation, and to lay up some good part thereof for all needs and occasions that may happen. In all these three a Prince must avoid two things, Injustice, and base Niggardlinesse preserving right towards all, and honour for himself.

Touching the first which is to lay the foundation, and to increase the treasury, there are divers means, and the forces are divers which are not all perpetual, nor alike assured, that is to say, the demaine and publick revenue of the State, which must be managed and used, without the alienating of it in any sort, forasmuch as by nature it is sacred and inalienable. Conquests made upon the enemy, which must be profitably employed, and not prodigally dissipated, as the ancient Romans were wont to do, carrying to the Exchequer very great sums, and the treasuries of conquered cities and countreys, as Livie reporteth of *Camillus Flaminius*, *Paulus Emilius*, of the *Scipios*, *Luculus*, *Cesar*; and afterwards receiving from those conquered countreys, whether from their natural country men left behind them, or from colonies sent thither certain annual revenues, Presents, gratuities, pensions, free donations, tributes of friends, allies, and subjects, by testaments, by donations among the living, as the Lawyers term it; or otherwise. The entrance, coming and going, and passages of merchandize, into docks, havens, rivers, as well upon strangers as subjects, a means just, lawfull, ancient, general, and very commodious; with these conditions: Not to permit the traffick and transportation of things necessary for life, that the subjects may be furnished; not of raw unwrought wares, to the end the subject may be set on work, and gain the profit of his

own.

20  
The fifth head  
of provision,  
Treasure.

Exchequer-  
knowledge in  
three points.

21  
1. To lay the  
foundation.

1

2

3

4



Anton. Pius  
Severus.  
Augustus

own labours. But to permit the traffick of things wrought and dressed, and the bringing in of such wares as are raw, and not of such as are wrought; and in all things to charge the stranger much more than the subject. For a great forrein imposition increaseth the treasure and comforteth the subject; to moderate neverthelesse the imposition upon those things that are brought in, necessary for life. These four means are not only permitted, but just, lawful, and honest. The fifth, which is hardly honest, is the traffick which the Sovereign useth by his factors, and is practised in divers manners more or lesse base; but the vilest and most pernicious is of honours, estates, offices, benefices. There is a mean that cometh near to traffick, and therefore may be placed in this rank, which is not very dishonest, and hath been practised by very great and wise Princes, which is, to employ the coin of the Treasure or Exchequer to some small profit, as five in the hundred, and to take good security for it either gages, or some other sound and sufficient assurance. This hath a threefold use, it increaseth the treasure, giveth means to particular men to traffick, and to make gain; and which is best of all, it saveth the publick Treasure, from the paws of our thieving Courtiers, the importunate demands and flatteries of favourites, and the over-great facility of the Prince. And for this only cause, some Princes have lent their publick treasure without any profit or interest, but onely upon pain of a double forfeiture, for not payment at the day. The sixth and last is in the lones and subsidies of subjects, whereunto he must not come but unwillingly, and then when other means do fail, and necessity presseth the State. For in this case it is just, according to that rule, *That all is just that is necessary*. But it is requisite, that these conditions be added after this first of necessity. To levy by way of lone (for this way will yield most Silver, because of the hope men have to recover their own again, and that they shall lose nothing, besides the credit they receive by succouring the weal-publick) and afterwards the necessity being past, and the warres ended to repay it again, as the *Romans* did, being put to an extremity by *Hannibal*. And if the common treasury be so poor that it cannot repay it, and that they must needs proceed by way of imposition; it is necessary that it be with the consent of the subjects, making known unto them their poverty and necessity, and preaching the word of that King of kings, *Dominus iis opus habet: The Lord hath need of them*: insomuch that they make them see, if need be, both the receipt, and the charge. And, if it may be, let

ner-

perswasion prevail without constraint; *Themistocles* said, *Imperare melius est, quàm imperare*: It is better to obtain by request, than by command. It is true, that the prayers of Sovereigns, are commandements; *Satis imperat qui rogat potentiâ: armata sunt preces regum*: He commandeth sufficiently that intreateth with power: the requests of Kings are armed: but yet let it be in the form of a free donation, at the least that they be extraordinary moneys, for a certain prefixt time and not ordinary; and never prescribe this law upon the subjects, except it be with their own consent. Thirdly, that such impositions be levied upon the goods, and not the heads of men, (capitation being odious to all honest people) the real and not personal (it being unjust that the rich, the great, the nobles, should not pay at all, and the poorer people of the countrey should pay all). Fourthly, that they be equally upon all. Inequality afflicteth much; and to these ends these moneys must be bestowed upon such things as the whole world hath need of, as Salt, Wine, to the end that all may contribute to the present necessity. Well may a man, and he ought, to lay extraordinary imposts and great, upon such merchandize and other things as are vicious, and that serve to no other end, than to corrupt the subjects, as whatsoever serveth for the increase of luxury, insolency, curiosity, superfluity in viands, apparel, pleasures, and all manner of licentious living, without any other prohibition of these things. For the denial of a thing sharpeneth the appetite.

The second point of this science, is well to employ the Treasure. And these in order are the articles of this imployment and charge. <sup>22.</sup> *To employ the treasure.* The maintenance of the Kings house, the pay of men of war, the wages of officers, the just rewards of those that have deserved well of the common weal, pensions and charitable succours to poor, yet commendable, persons. These five are necessary; after which come those that are very profitable, to repair cities, to fortifie and to defend the frontiers, to amend the high-ways, bridges, and passages, to establish Colledges of honour, of virtue and learning; to build publick houses. From these five sorts of reparations, fortifications, and foundations, cometh very great profit, besides the publick good: Arts and Artificers are maintained; the envy and malice of the people because of the levy of moneys ceaseth, when they see them well employed: and these two plagues of a common-weal idlenesse and poverty, are driven away. Contrarily, the great bounties, and unreasonable gifts, to some particular favourites; the great, proud



proud, and necessary edifices. superfluous and vain charges, are odious to the subjects, who murmur that a man should spoil a thousand to cloath one; that others should brave it with their substance, build upon their blood and their labours.

23

3. To make  
spare and re-  
servation.

Isay 30.

2 Paralip.

The third point consisteth in the reservation, which a man must make for necessity, to the end he be not constrained at a need, to have recourse to heady, unjust, and violent means, and remedies: this is that which is called the Treasury or exchequer. Now as to gather together too great abundance of treasure of gold and silver, though it be by honest and just means, is not alwayes the best; because it is an occasion of warre active or passive; either by breeding envy in others to see it done, when there is no cause, their being plenty of other means; or else because it is a bait to allure an enemy to come; and it were more honourable to employ them as hath been said: So to spend all and leave nothing in the exchequer is far worse, for this were to play to lose all; wise Princes take heed of this. The greatest treasuries that have been in former times, are that of *Darius* the last King of the *Persians*, where *Alexander* found fourscore millions of gold. That of *Tiberius*, 97 millions; of *Trajan*, 55. millions kept in *Egypt*. But that of *David* did farre exceed all these (a thing almost incredible in so small estate) wherein there was six score millions. Now to providethat these great treasuries be not spent, violated or robbed, the ancients caused them to be melted, and cast into great wedges and bowl, as the *Persians* and *Romans*: or they put them into the Temples of their gods, as the safest places; as the *Greeks* in the temple of *Apollo*, which neverthelesse hath been many times, pilld and robbed; the *Romans* in the temple of *Saturn*. But the best and securest way and most profitable is, as hath been said, to lend them with some small profit to particular persons, upon good gages, or sufficient security. So likewise for the safer custody of the treasures from thieves and robbers, the managing of them, and the exchequer offices must not be sold to base and mechanical persons, but given to gentlemen, and men of honour, as the ancient *Romans* were accustomed to do, who chose out young men from amongst their Nobles and great houses, and such as aspired to the greatest honours and charges of the common-wealth.

24

The sixth head  
of this provi-  
sion.  
An armed  
power.

After counsel and treasure, I think it not amisse to put Arms which cannot sublist nor be well and happily levied and conducted without these two. Now an armed power is very necessary for

a Prince to guard his person and his State: for it is an abuse to think to govern a State long without Arms. There is never any surety between the weak and the strong; and there are alwayes some that will be stirring either within or without the State. Now this power is either ordinary at all times, or extraordinary in times of warre. The ordinary consisteth in the persons and places; The persons are of two sorts; the guard for the body and the person of the Sovereign, which serve not only for the surety and conservation, but also for his honour and ornament: for that good saying of *Agessilaus* is not perpetually true, and it were too dangerous to try and trust unto it, that a Prince may live safely enough without a guard, if he command his subjects, as a good father doth his children (for the malice of men stayeth not it self in so fair a way.) And certain companies, maintained and alwayes ready for those necessities and sudden occurrences that may fall out. For at such times to be busied in levying powers is great imprudency. Touching the places, they are the fortresses and citadels in the frontiers, in the place of which, some, and the ancient too, do more allow of the colonies. The extraordinary force consisteth in arms, which he must leave and furnish in times of warre. How he should govern himself therein, that is to say, enterprize and make warre, it belongeth to the second part, which is of the action: this first belongeth to provision. Onely I here say, that a wise Prince should besides the guard of his body, have certain people alwayes prepared, and experienced in arms, either in great number or lesse, according to the extent or largeness of his State; to repress a sudden rebellion or commotion, which may happen either without or within his State, reserving the raising of greater forces, untill he must make warre, either offensive or defensive, willingly and of purpose: and in the mean time keeping his arsenals and store-houses well furnished, and provided with all sorts of offensive and defensive arms, to furnish both foot and horsemen, as likewise with munitions, engines, and instruments for warre. Such preparation is not onely necessary to make warre (for these things are not found and prepared in a short time) but to let and hinder it. For no man is so fool-hardy as to attempt a State, which he knoweth to be ready to receive him, and thorowly furnished. A man must arm himself against warres, to the end he may not be troubled with it *Qui cupit pacem, paret bellum*: He that desireth peace, let him provide for warre.

*In the Chapter following.*

After.



25.  
*The seventh  
 head of this  
 Provision,  
 Alliance or  
 Leagues.*

*With whom.*

After all these necessary and essential provisions, we will lastly put Alliances or Leagues, which is no smal prop or stay of a State. But wisdom is very necessary in the choice thereof, to build well, and to take heed with whom and how he joyn in alliance; which he must do with those that are neighbours and puissant: For if they be weak and far off, wherewith can they give aid? It is rather likely, that if they be assaulted, from their ruine ours may follow. For then are we bound to succour them, and to joyn with them because of this league whosoever they be. And if there be danger in making this alliance openly, let it be done secretly, for it is the part of a wise man to treat of peace and alliance with one, in the view and knowledge of all, with another secretly; but yet so, as that it be without treachery and wickednesse, which is utterly forbidden, but not wisdom and policy, especially for the defence and surety of his State.

26.  
*2. How.*

Finally, there are many sorts and degrees of Leagues and alliances; the lesser and more simple is for commerce, and traffick only, but commonly it comprehendeth amity, commerce, and hospitality; and it is either defensive only, or defensive and offensive together, and with exception of certain Princes and States; or without exception. The more straight and perfect is that which is offensive and defensive towards all, and against all, to be a friend to his friends, and an enemy to his enemies; and such it is good to make, with those that are strong and puissant. And by equal alliance, Leagues are likewise either perpetual, or limited to certain times, commonly they are perpetual, but the better and surest is, to limit it to certain times, to the end he may have means to reform, to take away, or add to the articles, or wholly to depart if need be, as he shall see it most expedient. And though a man would judge them to be such, as should be perpetual, yet it is better to renew them (which a man may and must do, before the time be expired) than to make them perpetual. For they languish and grow old; and whosoever findeth himself aggrieved, will sooner break them, if they be perpetual, than if they be limited, in which case he will rather stay the time. And thus much of these seven necessary provisions.

CHAP. III.

The second part of this Politick Prudence, and Government  
of the State, which concerneth the Action and  
Government of the Prince.

HAVING discoursed of the provision, and instructed a sovereign  
with what, and how he should furnish and defend himself and  
his State, let us come to the action; and let us see how he should em-  
ploy himself, and make use of these things, that is to say, in a word,  
well to command and govern. But before we come to handle this  
distinctly, according to the division which we have made, we may  
say in grosse, that well to govern and to maintain himself in his State  
consisteth in the acquisition of two things, Good-will and Authori-  
ty. Good-will is a love and affection toward the Sovereign and his  
State; Authority is a great and good opinion, and honourable esteem  
of the Sovereign and his State. By the first, the Sovereign and the  
State is loved: By the second, feared. These are not contrary things,  
but different, as love and fear. Both of them respect the subjects and  
strangers; but it seemeth that more properly, Benevolence be-  
longeth to the Subject, and Authority to the stranger; *Amorem apud  
populares, metum apud hostes querat*: The Prince must seek love from  
his own, fear from enemies. To speak simply and absolutely, Authori-  
ty is the more strong and vigorous, more large and durable. The  
temperature and harmony of both is a perfect thing, but according  
to the diversity of States of Peoples, their Natures and Humours, the  
one is more easie and more necessary in some places than in others.  
The means to attain them both, are contained and handled in that  
which hath been said before, especially of the manners and virtue of a  
Sovereign: neverthelesse of each, we will speak a little.

Benevolence or Good will (a thing very profitable, and almost  
wholly necessary, insomuch that of it self it prevaieth much, and  
without it all the rest hath but little assurance) is attained by  
three means, gentleness or clemency, not only in words and deeds,  
but much more in his commands, and the administration of the  
State; for so do the Natures of men require, who are impatient both  
of serving wholly, and maintaining themselves in entire liberty, *Nec  
totam servitutem patitur, nec totam libertatem*: Neither to endure  
wholly servitude, nor altogether liberty: They obey willingly as Sub-  
jects,

<sup>1</sup>  
A summary  
description  
of the action  
of the Prince.  
  
Benevolence,  
Authority,  
two Pillars  
of a Prince  
and State.

Tacit.

<sup>2</sup>  
Benevolence  
is attained  
by clemency

Tacit.



jects, not as slaves, *Domini ut pareant, non ut serviant*. And to say the truth, a man doth more willingly obey him which commandeth gently and mildly; *Remissus imperantii melius pareitur; qui vult amari languida regnet manu*: He that will be beloved let him reign with a soft hand. Power (saith *Cæsar*, a great Doctor in this matter) indifferently exercised preserveth all; but he that keepeth not a moderation in his commands, is never beloved nor assured. But yet it must not be an over-loose, and soft effeminate mildnesse, lest a man thereby come into contempt, which is worse than fear. *Sed in corrupto ducis honore*: The Leaders honour being both ways intemperate. It is the part of Wisdome to temper this, neither seeking to be feared by making himself terrible, nor loved by too much debasing himself.

3  
Benevolence

Tacit.

The second mean to attain benevolence is beneficence, I mean first towards all, especially the meaner people, by providence & good policy, whereby Corn and all other necessary things for the sustenance of this life may not be wanting, but sold at an indifferent price, yea may abound, if it be possible, that dearness and dearth afflict not the subject. For the meaner sort have no care for the publick good, but for this end, *Vulgo una ex republica annona cura*: The onely care the vulgar sort have of the Common-wealth, is the provision of victual and other necessities.

4  
Liberality.

Chap.2.  
art.23.

Tacit.

The third mean is liberality (Beneficence more special) which is a bait, yea an enchantment, to draw, to win, and captivate the wills of men: So sweet a thing is it to receive, honourable to give. In such sort, that a wise man hath said, That a State did better defend it self by good deeds, than by Arms. This virtue is alwaies requisite, but especially in the entrance, and in a new State. To whom, how much, and how liberality must be exercised, hath been said before. The means of Benevolence hath been wisely practised by *Augustus*; *Qui militem donis, populum annona, cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit*: who won the souldiers with gifts, the people with provision of victuals, and all with the sweetness of rest and peace.

5  
Authority.

By what it is  
required.

Authority is another Pillar of State; *Majestas imperii, salutis tutela*: The majesty of Empire, is the guardian of safety. The invincible fortress of a Prince, whereby he bringeth into reason all those that dare to contemn or make head against him: Yea, because of this they dare not attempt, and all men desire to be in grace and favour with him. It is composed of fear and respect, by which two, a Prince and his State is feared of all, and secured. To attain this authority besides the provision of things above-named there are three means which

which must carefully be kept in the form of commanding.

The first is severity, which is better, more wholesome, assured, durable, than common lenity, and great facility: which proceedeth first *Severity.* from the nature of the people, which as *Aristotle* saith, is not so well born and bred, as to be ranged into duty and obedience by love, or shame, but by force and fear of punishment; And secondly, from the general corruption of the manners, and contagious licentiousnesse of the world, which a man must not think to mend by mildness and lenity, which doth rather give aid to ill attempts. It engendreth contempt, and love of impunity, which is the plague of Common-weals and States: *Illecebra peccandi maxima, spes impunitatis: Hope of impunity, is the greatest allurements to offend.* It is a favour done to many, and the whole weal-publick, sometimes well to chastise some one. And he must sometimes cut off a finger, lest the Gangrene, spread it self through the whole arm, according to that excellent answer of a King of *Thrace*, whom one telling that he played the mad-man and not the King, answered, That his madnesse made his subjects sound and wise. Severity keepeth Officers and Magistrates in their devoir, driveth away Flatterers, Courtiers, wicked persons, impudent demanders, and petty Tyrannies. Whereas contrariwise, too great felicity openeth the Gate to all these kind of people, whereupon followeth an exhausting of the Treasuries, impunity of the wicked, impoverishing of the people, as Rheums and Fluxes in a rheumatick and diseased body fall upon those parts that are weakest.

*Cicero.*

The goodnesse of *Pertinax*, the licentious liberty of *Heliogabalus*, are thought to have undone and ruinated the Empire: the severity of *Severus*, and afterwards of *Alexander*, did re-establish it, and brought it into good estate. But yet this severity must be with some moderation, intermission, and to purpose, to the end that rigour towards a few, might hold the whole world in fear: *Ut pena ad paucos, metus ad omnes: That as the punishment lights upon a few, so the fear may invade all.*

And the more seldome punishments serve more for the Reformation of State, saith an ancient Writer, than the more frequent. This is to be understood, if Vices gather not strength, and men grow not opinatively obstinate in them; for then he must not spare either sword or fire: *Crudelem medicum intemperans æger facit: An intemperate sick person maketh a cruel Physician.*

The second is Constancy, which is a stayed Resolution, whereby the Prince marching always with one and the same pace, with- *Constancy.*



cut altering or changing, maintaineth always, and enforceth the observation of the ancient Laws and Customs, to change and to be re-advised, besides that it is an Argument of inconstancy and irresolution, it bringeth both to the Laws, and to the Sovereign, and to the State, contempt and sinister opinion. And this is the reason why the wiser sort do so much forbid the change, and rechange of any thing in the Laws and Customs, though it were for the better: for the change or remove bringeth alwaies more evil and discommodity, besides the uncertainty and the danger, than the novelty can bring good. And therefore all Innovators are suspected, dangerous, and to be chased away. And there cannot be any cause or occasion strong and sufficient enough to change, if it be not for a very great evident, and certain utility, or publick necessity. And in this case likewise he must proceed as it were stealingly, sweetly and slowly, by little and little, and almost insensibly, *leviter & lente*.

8

Aristot.

The third is to hold always fast in the hand the Stern of the State, the Rains of Government, that is to say, the honour and power to command and to ordain, and not to trust or commit it to another; referring all things to his Counsel, to the end that all may have their Eye upon him, and may know that all dependeth upon him. That Sovereign that loseth never so little of his Authority marreth all. And therefore it standeth him upon; not overmuch to raise and make great any person, *Communis custodia principatus, neminem unum, magnum facere: the common and surest guard of principality is to make no one man too great.* And if there be already any such, he must draw him back, and bring him into order, but yet sweetly and gently, and never make great and high charges and offices perpetual, or for many years, to the end, a man may not get means, to fortifie himself against his master, as it many times falleth out. *Nil tam utile, quam brev in potestatem esse, quæ magna sit. Nothing so profitable, as short Authority if it be great.*

Senec.

9

Against  
unjust Au-  
thority and  
Tyranny.

Behold here the just and honest means in a Sovereign to maintain with benevolence and love his Authority, and to make himself to be loved and feared altogether: for the one without the other is neither secure nor reasonable. And therefore we abhor a tyrannical Authority, and that fear that is an Enemy to love and benevolence, and is with a publick hate, *Oderint quem in tuum: They will hate whom they fear*, which the wicked seek after, abusing their power. The conditions of a good Prince and of a Tyrant, are nothing alike, and easily distinguished. They may be all reduced to these two points,

points, the one to keep the laws of God and of nature, or to trample them under foot; the other to do all for the publick good and profit of the subject, or to employ all to his particular profit and pleasure. Now a Prince, that he may be such as he should; must alwaies remember, that, as it is a felicity to have power to do what a man will, so it is true greatness to will what a man should; *Cæsari cum omnia licent, propter hoc minus liceat: ut felicitatis est posse quantum velis, sic magnitudinis velle quantum possis, vel potius quantum debeas.* Seeing all things are lawfull for Cæsar to do, it is therefore the lesse lawfull for him to do it: As it is a felicity to be able to do whatsoever thou wilt, so it is a point of greatnesse to will what thou shouldst, or rather what thou oughtest. The greatest infelicity that can happen to a Prince, is to believe that all things are lawful, that he can, and that pleaseth him. So soon as he consenteth to this thought, of good he is made wicked. Now this opinion is settled in them by the help of flatterers, who never cease alwayes to preach unto them the greatness of their power; and very few faithful servitors there are, that dare to tell them what their duty is. But there is not in the world a more dangerous flattery, than that wherewith a man flattereth himself; when the flatterer and flattered is one and the same, there is no remedy for this disease. Neverthelesse it falleth out sometimes in consideration of the times, persons, places, occasions, that a good King must do those things which in outward appearance may seem tyrannical, as when it is a question of repressing another tyranny, that is to say, of a furious people, the licentious liberty of whom is a true tyranny: or of the noble and rich, who tyrannize over the poor and meaner people: or, when the King is poor and needy not knowing where to get silver, to raise lones upon the richest. And we must not think that the severity of a Prince is alwaies tyranny, or his guards and fortresses, or the majesty of his imperious commands; which are sometimes profitable, yea necessary, and are more to be desired than the sweet prayers of tyrants.

Plin. de Traj.

These are the two true staves and pillars of a Prince, and of a State. If by them a Prince know how to maintain and preserve himself from the two contraries, which are the murderers of a Prince and State, that is to say, Hatred and contempt: whereof, the better to avoid them, and to take heed of them, a word or two. Hatred contrary to benevolence, is a wicked and obstinate affection of subjects against the Prince and his State: It ordinarily proceedeth

IO

Hate and contempt, two murderers of a Prince.  
Arist. lib. 5.  
Pol.  
Hatred.



Cicero.

from fear of what is to come, or desire of revenge of what is past, or from them both. This hatred when it is great, and of many, a Prince can hardly escape it; *Multorum odiis nulla spes possunt resistere*: No power or riches can resist the hatred of many. He is exposed to all, and there needs but one to make an end of all. *Multa illis manus, illi una cervix*: They have many hands, be but one neck. It standeth him upon therefore to preserve himself, which he shall do by flying those things that ingender it, that is to say, cruelty and avarice, the contraries to the aforesaid instruments of benevolence.

II

He must preserve himself pure and free from base cruelty, unworthy greatnesse, very infamous to a Prince: But contrarily he must arm himself with clemency, as hath been said before, in the virtues required in a Prince. But forasmuch as punishments, though they be just and necessary in a state, have some image of cruelty, he must take heed to carry himself therein with dexterity, and for this end I will give him this advice: Let him not put his hand to the sword of justice, but very seldome and unwillingly: *Libenter damnat, qui cito*: ergo illi parsimonia etiam vilissimi sanguinis: He condemneth willingly, that doth it hastily; therefore he is to be sparing even of the basest blood. 2. Enforced for the publick good, and rather for example, and to terrifie others from the like offence: 3. That it be to punish the faulty, and that without colour, or joy, or other passion: and if he must needs shew some passion, that it be compassion: 4. That it be according to the accustomed manner of the Country, not after a new; for new punishments are testimonies of cruelty: 5. Without giving his assistance, or being present at the execution: 6. And if he must punish many, he must dispatch it speedily, and all at a blow; for to make delays, and to use one correction after another, is a token that he taketh delight, pleaseth and feedeth himself therewith.

An advice for punishments.  
Senec.

12

Avarice.

He must likewise preserve himself from avarice, a sin ill befitting a great personage. It is shewed either by exacting and gathering overmuch, or by giving too little. The first doth much displease the people, by nature covetous, to whom their goods are as their blood and their life. The second, men of service and merit, who have laboured for the publick good, and have reason to think that they deserve some recompence. Now how a Prince should govern himself herein, and in his treasure and exchequer affairs, either in laying their foundation, or spending or preserving them, hath been

been more at large discoursed in the second Chapter. I will here only say, That a Prince must carefully preserve himself from three things: First from resembling, by over-great and excessive imposition, those tyrants, subject-mongers, Cannibals; *Qui devorant plebem sicut escam panis, duxesque, quorum ararium spoliarium civium cruentarumque praedarum receptaculum*; Who devour the people as a morsel of bread, and whose store-house is the receptacle of the spoils of the Citizens, and bloody preys: for this breeds danger of tumult, witness to many examples, and miserable accidents: Secondly, from base dishonesty, as well in gathering together, (*indignum lucrum ex omni occasione odorari*; & *ut dicitur, eiam à mortuis auferre*; To smell unworthy gain out of every occasion; and, as it is said, to take away even from the dead: and therefore he must not serve his turn herein with accusations, confiscations, unjust spoils) as in giving nothing, or too little, and that mercenarily and with long and importunate suit: Thirdly, from violence, in the levie of his provision, and that, if it be possible, he never seize upon the moveables and utensils of husbandry. This doth principally belong to receivers and purveyers, who by their rigorous courses, expose the Prince to the hatred of the people, and dishonour him, a people subtil, and cruell, with six hands and three heads, as one saith. A Prince therefore must provide that they be honest men, and if they fail in their duties, to correct them severely with rough chastisement, and great amends; to the end they may restore and disgorge like sponges, that which they have sucked and drawn unjustly from the people.

Let us come to the other worse enemy, contempt; which is a sinister, base, and abject opinion of the Prince, and the State; This is the death of a state, as authority is the soul and life thereof. What doth maintain one only man, yea an old and worn man, over so many thousands of men, if not authority, and the great esteem of his person: which if it be once lost by contempt, the Prince and State must necessarily fall to the ground. And even as authority, as hath been said, is more strong and large than benevolence, so contempt is more contrary and dangerous than hatred which dareth not any thing, being held back by fear, if contempt which shaketh off fear, arm it not, and giveth courage to execute. It is true that contempt is not so common, especially if he be a true and lawfull Prince, except he be such a one, as doth wholly degrade and prostitute himself, *Et videatur exire de imperio*; And seem to give over his



*All ill form of  
government.*

*Infelicity.*

*Manners.*

*Empire.* Neverthelesse we must see from whence this contempt doth come, that we may the better know how to avoid it. It proceedeth from things contrary to those means that win and beget authority, and especially from three, that is to say, from too loose, effeminate, milde, languishing, and carelesse, or very light form of government, without any hould or stay; this is a state without a state; under such Princes, the subjects are made bold and insolent; all things being permitted, because the Prince takes care of nothing. *Malum principem habere sub quo nihil ulli liceat: pejus, sub quo omnia omnibus:* It is an evil thing to have a Prince, under whom nothing is lawfull for any man: But worse, to have him, under whom all things are lawfull for all men. Secondly, from the ill hap and infelicity of the Prince, whether it be in his affairs which succeed not well; or in his line and issue if he have no Children, who are a great prop and stay to a Prince; or in the uncertainty of his successors, whereof *Alexander the great* complained: *Orbitas mea quod sine liberis sum, spernitur: Munimen aule, regii liberi:* My want of Children makes me to be despised: Royal Children, are a defence to the Kings house. Thirdly from manners, especially dissolute, loose, and voluptuous, drunkenness, gluttony, as also rusticity, childishness, scurrility.

*I 4.  
The distinction  
of the action of  
a Prince.*

Thus in grosse have I spoken of the action of a Prince. To handle it more distinctly and particularly, we must remember, as hath been said in the beginning; that it is twofold, peaceable and military: by the peaceable I here understand that ordinary action, which is every day done, and at all times of peace and of warre: by the military, that which is not exercised, but in time of war.

*of the peace-  
able.  
An advice.*

The peaceable and ordinary action of a Sovereign, cannot be wholly prescribed; it is an infinite thing, and consisteth as well in taking heed to do, as to do. We will here give the principal and more necessary advisements. For therefore a Prince must provide that he be faithfully and diligently advertised of all things. This (all things) may be reduced to two heads, whereupon there are two sorts of advertisements and advertisers, who must be faithfull and assured, wise and secret, though in some there be required a greater liberty and constancy than in others. Some are to advertise him of his honour, and duty, of his defects, and to tell him the truth. There are no kind of people in the world, who have so much need of such friends, as Princes have; who neither see nor understand, but by the eyes and ears of another. They maintain and hold up a publick life, and to satisfy so many people, have so many things hid from them, that

that before they be aware, they fall into the hatred and detestation of their people, for matters that would be easily remedied and cured, if they had been in time advertised of them. On the other side free advertisements, which are the best offices of true amity, are perillous about Sovereigns, though Princes be over-delicate, and shew great infirmity, if for their good and profit, they cannot endure a free advertisement, which enforceth nothing, it being in their power whatsoever they hear, to do what they list: others are to advertise the Prince whatsoever passeth, not only amongst his subjects, and within the circuit of his State, but with his bordering neighbour; I say, of all, that concerneth either a far off, or near at hand, his own state or his neighbours. These two kind of people answer in some sort to those two friends of *Alexander*, *Ephestion* and *Craterus*, of whom the one loved the King, the other *Alexander*; that is to say, the one the state, the other the person.

Secondly, a Prince must alwaies have a little book in his hand or memorial containing three things: first and principally a brief register of the affairs of the state; to the end he may know what he must do, what is begun to be done, and that there remain nothing imperfect and ill executed: A catalogue or Bed-roll of the most worthy personages that have well deserved, or are likely to deserve well of the weal-publick: A memorial of the gifts which he hath bestowed, to whom, and wherefore; otherwise, without these three, there must necessarily follow many inconveniences. The greatest Princes and wisest Politicians have used it, *Augustus*, *Tiberius*, *Vespasian*, *Trajan*, *Adrian*, the *Antonies*:

- 15  
2. To have a memorial of the 1. Affairs.  
2. Persons.  
3. Gifts.

Thirdly, inasmuch as one of the principal duties of a Prince, is to appoint and order both rewards and punishments, the one whereof is favorable, the other odious, a Prince must retain unto himself the distribution of rewards, as estates, honours, immunities, restitutions, graces, and favours; and leave unto his Officers, to execute and pronounce condemnations, forfeitures, confiscations, deprivations, and other punishments.

- 16  
3. To appoint rewards and punishments.

Fourthly, in the distribution of rewards, gifts, and good deeds, he must alwaies be ready and willing to give them before they be asked, if he can; and not to look that he should refuse them: and he must give them himself, if it may be; or cause them to be given in his presence. By this means gifts and good turns shall be better received, and given to better purpose: and he shall avoid two great and common inconveniences, which deprive men of honour and

- 17  
4. To distribute rewards.

worth.



worth of those rewards that are due unto them: the one is a long pursuit, difficult and chargeable, which a man must undergo, to obtain that which he would, and thinketh to have deserved, which is no small grief to honourable minds, and men of spirit. The other, that after a man hath obtained of the Prince a gift, before he can possesse it, it costeth the one half, and more, of that it is worth, and many times comes to nothing.

18

Of the military  
action which  
consisteth in  
three points.  
To enterprise,  
where two  
things are re-  
quired.

Let us come to the military action, wholly necessary for the preservation and defence of a Prince, of the subjects, and the whole state, let us speak thereof briefly. All this matter or subject may be reduced to three heads. To enterprise, make, finish war. In the enterprise, there must be two things, justice and prudence, and an avoidance of their contraries, injustice and temerity. First, the war must be just, yea justice must march before valour, as deliberation before execution. These reasons must be of no force, yea abhorred *That right consisteth in force; That the issue or event decideth it; That the stronger carrieth it away.* But a Prince must look into the cause, into the ground and foundation, and not into the issue: Warre hath its Laws and Ordinances as well as Peace. God favoureth just warres, and giveth the victory to whom it pleaseth him; and therefore we must first make our selves capable of this favour, by the equity of the enterprise. Warre then must not be begun and undertaken for all causes, upon every occasion: *Non ex omni occasione querere triumphum: Not to seek triumph for every occasion.* And above all a Prince must take heed that ambition, avarice, colour, possesse him not, and carry him beyond reason, which are alwaies, to say the truth, the more ordinary motives to warre: *Una & ea vetus causa bellandi est profunda cupido imperii & divitiarum: maximam gloriam in maximo imperio putant: Rupere fœdus impius lucri furor, & ira præceps: One, and that an ancient cause of war is, the greedy desire of rule and of riches: they esteem the greatest glory in the greatest command: the wicked rage of gain, breaketh leagues, and stirs up wrath.*

Plin. in Pan.

Salust.

19

Three things  
make an enter-  
prise just.

That a war may be in all points just, three things are necessary; that it be denounced and undertaken by him that hath power to do it, which is onely the Sovereign.

20

Cic. pro Milo.

That it be for a just cause, such as a defensive war is, which is absolutely just, being justified by all reason amongst the wise, by necessity amongst the barbarians, by nature amongst beasts: I say defensive, of himself, that is, of his life, his liberty, his parents, his country: of his

his allies and confederates, in regard of that faith he hath given, of such as are unjustly oppressed. *Qui non defendit, nec obsistit, si possit, injuriæ; tam est in vitio, quam si parentes, aut patriam, aut socios deserat:* He that defendeth not, nor resisteth injury, if he can, is as much in fault, as if he betrayed his parents, his countrey, or his friends. These 3. heads of defence are within the bounds of justice, according to S. Ambrose; *Fortitudo, quæ per bella tuetur à barbaris patriam, vel defendit infirmos, vel à latronibus socios, p'ena justitiæ est:* It is fortitude full of justice, which by wars defendeth the Countrey from barbarians, or protecteth the weak, or companions or friends from robbers. Another more briefly divided it in two heads, faith and safety; *Nulum bellum à civitate optima suscipitur, nisi aut pro fide, aut pro salute:* No war is undertaken by any worthy city, but either for faithfulness or for safety. And to offensive war he puts two conditions; that it proceed from some former offence given; as outrage or usurpation, and having redemanded openly by a Herald that which hath been surprised and taken away (*post clarigati nem*) and fought it by way of justice, which must ever go foremost. For if men be willing to submit themselves unto justice, and reason, there let them stay themselves; if not, the last, and therefore necessary, is just and lawful: *Justum bellum quibus necessarium, p' arma quibus nulla nisi in armis re'inquiratur spes:* That war is just, to whom it is necessary; arms are honest and righteous to them, that have no other hope or refuge left, but only in arms.

Plin. l. 22. nat. hist. cap. 2.  
Livius.

Thirdly, to a good end, that is to say, peace and quietnesse. *Sapientes pacis causa bellum gerunt, & laborem spe otii sustentant: ut in pace sine injuria vivant:* wise men wage war for peace sake, and sustain labour in hope of rest: that they may live in peace without injury.

After justice cometh prudence, whereby a man doth advisedly deliberate, before, by sound of trumpet, he publisheth the war. And therefore, that nothing be done out of passion, and over-rashly, it is necessary that he consider of the points; of forces and means, as well his own, as his enemies: secondly, of the hazzard and dangerous revolution of humane things, especially of arms, which are variable, and wherein fortune hath greatest credit, and exerciseth more her Empire than in any other thing, wherein the issue may be such, that in an hour it carrieth all: *Simul parata ac sperata, decora unius horæ fortuna vertere potest:* The fortune of one hour may overthrow all honour both gotten and hoped for.

22  
Prudence.

Livius.

Thirdly,



Tacit.

Pinder.

Thirdly, of those great evils, infelicities, and publick and particular miseries, which war doth necessarily bring with it, and which be such as the only imagination is lamentable. Fourthly, of the calumnies, maledictions, and reproaches that are spread abroad against the authors of the war, by reason of those evils, and miseries that follow it. For there is nothing more subject to the tongues and judgments of men than War. But all lighteth upon the Chieftain. *Iniquissima bellorum conditio hac est, prospera omnes sibi vendicant, adversa uni imputantur: This is a most unjust condition of war, when all do challenge to themselves the prosperous events, and the unhappy successes are imputed to one alone.* All these things together make the justest war that may be, detestable, saith S. *Augustine*; and therefore it standeth a Sovereign upon, not to enter into warres but upon great necessity, as it is said of *Augustus*; and not to suffer himself to be carried by those incendiaries and firebrands of warr, who for some particular passion, are ready to kindle and inflame him. *Quibus in pace durius servitium est, in id nati, ut nec ipsi quiescant, neque alios sinant: They to whom service is hard in peace, are born to this, that neither themselves can be quiet, nor yet suffer others.* And these men are commonly such, whose noses do bleed when they come to the fact it self. *Du'ce bellum inexpertis: War is sweetest to them that have not known it.* A wise Sovereign will keep himself in peace, neither provoking, nor fearing war, neither disquieting either his own state, or anothers, betwixt hope and fear, nor coming to those extremities of perishing himself, or making others to perish.

23  
The second  
head to make  
war, where-  
unto three  
things are re-  
quired.  
Provision, and  
Munition.

The second head of military action, is, To make war, whereunto are required three things, Munitions, Men, Rules of war. The first is provision and munition of all things necessary for war, which must be done in good time and at leisure: for it were great indiscretion in extremities to be employed about the search and provision of those things which he should have alwaies ready; *Diu apparandum est, ut vincas celerius: It must be long preparing, that thou mayest the speedier overcome.* Now of the ordinary and perpetual provision required for the good of their Prince and the State at all times, hath been spoken in the first part of this Chapter, which is wholly of this subject. The principal provisions and munitions of war are three, Money, which is the vital spirit, and sinews of war, whereof hath been shewed in the second Chapter. 2. Arms both offensive and defensive, whereof likewise heretofore. These two are ordi-

nary, and at all times, 3. Victuals, without which a man can neither conquer, nor live; whole armies are overthrown without a blow stricken, Souldiers grow licentious and unruly, and it is not possible to do any good, *Disciplinam non servat jejuna exercitus, A fasting and hungry Army observeth no discipline.* But this is an extraordinary provision, and not perpetual, and is not made but for War. It is necessary therefore, that in the deliberating of War, there be great Store-houses made for Victuals, Corn, poudred Flesh, both for the Army which is in the field, and for the Garrisons in the Frontiers, which may be besieged.

The second thing required to make War, are men fit to assail and to defend; we must distinguish them. The first distinction is into Souldiers, and Leaders or Captain, both are necessary: The Souldiers are the Body, the Captains the Soul, the life of the Army, who give motion and action: We will speak first of the Souldiers, who make the Body in grosse. There are divers sorts of them: There are Footmen and Horsemen; natural of the same Country, and strangers; ordinary and subsidiary. We must first compare them all together, to the end, we may know which are the better, and to be preferred; and afterwards we will see how to make our choice; and lastly, how to govern and discipline them. 24

In this comparison all are not of one accord. Some, especially rude and barbarous people, prefer horsemen before footmen; others quite contrary. A man may say that the foot are simply and absolutely the better, for they serve both throughout the War, and in all places, and at all occasions; whereas in hilly, rough, craggie, and streight places and in sieges, the Cavalry is almost unprofitable. They are likewise more ready and lesse chargeable: and if they be well lead and armed, as it is fit they should, they endure the shock of the horsemen. They are likewise preferred by such as are Doctors in this Art. A man may say that the Cavalry is better in Combat, and for a speedy dispatch. *Equestrium vitium proprium, cito parare, cito cedere victoriam: It is proper to the Troops of Horsemen quickly to get, and quickly to lose the victory.* For the foot are not so speedy, but what they do, they perform more surely. 25

As for natural Souldiers and strangers, divers men are likewise of divers opinions touching their precedency; but without all doubt the natural are much better, because they are more loyal than mercenary strangers. *And natural than mercenary strangers.*



*Venalesq; manus ubi fas, ubi maxima merces.*

*These mercenary hands that use to fight,*

*For greatest wages, not for greatest right.*

More patient and obedient, carrying themselves with more honour and respect towards their Leaders, more courage in Combats, more affection to the Victory, and good of their Countrey: They cost less and are more ready than strangers, who are many times mutinous, yea in greatest necessities, making more stirre, than doing service, and the most part of them are importunate, and burdensome to the Common-weal, cruel to those of the Countrey, whom they forage as enemies. Their coming and departure is chargable, and many times they are expected and attended with great losse and inconvenience. If in some extremity there be need of them, be it so, but yet let them be in faire lesse number than the natural, and let them make but a member and part of the Army, not the Body. For there is danger, that if they shall see themselves equal in force, or more strong than the natural they will make themselves their masters that called them, as many times as hath fallen out. For he is master of the State, that is master of the Forces. And again, if it be possible, let them be drawn from Allies and confederates, who bring with them more trust and service than they that are simple strangers. For to make more use of strangers, or to employ them more than natural Subjects, is to play the Tyrants, who fear their Subjects; and because they handle them like Enemies, they make themselves odious unto them, whereby they fear to arm them, or to employ them in the Wars.

27  
*As well ordinary as  
subsidiary.*

As touching ordinary Souldiers and subsidiaries, both are necessary, but the difference between them is, that the ordinary are lesse in number, are alway afoot and in arms, both in peace, and in warre: and of these we have spoken in the provision, a people wholly destinated and confined to the Wars, formed to all exercise of Arms, resolute. This is the ordinary force of the Prince, his honour in peace; his safegard in War: such were the *Roman* Legions: These should be divided by Troups in times of peace, to the end they raise no commotions. The subsidiaries are in far greater number, but they are not perpetual, and wholly destinated to War: they have other Vocations: At a need and in times of War, they are called by the sound of a Trumpet, enrolled, mustered, and instructed to the Wars; and in times of peace they return, and retire themselves to their Vocations.

We have understood their distinctions and differences, we must now consider of the good choice of them: A matter whereof we must be carefully advised, not to gather many, and in great numbers, for number winneth not the Victory, but Valour; and commonly they are but few that give the Overthrow. An unbridled multitude doth more hurt than good. *Non vires habet sed pondus, potius impedimentum quam auxilium: It is not of force, but a burden; a hinderance rather than a help.* Victory then consisteth not in the number, but in the force and valour; *Minibus opus est bello, non multis nominibus: In war there is need of hands, not of many names.* There must therefore be a great care in the choice of them (not pressing them pell-mell) that they be not voluntary Adventurers, ignorant of War, taken forth of Cities, corrupt, vicious, dissolute in their manners, arrogant Boasters, hardy and bold to pillage, far enough off from blows, leverets in dangers; *Assueti latrociniiis belorum insolentes, gaudent lepores, purgamenta urbium, quibus ob egestatem & fugitia maxima peccandi necessitudo: Accustomed to pillage, and the Robberies of the Wars, insolent, armed hares, the off-scum of the City, on whom want and the crimes they be subject unto, have brought a necessity of offending.*

To chuse them well, there needs judgment, attention and instruction, and to this end five things must be considered of, that is to say the place of their birth and education. They must be taken out of the fields, the mountains, barren and hard places, Countreys neer adjoining to the Sea, and brought up in all manner of labour. *Ex agris suppleendum præcipue robur exercitus, aptior armis rustica plebs sub dio & in laboribus enutrita ipsò terræ suæ solo & cælo acrius animantur. Et minus mortem timet qui minus deliciarum novit in vita: The strength of the Army is chiefly to be supplied out of the field; Countrey people are fitter for Arms, being trained up abroad in the air and in labours, are more eagerly encouraged by the soil and open air of the fields. And he feareth death least, who hath least tasted of delights in his life.* For they that are brought up in Cities, in the pleasant shadow and delights thereof, in gain, are more idle, insolent, effeminate; *Vernaculo multitudine, lascivie sueta, laborum intolerans. The home-bred multitude, used to sloath and wantonness, are impatient of labour.* Secondly, the age, that they be taken young, at eighteen years of age, when they are most pliant and obedient: the elder are possessed with many vices, and not fit for Discipline.

Thirdly, the bodies, which some will have to be of great stature,



as *Marius* and *Pyrrhus*: But though it be but indifferent, so the body be strong, dry, vigorous, sinewie, of a fierce look, it is all one. *Dura corpora, stricti artus, minax vultus, major animi vigor.* Hard bodies, well knit joyns, a fierce and threatening countenance, great courage and vigour of spirit.

4 Spirit.

Fourthly, the Spirit, which must be lively, resolute, bold, glorious, fearing nothing so much as dishonour and reproach.

5. Condition

Fifthly, the condition, which importeth much; for they that are of a base and infamous condition or dishonest qualities, or such as are mingled with the effeminate Arts, serving for delicacy, and for women are no way fit for this profession.

30  
Well disciplin-  
ed.  
Veget.

After the choice and Election, cometh Discipline: for it is not enough to have chosen those that are capable, and likely to prove good Souldiers, if a man make them not good; and if he make them good, if he keep and continue them not such. Nature makes a few men valiant, it is good Institution and Discipline that doth it. Now it is hard to say how necessary and profitable good Discipline is in War: This is all in all, it is this that made *Rome* to flourish, and that won it the Signory of the world: yea, it was in greater account, than the love of their Children. Now the principal point of Discipline is in Obedience, to which end served that ancient precept, That a Souldier must more fear his Captain than his Enemy.

31  
Discipline  
hath two  
parts.  
1 Valour,  
which is at-  
tained by  
Exercise.

Now this Discipline must tend to two ends; to make the souldiers valiant, and honest men: and therefore it hath two parts, Valour and Manners. To Valour, three things are required; daily Exercise in Arms, wherein they must always keep themselves, in practice without intermission; and from hence cometh the Latine word *Exercitus* which signifieth an Army. This Exercise in Arms, is an instruction to manage and use them well, to prepare themselves for Combats, to draw benefit from Arms, with dexterity to defend themselves, to discover and present unto them whatsoever may fall out in the fight, and come to the tryal, as in a ranged battel: to propose Rewards to the more active, and to enflame them.

2. Travel.

Secondly, travel or pains, which is as well to harden them to labour, to sweatings, to dust, *Exercitus labore proficit, otio consenescit, An Army profiteth by labour, and decayeth with ease and idleness*, as for the good and service of the Army, and Fortification of the Field, whereby they must learn to digge, to plant a Palisade, to order a Barricado, to run, to carry heavy Burthens, These are necessary things, as well to defend themselves, as to offend and surprize the Enemy.

Enemy. Thirdly, Order, which is of great use, and must be kept in War for divers causes, and after a divers manner. First, in the distribution of the Troops, into Battalions, Regiments, Ensigns, Camerades, Secondly, in the situation of the camp, that it be disposed into quarters with proportion, having the places, entries, issues, lodgings fitted both for the horsemen and footmen, whereby it may be easie for every man to find his quarter, his companion. Thirdly, in the march in the field, and against the Enemy, that every one hold his Rank; that they be equally distant the one from the other, neither too neer, nor too far from one another. Now this order is very necessary, and serves for many purposes. It is very pleasing to the eye, cheareth up friends, astonisheth the Enemy, secureth the Army, maketh all the Removes and the Commands of the Captains easie; in such sort, that without stirre, without confusion the General commandeth, and from hand to hand his intents and purposes come even to the least. *Imperium ducis simul omnes copiae sentiunt; & ad nutum regis sine tumultu respondent.* All the Army together know their Leaders command; and answer without tumult, the will of the General. To be brief this order well kept, maketh an Army almost invincible; and contrarily many have lost the field for want of this good order, and good intelligence.

The second part of this Military Discipline concerneth manners, which are commonly very dissolute, and in Arms hardly ordered, *As- fidue dimicantibus difficile morum custodire mensuram: It is a hard the second matter for souldiers, that are in continual employment, to keep a measure part of in their manners.* Neverthelesse, there muh be pains taken, and Discipline. especially to enstall, (if it may be) three Virtues; Continency, where- Continencie. by all Gluttony, Drunkenness, Whoredome, and all manner of dishonest pleasures are chased away, which do make a Souldier loose and licentious. *Degenerat à robore ac virtute miles assuetudine voluptatum; A Souldier degenerateth from courage and virtue, by custome of sensual pleasures; witness, Hannibal, who by delicacy and delights in a Winter was effeminated, and he, by Vice, was vanquished, that was invincible, and by Arms vanquished all others.* Modesty in Modesty. words, driving away all vanity, vain boasting, bravery of speech; for true valour stirreth not the tongue, but the hands, doth not speak but execute. *Viri nati malitia, factis magni, ad verborum linguaq; certamina rudes: discrimen ipsum certaminis differunt: viri fortes, in opere acres, ante id placidi.* Men that are born for Warfare be stout in deeds, and rude in words: prolong the danger



of the conflict: valiant men are fierce in execution. And contrarily great speakers are small doers. *Nimi verbis, lingua feroces*, Now the tongue is for counsel, the hand for combat, saith *Homer*; Modesty in action (that is, a simple and ready obedience, without merchandizing or contradicting the commands of the captains:) *Hæc sunt bonæ militiæ, vellet, vereri, obedire*: These things are fit in good Souldiers, to stand in fear, and ready to obey. Abstinency, whereby Souldiers keep their hands clean from violence, foraging, robbery. And this is a brieve summe in the military discipline; that which the General must strengthen by rewards and recompences of honour towards the good and valourous, and by severe punishments against offenders: for indulgence undoeth souldiers.

33  
Of Captains.

Of the General.

Tacit.

Tacit.

Tacit.

Let this suffice of Souldiers: Now a word or two of Captains, without whom the souldier can to nothing; they are a body without a soul, a ship with oars without a Master to hold the stern: There are two sorts, the General and first, and afterwards the subaltern, the Master of the Camp, Collonels: But the General (who must never be but one, under pain of losing all) is all in all. And therefore it is said, that an army can do as much as a General can do; and as much account must be made of him as of all the rest. *Plus in duce repones, quàm in exercitum: repose more in the General, than in the army*. Now this General is either the Prince himself and Sovereign, or such as he hath committed the charge unto, and made choice of. The presence of a Prince is of great importance to the obtaining of a victory; it doubleth the force and courage of his men; and it seemeth to be requisite when it standeth upon the safeguard and health of his state, and of a Province. In warres of less consequence he may depute another; *Dubiis præliorum exemptus summa rerum & imperii seipsum reservet*: In a doubtful battel he may exempt himself from the danger, and reserve himself for the security of himself and State. Finally, a General must have these qualities; he must be experienced in the Art military, having seen and suffered both fortunes; *Secundarum ambiguarumque rerum sciens eoque interritus*; Having tasted both good and bad fortune, and therefore fearlesse. Secondly, he must be provident and well advised; and therefore staid, old, and settled; farre from all temerity and percipitation, which is not only foolish, but unfortunate. For faults in warre cannot be mended: *Non licet in bello bis peccare*: Faults may not twice be committed in warre. And therefore he must rather look back, than before him; *Ducem oportet potius*

*ut respicere quàm prospicere.* Thirdly, he must be vigilant and active, and by his own example, teaching his souldiers to do his will. Fourthly, happy; good fortune comes from heaven, but yet willingly it followeth and accompanieth these three first qualities.

After the munitions and men of warre, let us come to the rules head and general adviselements to make warre. This third point is a very great and necessary instrument of warre, without which both munitions and men, are but phantasies; *Plura consilio quàm vi perficiuntur*; More things are brought to passe by counsel than by force. Now to prescribe certain rules and perpetual, it is impossible; For they depend of so many things that are to be considered of, and whereunto a man must accommodate himself, whereupon it was well said, That men give not counsel to the affairs, but the affairs to men, that a man must order his war by his eye. A man must take his counsel in the field *Consilium in arena*: for new occurrents yield new counsels. Neverthelesse there are some so general, and certain, that a man cannot fail in the delivery and observation of them. We will briefly set down some few of them, whereunto a man may adde as occasions shall fall out. Some are to be observed throughout a war, which we will speak of in the first place, others are for certain occasions and affairs.

34

The third point of the rules and counsels to make war.

1. The first is carefully to watch and to meet the occasions: not to lose any, nor to permit, if it be possible, the enemy to take his: occasion hath a great place in all humane affairs, especially in war, where it helpeth more than force.

Rules for the whole time of war.

2. To make profit of rumours and reports that run abroad, for whether they be true or false, they may do much, especially in the beginning, *Fama bella constant, fama bellum conficit, in spem metumve impellit animos*, By fame or report wars continue, fame endeth war, and moveth mens minds either to hope or fear.

3. But when a man is entred his course, let not reports trouble him: he may consider of them, but let them not hinder him to do that he should, and what he can, and let him stand firm to that which reason hath counselled him.

4. Above all, he must take heed of too great a confidence and assurance, whereby he grow into contempt of his enemy, and thereby becomes negligent and carelesse; it is the most dangerous evil that can fall out in war. He that contemneth his enemy, discovereth and betrayeth himself, *Frequentissimum initium calamitatis*



*tatis securitas. Nemo celerius opprimitur quam qui non timet. Nil in inhoneſte deſpicitur: quem ſpreveris, valentiorẽ negligentiã facies: Security is the moſt common beginning of calamity. No man is ſooner overcome than he that feareth not: Nothing ſafely is to be deſpiſed, in an Enemy: thou wilt make by thy negligence, him whom thou deſpiſeſt, more ſtrong and valiant. There is nothing in War that muſt be deſpiſed: for therein there is nothing little, and many times that which ſeemeth to a man to be of ſmall moment, yieldeth great effects. Sæpe parvis momentis magni caſus: ut nihil timendi, ſic nihil contemnendi: From things of ſmall moment oftentimes ariſe great events: As nothing is feared ſo nothing is to be contemned.*

5 To enquire very carefully, and to know the eſtate and affairs of the Enemy, eſpecially theſe points: 1. The nature, capacity, and deſignments of the Chieftain. 2. The nature minners and manner of life of his Enemies. 3. The ſituation of the places, and the nature of the Countrey where he is. *Hannibal* was excellent in this.

<sup>35</sup>  
*For the fight.* 6 Touching the fight or main battel, many things are adviſedly to be conſidered of; when, where, againſt whom, and how; to the end it be not to ſmall purpoſe. And a man muſt not come to this extremity, but with great deliberation, but rather make choice of any other mean, and ſeek to break the force of his Enemy by patience, and to ſuffer him to beat himſelf with time, with the place, with the want of many things before he come to this hazzard. For the iſſue of Battels is very uncertain, and dangerous: *Incerti exitus pugnarum Mars communis qui sæpe ſpoliantem & jam exultantem evertit, & perculit ab abjecto: The iſſue and event of war is uncertain: Mars is common to all who often overthroweth him that ſpoileth, and now triumpheth, and confoundeth and ſtrikeh him by the abject, and by him that was vanquiſhed.*

*When.*

7 A man then muſt not come to the Battel, but ſeldome, that is to ſay in great neceſſities, or for ſome great occaſion. In neceſſity, as if the difficulties grow on his part; his vians, his treaſure faileth; his men begin to diſtaſte the Wars, and will be gone, and he cannot long continue; *Capienda rebus in malis præceps via eſt: In extremities a ſudden courſe is to be taken upon great occaſions, as if his part be clearly the ſtronger that the victory ſeemeth to offer it ſelf, That the enemy is weak, and will ſhortly be ſtronger, and will offer the Battel, that he is out of doubt and fear, and thinketh his enemy far off; that he is weary and faint, reſtитуallh himſelf; his horſes feed upon the Litter.*

8. He must consider the place, for this is a matter of great consequence in battels. In general, he must not attend (if he may prevent it) his enemy, till he enter within his own territories. He must go forth to meet him, or at least stay him in the entrance. And if he be already entred, not hazard the battel, before he have another Army in readines, to make a supply; otherwise he puts his State in hazard. More particularly, he must consider the field where the Battel is to be fought, whether it be fit for himself, or his Enemy: for the field many times gives a great advantage. The plain Champion is good for the Cavalry; strait and narrow places, set with piles, full of Ditches, Trees, for the Infantry.

9. He must consider with whom he is to fight, not with the strongest, I mean not the strongest men, but the strongest and stoutest courages. Now there is not any thing that giveth more heart and courage, than Necessity, an enemy invincible. And therefore I say, that a man must never fight with such as are desperate. This agreeth with the former, that is, not to hazard a battel within his own Countrey; for an enemy being entred, fighteth desperately, knowing if he be vanquished, he cannot escape death, having neither fortress, nor any place of retreat or succour; *Unde necessitas in loco, spes in virtute salus, ex victoria: When necessity is in place, hope is in courage and resolution, and safety out of victory.*

10. The manner of fight that brings best advantage with it, whatsoever it be, is the best: whether it be surprize, subtilty, close and covert faining to bear, to the end, he may draw the Enemy, and catch him in his gin; *Spe victoria inducere, ut vincantur: To bring him into hope of Victory, that he may be vanquished;* to watch and mark his over-sights and faults, that he may the better prevail against him, and give the charge.

For ranged battels, these things are required. The first and principal, is a good and comely ordering of his people. 2. A supply and succour alwayes ready, but close and hidden, to the end, that coming suddenly and unawares, it may astonish and confound the Enemy. For all sudden things, though they be vain and ridiculous, bring fear and astonishment with them.

*Primi in omnibus p. a' iis oculi vincuntur & aures.*

*In skirmishes and battels all,*

*The eyes and eares are first that fall.*

3. To be first in the field, and ranged in battel aray. This a General doth with so much the more ease, and it much encreaseth the



courage of his Souldiers, and abateth his enemies ; for this is to make himself the assailant, who hath alwaies more heart than the defendant.

4. A beautiful, gallant, bold, resolved countenance, of the General and others Leaders. 5. An oration to encourage the Souldiers, and to lay open unto them the honour, commodity, and security that there is in valour ; that dishonour, danger, death, are the reward of cowards : *Minus timoris minus periculi, audaciam pro muro esse ; effugere mortem, qui eam contemnit : The lesse fear, the lesse danger ; courage is a wall of defence, he avoideth death that contemns it.*

37.  
Having joyned  
battel.

Being come to hand-strokes, if the Army waver, the General must hold him firm, to the duty of a resolute Leader, and brave man at arms, run before his astonished Souldiers, stay them recoyling, thrust himself into the throng, make all to know, both his own, and his enemies that his head, his hand, his tongue trembleth not.

And if it fall out, that he have the better, and the field be his, he must stay, and with-hold them, lest they scatter and disband themselves, by too obstinate a pursuit of the vanquished. That is to be feared, which hath many times come to passe, that the vauquished gathering heart, make use of despair, gather to a head, and vanquish the vanquisher, for this Necessity is a violent School-mistris. *Clausis ex desperatione crescit audacia : & cum spei nihil est, sumit arma formido : The courage of them that are enclosed, groweth out of despair : and when there is no hope, fear taketh arms.* It is better to give passage unto them, and to remove all lets and hindrance that may stay their flight. Much lesse must a General suffer himself or his men, to attend the booty, or to be allured thereby over hastily, if he be Conquerour. He must use his victory wisely, lest the abuse thereof turn to his own harm. And therefore he must not defile it with cruelty, depriving the enemy of all hope, for there is danger in it. *Ignavia necessestas acuit ; sæpe desperatio spei causa est, gravissimi sunt morsus irritate necessitatis : Necessity sharpneth cowardize ; despair is oftentimes the cause of hope ; most bitter are the bitings of urged necessity.* But contrarily, he must leave some occasion of hope, and overture unto peace, not spoiling and ransacking the Countrey, which he hath conquered ; for fury and rage are dangerous beasts. Again, he must not stain his victory with insolency, but carry himself modestly, and alwayes remember the perpetual flux and reflux of this World, and that alternative revolution, whereby from adversity springeth prosperity, from prosperity adversity. There are some that cannot digest a good  
for.

fortune: *Magnam felicitatem conquire non possunt: fortuna vitrea est; tunc cum splendet, frangitur: O inidam fiduciam! & saepe victor victus:* They cannot digest great felicity: fortune is brittle and slippery, when it shineth, it breaketh: O faithlesse confidence! that often the victor is vanquished. If he be vanquished, wisdom is necessary to weigh well, and consider of his losse; it is sottishness to make himself believe that it is nothing, and to feed himself with vain hopes, to suppress the newes of the overthrow. He must consider thereof, as it is at the worst, otherwise how shall he remedy it: And afterwards with good courage, hope for better fortunes, renew his forces, make a new leavy, seek new succours, put good and strong Garrisons into his strongest places. And though the Heavens be contrary unto him, as sometimes they seem to oppose themselves to holy and just arms; it is nevertheless, never forbidden to die in the bed of honour, which is far better than to live in dishonour.

And thus we have ended the second head of this subject, which is to make Warre except one scruple that remaineth: That is to say *A question of the Stratagem of War.* whether it be lawfull to use subtilty, policy, stratagems, in Warre. There be some that hold it negatively, that it is unworthy men of honour and vertue, rejecting that excellent saying; *Dolus an virtus quis in hoste requirat;* Whether deceit or courage, is most requisite in an enemy? Alexander would take no advantages of the obscurity of the night, saying, that he liketh not of thieving victories; *Malo me fortune pigeat, quam victorie pudeat:* I had rather be sorry for my fortune, than victory should shame me. So likewise the first Romans, sent their Schoolmaster to the Phaliscians; so Pyrrhus, his traiterous Physitian, making profession of vertue, disavowing those of their Countrey, that did otherwise, reproving the subtilty of the Greeks and Africans, and teaching, that true victory is by vertue; *Quae salva fide & integra dignitate paratur,* Which is gotten with a safe faith and true honour; That which is gotten by wit and subtilty, is neither generous, nor honourable, nor secure. The vanquished, hold not themselves to be well vanquished, *non virtute, sed occasione, & arte ducis se victos rati:* Ergo non fraude neque occultis sed palam & armatum hostes suos ulcisci. Think not themselves to be conquered by courage, but by occasion, and by the cunning and subtilty of the Generall: Therefore they would not be revenged on their enemies by deceit, or secret fraud, but openly, and by force of Arms. Now all this is well, said



Polib.  
Plut. in Marc.  
Ellp. lib. 1. de  
Prob.  
August. quæst.  
sup. Josue.

said and true, but to be understood in two cases, in private quarrels, and against private enemies, or where faith is not given, or a league and alliance made. But without these two cases, that is to say, in Warre, and without the prejudice of a mans faith, it is permitted by any means whatsoever, to conquer the enemy that is already condemned. This, besides the judgements of the greatest Warriours, who contrarily have preferred the victory gotten by occasion, and by subtile stratagems, before that which is won by open force; whereupon, to that they have ordained an Oxe for a sacrifice, to this only a Cock) is the opinion of that great Christian Doctor, *Cum judicium bellum suscipitur, ut appere pugnet quis, aut ex incidiis, nihil ad justitiam interest. When a just Warre is undertaken, it is no prejudice to justice, whether any fight openly, or by lying in wait, and by wiles.* Warre hath naturally reasonable priviledges, to the prejudice of reason. In time and place, it is permitted to make use and advantage of the sottishness of an enemy, as well as of his weakness or idleness.

39  
The third head  
Of this military  
subject, to finish  
war.

Of peace in re-  
spect of the  
vanquished.

In respect of  
the vanquished

Let us come to the third head of this military matter more short and pleasing than the rest, which is to finish the War by peace. The word is sweet, the thing pleasant, and good in all respects: *Pax optima rerum Quas homini novisse datum est. Pax una triumphis Innume- ris prior: Peace is the best thing that is given to man: one Peace is better than innumerable triumphs.* And very commodious to both parts, the Conquerors and conquered. But first, to the vanquished, who are the weaker; to whom I do first give this counsel, To continue armed, to make shew of security, assurance and resolution. For he that desireth peace, must be alwaies ready for war, whereupon it hath been said, That treaties of peace, do well and happily succeed, when they are concluded under a Buckler. But this peace must be honest, and upon reasonable conditions; otherwise, though it be said, that a base peace is more profitable than a just warre, yet it is better to die freely, and with honour, than to serve dishonourably. And again, it must be pure and free, without fraud and hipocrisie, which finisheth the war, differeth it not: *Pax suspecta rarius bellum: Warre is more safe, than a doubtful and suspicious peace.* Nevertheless, in times of necessity, a man must accommodate himself as he may. When a Pilot feareth a ship-wrack, he casteth himself into the Sea to save himself; and many times it succeedeth well, when a man committeth himself to the discretion of a generous adversary: *Victores qui sunt alto animo Secunda res in miserationem ex tra vertunt:*

For-

Fortunate and good success, turneth the mind of a noble and generous Conquerour, from wrath to mercy. To the vanquishers, I give this counsel. That they be not over-hardly perswaded to peace: for though perhaps it be lesse profitable unto them, than to be vanquished, yet some commodity it bringeth; for the continuance of war is odious and troublesome. And *Lycurgus* forbiddeth to make War often against one and the same enemies, because they learn thereby to defend themselves, and in the end to assail too. The bitings of dying beasts are mortal; *Fraclis rebus violentior ultima virtus*: The last courage is more violent in a state overthrown. And again, the issue is always uncertain; *Melior tutiorque certa pax sperata victoris*; *illa in tua, hæc in deorum manu est*: Better, and more safe is a certain peace, than a hoped for Victory, the one is in thine own hand, the other in the hand of God. And many times the poyson lieth in the tail, and the more favourable fortune is, the more it is to be feared; *Nemo se tuto diu periculis offerre tam crebris potest*: No man can with safety present himself long to open dangers. But it is truly honourable, it is a glory, having a victory in his hands, to be facil and easily perswaded unto peace: it is to make known, that he undertaketh a war justly, and doth wisely finish it. And contrarily, to refuse it, and afterwards, by some ill success to repent the refusal, it is very dishonourable, and will be said, that glory hath undone him. He refuseth peace, and would have honour, and so hath lost them both. But he must offer a gracious and a debonair peace; to the end, it may be durable. For if it be over-rough and cruel, at the first advantage that may be offered, the vanquished will revolt; *Si bonam dederitis, fidam & perpetuam, si malam haud diuturnam*: If thou shalt grant a good peace it will be faithful and perpetual, if evil, it will not last long. It is as great greatness, to shew as much lenity towards the suppliant vanquished, as valour against the enemy. The Romans did very well put this in practice, and it did them no harm.

Honourable.

S. Bernard,

Livius.



## CHAP. III.

*Of that Prudence which is required in difficult affairs, and in accidents, publick and private.*

## THE PREFACE.

**H**AVING spoken of that politick prudence required in a Sovereign for the carriage of himself and his good government, we will here severally speak of that prudence that is necessary for the preservation of himself, and the remedying of those affairs, and difficult and dangerous accidents, which may happen, either to himself, or his particular subjects.

*The division of  
this matter, by  
distinction of  
the accidents*

First, these affairs and accidents are very divers: they are either publick or particular, either to come, and such as threaten us, or present and pressing us: the one are only doubtful and ambiguous, the other dangerous and important, because of their violence: And they that are the greater and more difficult, are either secret and hid; and they are two, that is to say, conspiracy against the person of the Prince, or the State, and treason against the places and companies: Or manifest and open, and these are of divers sorts. For they be either without form of war, and certain order, as popular commotions for small and light occasions, factions and leagues between subjects of the one against the other, in small and great number, great or little: seditions of the people against the Prince or Magistrate, rebellion against the authority and head of the Prince: or they are ripe and formed into a war, and are called civil wars: which are of so many kinds, as the above-named troubles and commotions, which are the causes, foundations and seeds of them: but have grown, and are come into consequence and continuance. Of them all we will speak distinctly, and we will give advice and counsel, as well to Sovereigns, as particular persons, great and small, how to carry themselves wisely therein.

*I. Of the evils and accidents that do  
threaten us.*

**I**N those crosse and contrary accidents, whereunto we are subject, there are two divers manners of carriage: and they may be both good, according to the divers natures, both of the accidents, and  
of

of those to whom they happen. The one is strongly to contest, and to oppose a mans self against the accident, to remove all things that may hinder the diverting thereof; or at least, to blunt the point, to dead the blow thereof, either to escape it, or to force it. This requireth a strong and obstinate minde, and hath need of hard and painful care. The other is incontinently, to take and receive these accidents at the worst, and to resolve himself to bear them sweetly, and patiently, and in the mean time, to attend peaceably whatsoever shall happen, without tormenting himself, or hindering it. The former studieth how to range the accidents, this himself. That seemeth to be more couragious, this more sure. That continueth in suspense, is tossed between fear and hope; this putteth himself in safety, and lyeth so low, that he cannot fall lower. The lowest march is the surest, and the seat of constancy. That laboureth to escape, this to suffer: and many times this maketh the better bargain. Oftentimes it falleth out, that there is greater inconvenience and losse, in pleading and contending, than in losseing; in flying for safety, than in suffering. A covetous man tormenteth himself more than a poor, a jealous than a cuckold. In the former, prudence is more requisite, because he is in action; in this, patience. But what hindereth, but that a man may perform both in order: and that where prudence and vigilancy can do nothing, there patience may succeed? doubtlesse in publick evils, a man must assay the first; which such are bound to do, as have the charge and can do it; in particular, let every one choose the best.

*II. Of evils and accidents, present, pressing  
and extreme.*

**T**He proper means to lighten evils, and to sweeten passions, is not for a man to oppose himself, for opposition enflameth and encreaseth them much more. A man by the jealousie of contention & contradiction sharpneth & firreth the evil: but it is either in diverting them elsewhere, as Physicians use to do, who knowing not how to purge, and wholly to cure a Disease, seek to divert into some other part lesse dangerous, which must be done sweetly and insensibly. This is an excellent remedy against all evils, and which is practised in all things, if a man mark it well, whereby we are made to swallow the sowrest morsels; yea, death it self, and that insensibly, *Abducendus animus est ad alia studia, curas, negotia, lei denique mu-*

tati-



*tatione, tanquam aegroti non convalescentes. saepe curandus est*: The mind is to be led away to other studies, cares, business; lastly, with change of place, like sick persons not recovering, is often cured. As a man counsaileth those that are to passe over some fearful deep place, either to shut, or to divert their eyes. When a man hath occasion to launce a sore in a Child, he flattereth him, and withdraweth his mind to some other matter. A man must practice the experiment and subtilty of *Hippomenes*, who being to run with *Atalanta*, a Damofel of excellent beauty, and to lose his life if he lost the Goal; to marry the Damofel, if he won it, furnished himself with three fair Apples of Gold, which at divers times he let fall, to stay the course of the Damofel, whilst she took them up, and so by diverting her, got the advantage of her, and gained her-self: so if the consideration of some present unhappy accident, or the memory of any that is past, do much afflict us, or some violent passion, which a man cannot tame, do move and torment us; we must change and turn our thoughts to something else, and substitute unto our selves, some other accident and passion lesse dangerous. If a man cannot vanquish it, he must escape it, go out of the way, deal cunningly, or weaken and dissolve it, with other thoughts and alienations of the mind, yea, break it into many pieces; and all this by diversions. The other advice, in the last and more dangerous extremities, that are in a manner past hope, is a little to cast down the head, to lean unto the blow, to yield unto necessity; for there is great danger, that by too much obstinacy in not relenting at all, a man giveth occasion to violence, to trample all underfoot. It is better to make the Laws to will that they can, since they cannot do that they would. It was a reproach unto *Cato*, to have been over-rough in the civil Wars of his time, and that he rather suffered the Common-weal to run into all extremities, then succoured it, by tying himself over-strictly to the Laws. Contrarily *Epaminondas* in a necessity, continued his charge beyond his time, though the Law upon the pain of his life, did prohibit him: *Philpamines* is commended, that being born to command, he did not only know how to govern according to the Laws, but also commanded the Laws themselves, when publick necessity did require it. A Leader at a necessity must stoop a little, apply himself to the occasion, turn the Table of the Law, if not take it away, go a little out of the way, that he lose not all; for this is prudence, which is no way contrary, either to reason or justice.

*III. Doubtfull and ambiguous affairs.*

**I**N things doubtful, where the reasons are strong on all parts, and the inability to see and choose that which is most commodious, bringeth with it uncertainty and perplexity, the best and safest way is to lean to that part where there is most honesty and justice: for notwithstanding it fall not out happily, yet there shall alwaies remain an inward content, and an outward glory, to have chosen the better part. Besides, a man knoweth not, if he had taken the contrary part, what would have happened, and whether he had escaped his destiny. When a man doubteth which is the better and the shorter way, let him take the straiter.

*IV. Difficult and dangerous affairs.*

**I**N difficult Affairs, as in Agreements, to be over-careful to make them over-sure, is to make them lesse firm, lesse assured; because a man employeth therein more time, more people are hindred, more things, more clauses are mingled and interposed than are needful, from whence arise all differences. Add hereunto, that a man seemeth hereby to scorn fortune, and to exempt himself from her jurisdiction which cannot be, *Vim suorum ingruentem refringi non vult*: *He will not weaken their approaching force.* It is better to make them briefly and quietly with a little danger, then to be so exact and curious.

In dangerous affairs a man must be wise and courageous, he must fore-see and know all dangers, make them neither lesse nor greater than they are by want of judgment. think that they will not all happen, or shall not all have their effects; that a man may avoid many by industry or by diligence, or otherwise; what they are from whom he may receive aid and succour, and thereupon take courage, grow resolute, not fainting for them in an honest Enterprize. A wise man is courageous; for he thinketh, discourseth, and prepareth himself for all, and a courageous man must likewise be wise.

*V. Conjunctions.*

**W**E are come now to the greatest, most important, and dangerous accidents, which we will handle in order, expressly describing them one after the other, giving afterwards in every one



of them some advifements fit for a Sovereign, and in the end for every particular perfon.

Conjuration is a conspiracy and enterprife of one or many againſt the perfon of the Prince or the State: it is a dangerous thing, hardly avoided or remedied, becauſe it is cloſe and hidden. How ſhould a man defend himſelf againſt a covert enemy, ſuch an one as carrieth the countenance of a moſt officious friend; how can a man know the will and thoughts of another, And again, he that contemneth his own life, is maſter of the life of another, *Contemnit omnes ille, qui mortem prius*: He contemneth all men, that contemneth death, in ſuch fort that the Prince is expoſed to the mercy of a private man whoſoever he be.

*Machiavel* ſetteth down at large, how a man ſhould frame and order and conduct a conspiracy; we, how it may be broken, hindered, prevented.

2  
Remedies and  
Advifements.

1. The counſels and remedies hereupon are, firſt a privie ſearch and countermine by faithful and diſcreet perſons fit for ſuch a purpoſe, who are the eyes and ears of the Prince: Theſe muſt diſcover whatſoever is ſaid and done, eſpecially by the principal officers. Conſpirators do willingly here and there defame the Prince, or lend their ears to thoſe that blame and accuſe him. Their diſcourſe and conference then touching the Prince muſt be known, and a Prince muſt not ſtick to be bountiful in his rewards and immunities to ſuch diſcoverers: But yet he muſt not over-lightly give credit to all reports He muſt lend his ear to all, not his belief; and diligently examine to the end he oppreſſe not the innocent, and ſo purchaſe unto himſelf the hatred and hard ſpeech of the people.

2. The ſecond advice is, that he endeavour by clemency and innocency to win the love of all, even of his enemies, *fidiffima custodia Principis innocentia*: innocency is the moſt faithful ſafeguard of the Prince. By offending no man, a man taketh a courſe to be offended by none: And it is to ſmall purpoſe for a man to ſhew his power by wrongs and out-rages; *Male vim ſuam poteſtas, aliorum contumeliis experitur*; power doth ill make proof of its force by the contempt of others.

3. The third is to make a good ſhew, to ſhew a good countenance according to the accuſtomed manner, not changing or depreſſing any thing; and to publiſh in all places, that he is well perſwaded of thoſe meetings and aſſemblies that men appoint, and to make them believe that he hath them not in the wind, that he deſcrieth not their plots and purpoſes. This was an experiment which *Denys* the Tyrant made

made good use of against an enemy of his, which cost him dear.

4. The fourth is to attend without astonishment and trouble whatsoever may happen unto him. *Cæsar* did well put in practice these three latter means but not the first. It is better, saith he, to die once, than to live (nay to die) alwaies in a trance and a continuall fever of an accident, which is past remedy, and must be wholly referred unto God. They that have taken another course and have endeavoured to prevent it by punishments and revenge, have very seldome found it the best way, and have not for all that escaped the danger, as many Romane Emperour can well witnesse.

But the conspiracy being discovered, the truth found out what is to be done? the conspirators must rigorously be punished: to spare such people, is cruelly to betray the weal-publick. They are enemies to the liberty, good, and peace of all: Justice requireth it. But yet wisdom and discretion is necessary herein; & he must not alwaies carry himself after one and the same manner. Sometimes he must excuse suddenly, specially if the number of the conspirators be small. But whether the number be little or great, he must not speak by tortures to know the confederates (if otherwise and secretly he may know them, and to make as though he knew them not, is good) or a man seeketh that which he would not find. It is sufficient that by the punishment of a small number, good subjects are contained in their duty, and they diverted from their attempts, that either are not, or think not themselves bewraied. To know all by tortures doth perhaps stir up mens hearts against him. Sometimes he must delay the punishment, but yet never be slow in procuring of safety. But yet the conspirators may be such, and the Treason discovered at such a time, that a man must not dissemble, and to punish them instantly is to play and lose all. The best way of all others is, to prevent the conspiracy, to frustrate it, saining neverthelesse not to know the conspirators, but so to carry himself, as if he would provide for another thing as the *Carthaginians* did to *Hannon* their Captain. *Optimum & solum saepe insidiosum remedium, si non intelligatur: The best, and oftentimes the onely remedy of treachery, is, that a man seem not to know them.* And which is more, a Prince must sometime pardon, especially if he be a great man, that hath deserved well of the Prince and State, and to whom they are both in some sort bound, whose children, parents, friends are mighty. For what should he do? how should he break this band? If with safety he may, let him pardon, or at least lessen the punishment. Clemency in this case is sometimes not only glorious to a Prince, *Nil*

3  
Punishment of  
conspirators,  
and the advice  
thereupon.

Justin lib. 1.  
Tacit.

glori-



*gloriosus Principe impunè lesò*, but it helpeth much for safety to come, diverteth others from the like designments, and worketh either shame in them, or repentance; the example of *Augustus* towards *Cinna* is very excellent.

## VI. Treason.

I  
Description.

**T**Reason is a secret Conspiracy or Enterprize against a place, or a Troop or company: it is as a conjuration, a secret evil, dangerous and hardly avoided: for many times a Traytor is in the middle and bosome of the Company, or place, which he selleth and betrayeth. To this unhappy mystery are willingly subject, such as are covetous, light spirits, hypocrites: and this is commonly in them, that they make a fair shew of trust and fidelity, they commend and keep it carefully in small matters, and by that means endeavouring to cover they discover themselves. It is the mark whereby to know them.

2  
Advise-  
ments, and  
Remedies.

The advisements are always the same that belong to conjurations: except in the punishments, which here must be speedy, grievous, and irremissible: for they are a kind of people ill-born and bred, incorrigible, pernicious to the world; whom to pity it is cruelty.

## VII. Commotions of the People.

1  
2  
Advise-  
ments, and  
Remedies.

**T**Here are many sorts, according to the diversity of the causes, persons, manner and continuance, as we shall see hereafter: Faction, Confederacy, Sedition, Tyranny, Civil Wars. But we will speak here simply, and in general of those that are raised in a heat, as sudden Tumults that endure not long. The Advisements and Remedies, are to procure some one or other to speak and shew himself unto them, that is of Authority, vertue, and singular reputation, eloquent, having gravity mingled with grace, and industry with smooth speech to win the people: for at the presence of such a man, as at a sudden lighting, the people grow calm and quiet:

—*Veluti magno in populo cum saepe coorta  
Seditio est, sævitq; animis ignobile vulgus,  
Jamque faces, & saxa volant: furor arma ministrat.  
Tum pietate gravem, ac meritis, si fortè virum quem  
Conspexere silent, arrectisque auribus adstant  
Ille regit dictis animos, & pectora mulcet.*

When

When as the Commons in tumultuous guise  
with furious rage do in sedition rise,  
Then stones and fire, and all things fly about,  
as fury fills the hands of that base rout:  
And if by chance a man both grave and sage,  
of good desert, and reverenc'd for his age  
They hap to see, then silent straight they stand;  
with listning ears his words to understand:  
He with sweet words their anger doth assuage,  
rules their stout minds, and doth appease their rage.

Sometimes the Captain himself must undertake this business. But it must be done with an open front, a strong assurance, having his mind free, and pure from all imagination of death, and the worst that may happen unto him: for to go amongst them with a fearful and unconstant countenance, with flattery and humble carriage, is to wrong himself, and to do little good. This *Cesar* did excellently put in practice, upon those mutinous Legions and Armies, that rose up against him.

—*stetit aggere fultus*

*Cespitis, intrepidus vultu, meruitque timeri  
Nil metuens.*—

On high upon a heap of turfs he rear'd,  
Undaunted stood, as in his looks appear'd,  
And fearlesse shew'd him worthy to be fear'd.

And *Augustus* did as much to his *Aelian* legions, saith *Tacitus*. There are then two means to quiet and appease a moved and furious people, the one is by rough usage, and pure authority and reason. This is the better and more noble, and becometh a Captain, if it stand him upon; but yet he must take heed how he do it, as hath been said. The other more ordinary is by flattery and fair speeches for he must not make an open resistance. Savage beasts are never tamed with blows; and therefore a man must not be sparing of good words, and fair promises. In this case, the wise have permitted a man to lie, as men use to do with Children and sick folk. Herein *Pericles* was excellent, who won the people, by the eyes, the ears, and the belly; that is to say, Shews, Comedies, Feasts, and hereby did what he list. This mean, more base and servile, but yet necessary, must be practised by him whom the Captain sendeth, as *Menenius Agrippa* did at Rome. For if he think to win them by main force, when they are without the bounds of reason; no



way yielding unto them, as *Appius, Cortolanus, Cato, Phocion*, endeavoured to do, he is mistaken, and deceiveth himself.

## VIII. Faction and Confederacy.

1  
The description.

Faction or confederacy is a complotment and association, of one against another, between the subjects; whether it be between the great or the small, in great numbers or little. It ariseth sometimes from the hatreds that are between private men, and certain Families; but for the most part from ambition (the plague of States) every one coveting the first rank. That which falleth out between great personages is more pernicious. There are some that stick not to say, That it is in some sort, profitable for a Sovereign; and it doth the self-same service to a Common-weal, that brawls of servants do in Families, saith *Cato*. But that he cannot be true, except it be in tyrants who fear lest their subjects should agree too well; or in small and light quarrels between Cities, or between Ladies of the Court, to know newes. But not important factions, which must be extinguished in their first birth, with their marks, names, habiliments, which are many times the seeds of vilanous effects, witness that great deflagration, and those bloody murtherers happened in *Constantinople*, for the colours of green and blue, under *Justinian*. The advicements hereupon are, That if the factions be betwixt two great personages, the Prince must endeavour by good words or threatenings to make peace and attonement betwixt them; as *Alexander the Great* did betwixt *Ephestion* and *Craterus*, and *Archidamus* betwixt two of his friends. If he cannot do it, let him appoint arbitrators, such as are free from suspition and passion. The like he should do if the faction be betwixt divers subjects, or cities, and communities. And if it fall out, that it be necessary that he speak himself, he must do it with counsel, being called, to avoid the malice and hatred of those that are condemn'd. If the faction be between great multitudes, and that it be so strong, that it cannot be appeased by justice, the Prince is to imploy his force for the utter extinguishment thereof, But he must take heed that he carry himself indifferent, not more affectioned to one than to another, for therein there is great danger and many have undone themselves. And to say the truth, it is unworthy the greatness of a prince, and he that is master of all, to make himself a companion to the one, and an enemy to the other: And if some must needs be punished, let it light upon those that are the principal heads, and let that suffice.

2  
The advicements and remedies.

# Sedition.

## IX. Sedition.

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**S**edition is a violent commotion of a multitude against a Prince, or Magistrate. It ariseth or groweth, either from oppression, or fear : For they that have committed any great offence, fear punishment ; others think and fear they shall be oppressed ; and both of them by the apprehension of an evil, are stirred to sedition, to prevent the blow. It likewise springeth from a licentious liberty from want and necessity, in such sort ; that men fit for this businessse, are such as are indebted, male-content, and men ill accommodated in all things, light persons, and such as are blown up, and fear justice. These kind of people cannot continue long in peace ; peace is war unto them, they cannot sleep but in the midst of sedition, they are not in liberty, but by the means of confusion. The better to bring their purposes to passe, they confer together in secret, they make great complaints, use doubtful speeches, afterwards speak more openly, seem zealous of their liberty, and of the publick good, and ease of the people ; and by these fair pretences, they draw many unto them. The adviselements and remedies are : First, the self same that served for popular commotions, to cause such to shew themselves, and to speak unto them that are fit for such a purpose ; as hath been said. Secondly, if that profit not, he must arm and fortifie himself ; and for all that, not proceed against them, but rather give them leisure and time to put water in their wine, to the wicked to repent, to the good to reunite themselves. Time is a great Physitian, especially in people more ready to mutiny and rebel, than to fight. *Ferocior Plebs ad rebellandum, quam bellandum, tentari magis quam tueri libertatem :* The common people are more stout for rebellion, than for battel ; apter to assay, than to defend their liberty. Thirdly he must in the mean time, try all means to shake and dissolve them, both by hope and fear ; for these are the two wayes ; *Spem offer, metum intende :* Offer mercy and intend judgement. Fourthly, endeavour to disjoyn them, and to break the course of their intelligence. Fifthly, he must win and draw unto him under-hand, some few amongst them, by fair promises, and secret rewards, whereby some of them withdrawing themselves from their company, and coming unto him, others remaining with them to serve him, and to give intelligence of their carriages and purposes, they may the better be brought asleep, and their heat be somewhat allayed. Sixthly, to draw and win the rest, by yielding unto them some part of that which

*The Descripti-  
on.*

*Adviselements  
and remedies.*

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they demand, and that with fair promises and doubtful termes. It shall afterwards be easie, justly to revoke that, which they have unjustly by sedition extorted, *Irrita facies quæ per seditionem expresserint*, and to make all whole with lenity and clemency. Lastly, if they return unto reason and obedience, and become honest men, they must be handled gently, and a man must be contented with the chastisement and correction of some few of the principal authors and fire-brands, without any further enquiry into the rest of the confederates, that all may think themselves in safety, and in grace and favour.

## X. Tyranny and Rebellion.

The description.

**T**Yranny, that is to say, a violent rule, or domination against the Laws and Customs, is many times the cause of great and publick commotions, from whence cometh rebellion, which is as an insurrection of the people against the Prince, because of his tyranny, to the end, they may drive him away, and pluck him from his throne. And it differeth from sedition in this, they will not acknowledge the Prince for their master; whereas sedition proceedeth not so far, being raised only for a discontent of the government, complaining and desiring an amendment thereof. Now this tyranny is practised by people ill-bred, cruel, who love wicked men, turbulent spirits, tale-bearers; hate and fear men of honesty, and honour; *Quibus semper aliena virtus formidolosa, nobilitas, opes, omni gestique honores pro crimine, ob virtutes certissimum exitium: & non minus ex magna fama quam mala: To whom other mens vertue is ever fearful, nobility, riches, honours, are accounted for crimes; for vertues, they render most assured destruction; and no less out of good as evil report.* But they carry their punishment with them; being hated of all, and enemies to all. They live in continual fear, and apprehension of terrour; they suspect all things; they are pricked and gauled inwardly in their Consciences, and at last, die an evil death, and that very soon; For an old tyrant is seldom seen.

Cap 16. Plut.  
in Bruto.

The advertisements and remedies in this case, shall be set down at large hereafter in his proper place. The counsels are reduced to two: at his entrance to stay and hinder him, lest he get the mastery; being entalled and acknowledged, to suffer and obey him. It is better to tolerate him, than to move sedition and civil war; *Pejus deteriusque tyrannide, sive injusto imperio, bellum civile; Civil war is worse than tyranny, or unjust government; for there is nothing gotten*

gotten by rebelling or spurning against him, but it rather incenseth wicked Princes, and makes them more cruel : *Nil tam exasperat fervorem vulneris, quam ferendi impatientia* : Nothing so much exasperateth the heat of the wound, as impatience in suffering it. Modesty and obedience allayeth and pacifieth the fierce nature of a Prince ; for the clemency of a Prince, saith that great Prince *Alexander*, doth not only consist in their own natures, but also in the natures of their subjects, who many times by their ill carriage and bad speeches, do provoke a Prince, and make him far worse : *Obsequio mitigantur imperia ; & contra, contumacia inferi rum lenitatem imperitantis diminui ; contum : ciam cum perniciem quam obsequium cum sinceritate miluit* : Sovereign authorities are mitigated by dutiful service ; and contrariwise, the mildness of the Sovereign is diminished by the contumacy of subjects : They rather love disobedience with destruction, than dutifulness with security.

Curt. Tacit.

## XI. Civil Wars.

**W**Hen one of these forenamed publick commotions, popular insurrections, faction, sedition, rebellion, comes to fortifie it self, and continue until it get an ordinary train and form, it is a civil War : which is no other thing, but a press and conduct of Armies by the subjects ; either amongst themselves, and this is a popular commotion, or faction and confederacy ; or against the Prince, the State, the Magistrate, and this is Sedition or Rebellion. Now there is not a mischief more miserable, nor more shameful ; it is a Sea of infelicities. And a wise man said very well, *That it is not properly War, but a malady of the State, a fiery sickness and phrensie*, And to say the truth, he that is the Authour thereof, should be put out from the number of men, and banished out of the borders of humane nature. There is no kind of wickedness that it is freed from, impiety and cruelty between Parents themselves, murders with all manner of impunity : *Occidere palam, ignoscere non nisi fallendo licet, non etas, non dignitas quonquam protegit ; nobilitas cum plebe perit, lateque vagatur ensis* : It is lawful to kill openly, but not to pardon but in deceiving : No age, no dignity protecteth any man ; the Nobility perisheth with the common people, and the Sword wandereth far and wide, All kind of disloyalty, Discipline abolished ; *In omne fas nefasque avidos aut venales ; non sacro, non profano abstinemus* : Greedy and mercenary in all mischief, abstaining neither from Sacred nor Prophane. The inferiour and basest sort, are companions with the

I.  
The description.



best. *Rheni mihi Caesar in undis Dux erat, hic socius. Facinus quos inquinat, aequat: Caesar was both my Captain and Companion on the River of Rhine. Them whom mischief defileth, it maketh equal.* He dareth not to open his mouth, for he is of the same profession, though he approve it not; *Obnoxiiis ducibus & prohibere non ausis: The Leaders being guilty of the same crimes, dare not forbid them.* It is an horrible confusion; *Metu ac necessitate huc illuc mutantur: With fear and necessity, they are changed hither and thither.* To conclude, it is nothing but misery: but there is nothing so miserable, as the victory. For though it fall into the hand of him that hath the right on his side; yet there followeth this inconveniency, that it maketh him insolent, cruel, inhumane; yea, though he were before, of a mild and generous nature. So much doth this intestine war flesh a man in blood; yea, it is a poyson that consumeth all humanity. Neither is it in the power of the Captains to with-hold the rest.

2  
The Causes.

There are two causes to be considered of civil wars: The one in secret, which as it is neither known nor seen, so it cannot be hindred or remedied: It is destiny, the will of God, who will chastise, or wholly dispeople a State. *In se magna ruant, latis hunc numina rebus Crescendi posuere modum. They bring great ruines to themselves; God hath sent his stop to his growing prosperity.* The other is well understood by the wise, and may be happily remedied, if men will, and they to whom it appertaineth, set to their helping hand. This is the dissolution and general corruption of manners, whereby men of no worth, and that hath nothing to do, endeavour to turn all topsie turvey, to put all into combustion, cover their wounds with the hurt of the State; for they love better to be over-whelmed with the publick ruine than their own particular. *Miscere cuncta, & privata vulnera reipublicae malis operire: nam ita seres habet, ut publica ruina quisque malit quam sua proteri, & idem passurus minus conspici: They confound all things, and cover private wounds by the evils of the Common-wealth: for the case so stands, that everyone had rather be trodden down in the publick ruine, than in his own, and to be least seen when they suffer the same.*

3  
The Counsels  
and Remedies.

Now the adviselements and remedies for the mischief of civil war, are to end it as soon as may be, which is done by two means, agreement and victory. The first is the better, although it be not such as a man desireth, time will help the rest. A man sometimes must suffer himself to be deceived, to the end, he may end a civil war, as it is said of *Antipater, Bellum finire cupienti, opus erat decipi: He*  
that

that desireth to end the war, had need to be deceived. Victory is dangerous because it is to be feared, that the Conquerour will abuse it, whereby a tyranny may ensue. To the end, a man may carry himself well herein, he must quit himself of all the authors of troubles, and other commotions, and such like bloud-suckers, as well on the one part, as the other, whether it be by sending them far off with some charge, or under some fair pretext, and so dividing them; or by employing them against the stranger, and handling the meaner sort with lenity and gentleness.

*XII. Adviseiments for particular persons, touching the  
foresaid publick divisions.*

THUS we have seen many kinds of publick troubles and divisions, for which and every one of them, we have given counsels and remedies, in respect of the Prince: It remaineth, that we now give them for particular persons. This cannot be determined in a word. There are two questions; the one, whether it be lawful for an honest man to joyn himself to one part, or to remain quiet and indifferent: the second, how a man must carry himself in both cases, that is to say being joyned to one part, or not joyned to either. Touching the first point, it is proposed for such as are free, and are not yet engaged to any part; for if they be, this first question belongs not to them, but we send them to the second. This I say, because a man may joyn himself to the one part, not of purpose, and by election; yea, to that part which he approveth not; but only because he findeth himself carried and bound with strong and puissant bands, which he may not easily break, which carry with them a sufficient excuse, being natural and equivalent. Now the first question, hath contrary reasons and examples. It seemeth on the one side, that an honest man cannot do better than to keep himself quiet; for he knoweth not how to betake himself to either part, without offence, because all these divisions are in their own natures unlawful, and cannot be carried, nor subsist without inhumanity and injustice. And many good people have abhorred it, as *Asinius Pollio* answered *Augustus*, who desired him to follow him against *Marc Antony*. On the other side, is it not a thing reasonable, for a man to joyn with the good, and such as have right on their side? *Wise Solon*, hath judged affirmatively, yea, roughly chastised him, that retireth himself, and taketh not part. The professor of virtue *Cato*, hath likewise put in practice, not being content to take

*Two Questions*

*The first.*



one part, but commanding it. To determine this doubt, it seemeth that men of worth and renown, who have both publick charge and credit, and sufficiency in the State, may and ought to range themselves in that part which they shall judge the better: for they must not abandon in a tempest, the stern of that ship, which in a calm Sea they are content to govern; especially, being an honourable part, to provide for the safety of the State; And secondly, that private men, and such as are of a lower degree in the charge of the State, should stay and retire themselves into some peaceable and secure place, during the division: and both of them so to carry themselves, as shall be said hereafter. Finally, touching the choice of the part, sometimes there is no difficulty, for the one is so unjust, and so unfortunate, that a man cannot with any reason, joyn himself therunto: But at another time, the difficulty is very great, and there are many things to be thought of, besides the justice and equity of the parts.

*Ex. scd.*

Let us come to the other point, which concerneth the carriage of all. This is determined in a word, by the counsel and rule of moderation, following the example of *Atticus*, so renowned for his modesty and prudence in such tempests, alwayes held to favour the good part, yet never troubling, nor intangling himself with arms, and without the offence of the contrary part.

*Outragious.  
Moderate.*

1. For they that are known to be of one part, must not be moved over-much, but carry themselves with moderation, not busying themselves with the affairs, if they be not wholly carried and pressed unto it, and in this case, carry themselves in such order and temperature, that the tempest being passed over their heads, without offence, they have not any part in these great disorders and insolencies, that are committed, but contrarily sweetning and diverting them as they can. 2. They that are not engaged to any part (whose condition is sweetest and best) though, it may be inwardly, and in affection, they incline rather to one, than another, must not remain as neutrals, that is, taking no care of the issue, and of the state of either the one or the other, living to themselves, and as spectators in a Theater, feeding upon the miseries of other men. These kind of men are odious to all, and at the last, they run a dangerous fortune, as we read of the *Thebanes*, in the war of *Xerxes*, and of *Jabes Gilead*; *Neutrality nec amicos parit; nec inimicos tollit*: *Neutrality neither getteth friends, nor taketh away enemies*. Neutrality is neither fair, nor honest, if it be not with consent of parts, as *Cesar*, who held neutrals for his friends, contrary to *Pompey*, who held them for enemies; or that

*Neutrals.*

*Judg 2.  
Tit. Liv.*

### *Touching the aforesaid and publick divisions.*

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that he be a stranger, or such a one, as for his greatness and dignity, ought not to mingle himself with such a rout, but rather reclaim them if he can, arbitrating and moderating all. Much lesse, must men in such a case be unconstant, wavering mungrels, *Proteus's*, far more odious than neuters, and offensive to all. But they must (continuing partakers in affection if they will, for thought and affection is wholly our own) be common in their actions, offensive to none, officious and gracious to all, complaining in the common infelicity. These kind of people, neither get enemies, nor lose their friends, They are fit to be mediators, and loving arbitrators, who are better than the common. So that of such as are not partakers, who are four, two are evil, neuters and inconstant persons; two good, common, and mediators; but alwayes the one more than the other, as of partakers, there are two sorts, heady, outragious, and moderate.

*Inconstant.*

*Common.*

*Mediators.*

### *XIII. Of private troubles and divisions.*

**I**N private divisions, a man may commodiously, and loyally carry himself between enemies, if not with equal affection, yet in such a temperate manner, as that he engage not himself so much to one, more than to another, as that either part may think they have more interest in him, and so contenting himself with an indifferent measure of their grace, report nothing but indifferent things, and such as are known, or that serve in common to both parts, speaking nothing to the one, that he may not lay to the other in its due time, changing only the accent and the form thereof.

### *Of Justice the second Virtue.*

#### CHAP. V.

### *Of Justice in general.*

**J**ustice is to give to every one, that which appertaineth unto him, to himself first, and afterwards to others: so that it comprehendeth all the duties and offices of every particular person: which are two-fold, the first to himself, the second to another, and they are contained in that general commandment, which is the summary of all justice; *Thou shalt love thy Neighbour, as thy self*: which doth not only set down the duty of a man towards another, in the second place,

1

*The description.*



place, but it sheweth and ruleth it, according to the pattern of that duty and love he oweth towards himself: for as the *Hebrews* say, a man must begin charity with himself.

2  
The first and  
original justice.

The beginning then of all justice, the first and most ancient commandment, is that of reason over sensuality. Before a man can well command others, he must learn to command himself, yielding unto reason, the power of commanding, and subduing the appetite, and making it pliant to obedience. This is the first original, inward, proper, and most beautiful justice that may be. This command of the Spirit, over the brutal and sensual part, from whence the passions do arise, is compared to an Esquire, or Horseman, who by reason, that he keepeth his horse and mounteth him often, and is ever in the saddle, he turneth and manageth him at his pleasure.

3  
The distinction  
of justice.

To speak of that justice which is outwardly practised, and with another, we must first know, that there is a twofold justice; the one natural, universal, noble, philosophical; the other after a sort, artificial, particular, politick, made and restrained to the necessity of policies and states. That hath better rules, is more firm, pure and beautiful, but it is out of use, unprofitable to the world, such as it is. *Veri juris germanaque justitiae solidam & expressam effigiem nullam tenemus; umbris & imaginibus utimur: We hold no sound and true image of right and perfect justice; we only use the shadow and imaginations thereof:* It is not in a manner capable thereof, as hath been said. That is the rule of *Polycletus* inflexible, invariable. This is more loose and flexible, accommodating it self to humane weaknesse, and vulgar necessity. It is the leaden Lesbian rule, which yieldeth and bendeth it self, as there is need, and as the times, persons, affairs, and accidents do require. This permitteth upon a necessity, and approveth many things, which that wholly rejecteth and condemneth. It hath many vices lawful, and many good actions unlawful. That respecteth wholly and purely reason, honesty; This profit, joyning it as much as may be with honesty. Of that, which is but an *Idea*, and in contemplation, we shall not need to speak.

4  
Justice in  
practice distinguished.

The usual justice, and which is practised in the world, is first twofold, that is to say, equal, bound, and restrained to the terms of the Law; according to which Judges and Magistrates are to proceed: the other just and conscionable, which not enthralling it self to the words of the Law, marcheth more freely, according to the exigency of the case, yea, sometimes against the words of the Law. Now

to speak better, it handleth and ruleth the Law, as need requireth. And therefore, saith a wise man, the Lawes themselves and justice, have need to be ordered and handled justly, that isto say, with equitie; *Quæ expositio & emendatio legis est, exponit sensum, emendat defectum: Which is an exposition and amending of the Law, expoundeth the meaning, and amendeth the defect.* This is fine flour of justice, which is in the hand of those that judge in soveriegnitie. Again, to speak more particularly, there is a twofold justice; the one commutative, betwixt private men, which, is handled and practised by Arithmetical proportion; the other distributive, publickly administered by Geometrical proportion: it hath two parts, reward, and punishment.

Now this usual and practised justice, is not truly and perfectly justice: humane nature, is not capable thereof, no more then of all other things in their purity. As humane justice is mingled with some grain of injustice, favour, rigour, too much, or too little, and there is no pure and true mediocrity; from whence have sprung these ancient proverbs, That he is enforced to do wrong by retail, that will do justice in grosse: and injustice in small things, that will do justice in great. Lawyers to give course and passage to commutative justice, do covertly and silently suffer themselves to deceive one another, and that in a certain measure, so that they passe not the moiety of the just price; and the reason is, because they know not how to do better. And in distributive justice, how many innocents are apprehended and condemned? how many guilty quit and set at liberty? and that without the fault of the Judges, never dreaming, either of that too much, or too little, which is alwayes perpetual in the purest justice? Justice is a let or hinderance to it self; and humane sufficiency, cannot see and provide for all. And here we may take notice among other matters, of a great defect in distributive justice, in that it punisheth only, and rewardeth not; although these are the two parts, and the two hands of justice: but as it is commonly practised, it is lame, and inclineth wholly unto punishment. The greatest favour that a man receiveth from it, is indemnity, which is a pay too short, for such as deserve better than the common sort. But yet this is not all; for if a man be fallily acused, and upon that accusation committed, he is sure to endure punishment sufficient: at the last, his innocency being known, he escapeth perhaps his uttermost punishment, but without amends of that wrongful affliction he hath endured, even such perhaps, as shall never leave him.

5.

*There is no true justice in the World.*



him. And the accuser in the mean time, be the colour and ground of his accusation never so light (which is easie to do) escapeth without punishment; so sparing is justice in rewarding, as that it consisteth wholly in chastisement, whereof that common speech ariseth, that to do justice, and to be subject unto justice, is alwayes to be understood of punishment. And it is an ealie matter for any man that will, to bring another man into danger of punishment, even to such an estate, as that he shall never know which way to get forth, but with loss.

6.  
*The division of  
this matter.*  
l. 2. c. 5.

Of justice and duty, there are three principal parts: for man is indebted to three, to God, to Himself, to his Neighbour: to One above himself, to himself, and to others beside himself. Of his duty towards God, which is piety and religion, hath sufficiently been spoken before: It remaineth, that we now speak of his duty towards himself, and his Neighbour.

#### CHAP. VI.

##### *Of the Justice and Duty of a man towards himself.*

THIS is sufficiently contained in this whole work; in the first book, which teacheth a man to know himself, and all humane condition; in the second, which teacheth a man to be wise, and to that end, giveth advisements and rules; and in the rest of this book, especially in the virtues of fortitude and temperance. Nevertheless, I will here summarily set down some advisements, more expresse and formal.

The first and fundamental advice is, to resolve not to live carelessly, after an uncertain fashion, and by chance and adventure, as almost all are accustomed to do, who seem to mock and deceive themselves, and not to live in good earnest, nor leading the life seriously and attentively, but living from day to day, as it falleth out. They taste not, they possess not, they enjoy not their life: but they use it, to make use of other things. Their designments and occupations do many times trouble, and hurt their life, more than do it service. These kind of people, do all things in good earnest, except it be to live. All their actions, and the lesser parts of their life are serious, but the whole body thereof passeth away, as if they thought not thereof: it is a bare supposition, that is not worth the thinking of. That which is but an accident, is principal unto them, and the principal as an accessory. They affect and incline themselves to all things,

*Of the justice and duty of man towards himself.*

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things, some to get knowledge, honours, dignities, riches : others to take their pleasure, to hunt, to sport themselves, to passe away the time : others to speculations, imaginations, inventions : others to manage and order affairs : others to other things ; but to live, is the least they think of. They live as it were insensibly, being wholly addicted and fastening their thoughts upon other things. Life is unto them but as a tearm, and a procrastination or delay to employ it about other things. Now all this is very unjust, it is an infelicity and treason against a mans self: it is for a man to lose his life and to go against that which every man should do, that is, live seriously, attentively, and chearfully, *bene vivere & letari: sibi semper valere, & vivere doctum: To live well and chearfully: ever to do good to himself, and to live learned,* to the end he may live well, and well die: it is the fault of every man. A man must lead and order his life, as if it were a businesse of great weight and consequence, and as a bargain made whereof he must give an account exactly by parts and parcels. It is our greatest business, in respect whereof, all the rest are but toyes, things accessary and superficial. There are some that deliberate and purpose to do it, but it is when they must live no longer, wherein they resemble those that put off their buying and selling, till the market be past, and when they see their folly, they complain, saying, Shall I never have leisure to make my retreat, to live unto my self? *quàm serum est incipere vivere cum desinendum est* See Lib. 1. Cap. 36.  
*quàm stulta mortalitatis oblivio? dum differtur, vita transcurrit. How late is it to begin to live, when a man must cease to live? how foolish is it to forget our mortality? whilst it is deferred, life passeth away.* And this is the reason why the wise cry out unto us, well to use the time, *tempori parce.* That we have not need of any thing so much as time, saith Zenon. For life is short, and Art is long : not the Art to heal, but rather to live, which is wisdom. To this first and principal advice, these following do serve.

To learn to dwell, to content, to delight himself alone, yea, to quit himself of the World, if need be: the greatest thing is for a man to know how to be himself; virtue is content with it self: let us win so much of our selves, as to be able in good earnest and willingly, to live alone, and to live at our ease. Let us learn to quit our selves of all those bands that fasten and bind us to another, and that our contentment depending of our selves, neither seeking nor disdaining, or refusing company, but chearfully to go on, with or without company, as either our own, or anothers need do require: but yet not  
so



so to shut up our selves, and to settle and establish our pleasure, as some that are half lost being alone. A man must have within himself wherewith to entertain and content himself, & *in sinu suo gaudere, And to rejoyce within himself.* He that hath won this point, pleaseth himself in all places, and in all things. He must carry a countenance conformable to the company, and the affairs that are in hand and present themselves, and accommodate himself unto another, be sad if need be, but inwardly to keep himself one and the same: this is Meditation, and consideration, which is the nourishment and life of the spirit, *cujus vivere est cogitare: Whose life is cogitation.* Now for the benefit of nature, there is not any business which we do more often, continue longer; that is more easie, more natural, and more our own, than to meditate, and to entertain our thoughts. But this meditation is not in all after one manner, but very divers, according to the diversity of spirits. In some, it is weak, in others strong, in some it is languishing idleness, a vacancy, and want of other business. But the greater spirits make it their principal vacation, and most serious study, whereby they are never more busied, or lesse alone, (as it is said of *Scipio*) than when they are alone, and quitting themselves of affairs, in imitation of God himself, who liveth and feedeth himself with his eternal thoughts and meditations. It is the business of the Gods (saith *Aristotle*) from whence doth spring both their and our blessedness.

3  
To know and  
culture himself.

Now this solitary imployment, and this chearful entertainment of a mans self, must not be, in vanity, much lesse, in any thing that is vicious; but in study and profound knowledge, and afterwards in the diligent culture of himself. This is the price agreed, the principal, first and plainest travel of every man. He must alwaies watch, taste, sound himself; never abandon, but be alwayes neer, and keep himself to himself: and finding that many things go not well, whether by reason of vice and defect of nature, or the contagion of another, or other casual accidents that trouble him, he must quietly and sweetly correct them, and provide for them. He must reason with himself, correct and recal himself couragiously, and not suffer himself to be carried away, either with disdain or carelessness.

4  
To keep himself  
in exercise.

He must likewise, in avoiding all idleness, which doth but rust and marre both the soul and body, keep himself alwayes in breath, in office and exercise, but yet not over-bent, violent and painful; but above all, honest, virtuous and serious, And that he may the better

*Of the justice and duty of man towards himself.*

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ter do it, he must quit himself of other business, and propose unto himself such designments as may delight him, conferring with honest men, and good books, dispensing his time well, and well ordering his hours, and not live tumultuously, and by chance and hazard.

Again, he must well husband, and make profit of all things that are presented unto him, done, said, and make them an instruction unto him, apply them unto himself, without any shew or semblance thereof.

And to particularize a little more, we know that the duty of man towards himself, consisteth in three points, according to his three parts, to rule and govern his spirit, his body, his goods. Touching his spirit, (the first and principal, whereunto especially do belong these general advisements which we are to deliver) we know, that all the motions thereof, are reduced to two, to think, and to desire, the understanding and the will; whereunto do answer science and virtue, the two ornaments of the spirit. Touching the former, which is the understanding, he must preserve it from two things, in some sort, contrary and extreme, that is, sottishness and folly, that is to say, from vanities and childish follies, on the one side; this is to bastardize and to lose it, it was not made to play the novice or baboun, *non ad jocum & lusum genitus, sed ad severitatem potius*; Not born to sport and play, but rather for gravity: and from phantastical, absurd, and extravagant opinions on the other side; this is to pollute and debase it. It must be fed and entertained with things profitable and serious, and furnished and indued with sound, sweet, and natural opinions: and so much care must not be taken, to elevate and mount it, to extend it beyond the reach, as to rule, and order it. For order and continency, is the effect of wisdom, and which giveth price to the soul; and above all, to be free from presumption, and obstinacy in opinion, vices very familiar, with those that have any extraordinary force and vigour of spirit; and rather, to continue in doubt and suspense, especially in things that are doubtful, and capable of oppositions and reasons on both parts, not easily digested and determined. It is an excellent thing, and the securest way, well to know how to doubt, and to be ignorant, and the most noble Philosophers, have not been ashamed to make profession thereof; yea, it is the principal fruit and effect of science.

Touching the will, it must in all things be governed, and submit it self to the rule of reason, which is the office of virtue, and not

5  
To make use of  
all things.

6  
To govern his  
spirit, that is  
his judgement.



*Of the justice and duty of man towards himself.*

not unto fleeting inconstant opinion, which is commonly false, and much lesse unto passion. These are the three that move and govern our souls. But yet this is the difference, that a wise man ruleth and rangeth himself according to nature and reason, regardeth his duty, holdeth for apocryphal, and suspects whatsoever dependeth upon opinion, or passion: and therefore he liveth in peace, passeth away his life cheerfully and pleasingly, is not subject to repentance, recantations, changes; because whatsoever falleth out, he could neither do nor chuse better, and therefore he is neither kindled nor stirred; for reason is alwayes peaceable. The fool that suffereth himself to be led by these two, doth nothing but wonder and war with himself and never resteth. He is alwayes re-advising, changing, mending, repenting, and is never contented; which to say the truth, belongeth to a wise man, who hath reason and virtue to make himself such a one. *Nulla placidior quies nisi quam ratio composuit.* No rest more pleasing, than that which reason hath settled. An honest man must govern and respect himself, and fear his reason and his Conscience, which is his *bonus genius*, his good spirit, in such sort, that he cannot without shame, stumble in their presence: *rarum est, ut satis se quisque vereatur.* It is a rare thing, that any man should sufficiently be afraid of himself.

- 8 As touching the body, we owe thereunto assistance, and conduct or direction. It is folly to go about to separate and sunder these two principal parts, the one from the other; but contrarily it is fit and necessary they be united and joyned together. Nature hath given us a body, as a necessary instrument to life: and it is not that the spirit as the principal, should take upon it the guardianship and protection of the body. So far should it be from serving the body, which is the most base, unjust, shameful, and burthenesome servitude, that is, that it should assist, counsel it, and be as a husband unto it. So that it oweth thereunto care, not service: It must handle it as a Lord, not as a Tyrant; nourish it, not pamper it, giving it to understand, that it liveth not for it, but that it cannot live here below, without it. This is an instruction to the work-man, to know how to use, and make use of his instruments. And it is likewise no small advantage to a man, to know how to use his body, and to make it a fit instrument for the exercise of virtue. Finally, the body is preserved in good estate by moderate nourishment, and orderly exercise. How the spirit must have a part, and bear it company in those pleasures that belong unto it, hath been said before, and shall hereafter

after, be set down in the virtue of Temperance.

Touching goods and the duty of every man in this case, there are many and divers Offices; for to gather riches, to keep them, to husband them, to employ them, to yield unto them all that is fit, are different sciences. One is wise in the one of them, that in the other understandeth nothing, neither is it fit he should. The acquisition of riches, hath more parts than the rest. The employment is more glorious and ambitious. The preservation and custody, which is proper to the women, is the labour to cover them.

These are the two extremities alike vicious, to love and affect riches; to hate and reject them. By riches, I understand that which is more than enough, and more than is needful. A wise man will do neither of both, according to that wish and prayer of Solomon: *Give me neither riches nor poverty*: but he will hold them in their place, esteeming them as they are, a thing of it self indifferent, matter of good and evil, and to many things commodious.

The evils and miseries that follow the affecting and hating of them, have been spoken of before. Now in five words we set down a rule touching the mediocrity therein. 1. To desire them, but not to love them. *Sapiens non amat divitias, sed mavult*: A wise man doth not love riches, but would willingly have them. As a little man, and weak of body, would willingly be higher and stronger, but this his desire is without care or pain unto himself, seeking that without passion, which nature desireth: and fortune knoweth not how to take from him. 2. And much lesse, to seek them at the cost and damage of another, or by art, and bad and base means, to the end, no man should complain, or envy his gains. 3. When they come upon him, entering at an honest gate, not to reject them, but chearfully to accept them, and to receive them into his house, not his heart; into his possession, not his love, as being unworthy thereof. 4. When he possesseth them, to employ them honestly and discreetly, to the good of other men; that their departure may, at the least, be as honest as their entrance. 5. If they happen to depart without leave, be lost or stolen from him, that he be not sorrowful but that he suffer them to depart with themselves, without any thing of his. *Si divitiæ effluxerint nisi non auferant semetipsam*: If riches passe away, let them carry nothing with them but themselves. To conclude, he deserveth not to be accepted of God, and is unworthy his love, and the profession of virtue, that makes account of the riches of this world.



*Aude hospes contemnere opes, & te quoque dignum Finge Deo:  
Be bold to set at naught base trash and pelf,  
And worthy of a God frame thou thyself.*

*Of the justice and duty of man towards man.*

*An Advertisement.*

**T**His duty is great, and hath many parts; we will reduce them to two great ones. In the first we will place the general, simple, and common duties required in all and every one, towards all and every one, whether in heart, word, or deed; which are amity, faith, verity and free admonition, good deeds, humanity, liberality, acknowledgement or thankfulness. In the second, shall be the special duties required for some special and express reason and obligation between certain persons, as between a Man and his Wife, Parents and Children, Masters and Servants, Princes and Subjects, Magistrates, the great and powerful, and the lesse.

*The first part, which is of the general and common duties of all towards all, and first,*

## CHAP. VII.

*Of love or friendship.*

**I**  
*The Descripti-  
on.*

**A**Mity is a sacred flame, kindled in our breasts, first by nature, and hath expressed its first heat between the Husband and Wife, Parents and Children, Brothers and Sisters; and afterwards growing cold, hath recovered heat by Art, and the invention of alliances, Companies, Fraternities, Colledges, and Communities. But forasmuch as in all things, being divided into many parts, it was weakened and mingled with other pleasant and profitable considerations; to the end, it might re-strengthen it self, and unite its own forces into a narrow room, betwixt two true friends. And this is perfect amity, which is so much more fervent and spiritual than other, by how much the heart is hotter than the liver, and the blood than the veins.

**2**

Amity is the soul and life of the world, more necessary (say the wife)

wife) than fire and water : *Amicitia, necessitudo, amici necessarii*; Friendship, familiarity, are necessary friends. It is the sun, the staff, the salt of our life ; for without it, all is darkness, and there is no joy, no stay, no taste of life : *Amicitia justitiæ cõsors, naturæ vinculum, civitatis presidium, senectutis solatium, vitæ humane portus: eâ omnia constant, discordiâ cadunt*: Friendship is the companion of Justice, the bond of nature, the defence of a City, the comfort of old age, and the quiet harbour of mans life : By it all things consist, and by discord decay.

And we must not think that friendship is profitable and delightful to private men only, for it is more commodious to the weal-publick : it is the true nurling Mother of humane society, the preserver of States and policies. Neither is it suspected, nor displeaseth any but Tyrants and Monsters, not because they honour it not in their hearts, but because they cannot be of that number, for only friendship sufficeth to preserve the world. And if it were every where in force there would be no need of a Law, which hath not been ordained, but as a help, and as a second remedy for want of friendship, to the end, it might inforce and constrain by the authority thereof, that which for love and friendship, should be free and voluntary ; but howsoever the Law taketh place far below friendship. For friendship ruleth the heart, the tongue, the hand, the will, and the effects ; the Law can but provide for that which is without. This is the reason why *Aristotle* said, that good Law-makers, have ever had more care of friendship, than of justice : And because the Law and Justice do many times lose their credit, the third remedy, and least of all, hath been in Arms and force, altogether contrary to the former, which is friendship. Thus we see by degrees, the three means of publick Government. But love or friendship is worth more than the rest, for second and subsidiary helps are no way comparable to the first and principal.

3  
How necessary  
to the weal-  
publick.

The diversity and distinction of friendship is great : That of the ancients into four kinds, Natural, Sociable, Hospitall, Venerous, is not sufficient. We may note three ; The first is drawn from the causes which ingender it, which are four ; nature, virtue, profit, pleasure : which sometimes go together in Troops ; sometimes two, or three, and very often one alone : But virtue is the more noble and the stronger, for that is spiritual, and in the heart, as friendship is : Nature in the blood, profit in the purse, pleasure in some part, or sense of the body. So likewise virtue is more liberal, more free, and

4  
The first distinction of the  
causes.



pure, and without it the other causes are poor, and idle, and frail. He that loveth for virtue, is never weary with loving, and, if friendship be broken, complaineth not: He that loveth for profit, if it fail, complaineth, and it turneth to his reproach, that when he hath done all he can, he hath lost all: He that loveth for pleasure, if his pleasure cease, his love ceaseth with it, and without complaint, estrangeth himself.

5  
2. *Of persons.*

1

The second distinction which is in regard of the persons, is in three kinds: The one is in a straight line, between superiours and inferiours; and it is either natural, as between Parents and Children, Uncles and Nephews; or lawful, as between the Prince and the subjects, the Lord and his vassals, the Master and his servants, the Doctor and the Disciple, the Prelate or Governour, and the People. Now this kind to speak properly, is not friendship, both because of the great disparity that is betwixt them, which hindereth that inwardness and familiarity and entire communication, which is the principal fruit and effect of friendship, as likewise because of the obligation that is therein, which is the cause why there is lesse liberty, and lesse choice and affection therein. And this is the reason, why men give it other names than of friendship: for in inferiours, there is required of them honour, respect, obedience; in superiours, care and vigilancy, over their inferiours. The second kind of friendship, in regard of the persons, is in a collateral line between equals, or such as are near equals. And this is likewise twofold; for either it is natural, as between brothers, sisters, cousins, and this comes nearer to friendship, than the former, because there is lesse disparity. But yet there is a bond of nature, which as on the one side, it knitteth and fastneth, so on the other it loosneth: for by reason of goods, and divisions, and affairs, it is not possible, but brothers and kins-folks must sometimes differ: besides, that many times the correspondency, and relation of humours and wills, which is the essence of friendship, is not found amongst them; He is my brother, or my kins-man, but yet he is a wicked man, a fool: Or it is free and voluntary, as between companions and friends, who touch not in blood, and hold of nothing but only friendship and love: and this is properly and truly friendship.

3

3. The third kind of friendship, in regard of the persons, is mixt, and as it were compounded of the other two, whereby it is, or it should be more strong, this is matrimonial of married couples, which

which holdeth of love or friendship in a straight line because of the superiority of the husband, and the inferiority of the wife; and of collateral friendship being both of them companions joyned together by equal bands. And therefore the wife was not taken out of the head, nor foot, but the side of man. Again, such as are married, in all things and by turns exercise and shew both these friendships; that which is in a straight line in publick, for a wife woman honoureth and respecteth her husband; that which is collateral in private, by private familiarity. The matrimonial friendship is likewise after another fashion double and compounded; for it is spiritual and corporal, which is not in other friendship, save onely in that which is reprov'd by all good laws, and by nature it self. Matrimonial friendship then is great, strong, and puissant. There are neverthelesse two or three things that stay and hinder it, that it cannot attain to the perfection of friendship; the one, that there is no part of marriage free but the entrance, for the progresse and the continuance thereof is altogether constrained, enforced, I mean in Christian marriages; for every where else it is lesse enforced, by reason of those divorcements which are permitted: the other is the weakness and insufficiency of the wife, which can no way correspond to that perfect conference and communication of thoughts and judgments: her soul is not strong and constant enough to endure the straightness of a knot so fast, so strong, so durable; it is as if a man should sew a strong and coorse piece of cloth to a soft and delicate. This filleth not the place, but vanisheth and is easily torn from the other. Again, this inconvenience followeth the friendship of married couples, that it is mingled with so many other strange matters, children, parents of the one side and the other, and so many other distaff-busineses that do many times trouble and interrupt a lively affection.

The third distinction of friendship respecteth the force and intention, or the weakness and diminution of friendship. According to this reason, there is a twofold friendship, the common and imperfect, which we may call good will, familiarity, private acquaintance: and it hath infinite degrees, one more strict, intimate and strong than another: and the perfect, which is invincible, and is a Phenix in the world, yea hardly conceived by imagination.

We shall know them both by confronting them together, and by knowing their differences, The common may be attained in a short time. Of the perfect it is said, that we must take long time



to deliberate, and they must eat much salt together before it be perfected.

2. The common is attained, built, and ordered by divers profitable and delightful occasions and occurrants: and therefore a wise man hath set down two means to attain unto it, to speak things pleasant, and to do things profitable; the perfect is acquired by an only true and lively virtue reciprocally known.

3. The common may be with and between divers: the perfect is with one only, who is another self, and between two only, who are but one. It would intangle and hinder it self amongst many, for if two at one time should desire to be succoured, if they should request of me contrary offices; if the one should commit to my secrecy a thing that is expedient for another to know, what course, what order may be kept herein? Doubtless, division is an enemy to perfection, and union her cousin-germane.

4. The common is capable of more and lesse, of exceptions, restraints, and modifications; it is kindled and cooled, subject to accession and recession, like a favour, according to the presence or absence, merits, good deeds, and so forth. The perfect not so, alwaies the same, marching with an equal pace, firm, haughty, and constant.

5. The common receiveth and hath need of many rules and cautions given by the wise; whereof one is, to love without respect of piety, verity, virtue, *Amicus usque ad aras*. Another, so to love as that a man may hate; so to hate, as that he may likewise love, that is to hold alwaies the bridle in his hand, and not to abandon himself so profusely, that he may have cause to repent, if the knot of friendship happen to unite.

Again, to aid and succour at a need without intreaty: for a friend is bashful, and it costs him dear to request that that he thinks to be his due. Again, not to be important to his friends, as they that are alwaies complaining after the manner of women. Now all these lessons are very wholesome in ordinary friendship, but have no place in this sovereign and perfect.

6

*The description  
of perfect  
friendship.*

We shall know this better by the portrait and description of perfect friendship; which is a very free, plain, and universal confusion of two souls. See here three words. 1. A confusion, not only a Conjunction, and joyning together, as of solid things, which howsoever they be fastened, mingled, and knit together, may be separated

rated and known apart. For the souls of men in this perfect amity are in such sort plunged and drowned the one within the other, that they can no more be divided, neither would they than things liquid that are mingled together. 2. Very free, and built upon the pure choice and liberty of the will, without any other obligation, occasion, or strange cause. There is nothing more free and voluntary than affection. 3. Universal, without any exception of all things, goods, honours, judgments, thoughts, wills, life. From this universal and full confusion it proceedeth, that the one cannot lend or give to the other, and there is no speech betwixt them of good turns, obligations, acknowledgements, thankfulness, and other the like duties, which are the nourishers of common friendships, but yet testimonies of division and difference, as I know not how to thank my self for the service I do unto my self, neither doth that love which I bear unto my self increase by those succours and helps I give unto my self. And in marriage it self, to give some resemblance of this divine knot, though it come far short thereof, donations are forbid between the husband and the wife: and if there were place for three, one to give unto the other, he is the giver that gives cause to his friend to expresse and imploy his love; and he receiveth the good turn, that by giving binds his companion: for the one and the other seeking above all things even with a greedy desire to do good to one another, he that giveth the occasion and yieldeth the matter he that is liberal, giving that contentment to his friend, to effect that which he most desireth.

Of this perfect friendship and communion, antiquity yieldeth some examples. *Bl sius* taken for a good friend of *Tiberius Gracchus* then condemned to die, and being asked what he would do for his sake, and he answering that he would refuse nothing, it was demanded what he would do if *Gracchus* should intreat him to fire the Temples? to whom he answered, that *Gracchus* would never intreat such a matter at his hands, but if he should he would obey him; a very bold and dangerous answer. He might boldly have said, that *Gracchus* would never have required such a matter, and that should have been his answer; for according to this our description, a perfect friend doth not only fully know the will of his friend, which might have sufficed for an answer, but he holdeth in his sleeve, and wholly possesseth it. And in that he added, that if *Gracchus* would have required it, he would have done it, it is as if he had said nothing, it neither alters nor hurteth his first answer concerning



that assurance that he had of the will of *Gracchus*. This of Wills and Judgements. 3. Touching goods, There were three friends (this word three is some impeachment to our rule, and may make us think that this was no perfect amity) two rich and one poor charged with an old mother, and a daughter to marry: this man dying made his will, wherein he bequeathed to one of his friends his mother to be fed and maintained by him, to the other his daughter to be married by him, enjoying him withall to bestow upon her the best dowry that his ability would afford, and if it should happen that the one of them should die, he should substitute the other. The people made themselves merry with his Will or Testament, the legataries accepted of it with great contentment, and each of them received unto them their legacy; but he that hath taken the mother, departing this life within five dayes after, the other surviving and remaining the sole universall inheritour, did carefully intertain the mother, and within a few dayes after he married in one day his own & onely daughter, and her that was bequeathed unto him dividing betwixt them by equall portions all his goods. The wise, according to this description, have judged that the first dying, expressed greatest love, and was the more lib-erall, making his friends his heires, and giving them that contentment, as to employ them for the supply of his wants. 4. Touching life; that history is sufficiently known of those two friends, whereof the one being condemned by the tyrant to dye at a certain day and hour, he requested, that giving baile, he might in the mean time go and dispose of his domesticall affairs, which the tyrant agreeing unto upon this condition, that if he did not returne by that time, his baile should suffer the punishment. The prisoner delivered his friend, who entred into prison upon that condition: and the time being come, and the friend who was the baile resolving to dye, his condemned friend failed not to offer himself, and so quit his friend of that danger. Whereat the tyrant being more than astonished, and delivering them both from death, desired them to receive, and to adopt him in their friendship as their friend.

## CHAP. VIII.

*Of faith, trust, treachery, secrecy.*

<sup>1</sup>  
The dignity of **A**Ll men, yea the most treacherous know and confesse that faith is the band of humane society, the foundation of all justice and

and that above all things it ought to bee religiously observed ; *Nihil augustius fide, quæ justitiæ fundamentum est, nec ulla res vehementius rempublicam continet & vitam : Sanctissimum humani pectoris bonum : Nothing is more excellent than faith, which is the foundation of justice, neither doth any thing more mightily bridle and rule the common-wealth and the life of man. It is the most sacred good in the breasts of men.*

*Ante Iovem generata, decus divumq; hominumq;*

*Quæ sine non tellus pacem non æquora norunt,*

*Iustitiæ consors, tacitumq; in pectore numen.*

*Borne before Jupiter, of gods and men the grace,*

*Which neither land, nor seas for peace have place,*

*Consort to Justice, in mans breast,*

*A God-head not to be exprest.*

Cic.

Neverthelesse the world is full of treacheries. There are but few that doe well and truly keep their faith. They break it divers wayes, and they perceive it not. So they finde some pretext and colour thereof, they think they are safe enough. Others seek corners, evasions, subtilties ; *Querunt latebras perjurio.* Now to remove all the difficulties that are in this matter, and truly to know how a man should carry himself, there are four considerations, whereto all the rest may be referred : The persons, as well he that giveth faith, as he that receiveth it ; the subject whereof the question is made, and the manner according to which the faith is given.

As touching him that giveth faith, it is necessary that he have power to doe it : If he be subject to another, he cannot give it, and having given it without the leave and approbation of his master, it is of none effect, as it did well appeare in the Tribune Saturnine & his complices who comming forth of the Capitol (which they had taken by rebellion) upon the faith given by the Consuls, subjects, and officers of the Common-wealth were justly slain. But every free man must keep his faith, how great and honourable soever he be ; yea the greater he is, the more he is bound to keep it, because he is the more free to give it. And it was well said, That the simple word of a Prince should be of as great force, as the oath of a private man.

2  
Fidelity grave.

The division of  
this matter.

3  
He that giveth  
faith.

As touching him to whom faith is given, whosoever he be, it must carefully be kept, and there are but two exceptions, which are clear enough, the one if he received it not, and were not contented with it, but demanded other caution and assurance. For faith is a sacred thing.

4  
He that receiveth  
it.



## Of faith, trust, treachery, secreſſe.

things, muſt ſimply be received; otherwiſe it is no more faith, nor truſt, when hoſtages are demanded, ſureties are given; to take gages or caution with faith, is a thing ridiculous. He that is held under the guard of men, or walls, if he eſcape and ſave himſelf, is not faultie. The reaſon of that Romane, is good; *Vult ſibi quique, credi, & habita fides ipſam ſibi obligat fidem: fides requirit fiduciam, & relativa ſunt*; Every one would have himſelf to be credited, and faith given, bindeſh faith unto him: faith required truſt, and they have relation the one to the other. The other, if having accepted it, he firſt brake it; *Frangenti fides frangatur eadem: quando in me non habes pro Senatore, nec ego te pro Conſule*: With him that breaketh faith, let faith alſo be broken: *When thou holdeſt not me for a Senator, I will not hold thee for a Conſul*. A treacherous man deſerveth not by the law of nature that faith ſhould be kept unto him, except it be after an agreement, which covereth the treachery, and maketh revenge unlawfull. Now theſe two caſes excepted, a man muſt keep his faith to whomſoever, to his ſubjects as ſhall be ſaid. 2. To an enemy, witneſſe the act of *Atilius Regulus*; the proclamation of the Senate of Rome againſt all thoſe that had been liſenced by *Pyrrhus* upon their faith given to depart; and *Camillus*, who would not ſo much as make uſe of the treachery of another, but reſent the children of the *Falſſians* with their matter. 3. To a thief and publick offender, witneſſe the fact of *Pompey*, to the pirates and robbers; and of *Auguſtus* to *Crocotas*. 4. To the enemies of religion, according to the example of *Iſua* againſt the *Gibeonites*. But faith ought not to be given to theſe two latter, thieves and hereticks, or apoſtate's, nor taken of them: for we ought not to capitulate, nor to treat wittingly of peace and alliance with ſuch kind of people, except it be in extreme neceſſity, or for the winning of them to the truth, or for the publick good, but being given, it ought to be kept.

Chap. 14.

5  
The ſubject of  
faith-

Livie.

As touching the thing ſubject, if it be unjuſt or impoſſible, a man is quit: and being unjuſt, it is well done to ſlie from it, and a double fault to keep it. All other excuſes beſides theſe two, are of no account, as loſſe, damage, diſpleaſure, diſcommodity, difficulty; as the *Romanes* have many time practiſed, who have rejected many great advantages, to avoid the breach of faith, *Quibus tanta utilitate fides antiquior fuit*: With whom faith was better accounted than ſo much profit.

6  
The manner of  
giving faith.

Touching the manner of giving faith, there is ſome doubt; for ma-

ny think, that if it have been extorted either by force and fear, or by fraud and ſudden ſurpriſe, a man is not bound unto it; becauſe in both caſes, he that promiſeth hath not a will, whereby all things are to be judged. Others are of a contrary opinion; and to ſay the truth, *Joſua* kept his faith and promiſe to the *Gibionites*, though it were extorted from him by a great ſurpriſe, and falſe intelligence, and it was afterwards declared, that he did therein what he ought to do. And therefore it ſeemeth that a man may ſay, That where there is onely a ſimple word and promiſe paſt, a man is not bound, but if faith or promiſe given be confirmed and authoriſed by an act, as the fact of *Joſua*, he is bound to perform it in regard of the name of God: but yet that he is afterwards in judgement to ſeek means to right himſelf of that either deceit or violence. Faith given with an oath, and the interpoſition of the name of God, bindeth more than a ſimple promiſe; and the breach thereof which includeth perjury with treachery, is far worſe. But to think to give aſſurance of faith by new and ſtrange oaths, as many do, is ſuperfluous amongſt honeſt men, and unprofitable, if a man will be diſloyall. The beſt way is to ſwear by the eternall God, the revenger of thoſe that vainly uſe his name, and break the faith.

Treachery and perjury is in a certain ſenſe, more baſe and execrable than Atheiſme. The Atheiſt that believeth there is no God, is not ſo injurious againſt him in thinking there is no God, as he that knoweth him, believeth in him, and in mockery and contempt doth perjuriously abuſe his name. He that ſweareth to deceive, mocketh God, and feareth man. It is a leſſe ſin to contemn God, than to mock him. The horror of treachery and perjury cannot be better deciphered, than it was by him that ſaid, It was to give a testimony of the contempt of God, and the fear of men. And what thing is more monſtrous than to be a coward with men, and reſolute and valourous with God? Treachery is, ſecondly, the traytor and capital enemy of humane ſociety. For it breaketh and deſtroyeth the band thereof, and all commerce which dependeth upon the word and promiſes of men, which if it fail we have nothing elſe to ſtick unto.

To the keeping of faith belongeth the faithfull guard of the ſecrets of another, which is a charge full of inconvenience, eſpecially of great perſonages, which though it may wiſely be performed, yet it is good to ſlie the knowledge of them, as ſometimes that Poet did the ſecrets of *Lyſmachus*. He that takes into his cuſtody the ſecrets of another, draws a greater trouble upon him, than he dreams of:

for

7  
Treachery inju-  
rious to God.

To man.

8  
To keep ſecrets.



for besides the care that he takes unto himself, to keep them well, he binds himself to faine, and to denie his own thoughts a thing very irksome to a noble and generous heart. Neverthelesse he that takes that charge upon him, must keep it religiously: and to the end he may do it well, and play the good secretary, he must be such a one by nature not by art and obligation.

## CHAP. I X.

## Veritie and free admonition.

<sup>1</sup>  
An excellent  
thing.

**F**ree and hearty admonition is a very wholsome and excellent medicine, and the best office of amity. For to wound and offend a little, to profit much, is to love soundly. It is one of the principall and most profitable Evangelical commandments: *Si peccaverit in te frater tuus, corripe illum, &c.* If the brother sin against thee, reprove him, &c.

<sup>2</sup>  
To whom profitable.

All have sometimes need of this remedy, but especially all those that are in prosperity, for it is a very hard thing to be happy and wise together. And Princes who lead a life so publick and are to furnish themselves with so many things, and have so many things hid from them, cannot see nor understand, but by the eyes and eares of another. And therefore they have great need of advertisements: otherwise they may chance to run strange and hard fortunes, if they be not very wise.

<sup>3</sup>  
Rare, difficult,  
dangerous.

This office is undertaken by very few; There are required thereunto (as the wise affirme) three things, judgement or discretion, courageous liberty, amity and fidelity. These are tempered and mingled together, but few there are that doe it, for fear of offending, or want of true amity, and of those that doe it, few there are that know how to do it well. Now if it be ill done, like a medicine ill applied, it woundeth without profit, and produceth almost the same effect with griefe, that flattery doth with pleasure. To be commended and to be reprehended unfittingly and to small purpose, is the self-same wound, and a matter a like faulty in him that doth it. Verity how noble soever it be, yet it hath not this priviledge, to be employed at all hours and in all fashions. A wholsome holy reprehension may be vitiously applied:

<sup>4</sup>  
The rules of true  
admonition.

The counsels and cautions for a man well to govern himself here-  
in (it is to be understood where there is no great inwardnesse, fami-  
liaritie, confidence, or authority and power, for in these cases  
there

here is no place for the careful, observation of these rules following ) are these. 1. To observe place and time ; that it be neither in times nor places of feasting, and great joy ; for that were (as they say) to trouble the feast : nor of sorrow and adversity : for that were a point of hostility, and the way to make an end of all ; that is rather a fit time to succour and comfort a man. *Crudelis in re adversa objurgatio, damnare est objurgare, cum auxilio est opus : Chiding is cruel in adversity, to chide is to condemn, when help is needful.* King *Perseus*, seeing himself thus handled by two of his familiar friends, killed them both. 2. Not to reprehend all things indifferently : not small and light offences ; this were to be envious ; and an importunate, ambitious reprehender ; not great and dangerous, which a man of himself doth sufficiently feel, and fear a worse punishment to come ; this were to make a man think he lies in wait to catch him. 3. Secretly and not before witness ; to the end he make him not ashamed, as it hapned to a young man, who was so much abashed, that he was reprehended by *Pythagoras*, that he hanged himself. And *Plutarch* is of opinion, that it was for this cause that *Alexander* killed his friend *Clitus*, because he reprehended him in company : but especially, that it be not before those, whose good opinion, he that is reprehended desireth to retain, and with whom he desires to continue his credit, as before his Wife, his Children, his Disciples. 4. Out of a simple careless nature, and freedom of heart, without any particular interest, or passion of the mind, be it never so little. 5. To comprehend himself in the same fault, and to use general termes, as, We forget our selves, what do we think of ? To begin with commendations, and to end with proffers of service and help ; this tempereth the tartness of correction, and gives a better entertainment. Such and such a thing, becomes you well, but not so well such and such a thing. 7. To express the fault with better words than the nature of the offence doth require, as, You have not been altogether well advised in stead of, You have done wickedly : receive not this woman into your company, for she will undo you ; in stead of, Allure her not, perswade her not to yield to your desires, for thereby you will undo your self : Enter not into dispute with such a man ; in stead of, Quarrel not, envy not such a man. 8. The admonition being ended, be not presently gone ; but stay and fall into some other common and pleasant discourse.



## CHAP. X.

## Of flattery, lying, and dissembling.

**F**lattery a pernicious and villainous thing.

Flattery is a very dangerous poyson, to every particular person, & almost the only cause of the ruine of a Prince and the State: it is worse than false witness, which corrupteth not the Judge, but deceiveth him only, causing him to give a wicked sentence against his will and judgement: but flattery corrupteth the judgement, enchanteth the spirit, and makes him unapt to be further instructed in the truth. And if a Prince be once corrupted by flattery, it necessarily followeth, that all that are about him, if they will live in grace and favour, must be flatterers. It is therefore a thing as pernicious, as truth is excellent, for it is the corruption of truth. It is also a villainous vice, of a base beggerly mind, as foul and ill befitting a man, as impudency a woman. *Ut matrona metretici dispar erit atque Discolor, infidoscurræ distabit amicus:* Look how different and unlike a modest matron is to an impudent harlot; so far distant is a friend from a faithless jester. Flatterers are likewise compared to harlots, forcerers, oyl-sellers, to wolves; and another saith, that a man were better fall among crows than flatterers.

<sup>2</sup>  
Especially to two sorts of people.

There are two sorts of People subject to be flattered, that is to say, Such as never want People to furnish them with this kind of Merchandize, and easily suffer themselves to be taken by it; that is to say, Princes, with whom wicked men get credit thereby; and women, for there is nothing so proper and ordinary, to corrupt the chastity of women, as to feed and entertain them with their own commendations.

<sup>3</sup>  
Hardly avoided.

Flattery is hardly avoided, and it is a matter of difficulty, to be preserved from it, not only to women, by reason of their weakness and their natures full of vanity, and desirous of praise; and to Princes, because they are their kinsfolks, friends, and principal officers, whom they cannot avoid, that profess this mystery: (*Alexander*, that great king and Philosopher, could not defend himself from it, and there is not any private man, that would not yield much more unto it, than Kings, if he were daily assaulted and corrupted, by such base rascal sort of people as they are) But generally unto all, yea, to the wisest, both by reason of the sweetness thereof in such sort that though a man withstand it, yet it pleaseth; and though he oppose himself against it, yet he never shutteth it quite out of doors:

doors : *Unde saepe exclusa novissimè accipitur* : Though often rejected, yet at last received : and because of the hypocrisie thereof, whereby it is hardly discovered : for it is so well counterfeited and covered with the visage of amity, that it is no easie matter to discern it.

It usurpeth the Offices, it hath the voice, it carrieth the name and counterfeited thereof so artificially, that you will say, that it is the same. It studieth to content and please, it honoureth and commendeth : It busieth it self much, and takes much pains to do service; it accommodateth it self to the wills and humours of men. What more? It takes upon it, even the highest and most proper point of amity, which is, to chide, and freely to reprehend. To be brief, A Flatterer will seem to exceed in love, him that he flattereth; whereas contrariwise, there is nothing more opposite unto love, not detraction, not injury, not professed enmity. It is the plague and poyson of true amity; they are altogether incompatible; *Non potes simul amico & adulatore uti* : Thou canst not use me together, both for a friend, and a flatterer. Better are the sharp admonitions of a friend, than the kisses of a flatterer. *Meliora vulnera diligentis, quàm oscula blandientis.*

*It imiteth and resembleth amity, but it is the plague thereof.*

4

Wherefore, not to mistake it, let us by the true Picture thereof, finde out the means to know it, and to discern it from true amity. *The description and antithesis of flattery and amity.*  
 1. Flattery respecteth for the most part its own particular benefit, and thereby it is known; but true friendship seeketh not the good of it self. 2. The flatterer is changeable, and divers in his judgement, like wax, or a Looking-glasse, that receiveth all forms. He is a *Chameleon*, a *Polypus*, faine to praise and dispraise, and he will do the like, accommodating himself to the mind of him he flattereth. A friend is firm and constant. 3. He carrieth himself too violently and ambitiously in all that he doth, in the view and knowledge of him he flattereth, ever praising and offering his service. *Nm imitatur amicitiam, sed præterit* : He doth not imitate friendship, but passe by it. He hath no moderation in his outward actions, and contrariwise, inwardly he hath no affection; which are conditions quite contrary to a true friend. 4. He yieldeth, and alwayes giveth the victory to him he flattereth, alwayes applauding him, having no other end than to please, in such sort, that he commendeth all, and more than all; yea, sometimes to his own cost, blaming and humbling himself like a wrestler that stoopeth, the better to overthrow his companion. A friend goes roundly to work, cares not whether he have the



*Of flattery, lying, and dissimulation.*

the first or the second place, and respecteth not so much how he may please, as how he may profit, whether it be by fair means, or by foul, as a good Physician useth to do to cure his patient: 5. A flatterer sometimes usurpeth the liberty of a friend to apprehend; but it is with the left hand and untowardly. For he stayes himself at small and light matters, that are not worthy reprehension, faining want of knowledge of any greater, but yet he will be rude and rough enough in the censuring of the kindred and servants of him he flattereth, as failing much in that duty they should do unto him. Or he faineth to have understood some light accusations against him, and that he could not be quiet until he knew the truth thereof; and if it fall out, that he that is flattered deny them, or excuse himself, he taketh occasion to commend him the more: I was much astonished at it (saith he) and I could not believe it, for I see the contrary. For how should I think, that you will take from another man, when you give all that is your own, and take more care to give than to take? Or at least wise, he will make his reprehension to serve his turn, that he may flatter the better; telling him, that he takes not care enough of himself, he is not sparing enough of his person and presence, so necessary to the Common-weal, as once a Senator did to *Tiberius* in a full Senate, but with an ill scent, and as bad success. 6. Finally, to conclude in a word, a friend alwayes respecteth, procureth, and attempteth that which is reason, and honesty, and duty; the flatterer that which belongs to passion and pleasure, and that which is already a malady in the minde of him that is flattered. And therefore he is a proper instrument, for all things that belong to pleasure and licentious liberty, and not for that which is honest or painful, and dangerous. He is like an Ape, who being unfit for any other service, as other beasts are, serves for a play-game, and to make sport.

7  
Of lying, the  
foulness and  
hurt thereof.

A near Neighbour and alliance to flattery is lying, a base vice; and therefore said an ancient Philosopher, *That it was the part of slaves to lie, of free-men to speak the truth.* For what greater wickedness is there, than for a man to belie his own knowledge? The first step to the corruption of good manners, is the banishment of truth; as contrarily, saith *Pindarus*, *To be true, is the beginning of vertue.* It is likewise pernicious to humane society. We are not men, neither can we knit and joyn together in humane society, as hath bin said, if this be wanting. Doubtless, silence is more sociable, than untrue speech. If a lie had but one visage as truth hath, there were some reme-

remedy for it; for we would take the contrary to that which a lyar speaketh to be the certain truth. But the contrary to truth hath a hundred thousand figures, and an indefinite and unlimited field. That which is good, that it to say, virtue & verity, is too finite & certain, because there is but one way to the mark: That which is evil, that is to say, vice and error, and lying, is infinite and uncertain, because there are a thousand ways to miss the mark. Doubtlesse if men knew the horror of lying, they would pursue it with sword and fire. And therefore such as have the charge of youth are with all instance and diligence, to hinder it, and to withstand the first birth and progress of this vice, as likewise of opinative obstinacy, and that in time, for they never leave growing.

There is likewise a covered and disguised lye, which is hypocrisie and dissimulation (a notable quality of Courtiers, and in as great credit amongst them as virtue) the vice of licentious and base minds: for a man to disguise and hide himself under a mask, as not daring to shew himself to be that which he is, is a cowardly and servile humour.

6  
*Of hypocrisie.*

Now he that makes profession of this goodly mystery, lives in great pain, for it is a great unquietness for a man to endeavour to seem other than that he is, and to have an eye unto himself, for fear lest he should be discovered. It is a torment for a man to hide his own nature: to be discovered, a confusion. There is no such pleasure as to live according to his nature, and it is better to be lesse esteemed and to live openly, than to take so much pains to counterfeit and live under a canopy; so excellent and so noble a thing is freedom.

7  
*The difficulty thereof.*

But the mystery of these kind of men is but poor; for dissimulation continues not long undiscovered, according to that saying: Things fained and violent dure not long: and the reward of such people is, that no man will trust them, nor give them credit when they speak the truth; for what soever comes from them is held for apocryphal and mockery.

8  
*The dissimulation of courtiers.*

Now here is need of indifferency and wisdom. For if nature be deformed, vicious and offensive to another; it must be contrained, and, to speak better, corrected. There is a difference between living freely and carelessly. Again, a man must not always speak all he knows, that is a folly; but that which he speaketh, let it be that which he thinketh.

9  
*The counsel hereupon.*

There are two sorts of people in whom dissimulation is excusable,

10  
*Dissimulation benefitting woble men.*



ble, yea sometimes requisite ; but yet for divers reasons, that is to say, in the Prince for the publick benefit, and the good and peace of himself, or the state, as before hath been said ; and in women for the conveniency thereof, because an overfree and bold liberty becomes them not, but rather inclines to impudence. Those small disguisements, fained carriages, hypocrisies, which well besit their shamefastness and modesty, deceive none but fools ; beseeem them well and defend their honours ; But yet it is a thing which they are not to take any great pains to learn, because hypocrisie is natural in them. They are wholly made for it, and they all make use of it, and too much : their visage, their vestments, their words, countenance, laughter, weeping ; and they practise it not onely towards their husbands living, but after their death too. They feign great sorrow, and many times inwardly laugh. *Jactantius moerent, quæ minus dolent : They mourn in shew, that grieve but little.*

## CHAP. XI.

## Of benefits, obligation, and thankfulness.

**T**He science and matter of benefits or good turns, and the thankful acknowledgment of the obligation, active and passive is great, of great use, and very subtile. It is that where in we fail most. We neither know how to do good, nor to be thankful for it. It should seem that the grace as well of the merit, as of the acknowledgment is decayed, and revenge and ingratitude is wholly in request, so much more ready and ardent are we thereunto. *Gratia oneriest, ultio in questu habetur : altius injuriæ quam merita descendunt : Thankfulness is a burthen, revenge is accounted for gain : Injuries sink deeper than deserts.* First then we will speak of merit and good deeds, where we will comprehend humanity, liberality, almes-deeds and their contraries, inhumanity, cruelty ; and afterwards of obligation, acknowledgment, and forgetfulness, or ingratitude and revenge.

Tacit.  
Senec.

I.  
*An exhortation to good works by divers reasons.*

God, nature, and reason, do invite us to do good, and to deserve well of another ; God by his example, and his nature, which is wholly good ; neither do we know any better means how to imitate God ; *Nulli re propius ad Dei naturam accedimus, quam beneficentia. Dei est mortalem succurrere mortali.* In nothing we come nearer to the nature of God, than in doing good. It is of God that one mor-

tal man succoureth another. Nature witnesseth this one thing, that every one delighteth to see him, to whom he hath done good: it best agreeth with nature; *Nihil tam secundum naturam, quam juvare consortium naturæ*: Nothing is more agreeable to nature, than to help him that partaketh of the same nature. It is the work of an honest and generous man to do good, and to deserve well of another, yea to seek occasions thereunto. *Liberalis etiam dandi causas querit*: It is a part of a liberal man even to seek occasions of giving. And it is said, that good blood cannot lye, nor fail at a need. It is greatness to give, baseness to take; *Beatius est dare quam accipere*. It is better to give than to receive. He that giveth, honoureth himself, makes himself master over the receiver; he takes, sells himself. He (saith one) that first invented benefits or good turns, made stocks and manacles to tie and captivate another man. And therefore divers have refused to take, lest they should wound their liberty, especially from those whom they would not love, and be behold- ing unto, according to the counsel of the wise, which adviseth a man not to receive any thing from a wicked man, lest he be thereby bound unto him. *Cæsar* was wont to say, that there came no sound more pleasing unto his ears than prayers and petitions. It is the mot of greatness, Ask me; *Invoca me in die tribulationis, eruam te & honorificabis me*: Call upon me in the day of tribulation, and I will deliver thee, and thou shalt glorifie me. It is likewise the most noble, and honourable use of our means or substance, which so long as we hold and possess them privately, they carry with them base and abject names; horses, lands, mony: but being brought into light, and employed to the good and comfort of another, they are ennobled with new and glorious titles, benefits, liberalities, magnificencies. It is the best and most commodious imployment that may be; *Ars questu- ossima, optima negotiatio*, whereby the principal is assured, and the profit is very great. And to say the truth, a man hath nothing that is truly his own, but that which he gives; for that which he retains, and keeps to himself, benefits neither himself, nor another: and if he imploy them otherewise, they consume and diminish, pass thorow many dangerous accidents, and at last death it self. But that which is given, it can never perish, never wax old. And therefore *Mark Antony* being beaten down by fortune, and nothing remaining to him, but his power to die, cryed out that he had nothing, but that which he had given: *Hoc habeo quodcunque dedi*. And therefore this sweet, debonair, and ready will to do good unto all, is a

Ambros.



right excellent and honourable thing in all respects: as contrarily, there is not a more base and detestable vice, more against nature than cruelty, for which cause it is called inhumanity; which proceedeth from a contrary cause, to that of bounty and benefits, that is to say, dastardly cowardliness, as hath been said.

2  
The distinction  
of benefits.

There is a two-fold manner of doing good unto another, by profiting and by pleasing him: for the first a man is admired and esteemed; for the second, beloved. The first is far the better, it regardeth the necessity and want of a man, it is to play the part of a father and a true friend. Again, there are two sorts of bounties or good turns; the one are duties, that proceed out of a natural or lawful obligation: the other are merits and free, which proceed out of pure affection. These seem the more noble: nevertheless if the other be done with attention and affection, though they be duties, yet they are excellent.

3  
Inward and  
outward bene-  
fits.

The benefit and the merit is not properly that, that is given, is seen, is touched; this is but the grosse matter, the mark, the shew thereof, but it is the good will. That which is outward is many times but small, that which is inward very great; for this hath commonly with it a kind of hunger and affection, and is alwaies seeking occasions to do good; it giveth so much as it can, and what is needful, forgetting its own benefit. *In beneficio hoc suspiciendum quod alteri dedit, ablaturus sibi, utilitatis suae oblitus: In a benefit this is to be considered that which he giveth to another he taketh away from himself, being forgetful of his own profit.* Contrarily, where the gift is great, the grace may be small; for it is commonly given with an ill will; with an expectation of much intreaty, and leisure enough to consider whether he may give it or no. This is to make too great preparation thereunto, and too great use thereof, to give it rather to himself; and his ambition, than to the good and necessity of the receiver. Again that which is outward may incontinently vanish, that which is inward remains firm: The liberty, health, honour, which is to be given, may all at an instant, by some accident or other, be taken away; the benefit neverthelesse remaining entire.

4  
Rules of bene-  
fits.  
1. To whom.

The advilements whereby a man should direct himself, in his bounties and benefits he bestoweth, according to the rules and instruction of the wise, are these: First, to whom must he give? to all? It seemeth that to do good unto the wicked and unworthy, is at one instant to commit many faults, for it brings an ill name upon the giver, entertaineth and kindleth malice, gives that which

which belongs to vertue and merit, to vice also. Doubtlesse free and favourable graces are not due, but to the good and worthy; but in a time of necessity, and in a generality all, is common. In these two cases the wicked and ungratefull have a part, if they be in necessity; or if they be in such a sort mingled with the good, that the one can hardly receive without the other. For it is better to do good to those that are unworthy for their sakes that are good, than to deprive the good for their sakes that are evil. So doth God, good unto all; he suffereth the sun to shine, and the rain to fall indifferently upon all: But yet his special gifts he giveth not but to those whom he hath chosen for his; *Non est bonum sumere panem filiorum, & projicere canibus: multum refert utrum aliquem non excludas an eligas: It is not good to take the Childrens bread, and cast it unto dogs. There is a great difference between not excluding and chusing.* At a need therefore, in a time of affliction and necessity we must do good unto all; *Naminibus prodesse natura jubet, ubicunque homini beneficio locus: Nature commandeth to do good unto men, whensoever opportunity is offered to benefit them.* Nature and humanity teach us, to regard and to offer our selves unto them, that stretch out their arms unto us, and not unto those that turn their backs towards us; rather unto those to whom we may do good, than to those that are able to do good unto us. It is the part of a generous mind, to take part with the weaker side, to succour the afflicted, and to help to abate the pride and violence of the conqueror; as *Chelosis* once did, the Daughter and Wife of a King, whose father and husband being at variance and wars one against another, whensoever the husband had got the better against her father, like a good daughter she followed and served her father in all things in his afflictions; but the chance turning, and her father getting the mastery, like a good wife, she turned to her husband, and accompanied him in his hardest fortune.

Secondly, he must do good willingly and cheerfully; *Non ex tristitia aut necessitate; hilarem datorem diligit Deus: Bis est gratum, quod opus est, si ultro offeras: Not with discontent, or out of necessity: God loveth a chearfull giver: that is twice acceptable, that is needfull, and offered of thine own accord: not suffering himself to be over-intreated, and importuned; otherwise it will never be pleasing: Nemo libenter debet quod non accipit, sed expressit: No man receiveth with that thankfulness, when it is not willingly given, but wrung out by importunity.* That which is yielded by force, and en-



treaty and prayers, as dearly sold; *Non tulit gratis, qui accipit rogatus: imò nihil carius emitur quàm quod precibus*: He hath it not freely, which receiveth by entreaty: yea nothing is dearer bought, than that which is had by earnest suit. He that praieth and intreateth, humbleth himself, confesseth himself an inferiour, covereth his face with shame, honoureth him whom he intreateth; whereupon *Cæsar* was wont to say after he had overcome *Pompey*, That he lent not his ears more willingly, nor took so much content in any thing, as to be intreated whereby he gave a kind of hope unto all, even his enemies, that they should obtain whatsoever they should request. Graces are silken vestments, transparent, free, and not constrained.

6  
3. Speedily.

Thirdly, speedily and readily. This seems to depend upon the former; for benefits are esteemed according to the will wherewith they are bestowed: now he that staves long before he succour and give, seems to have been a long time unwilling to do it; *qui tardè fecit, diu noluit*. As contrarily, a readyness herein doubleth the benefit; *Bis dat qui celeriter*: He giveth twice that giveth quickly. That indifferency and careless regard whether it be done, or not done, that is used herein, is not approved by any, but impudent, persons. Diligence must be used in all points. Herein then there is a five-fold manner of proceeding, whereof three are reprovèd; to refuse to do a good turn, and that slowly too, is a double injury: to refuse speedily, and to give slowly, are almost one: and some there are that are lesse offended with a quick denial; *Minus decipitur cui negatur celeriter: he is lesse deceived that is soon denied*. The best way then is, to give speedily: but that which is most excellent, is, to anticipate the demand, to prevent the necessity and the desire.

7  
4. Without hope of restitution.

Fourthly, without hope of restitution: this is that wherein the force and virtue of a benefit doth principally consist. If it be a virtue, it is not mercenary: *Tunc est virtus, dare beneficia non reditura*: Then it is virtue to bestow benefits, when they expect no requital. A benefit is lesse richly bestowed, where there is a retrogradation and reflection; but when there is no place for requital; yea, not known from whence the good turn cometh, there it is in its true lustre and glory. If a man look after the like, he will give slowly and to few. Now it is far better to renounce all such hopes of two returns, than to cease to merit, and to do good; for whilest a man seeketh after that strange and accidental payment he depriveth himself of the true and natural, which is that inward joy and comfort he receiveth in doing good. Again, he must not be twice entreated

for one thing. To do wrong, is in it self a base and abominable thing, and there needs no other thing to dissuade a man from it: so to deserve well of another: is an excellent and honourable thing, and there needs no other thing to enflame a man to it. And in a word, It is not to do good, to look after the like return; it is to make merchandize and profit thereof; *Non est beneficium quod in questum mittitur: That is not a benefit that is given for gain.* And a man should not confound and mingle together actions so divers; *demus lencia, non fœneremus: Let us give benefits, but not for usury.* It is pitie but such men should be deceived that hope after such requitals: *Dignus est decipi, qui de recipiendo cogitaret, cum daret: He is worthy to be deceived, who looketh for a recompence of that he gave.* She is no honest woman who either for fear, or the better to enflame, or to draw a man on, refuseth: *Que quia non licuit non dedit, ipsa dedit: She who hath not given her consent because she could not fitly do it, hath notwithstanding consented.* So he deserves nothing that doth good to receive good again. Graces are pure virgins, without hope of return, saith Hesiod.

Fifthly, to do good in a proportion answerable to the desire of a man, and as it may be acceptable to him that receiveth it, to the end he may know and find, that it is truly intended and done unto him. Concerning which point you are to know, that there are two sorts of benefits, the one are honourable to the person that receiveth, and therefore they should be done publickly: The other are commodious, such as succour the want, weakness, shame, or other necessitie of the receiver. These are to be done secretly, yea, if need be, that he onely may take notice that receiveth them; and if it be fit, the receiver should not know from whence they come (because it may be he is bashfull, and the knowledge thereof may discourage him from taking, though his needs be great) it is good and expedient to conceal it from him, and to suffer the benefit to drop into his hand, as it were unawares. It is enough the benefactor know it; and his own conscience serve him for a witness, which is better than if he had a thousand lookers on.

Sixthly, without the hurt and offence of another, and the prejudice of justice: to do good not doing evil: To give to one at the charge of another, is to sacrifice the son in the presence of the father, saith a wise man.

Seventhly, wisely. A man may be sometimes hindered from answering demands and petitions, from refusing or yielding unto them

8

5. According to the desire of the receiver.

9

6. Without the offence of another.

10.

7. Wisely.



them. This difficulty proceedeth from the evil nature of man, especially of the petitioner, who vexeth himself too much in the enduring of a repulse, be it never so just and reasonable. And this is the reason why some promise and agree to all (a testimony of weakness) yea, when they have neither power, nor will to perform and referring the avoiding of the difficulty to the very point of the execution, they hope that many things may happen that may hinder and trouble the performance of their promise, and so think to quit themselves of their obligation: or if it fall out there be question made thereof, they find excuses and avoidances; and so for that time content the petitioner. But none of all this is to be allowed; for a man ought not to agree to any thing, but to that which he can, will, and ought to perform. And finding himself between these two straits and dangers; either of a bad promise, because it is either unjust, or ill befitting; or an absolute denial, which may stir up some suspicion, or mis-conceit; the counsel is, that he save this matter either by delaying the answer, in such sort composing the promise, in such generall and doubtfull terms, that they bind not a man precisely to the performance thereof. But here is craft and subtlety, far different from true freedom; but this iniquity of the petitioner is the cause there, and he deserveth it,

11  
8. From a heart-  
17 affliction.

Eighthly it must proceed from a manly heart, and hearty affection, *Homo sum, humani me nihil alienum puto*: I am a man, and I think nothing belonging unto man strange unto me; especially towards those that are afflicted in want; and this is that which we call mercy. They that have not this affection, *ἀσπλαγχις*, & *immanes*, are inhumane; and carry the marks of dishonest men. But yet this must proceed from a strong, constant, and generous; not a soft, effeminate, and troubled mind: for that is a vicious passion, and which may fall into a wicked mind, whereof in this place we have already spoken: for there is a good and evil mercy. And a man must succour the afflicted, not afflicting himself and applying the evil unto himself, detract nothing from equity, and honour: for God saith that we must not have pity of the poor in judgment: and so God and his Saints are said to be mercifull and pitifull.

12  
9. Without  
boasting.

Ninthly, it must be without boasting and shew, or publick proclamation thereof, for this is a kind of reproach: These kind of vaunts do not onely take away the grace, but the credit, and make a benefit odious, *hoc est in odium beneficia perducere*. And in this sense it is said, that a benefactor must forget his good deeds.

He

He must continue them, and by new benefits confirm, and renew the old, (this inviteth the whole world to love him, and to seek his love) and never repent himself of the old, howsoever it may seem that he hath cast his seed upon a barren and unthankful ground, *beneficii tui etiam infelicitas placeat, nusquam hæc vox, Vellem non fecisse.* let even the ill success of thy good deeds please thee: never have this in thy mouth, I would I had not done it. An unthankful man wrongs none but himself, and a good turn is not lost by his ingratitude; it is a holy consecrated thing that cannot be violated, nor extinguished by the vice of another. And it is no reason because another is wicked, that therefore a man should cease to be good, or discontinu his office; and that which is more, the work of a noble and generous heart is to continue to do well, to break and to vanquish the malice and ingratitude of another man, and to mend his manners *Optimi viri & ingentis animi est tam diu ferre ingratum donec feceris gratum: vincit malos pertinax bonitas.* The best men and generous minds will bare so long with an ungrateful person, until with their goodnesse they shall make him grateful, persevering goodnesse overcometh the evil.

13

10. Continue them without repentance.

Lastly, not to trouble, or importune the receiver in the fruition thereof, as they who having given an honour, or an office to a man, will afterwards execute it themselves; or at leastwise, procure them one good, that they may reap another themselves. He that is the receiver ought not to endure this, and therefore is not unthankful; and the benefactor defaceth the benefit, and cancelleth the obligation. One of the Popes denying a Cardinal an unjust boon which he demanded, alledging unto him that he was the cause why he was made Pope, answered him, Why then give me leave to be Pope, and take not that from me that thou hast given me.

14

Not to remove or trouble a good turn

After these rules and advisements concerning good deeds; we must know that there are some benefits more acceptable and welcome than others, and which are more or lesse binding. They are best welcome, that proceed from a friendly hand from those whom a man is inclined to love without this occasion; and contrarily it is a grief to be obliged unto him, whom a man likes not, and to whom he would not willingly be indebted. Such benefits also are welcome that come from the hand of him that is any way bound to the receiver: for here is a kind of Justice, and they bind lesse. Those good deeds that are done in necessities, and great extremities, carry with them

15

Distinction of benefits.



them a greater force, they make a man forget all injuries, and offences past, if there were any, and blind more strongly; as contrarily the denial, in such a case is very injurious and makes a man forget all benefits past; such benefits likewise, as may be required with the like, are more gladly received, than their contraries, which ingender a kind of hate; for he that findeth himself wholly bound, without any power or possibility of repayment, as often as he seeth his benefactor, he thinks he sees a testimony of his inability or ingratitude, and it is irksome to his heart. There are some benefits, the more honest and gracious they are, the more burthensome are they to the receiver, if he be a man of credit, as they that tie the conscience and the will; for they lock faster, keep a man in his right memory, and some fear of forgetfulness, and failing his promise. A man is a safer prisoner under his word, than under lock and key. It is better to be tied by civil and publick bands, than by the law of honesty, and conscience: two notaries are better than one. I trust your word, and your faith, and conscience: here is more honour done to the receiver, but yet constraint fasteneth, soliciteth, and presseth much more, and here is more safety to the lender, and a man carrieth himself more carefully, because he doubteth not but that the law, and those outward ties will awaken him when the time shall serve. Where there is constraint, the will is more loose: where there is lesse constraint, the will hath less liberty: *Quod me jus cogit, vix à voluntate impetrem: I can hardly request of my will, that which the law constraineth me unto.*

16

Obligation the  
mother and  
daughter of a  
benefit or good  
turn.

From a benefit proceeds an obligation; and from it a benefit; and so it is both the child and the father, the effect and the cause, and there is a two-fold obligation, active and passive, Parents, Princes and superiours, by the duty of their charge are bound to do good unto those that are committed and commended unto them, either by law by nature; and generally all men that have means are bound to releive those that are in want, or any affliction whatsoever, by the command of nature. Behold here the first obligation; afterwards from benefits or good turns, whether they be due or springing from this first obligation, or free and pure merits, ariseth the second obligation and discharge, whereby the receivers are bound to an acknowledgment and thankfull requital. All this is signified by *Hesiodus*, who hath made the Graces three in number, holding each other by the hands.

17

The first obli-  
gation and  
mother.

The first obligation is discharged by the good offices of every one that is in any charge, which shall presently be discoursed of in the second part, which concerneth particular duties: but yet this obligation

gation is strengthened, and weakned and lessened accidentally, by the conditions and actions of those that are the receivers. For their offences, ingratitude, and unworthiness do in a manner discharge those, that are bound to have care of them; and a man may almost say as much of their natural defects too. A man may lustily, with lesse affection love that child, that kinsman, that subject, that is not only wicked and unworthy, but foul, mis-shapen, crooked, unfortunate, ill born; God himself hath abated him much, from their natural price and estimation: but yet a man must in this abatement of affection, keep a justice, and a moderation; for this concerneth not the helps and succours of necessity, and those offices that are due by publick reason, but only that intention, and affection, which is in the inward obligation.

The second obligation, which ariseth from benefits, is that which we are to handle, and concerning which, we must at this time set down some rules: First, the law of dutiful acknowledgment and thankfulness is natural, witness beatts themselves, not only private and domestical, but cruel and savage, among whom there are many excellent examples of this acknowledgment, as of the Lion towards the Roman slave. *Officia etiam fera sentiunt: Even wild beasts have a feeling of good offices done unto them.* Secondly, it is a certain act of virtue, and a testimony of a good mind, and therefore it is more to be esteemed than bounty or benefit, which many times proceed from abundance, from power, love of a mans proper interest, and very seldom from pure virtue, whereas thankfulness springeth alwaies from a good heart, and therefore howsoever the benefit may be more to be desired, yet kind acknowledgment is far more commendable. Thirdly, it is an easy thing, yea a pleasant, and that is in the power of every man. There is nothing more easie, than to do according to nature nothing more pleasing than to be free from bands, and to be at liberty.

18  
The second obligation which is thankfulness.

By that which hath been spoken, it is easie to see how base and villanous a vice forgetfulness and ingratitude is, how unpleasing and odious unto all men; *Dixeris maledicta cuncta cum ingratum hominem dixeris: Thou speakest all the evil that may be said, when thou namest an ungrateful man.* It is against nature; and therefore Plato speaking of his disciple *Aristotle*, calleth him an ungrateful mule. It is likewise without all excuse, and cannot come but from a wicked nature; *Grave vitium, intolerabile, quod dissociat homines: A grievous vice and intolerable, which breaketh the society of*

19  
Of ingratitude.

Seneca  
men



men Revenge which followeth an injury, as ingratitude a good turn, is much more strong and pressing (for an injury enforceth more, than a benefit): *Alius injuriæ quàm merita descendant: Injuries sink deeper into the mind, than deserts.* It is a very violent passion, but yet nothing so base, so deformed a vice as ingratitude. It is like those evils that a man hath, that are not dangerous, but yet are more grievous and painful, than they that are mortal. In revenge, there is some shew of justice, and a man hides not himself to work his will therein; but in ingratitude there is nothing but base dishonesty and shame.

20  
Rules of thank-  
fulness.  
Senec.

Idem.

Plin.

Thankfulness or acknowledgment that it may be such as it should be, must have these conditions. First he must graciously receive a benefit, with an amiable and cheerful visage and speech: *Qui grātē beneficium accepit, primam ejus pensionem solvit: He which receiveth a benefit thankfully dischargeth the first payment thereof.* Secondly, he must never forget it. *Ingratissimus omnium qui oblitus, nusquam enim gratus fieri potest, cui totum beneficium elapsum est: he that forgetteth a benefit is of all other most ingrateful; for in no respect can he be made thankful, that hath utterly forgotten a good turn.* The third office, is to publish it: *ingenui pudoris est fateri per quos profecerimus; & hæc quasi merces auctoris: It is the part of an honest mind, to confesse by whom we have received profit; and this is as it were a reward to the author.* As a man hath the heart, and the hand of another, open to do good; so must he have his mouth open to preach and publish it: and to the end the memory thereof may be more firm and solemn, he must name the benefit, and that by the name of the benefactor. The fourth office is to make restitution, wherein he must observe these four conditions; That it be not too speedy nor too curiously, for this carries an ill scent with it, and it bewrays too great an unwillingnesse to be in debt, and too much hast to be quit of that band. And it likewise giveth an occasion to the friend or benefactor, to think that his courtesie was not kindly accepted of; for to be too careful and desirous to repay, is to incurre the suspicion of ingratitude. It must therefore follow sometime after; and it must not be too long neither lest the benefit grow too ancient, (for the Graces are painted young) and it must be upon some apt and good occasion, which either offereth it self, or is taken, and that without noise and rumour. That it be with some usury, and surpass the benefit, like fruitful ground: *Ingratus est qui beneficium reddit sine usura. He*

is *unthankful*, who restoreth a benefit without profit; or at least equal it with all the shew and acknowledgment that may be, of great reason, of a farther requital, and that this is not to satisfie the obligation, but to give some testimony that he forgetteth not how much he is indebted. That it be willingly and with a good heart: *Ingratus est, qui melius gratus est: He is ungrateful, who is grateful for fear.* For if it were so given; *Eodem animo beneficium debetur quo datur; errat si quis beneficium libentius accipit, quam reddit: A benefit ought to be restored with the same mind whereunto it was given: he is to be blamed who soever he be, that receiveth a benefit more willingly than he restoreth it.* Lastly if his inability be such, at that he cannot make present restitution, yet let his will be forward enough which is the first and principal part, and as it were the soul, both of the benefit and acknowledgment; though there be no other witness hereof than it self; and he must acknowledge not only the good he hath received, but that likewise that hath been offered and might have been received, that is to say, the good will of the benefactor, which is, as hath been said, the principal.

3

4

## The second Part.

*Which concerneth the special duties of certain men, by certain and special obligations.*

### THE PREFACE.

BEING to speak of special and particular duties, differing according to the diversity of the persons and their states, whether they be unequal as superiours, and inferiours, or equal: we will begin with married folks, who are mixt, and hold with both equality and inequality. And so much the rather, because we are first to speak of private and domestical justice and duties, before publick, because they are before them; as families and houses are before common-weals, and therefore that private justice which is observed in a family, is the image, and source, and model of a Common-weal. Now these private and domestical duties are three; that is to say between the husband and the wife, parents and children, masters and servants, and these are the parts of a household or family, which taketh the foundation from the husband and the wife, who are the masters and authors thereof. And therefore first of married folk.

CHAP.



**1**  
*Common duties.* **A**Ccording to those two divers considerations that are in marriage, as hath been said, that is to say, equality and inequality; there are likewise two sorts of duties and offices of married folk, the one common to both, equally reciprocal, of like obligation, though according to the custom of the world, the pain, the reproach, the inconvenience, be not equal: that is to say an entire loyalty, fidelity, community, and communication of all things, and a care and authority over their family and all the goods of their house. Hereof we have spoken more at large in the first book.

**2**  
*Particular duties of the husband.* The other are particular and different, according to that inequality that is betwixt them: for those of the husband are; 1. To instruct his wife with mildness in all things that belong unto her duty, her honour, and good, whereof she is capable. 2. To cloth her whether she brought dowry with her or no. 3. To nourish her. 4. To lie with her. 5. To love and defend her. The two extremities are base and vicious, to hold her under like a servant, to make her mistress by subjecting himself unto her: And these are the principal duties. These follow after, to comfort her being sick, to deliver her being captive, to bury her being dead, to nourish her living, and to provide for his children he hath had by her, by his will and Testament.

**3**  
*Of the wife* The duties of the wife, 1. Are to give honour, reverence, and respect to her husband, as to her master and lord; for so have the wisest women that ever were, termed their husbands, and the Hebrew word *Baal* signifieth them both, husband and lord. She that dischargeth her self of this duty, honoureth her self more than her husband; and doing otherwise, wrongs none but her self. 2. To give obedience in all things just and lawful, applying and accommodating her self to the manners and humours of her husband, like a true looking glasse, which faithfully representeth the face; having no other particular designment, love, thought, but as the dimensions and accidents, which have no other proper action or motion, and never move but with the body, she applies her self in all things to her husband. 3. Service, as to provide either by her self or some other his viands, to wash his feet. 4. To keep the house, and therefore she is compared to the Tortois, and is painted having her feet naked, and especially in the absence of her husband. For her husband being

being far from her she must be as it were invincible, and contrary to the Moon (which appeareth in her greatness when she is farthest from the Sun) not appear, but when she comes neer her Sun. 5 To be silent, and not to speak but with her husband, or by her husband: and forasmuch as a silent woman is a rare thing, and hardly found she is said to be a precious gift of God. 6. To employ her time is the practice and study of housewifery, which is the most commodious and honourable science and occupation of a woman; this is her special mistress-quality, and which a man of mean fortune, should especially seek in his marriage. It is the only dowry, that serveth either to ruinate, or preserve families; but it is very rare. There are divers that are covetous, few that are good housewives. We are to speak of them both, of household husbandry presently by it self.

In the private acquaintance and use of marriage, there must be a moderation, that is, a religious and devout band, for that pleasure that is therein must be mingled with some severity; it must be a wife and conscionable delight. A man must touch his wife discreetly and for honesty, as it is said, and for fear, as *Aristotle* saith, lest provoking her desires too wantonly, the pleasures thereof make her to exceed the bounds of reason, and the care of health: for too hot and too frequent a pleasure altereth the seed, and hindreth generation. On the other side, to the end she be not over-languishing, barren, and subject to other diseases, he must offer himself unto her, though seldome. *Solon* saith, thrice in a moneth; but there can no certain law or rule be given hereof.

*An advisement  
upon the ac-  
quaintance of  
married folk.*

*Plutarch, in  
Solon.*

The doctrine of household husbandry doth willingly follow, and is annexed unto marriage.

CHAP. XIII.

*Household husbandry.*

1. **H**ousehold husbandry is an excellent, just, and profitable occupation. It is a happy thing, saith *Plato*, for a man to go through his private affairs without injustice. There is nothing more beautiful than a household well and peaceably governed.

2. It is a profession which is not difficult, for he that is not capable of any thing else, is capable of this; but yet it is careful and painful, and troublesome, by reason of the multitude of affairs, which though they be small and of no great importance, yet forasmuch

much



much as they are common and frequent, and never at an end, they do much annoy and weary a man. Domestical thorns prick, because they are ordinary; but if they come from the principal persons of the family, they gaul and exulcerate, and grow remediless.

3. It is a great happiness, and a fit mean to live at ease, to have one whom a man may trust, and upon whom he may repose himself; which that he may the better do, he must choose one that is true and loyal, and afterwards bind him to do well by that trust and confidence he putteth in him. *Hibita fides ipsam obligat fidem; multi fallere docuerunt, dum timent falli; & aliis jus peccandi, suspicando dederunt*: Faith being given, binds faith again; many have taught to deceive, whilst they fear to be deceived, and have given occasion unto others of offending by suspecting them.

4. The principal precepts and counsels that belong to frugality, or good husbandry, are these: 1. To buy and sell all things at the best times and seasons, that is, when they are best and best cheap. 2. To take good heed lest the goods in the house be spoyled or mis-carry, be either lost or carried away. This doth especially belong to the woman, to whom *Aristotle* gives this authority and care. 3. To provide first and principally for these three; necessity, cleanliness, order: and again, if there be means, some advise to provide for these three too: but the wiser sort wish no great pains to be taken therein: *non amplius, sed mundius convivium; plus salis quam sumptus*: A feast must not be costly, but cleanly, more mirth than cost. Abundance, pomp, and preparation, exquisite and rich fashion. The contrary is many times practised in good houses, where you shall have beds garnished with silk, embroydered with gold, and but one simple coverlid in winter, which were a commodity far more necessary. And so of the rest.

4. To rule and moderate his charge, which is done by taking away superfluities, yet providing for necessities, and that which is fit and becoming. A ducket in a mans purse will do a man more honour honestly, than ten prodigally spent, saith one. Again (but this requires industry and good sufficiency) to make a great shew with a little charge; and above all, not to suffer the expence to grow above the receipt and the income.

5. To have a care and an eye over all: The vigilancy and presence of the Master, saith the Proverb, fattereth the horse and the land. And in any case the master and mistress must take a care to con-

to conceal their ignorance and insufficiency in the affairs of the house, and much more their carelesse, making a shew as if they attended and thought nothing else. For if officers and servants have an opinion, that their masters look not unto them, they may chance to make his hair grow through his hood.

CHAP. XIV.

*The duty of Parents and Children.*

**T**He duty of Parents and Children is reciprocal. and reciprocally naturall: if that of children be more strict, that of Parents is more ancient, parents being the first authours and cause, and more important to a Common-weal: for to people a State, and to furnish it with honest men and good citizens, the culture and good nourishment of youth is necessary, which is the seed of a Common wealth. And there comes not so much evil to a Weal-publick, by the ingratitude of Children towards their Parents, as by the carelesness of Parents in the instruction of their Children: and therefore with great reason in *Lacedemon*, and other good and pollicke States, there was a punishment and a penalty laid upon the Parents, when the Children were ill conditioned. And *Plato* was wont to say, that he knew not in what a man should be more careful and diligent, than to make a good son. And *Crates* cryed out in choler, To what end do men take so much care in heaping up goods, and so little care of those to whom they shall leave them? It is as much as if a man should take care of his shoo, and not of his foot. What should he do with riches that is not wise, and knows not how to use them? It is like a rich and beautifull saddle upon a Jades back. Parents then are doubly obliged to this duty, both because they are their Children, and because they are the tender plants and hope of the Common-weal: This is to till his own land, together with that of the Weal-publick.

Now this office or duty hath four successive parts, according to those four goods or benefits that a child ought to receive successively from his parents, Life, Nourishment, Instruction, Communication. The first regardeth the time when the infant is in the womb, untill his coming into the world inclusively; the second, the time of his infancy in his Cradle, untill he know how to go and to speak: the third, all his youth; this part must be handled more at large, and more seriously: the fourth concerneth their affection, communication.



munication and carriage towards their children now come to mans estate, touching their good thoughts, designments.

3  
The first part of  
the office of  
Parents.

The first, which regardeth the generation and fruit in the womb, is not accounted of and observed with such diligence as i thought, although it have as much part in the good or evil of a child (as well of their bodies as their souls) as their education and instruction after they are born, and come to some growth. That is that, that giveth the substance, the temper and temperature, the nature, the other artificiall and acquired : and if there be a fault committed in this first part, the second and third can hardly repair it, no more than a fault in the first concoction of the stomach, can be mended in the second or third. We men go unadvisedly and headlong to this copulation, onely provoked thereunto by pleasure, and a desire to disburthen our selves of that which tickleth and presseth us thereunto : if a conception happen thereby, it is by chance ; for no man goeth to it warily, and with such deliberation and disposition of body as he ought, and nature doth require. Since then men are made at adventure, and by chance, it is no marvell if they seldome fall out to be beautifull, good, sound, wise, and well composed. Behold then briefly, according to Philosophy the particular advisements touching this first point, that is to say, the begetting of male-children, sound, wise, and judicious : for that which serveth for the one of these qualities, serves for the other. 1. A man must not couple himself with a woman that is of a vile, base, and dissolute condition, or of a naughty and vitious composition of body. 2. He must abstain from this action and copulation seven or eight dayes. 3. During which time he is to nourish himself with wholsome victuals, more hot and dry than otherwise, and such as may concoct well in the stomach. 4. He must use a more than moderate exercise. All this tendeth to this end and purpose, that the seed may be well concocted and seasoned, hot and dry, fit and proper for a masculine, sound and wise temperature. Vagabonds, idle and lazie people, great drinkers, who have commonly an ill concoction, ever beget effeminate, idle, and dissolute children (as *Hippocrates* recounteth of the *Seythians*.) Again, a man must apply himself to this encounter after one manner, a long time after his repast, that is to say, his belly being empty, and he fasting (for a full panch performes nothing good either for the mind or for the body) and therefore *Dionogenes* reproached a licentious young man, for that his father had begotten him being drunk. And the law of the *Caribaginians* is commended

mended by *Plat.*, which enjoyned a man to abstain from wine that Lib.2.de leg.  
day that he lay with his wife. 6. And not near the monethly terms  
of a woman, but six or seven dayes before, or as much after them.  
7. And upon the point of conception and retention of the seed, the  
woman turning and gathering her self together upon the right side,  
let her so rest for a time. 8. This direction touching the stands and  
exercise must be continued during the time of her burthen.

To come to the second point of this office after the birth of the  
infant, these four points are to be observed. 1. The infant must  
be washed in warm water, somewhat brinish, to make the members  
supple and firm, to cleanse and dry the flesh and the brain, to strength-  
ed the sinews, a very good custome in the Eastern parts, and among  
the Jews. 2. The nurse, if she be to be chosen, let her be young of a  
temperature or complexion the least cold and moist that may be,  
brought up in labour, hard lodging, slender diet, hardened against  
cold and heat. I say, if she be to be chosen, because according to rea-  
son, and the opinion of the wisest, it should be the mother, and there-  
fore they cry out against her, when she refuseth this charge, being  
invited and as it were bound thereunto by nature, who to that end  
hath given her milk and dugs, by the example of beasts; and that love  
and jealousy that she ought to have of her little ones, who receive a  
very great hurt by the change of their aliment, now accustomed in a  
stranger, and perhaps a bad one too, of a constitution quite contrary  
to the former, whereby they are not to be accounted mothers, but  
by halves. *Quod est hoc contra naturam, imperfectum, ac dimidium*  
*marris genus & peperisse & statim ab se abjecisse; & auisse in utero sangui-*  
*ne suo nescio quid quod non videret: non alere autem nunc suo lacte,*  
*quod videat jam, viventem, jam hominem, jam marris officia imploran-*  
*tem: It is a thing against nature, imperfect and by halves, for a mother to*  
*bring forth a child, and presently to cast it from her; to n wish in her*  
*womb with her own blood. I know not what, which she saw not; and not*  
*nurse with her milk that which she saw already living, a man, and im-*  
*ploring the duties of a mother.* 3. The nourishment besides the dug  
should be goats milk, or rather cream, the most subtil and aery part  
of milk, sod with honey and a little salt. These are things very fit  
for the body and minde. by the advice of all the wise and great  
Physitians, Greeks and Hebrew. *Butyrum & mel comedet, ut sciat*  
*reprobare malum, & eligere bonum: Let him eat butter and ho-*  
*ney, untill he be able to refuse the evil, and choose the good.* The  
quality of milk or cream is very temperate, and full of good

4  
The second part  
of the office of  
par. ms.  
Ezech. 16.

Aul. Gell.  
l. 12. c. 1.

Galen, matris  
locis.  
Homer. 10.  
Iliad,  
Esay 7.



*The duty of Parents and Children.*

nourishment; the dryness of the honey and salt consumeth the too great humidity of the brain, and disposeth it unto wisdom. 4. The infant must by little and little be accustomed and hardened to the air, to heat, and cold: and we are not to be fearful thereof; for in the Northern parts of the world, they wash their children so soon as they come out of the womb of their mothers, in cold water, and are never the worse.

5

The two first parts of the office of parents we have soon dispatched; whereby it appeareth, that they are not true fathers that have not that care, affection, and diligence in these matters that is fit; for they are the cause and occasion, either by carelesnesse, or otherwise, of the death and untimely birth of their Children; and when they are born they care not for them, but expose them to their own fortunes; for which cause they are deprived by law of that fatherly power over them that is due unto them; and the Children to the shame of their parents, are made slaves by those that have nourished them, and brought them up, who are far from taking care to preserve them from fire and water, and all other crosses and afflictions that may light upon them.

6

*The third part  
of the office of  
parents.  
An instruction  
very important.*

The third part which concerneth the instruction of Children, we are to handle more seriously. So soon as this Infant is able to go, and to speak, and shall begin to employ his mind and his body, and that the faculties thereof shall be awakened and shew themselves, the memory, imagination, reason, which begin at the fourth or fifth year there must be a great care and diligence used, in the well forming thereof: for this first tincture and liquor wherewith the mind must be seasoned, hath very great power. It cannot be expressed how much this first impression and formation of youth prevaleth, even to the conquering of Nature it self. Nurture, saith one, excelleth Nature. *Lycurgus* made it plain to all the world, by two little dogs of one litter, but diversly brought up, to whom presenting before them in an open place, a pot of pottage and a hare, that which was brought up tenderly in the house fell to the pottage; the other that had been ever trained up in hunting, forsook the pottage, and ran after the hare. The force of this instruction proceeds from this, that it entereth easily, and departeth with difficulty: for being the first that entereth, it taketh such place, and winneth such credit as a man will there being no other precedent matter to contest with it, or to make head against it. This mind then wholly new and neat, soft and tender, doth easily receive that impression that a man will give unto it, and afterwards doth not easily lose it. Now

*Quint.  
Sen.*

## The duty of Parents and Children.

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7

Now this is not a thing of small importance, but a man may rather say, it is the most difficult and important that may be. For who seeth not that in a State, all depends upon this? Neverthelesse ( and it is the greatest, most dangerous and lamentable fault that is in our policies, noted by *Aristotle* and *Plutarch* ) we see that the conduct and discipline of youth is wholly left unto the charge and mercy to their parents, what kind of men soever they be, many times careless, foolish, wicked, and the publick state regardeth it not, cares not for it, whereby all goes to ruine. Almost the onely States that have given to the laws the discipline of children, were that of *Lacedemon* and *Crete*: But the most excellent discipline of the world for youth, was the *Spartans*; and therefore *Agesslaw* perswaded *Xenophon* to send his Children thither, for there (saith he) they may learn the most excellent science of the world, and that is to command and to obey well, and there are formed good Lawyers, Emperours at arms, Magistrates, Citizens. Their youth and their instruction they esteemed above all things; and therefore *Antipater* demanding of them fifty Children for hostages, they answered him, that they had rather give him twice as many men at their ripest years.

8

Now before we enter into this matter, I will here give an advertisement of some weight. There are some that take great pains to discover the inclinations of Children, and for what employment they shall be most fit; but this is a thing so obscure, and so uncertain, that when a man hath bestowed what cost, and taken what pains he can, he is commonly deceived. And therefore not to tie our selves to these weak and light divinations and prognostications drawn from the motions of their infancy, let us endeavour to give them an instruction, universally good and profitable whereby they are made capable, ready, and disposed to whatsoever. This is to go upon a sure ground, and to do that which must alwayes be done. This shall be a good tincture, apt to receive all others.

9

To make an entrance into this matter, we may refer it unto three points, the forming of the spirit, the ordering of the body, the ruling of the manners. But before we give any particular counsell touching these three, there are generall advisements that belong to the manner of proceeding in this businesse, that shew us how to carry our selves worthily and happily therein, which must be first known as a preamble to the rest.

The division of  
this matter.

The first is carefully to guard his soul, and to keep it neat and free  
G g 3 from

re



*The first general advice touching instruction. To guard the ears.*

from the contagion and corruption of the world, that it receive not any blot nor wicked attainture. And the better to do this, he must diligently keep the gates, which are the ears especially, and then the eyes; that is to say, give order, that not any, no not his own father, come near unto him, to buz into his ears any thing that is evil. There needs no more but a word, the least discourse that may be, to make an evil almost past reparation: Guard thine ears above all, and then thine eyes. And for this cause, *Plato* was of opinion that it was not fit that servants and base persons should entertain Children with discourse, because their talk can be no better than fables, vain speeches, and fooleries, if not worse. This were to train up and to feed those tender years with follies and fooleries.

## II

*The second general advice touching the choice of instructors, conferences, books.*

The second advice concerneth not onely the persons that must have charge of this Child, but the discourse and conference where-with he must be entertained, and the books he must read. Touching the persons, they must be honest men, well-born, of a sweet and pleasing conversation, having their head well framed, fuller of wisdom than of science, and that they agree in opinion together; lest that by contrary counsels, or a different way in proceeding, the one by rigour the other by flattery, they hinder one another, and trouble their charge and designmen's. Their books and communication must not be of small, base, sottish, frivolous matters, but great and serious, noble and generous; such as may rule and enrich the understanding, opinions, manners, as they that instruct a man in the knowledge of our humane condition, the motions and mysteries of our minds, to the end he may know himself and others: such, I say, as may teach him what to fear, to love, to desire; what passion is, what virtue, how he may judge betwixt ambition and avarice, servitude and subjection, liberty and licentiousness. He is deceived that thinketh that there is a greater proportion of spirit required to the understanding of those excellent examples of *Valerius Maximus*, and all the Greek and Roman Histories (which is the most beautifull science and knowledg of the world) than to understand *Amadis of Gaul*, and other like vain and frivolous discourses. That Child that can know how many hens his mother hath, and who are his uncles and his cosens, will as easily carry away how many Kings there have been, and how many *Cesars in Rome*. A man must not distrust the capacity and sufficiency of his mind, but know how to conduct and manage it.

## 12

The third is, to carry himself towards him, and to proceed not after

## The duty of Parents and Children.

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after an austere, rude, and severe manner, but sweetly, mildly, and cheerfully. And therefore we do here altogether condemn that custom which is common in all places. to beat, and to box, and with strange words and out-cries to hazen Children, and to keep them in fear and subjection, as the manner is in free-schools and colledges. For it is a custome too unjust, and as foul a fault, as when a Judge or Physitian shall be moved with choler against an offender and patient: prejudiciall and quite contrary to that purpose that a man hath, which is to stir up a desire in them, and to bring them in love with virtue, wisdom, science, honesty. Now this imperious and rude carriage, breeds in children a hatred, horror, and detestation of that they should love; it provoketh them, makes them headstrong, abateth and taketh away their courage, in such sort that their minds become servile, base, and slavish, like their usage; *Parentes ne provocetis ad iracundiam filios vestros, ne despondeant animum; Parents provoke not your Children to anger, lest they be discouraged.* For seeing themselves thus handled, they never perform any thing of worth but curse their master and their apprenticeship. If they do that which is required at their hands, it is because the eye of the master is always upon them, it is for fear, and not cheerfully and nobly, and therefore not honestly. If they fail and perform not their task, to save themselves from the rigour of the punishment, they have recourse to base unlawfull remedies, lies, false excuses, tears of despiight, flights, truantings, all worse than the fault they have committed.

*The third general advice  
Instruction  
mild and free*

Coloss. 3.

Terent.

*Dum id rescitum iri credit, tantisper cavet;*

*Sis perat fore clam, rursus ad ingenium redit.*

*Ille, quem beneficia adjungas, ex animo facit;*

*Studet par referre, præsens absensque idem erit.*

*The shame keeps knowledge, know'edge keeps the sin*

*In aw, which did in secrecie begin:*

*Whom good turns with love have got*

*To be thy friend, repose thy lot,*

*Best thou there or best thou not!*

My will is that they be handled freely and liberally, using therein reason, and sweet and mild perswasions, which ingender in their hearts the affections of honour and of shame. The first will serve them as a spur to what is good, the second as a bridle to check and with-draw them from evill. There is something, I know not what, that is servile and base in rigour and constraint, the enemy



to honour and true liberty. We must clean contrary fat their hearts with ingenuity, liberty, love, virtue and honour.

*Pudore & liberalitate liberos retinere*

*Satius esse credo, quàm metu.*

*Hoc patrium est potius consuefacere filium*

*Suâ sponte rectè facere, quàm alieno metu.*

Terent.

*Hoc Pater ac Dominus interest : hoc qui nequit,*

*Fateatur se nescire imperare liberis.*

*I hold it better, children up to rear*

*With modesty and bounty; than by fear,*

*T'enure a child; 'tis rather fathers law*

*To do well of himself, than others aw.*

*A Father and a Master differ so;*

*So who can not, to rule sons doth not know.*

Blows are for beasts that understand not reason : injuries and brawls are for slaves. He that is once accustomed thereunto is mar'd forever. But reason, the beauty of action, the desire of honesty and honour, the approbation of all men, cheerfulness and comfort of heart, and the detestation of their contraries, as brutishness, baseness, dishonour, reproach, and the improbation of all men, these are the arms, the spurs, and the bridles of Children well-born, and such as a man would make honest men, This is that which a man should alwayes sound in their ears; and if these means cannot prevail, all other rigour and roughness shall never do good: That which cannot be done with reason, wisdom, endeavour, shall never be done by force; and if haply it be done, yet it is to small purpose. But these other means cannot be unprofitable, if they be employed in time, before the goodness of nature be spent and spilt. But yet for all this, let no man think that I approve that loose and flattering indulgence, and sottish fear to give children cause of discontent and sorrow, which is another extremity as bad as the former. This were like the Ivie, to kill and make barren the tree which it embraceth; or the Ape, that killeth her young with culling them; or like those that fear to hold him up by the hair of the head that is in danger of drowning, for fear of hurting him, and so suffer him to perish. Against this vice the wise Hebrew spake much. Youth must be held in obedience and discipline, not bodily like beasts and madmen, but spiritual, humane, liberall, according to reason.

Ecclus. 30.

13

We come now to the particular and more expresse advise-  
ments of this instruction. The first head of them is; as we have said, to

ex-

exercise, sharpen and form the mind. Whereupon there are divers precepts, but the first principal and fundamental of all others, which respecteth the end of instruction, and which I most desire to inculcate, because it is least embraced and followed, and every man runneth after the contrary, which is a common and ordinary error, is, to have much more, and the chief and principal care to exercise, to husband and manure, to use the proper good, and much lesse to get and endeavour the attainment of that which is strange; to strive and study more for Wisdome, than for Science and art; rather well to form the judgment, and by consequence the will, and the conscience, than to fill the memory, and to enflame the imagination. These are the three mistress parts of a reasonable soul: But the first is the judgment, as before hath been discoursed, to which place I refer the Reader. Now the custom of the world is quite contrary, which runneth wholly after Art, Science, and what is acquired. Parents to the end they may make their Children wise, are at great charge, and their children take great pains. *Ut omnium rerum sic liberalium intemperantiâ laboramus: We are troubled with an immoderate* desire of learning, as of all things else. And many times all is lost. But to make them wise, honest, apt and dexterous, which is a matter of small charge or labour, they take no care at all. What greater folly can there be in the world, more to admire Science, that which is acquired, than memory, than wisdom, than nature? Now all commit not this fault with one and the same mind; some simply carried by custome, think that wisdom and science are not things different, or at leastwise, that they match alwaies together, and that it is necessary a man have the one to attain the other: these kind of men deserve to be taught: others go out of malice: and think they know well enough what they do, and at what price soever it be they will have Art and Science: For this is a mean in these daies in the occidental parts of Europe to get fame, reputation, riches, These kind of people make of Science, an Art and merchandise, science mercenary, pedantical, base and mechanical. They buy Science to sell it again. Let us leave these merchants as incurable. Contrariwise, I cannot here but blame the opinion and fashion of some of our Gentlemen of France, (for in other nations this fault is not so apparent) who having knowledg or Art in such disdain and contempt, that they do lesse esteem of an honest man only for this, because he hath studied: they discharge it as a thing that seemeth in some sort to impeach their Nobility. Wherein they shew themselves

Particular advi-  
sements.  
touching the  
mind.

Lib. 1. cap. 7.

Tacit.



selves what they are, ill born, worse advised, and truly ignorant of virtue and honour, which they likewise bewray in their carriage, their idleness, their impertinencies, their insufficiencies, in their insolencies, vanities, and barbarities.

14  
*A comparison  
of science and  
wisdom.*

To teach others, and to discover the fault of all this, we must make good two things; The one, that Science and Wisdom are things very different; and the Wisdom is more worth than all the Science or Art of the world; as Heaven exceeds the price of the Earth, gold of iron: The other, that they are not only different, but that they seldom or never go together, that they commonly hinder one another, he that hath much knowledge or Art is seldom wise, and he that is wise hath not much knowledge. Some exceptions there are herein, but they are very rare, and of great, rich, and happy spirits. Some there have been in times past, but in these dayes there are no more to be found.

15  
*The definition  
of science and  
wisdom.*

The better to perform this, we must first know what science and wisdom is. Science is a great heap, or accumulation and provision of the good of another; that is, a collection of all that a man hath seen heard and read in books, that is to say of the excellent sayings and doings of great personages that have been of all nations; now the garner or storehouse where this great provision remaineth and is kept, the treasury of science and all acquired good, is the Memory. He that hath a good memory, the fault is his own if he want knowledge, because he hath the mean. Wisdom is a sweet and regular managing of the soul. He is wise that governeth himself in his desires, thoughts, opinions, speeches, actions, with measure and proportion. To be brief, and in a word, wisdom is the rule of the soul: and that which manageth this rule is the judgment, which seeth, judgeth, esteemeth all things, rangeth them as they ought, giving to every thing that which belongs unto it. Let us now see their differences, and how much wisdom excels the other.

16

Science is a small and barren good in respect of wisdom, for it is not only not necessary (for of three parts of the world, two and more have made little use thereof) but it brings with it small profit, and serves to little purpose. 1. It is no way serviceable to the life of a man: How many people rich and poor, great and small, live pleasantly and happily, that have never heard any speech of science? There are many other things more commodious and serviceable to the life of man, and the maintenance of humane society, as honour, glory, nobility, dignity, which nevertheless are not necessary; 2. Neither

2. Neither is it serviceable to things natural, which an ignorant ſot may as well perform, as he that hath beſt knowledge : nature is a ſufficient miſtriſs for that. 3. Nor to honeſty, and to make us better : *paucis eſt opus literis ad bonam mentem. Little learning is requiſite for a good mind* : nay, it rather hindreth it. He that will mark it well, ſhall find not only more honeſt people, but alſo more excellent in all kind of virtue amongſt thoſe that know little, than thoſe that know moſt ; witneſs Rome, which was more honeſt being young and ignorant, than when it was old, crafty and cunning. *Simplex illa & aperta virtus in obſcuram & ſolertem ſcientiam verſa eſt* : That ſimple and open virtue is turned into obſcure and crafty knowledge. Science ſerveth not for any thing, but to invent crafts and ſubtilties, artificial cunning devices, and whatſoever is an enemy to innocency, which willingly lodgeth with ſimplicity and ignorance. Atheiſme, errours, ſects, and all the troubles of the world have riſen from the order of theſe men of Art and knowledge. The firſt temptation of the devil, ſaith the Scripture, and the beginning of all evil, and the ruine of mankind, was the opinion and the deſire of knowledge : *Eritis ſicut dii ſcientes bonum & malum* : Ye ſhall be as gods, knowing good and evil. The Sirens, to deceive and intrap Uliſſes within their ſnares, offered to him the gift of Science ; and S. Paul adviſeth you all to take heed, *ne quis vos ſeducat per philoſophiam* : let no man ſeduce you through their Philoſophy. One of the ſufficienteſt men of knowledge that ever was, ſpoke of ſcience, as of a thing not only vain, but hurtful, painful, and tedious. To be brieſ, ſcience may make us more humane and courteous, but not more honeſt. 4. Again, it ſerveth no

Solomon in  
his Eccleſiaſt.

Eccleſ. i. 18.

and



and safest Sanctuary that may be? But this is but a mockery, for to remember and to forget is not in our power. But they would do as Chirurgions use to do, who not knowing how to heal a wound yet set a good shew upon it by allaying the pain and bringing it a sleep. They that counsel men to kill themselves in their extreme remediless evils, do they not send a man to ignorance, stupidity, insensibility? Wisdom is a necessary good, and universally commodious for all things: it governeth and ruleth all: there is not any thing that can hide, or quit it self of the jurisdiction or knowledge thereof: It beareth sway every where, in peace, in war, in publick, in private; it ruleth and moderateth even the insolent behaviours of men, their sports, their dances, their banquets, and is as a bridle unto them. To conclude, there is nothing that ought not to be done discreetly and wisely; and contrarily, without wisdom all things fall into trouble and confusion.

17

Secondly, Science is servile, base and mechanical, in respect of wisdom, and a thing borrowed with pain. A learned man is like a Crow deckt with the feathers that he hath stolen from other birds. He maketh a great shew in the world, but at the charge of another: and he had need to veil his bonnet often, as a testimony of that honour he gives to those from whom he hath borrowed his Art. A wise man is like him that lives upon his own renewes; for wisdom is properly a mans own; it is a natural good well tilled and laboured.

18

Thirdly, the conditions are divers, the one more beautiful and more noble than the other. Learning or Science is fierce, presumptuous, arrogant, opinative, indiscreet, querulous, *Scientia inflat: Knowledg puffeth up.* 2. Science is talkative, desirous to shew it self, which neverthelesse knows not how to do any thing, is not active, but only fit to speak and to discourse: wisdom acteth and governeth all.

Learning then, and wisdom are things very different, and wisdom of the two the more excellent, more to be esteemed than science. For it is necessary, profitable to all, universal, active, noble, honest, gracious, cheerful. Science is particular, unnecessary, seldom profitable, not active, servile, mechanical, melancholick, opinative, presumptuous.

19

*Learning and  
wisdom meet  
not together.*

We come now to the other point, and that is, that they are not alwaies together, but contrarily almost alwaies separated. The natural reason (as hath been said) is, that their temperatures are contrary.

rary. For that of science and memory is moist; and that of wisdom and judgment, dry. This also is signified unto us, in that which happened to our first parents, who as soon as they cast their eyes upon knowledg, they presently desired it, and so were robbed of that wisdom, wherewithall they were indued from the beginning; whereof we every day see the like in common experience. The most beautiful and flourishing States, Common-weals, Empires, antient and modern, have been, and are governed very wisely, both in peace and war, without Science. *Rome* the first five hundred years, wherein it flourished in virtue and valour, was without knowledg; and so soon as it began to be learned, it began to corrupt, trouble, and ruinate it self by civil wars. The most beautiful Politie that ever was, the *Lacedemonian*, built by *Licurgus* from whence have sprung the greatest personages of the world made no profession of learning, and yet it was the school of virtue and wisdom, and was ever victorious over *Athens*, the most learned City of the world, the school of all science, the habitation of the Muses, the store-house of Philosophers. All those great and flourishing Realms of the east and west Indies, have stood for many ages together without learning, without the knowledg of books or writings. In these days they learn many things, by the good leave and assistance of their new masters, at the expence of their own liberties, yea their vices and their subtilties too, whereof in former times they never heard speech. That great, and it might be the greatest and most flourishing State and Empire which is at this day in the world, is that of that great Lord, which like the Lion of the whole earth, makes himself to be feared of all the Princes and Monarchs of the world; and even in this State, there is not any profession of Science, nor school, nor permission or allowance to read, or teach publicly, no not in matters of religion. What guideth and governeth and maketh the State to prosper thus? It is wisdom, it is prudence. But come we to those States wherein Learning and Sciences are in credit. Who do govern them? Doubtlesse, not the learned. Let us take for example this our Realm, wherein learning and knowledg have greater honour than in all the world besides, and which seemeth to have succeeded Greece it self; The principal officers of This Crown, the Constable, Martial, Admiral, the Secretaries of the State who dispatch all affairs, are commonly men altogether illiterate. And doubtlesse many great Lawgivers, Founders, and Princes have banished Science as the poyson and pestilence of a

*Wisdom without Science.*

Common-



*The duty of Parents and Children.*

Science without wisdom.

Act, 26.

Common wealth, *Licinius, Valentinian, Mahomet, Lycurgus*. And this we see what wisdom is without science. Let us now see what science is without wisdom, which is not hard to do. Let us look a little into those that make profession of learning, that come from Schools and Universities, and have their heads full of *Aristotle, Cicero, Barolus*; are there any people in the world more untoward, more sottish, more unfit for all things? From hence cometh that Proverb, that when a man would describe a fool, or an untowardly person he calleth him Clerk, Pedant: and to expresse a thing ill done, it is the manner to say, It is Clerkly done. It should seem that learning doth intoxicate, and as it were hammer a mans brains, and makes him to turn sot and fool, as King *Agrippa* said to *S. Paul*; *Multa te literæ ad insaniam adigunt: much learning maketh thee mad.* There are divers men, that had they been never trained up in schools and colledges, they had been far more wise: and their brethren that have never applied themselves to learning, have proved the wiser men; *Ut melius fuisset non didicisse: nam postquam docti prodierunt, boni desunt: So that it had been better they had never been learned: for after they became learned, they left off from being good.* Come to the practice: chuse me one of these learned scholars, bring him to the common councel of a city, or any publick assembly, wherein the affairs of State are consulted of, or matter of policy, or household husbandry, you never saw a man more astonished, he waxeth pale, blusheth, cougheth, and at last knows not what to say. And if he chance to speak, he entreth into a long discourse of definitions, and divisions of *Aristotle: ergo pot-lead.* Mark in the self same counsel, a Merchant, a Burgesse, that never heard speak of *Aristotle*, he will yield a better reason, give a sounder judgment, and more to purpose than these scholastical Doctors.

The reason of this seperation.

Now it is not enough to have said, that wisdom and learning seldom concur and meet together, unless we seek the reason and cause thereof; not doubting thereby but sufficiently to content and to satisfie those, that mislike what I have said, or think me perhaps an enemy to erudition and learning. The question therefore is, From whence it cometh that learning and wisdom do seldom encounter and meet together in one and the same man; And there is great reason, why we should move this question: for it is a strange thing, and against reason, that a man, the more learned he is, should not be the more wise? learning and knowledg being a proper means,  
and

and instrument unto wisdom. Behold therefore two men, the one a student, the other none; he that hath studied, is, in some sort, bound to be far the wiser of the two, because he hath all that the other hath, that is, nature, reason, judgment, spirit; and besides these the counsels, discourses, judgements of all the greatest men of the world by reading their books. Is there not then great reason, he should be much more wise, more dexterous, more honest than the other, since that with these proper and natural means, he attaineth so many extraordinary on every side? For as one saith well, the natural good cohering and concurring with the accidental, frameth an excellent composition; and yet neverthelesse, we see the contrary, as hath been said.

Now the true reason and answer to all this, is the evil and sinister manner of study and ill instruction. They learn out of books and schools excellent knowledg, but with ill means, and as bad success. Whereby it comes to passe, that all their study profiteth them nothing at all, but they remain indigent and poor, in the midst of their plenty and riches, and like *Tantalus*, die for hunger in the midst of their dainties: the reason is, because whilst they pore upon their books, they respect nothing so much as to stufte and furnish their memories with that which they read and understand, and presently they think themselves wise; like him that put his bread in his pocket and not into his belly, when his pocket was full, died for hunger. And so with a memory fully stuffed, they continue fools; *Student non sibi & vite, sed aliis & scholæ*: They study not for themselves, and for the benefit of their life, but for others, and for the schooles. They prepare themselves to be reporters; *Cicero* hath said it, *Aristotle*, *Plato* hath left in writing, &c. but they for their parts know nothing. These men commit a double fault; the one is that they apply not that which they learn, to themselves, that so they may form themselves unto virtue, wisdom, resolution, by which means their knowledg is unprofitable unto them; the other is, that during all that time, which with great pains and charge they employ, to the heaping together and pocketing up for another without any profit to themselves, whatsoever they can rob from other men, they suffer their own proper good to fall to the ground, and never put in practice. They on the other side that study not, having no recourse unto another, take a care to husband their natural gifts, and so prove many times

the

21

*An answer to  
ill discipline.*



the better, the more wise, and resolute, though lesse learned, lesse gainers, lesse glorious. One there is that hath said as much, though otherwise and more briefly ; That learning marreth weak wits and spirits, perfitteth the strong and natural.

*Good discipline.*

Now hearken to that counsell that I give hereupon ; A man must not give himself to the gathering and keeping the opinions & knowledges of another, to the end he may afterwards make report of them, or use them for shew or ostentation, or some base and mercenary profit ; but he must use them so, as that he may make them his own. He must not only lodg them in his mind, but incorporate and transubstantiate them into himself. He must not only water his mind with the dew of knowledg, but he must make it essentially better, wise, strong, good, couragious ; otherwise to what end serveth study ? *Non paranda nobis solum, sed fruenda sapientia est : Wisdome is not only to be gotten by us, but to be enjoyed.* He must not do as it is the manner of those that make garlands, who pick here and there whole flowers, and so carry them away to make nose-gayes, and afterwards presents ; heap together out of that book, and out of this book, many good things, to make a fare and a goodly shew to others ; but he must do as Bees use to do, who carry not away the flowers, but settle themselves upon them (like a hen that covereth her chickens) and draweth from them their spirit, force, virtue, quintessence, and nourishing themselves, turn them into their own substance, and afterwards make good and sweet honey, which is all their own ; and it is no more either Thyme or sweet Margorum. So must a man gather from books the marrow and spirit (never enthralling himself so much as to retain the words by heart, as many use to do much lesse the place, the book, the chapter ; that is a sottish and vain superstition and vanity, and makes him lose the principal) and having sucked and drawn the good, feed his mind therewith, inform his judgment, instruct and direct his conscience and his opinion, rectifie his will ; and in a word, frame unto himself a work wholly his own, that is to say, an honest man, wise, advised, resolute ; *Non ad pompam, nec ad speciem, nec ut nomine magnifico sequi ocium velis, sed quò firmior adversus fortuita rempublicam capeffas.* Not for pomp or ostentation, nor to the end thou wouldest follow ease with a glorious name, but that thereby thou mayest more firmly, take upon thee the government of the Common-wealth against all accidents.

*Tacit.*

commend above all others, and that best serve to that end, which I 2. *The second advice touching the choice of science.*  
purpose, and whereof I am to speak, are natural and moral, which teach us to live, and to live well, nature and virtue; that which we are and that which we should be; under the moral are comprehended, the Politicks, Oeconomicks, Histories. All the rest are vain and frothy, and we are not to dwell upon them, but to take them as passing by.

This end of the instruction of youth and comparison of learning and wisdom, hath held me too long, by reason of the consideration. 24  
Let us now proceed to the other parts and advisements of this instruction. The means of instructions are divers, especially of two 3. *The means to learn. By word of mouth.*  
sorts: the one by word, that is to say, by precepts, instructions and lectures; or else by conference with honest and able men, filling and refining our wits against theirs, as iron is cleansed and beautified by the file. This means and manner is very pleasing and agreeable to Nature.

The other by action, that is, example, which is gotten, not 25  
onely from good men by imitation, and similitude, but also wicked, *By example.*  
by disagreement in opinions; for some there are that learn better by the opposition and horreur of all evil they see in another. It is a speciall use of Justice, to condemn one that he may serve for an example unto others. And old *Cato* was wont to say, That wise men may learn more of fools, than fools of wise men. The Lacedemonians the better to dissuade their children from drunkenness, made their servants drunken before their faces, to the end that seeing how horrible a spectacle a drunken man was, they should the rather detest it.

Now this second means or manner by example, teacheth us with more ease and more delight. To learn by precepts is a long way, *A comparison of these two.*  
because it is a painfull thing to understand well, and understanding to retain well, and retaining to use and practise well. And hardly can we promise our selves to reap that fruit which they promise unto us. But example and imitation teacheth us above the work or action it self, invite us with much more ardour, and promise unto us that glory which we learn to imitate.

The seed that is cast into the earth, draweth unto it self in the end, the quality of that earth whereunto it is transported, and becomes like unto that which doth there naturally grow: So the spirits and manners of men conform themselves to those with whom they commonly converse.



26  
From the li-  
ving.

Now these two manners of profitting by Speech and by Example are like wise twofold : for they are drawn from excellent Personages, either living by their sensible and outward frequentation and conference ; or dead, by the reading of their books.

The first, that is the commerce with the living, is more lively and more naturall, it is a fruitful exercise of life, which was much in use amongst the ancients, yea the Greeks themselves ; but it is casual depending on another, and rare : It is a difficult matter to meet with such people, and more difficult to make use of them. And this is practised either by keeping home, or by travelling and visiting strange countries, not to be fed with vanities, as the most do, but to carry with them the knowledge and consideration especially of the humors and customs of those nations.

This is a profitable exercise, the body is neither idle, nor tyred with labour, for this moderate agitation keeps a man in breath, the minde is in continuall exercise, by marking things known and new.

There is not a better school to form the life of man, then to see the diversity of so many others lives, and to taste a perpetuall variety of the forms of our nature.

27  
From the dead,  
by books.

The other commerce with the dead by the benefit of their books, is more sure, and more near unto us, more constant and lesse chargeable. He that knows how to make use of them, receiveth thereby great pleasure, great comfort. It dischargeth us of the burthen of a tedious idlenesse, it withdraweth us from fond imaginations, and other outward things, that vex and trouble us : It counselleth us and comforteth us in our griefs and afflictions : but yet it is only good for the mind, whereby the body remaineth without action, altereth and languisheth.

28  
To make the  
scholar to  
speak and to  
reason.

We must now speak of that order of proceeding and formality which a teacher of youth must keep, that he may happily arrive to his proposed end. It hath many parts ; we will touch some of them, First he must often examine his scholar, aske his judgment and opinion of whatsoever shall present it self unto him. This is quite contrary to the ordinary style, which is, that the master do alwaies speak and teach his child with authority, and work into his head as into a vessel, whatsoever he will, insomuch that children are only Auditors and Receivers, which manner of teaching I cannot commend ; *Obest plerumque is qui discere volunt, autoritas eorum qui docent : The authority of them which teach, hurteth for the most*

*part those which would learn.* Their spirits must be awakened and inflamed by demands, make them first to ask others, to enquire, and to open the way at their own will. If without questioning with them a man speak wholly unto them, it is a labour in a manner lost, the child is not profited thereby, because he thinks it belongs not unto him, so long as he yields not an account thereof; he lends only his ears and those coldly too; he sets not forward with so good a pace, as when he is a party in the business. Neither is it enough to make them give their judgment, but that they maintain it, and to be able to give a reason of their saying, to the end that they speak not by rote; but that they be attentive, and careful of that they speak: And to give them the better encouragement thereunto, a man must not seem to neglect that they say, but commend at the least their good essay and endeavour. This form of teaching by questions and demands, is excellently observed both by *Socrates* (the principal in this business) as we see every where in *Plato*, where by a long annexion and enfolding of demands wittily and dexterously made, he sweetly leadeth a man to the closet of verity; and also by the Doctour of verity, in his Gospel. Now *Matth. 16. 12.* these questions must not be only of things touching science and *Luk. 10. & 24* memory, as hath been said, but matter of judgment. For to this exercise all things may serve, even the least that are, as the follies of a Laquey, the malice of a Page, a discourse at Table: for the work of judgment is not to handle and to understand great and high matters, but justly to weigh them, and consider of them whatsoever they be.

Questions therefore must be moved touching the judgment of men and their actions, and by reason determined, to the end that thereby men may frame their judgment and their conscience. The tutor or instructor of *Cyrus* in *Xenophon* for a lecture proposed this Question; A great youth having a little coat or cassock, gave it to one of his companions of a lesse stature, and took from him his cassock, which was the greater: upon which fact he demanded his judgment. *Cyrus* answered, that it was well, because both of them were thereby the better fitted. But his master reprehended him sharply for it, because he considered only the fitnesse and conveniency thereof, and not the justice, which should first and especially have been thought of, which was that no man may be enforced in that which was his own. And this no doubt is an excellent manner of instruction. And though a man may recite authorities out of



books, the saying of *Cicero*, or *Aristotle*, yet it is not only to recite them, but to judge of them, and so to frame and fashion them to all uses and to apply them to divers subjects. It is not enough to report as a history, that *Cato* killed himself at *Utica*, that he might not fall into the hands of *Cesar*; and that *Brunus* and *Cassius* were the authors of the death of *Cesar*; for this is the least: but I will that he proceed and judge, whether they did well herein, or no; whether they deserve well of the common-weal; whether they carried themselves therein according to wisdom, justice, valour; and wherein they did ill, wherein well. Finally, and generally, in all these discourses, demands, answers, the conveniency, order, verity, must be inquired into; a work of judgment and conscience. These things a man by any means must not dissemble, but ever presse them, and hold him subject unto them.

29  
3. An advise-  
ment touching  
honesty

Secondly, he must accustom and frame him to an honest curiosity to know all things, whereby he must first have his eyes upon every thing the better to consider all that may be said, done or attempted concerning himself, and nothing must passe his hands, before it passe and repasse his judgment; and then he must make an enquiry into other matters, as well of right as of action. He that enquireth after nothing; knows nothing, saith one: He that busieth not his mind, and suffereth it to rust, becomes a fool; and therefore he must make profit of all, apply every thing to himself, take advice and counsel as well of what is past, the better to see the error he hath committed; as of that which is to come, the better to rule and direct himself. Children must not be suffered to be idle to bring themselves asleep, to entertain themselves with their own prattle: for wanting sufficiency to furnish themselves with good and worthy matter, they will feed upon vanities; they must therefore be alwayes busied in some employment, and kept in breath: and this curiosity must be ingendred in them, the better to awaken them, and to spur them forward, which being such as is said, shall be neither vain in it self, nor tedious to another.

30  
Advise.

He must likewise fashion and mould his spirit to the general pattern and model of the world and of nature, make it universal, that is to say, represent unto him in all things, the universal face of nature; that the whole world may be his book: that of what subject soever a man talk, he cast his eye and his thought upon the large immensity of the world; upon so many different fashi-

ons and opinions, which have been, and are in the world touching that subject. The most excellent and noble minds, are the more universal and more free; and by this means the mind is contented, learneth not to be astonished at any thing, is formed to a resolution and stedfast constancy. To be brief, such a man doth no more admire any thing, which is the highest and last point of wisdom. For whatsoever doth happen, or a man may report unto him, he easily finds that there is nothing in the world either new or strange; that the condition of man is capable of all things; that they have come to others, and that elsewhere divers things passe more strange, more great. And in this sense it was that wise *Socrates* called himself, A citizen of the world. And contrarily, there is not any thing that doth more deprave and enthral the mind of man, than to make him tast and understand but one certain opinion, belief, and manner of life. What greater folly or weakness can there be, than to think that all the world walketh, believeth, speaketh, doth, liveth and dieth, according to the manner of this country? like those hard block-heads, who when they hear one recite the manners and opinions of forrein countries very different and contrary to theirs, they tremble for fear, and believe them not, or else do absurdly condemn them as barbarous; so much are they enthralled and tyed to their cradle, a kind of people brought up (as they say) in a bottle, that never saw any thing but thorow a hole. Now this universal spirit must be attained by the diligence of the master or teacher, afterwards by travel, and communication with strangers, and the reading of books and the histories of all Nations.

Finally, he must teach him to take nothing upon credit and by authority; this is to make himself a beast, and to suffer himself to be led by the nose like an ox: but to examine all things with reason, to propose all things, and then to give him leave to chuse. And if he know not how to chuse, but doubt which perhaps is the better, sounder and surer course; to teach him likewise to resolve of nothing of himself, but rather to distrust his own judgment.

31

After the mind comes the body, whereof there must likewise be a care taken, at one and the same instant with the spirit, not making two works thereof. Both of them make an entire man. Now a master must endeavour to keep his child free from delicacy and pride in apparel, in sleeping, eating, drinking; he must bring him up hardly to labour and pains, accustom him to heat and cold,

32  
*An advisement  
touching the  
body.*



wind and weather, yea and unto hazzards too; harden his muscles and his sinews, as well as his minde, to labour and than to pain and grief too; For the first disposeth to the second: *Labor calum obducit dolori: Labour hardneith a man against grief.* To be brief, he must endeavour to make him lusty and vigorous, indifferent to all kind of viands. All this serveth not only for his health, but for publick affairs and services.

33  
3. An advise-  
ment touching  
manners.

We come now to the third head, which concerneth manners: wherein both body and soul hath a part, This is two-fold; To hinder the evil, to ingraft and nourish the good. The first is the more necessary, and therefore the greater care and heed must be taken. It must therefore be done in time, for there is no time too speedy, to hinder the birth and growth of all ill manners and conditions; especially these following, which are to be feared in youth.

I

Evil manners. To lie, a base vice of servants and slaves, of a licentious and fearful minde, the cause whereof ariseth many times from bad and rude instruction.

2.

A sottish shame and weaknesse, whereby they seek to hide themselves, hold down their heads, blush at every question that is proposed, cannot endure a correction, or a sharp word without a strange alteration of countenance. Nature doth many times bear a great sway herein, but it must be corrected by study.

3

All affection and singularity in habit, carriage, gate, speech, gesture, and all other things; this is a testimony of vanity and vain-glory, and marreth all the rest, even that which is good; *Licet sapere sine pompa, sine invidia: A man may be wise without pomp, without envie.*

4.

But above all, choler, fullennesse, obstinacy; and therefore it is very necessary that a childe never have his will by such froward means, and that he learn and find that these qualities are altogether unprofitable and bootlesse, yea base and villanous; and for this cause he must never be flattered, for that marreth and corrupteth him, teacheth him to be fullen and froward, if he have not his will, and in the end maketh him insolent, that a man shall never work any good upon him; *Nil magis reddit iracundos, quam educatio mollis & blanda: Nothing more maketh one prone to anger than soft and cockering education.*

34

Good manners. By the self-same means a man must ingraft into him good and honest manners: And first to instruct him to fear and reverence God

God, to tremble under that infinite and invifible majesty, to speak seldom and foberly of God, of his power, eternity, wisdom, will, and of his works; not indifferently and upon all occasions, but fearfully, with shame and reverence. Not to be over scrupulous in the myfteries and point of Religion, but to conform himself to the Government and Discipline of the Church.

Secondly, to replenish and cherish his heart with ingenuity, freedom, candor, integrity, and to teach him to be an honest man, out of an honourable and honest mnde, not servilely and mechanically, for fear, or hope of any honour or profit, or other consideration, than virtue it self. These two are especially for himself.

For another and the company with whom he converseth, he must work in a sweet kinde of affability to accommodate himself to all kinde of people, to all fashions; *Omnis Aristippum decuit color, & status, & res*: Every countenance, condition and gesture became Aristippus. Herein Alcibiades was excellent. That he learn how to be able, and to know how to do all things, yea excesse and licentious behaviours, if need be; but that he love to do only that which is good. That he refrain to do evil, not for want of courage, nor strength, nor knowledge, but will. *Multum interest utrum peccare quis nolit, aut nescit*: There is great difference, in not being willing to sin, and not being able.

Modesty, whereby he contenteth not, nor tyeth himself, either to all, as to the greatest and most respective persons, or such as are his inferiors, either in condition or sufficiency; nor defendeth any thing obstinately, with affirmative, resolute, commanding words, but sweet, submisive and moderate speeches. Hereof hath been spoken elsewhere. And thus the three heads of the duties of parents are dispatched:

The fourth, concerneth their affection and communication with them, when they are great and capace of that whereunto they were instructed. We know that affection is reciprocall and naturall betwixt parents and their Children, but that of parents towards their children is far more strong and more naturall; because it is given by nature to love those things that are coming on to the maintenance and continuance of the world, especially those in whom a man doth live when he is dead. That of children towards their parents is retrograde, and therefore it goeth not so strongly, not so naturally; and it seemeth rather to be the payment of a debt, and a thankful

2

3

35

See lib. 2. Cap

9.

36

The fourth part touching the duty of parents.

The love of parents greater than the love of children.



acknowledgment of a benefit received, than a pure, free, simple, and natural love. Moreover, he that giveth and doth good, loveth more than he that receiveth and is indebted: And therefore a father and every agent that doth good to another, loveth more than he is beloved. The reasons of this proposition are many. All love to Be (which Being is exercised and demonstrated in motion and action). Now he that giveth and doth good to another, is after a sort in him that receiveth. He that giveth and doth good to another, doth that which is honest and honourable; he that receiveth doth none of this: honesty is for the first, profit for the second. Now honesty is far more worthy, firm, stable, amiable than profit, which in a moment vanisheth. Again, those things are most beloved that cost us most; that is dearest unto us, which we come more dearly by. Now to beget, to nourish, to bring up is a matter of greater charge, than to receive all these.

37  
*The love of parents, twofold.*

This love of Parents is twofold, though alwayes natural, yet after a divers manner: the one is simply and universally natural, and is a simple instinct which is common with beasts, according to which Parents love and cherish their children, though deformed, stammering, halting, milk-sops, and use them like moppets or little apes. This love is not truly humane. Man indued with reason, must not servilely subject himself unto nature as beasts do, but follow it more nobly with discourse of reason. The other then is more humane and reasonable, whereby a man loveth his children more or lesse, according to that measure wherein he seeth the seeds and sparks of virtue, goodness, and towardliness to arise and spring up in them. Some there are who being besotted, and carried with the former kind of affections, have but little of this, and never complaining of the charge so long as their children are but small, complain thereof when they come to their growth, and begin to profit. It seemeth that they are in a sort offended and vexed to see them to grow and set forward in honest courses, that they may become honest men: these parents are brutish and inhumane.

38  
*Of the true fatherly love in communicating with his children being come to years of discretion.*

Now according to this second, true, and fatherly love, in the well governing thereof, parents should receive their children, if they be capable, into their society and partnership to their goods, admit them to their counsel, intelligence, the knowledg and course of their domestical affairs, as also to the communication of their designsments, opinions, and thoughts, yea consent and contribute to their honest recreations and pastimes, as the case shall require, alwayes

alwaies reserving their rank and authority. For we condemn the austere, lord-like, and imperious countenance and carriage of those that never look upon their children, nor speak unto them but with authority, will not be called fathers but lords, Though God himself refuse not this name of Father, never caring for the hearty love of their children, so they may be feared, revered, and adored. And for this cause, they give unto them sparingly, keep them in want that they may the better keep them in aw, and obedience, ever threatening them some small pittance by their last Will, when they depart out of this life. Now this is a sottish, vain, and ridiculous foolery; It is to distrust their own proper, true, and natural authority, to get an artificial; and it is the way to deceive themselves, and to grow in contempt, which is clean contrary to that they pretend. It causeth their children to carry themselves cunningly with them, and to conspire and find means how to deceive them. For parents should in good time frame their minds to duty, by reason, and not have recourse to these means more tyrannous than fatherly.

*Errat longè meâ quidem sententiâ,  
Qui imperium credit esse gravius aut stabilius  
Vi quod sit quàm illud quod amicitia adjungitur.  
In my opinion he is much amiss,  
Who thinks more firm or gave that rule of his,  
That's wrought by force, than what of friendship is.*

In the last disposition of our goods, the best and surest way is to follow the laws and customes of the Country. The laws have better provided for it than we, and it is a safer course to suffer them to fail in something, than to adventure upon our own defects, in our own proper choice. It is to abuse that liberty we have therein, to serve our foolish fantasies and private passions, like those that suffer themselves to be carried by the unwonted officious actions and flatteries of those that are present, who make use of their last Wills and testaments, either by gratifying or chastising the actions of those that pretend interest therein. A man must conform himself to reason and common custom herein which is wiser than we are, & the surer way.

39  
*The usage of  
them in their  
last wills ac-  
cording to the  
laws.*

We come now to the duty of children towards their Parents, so natural and so religious, and which ought to be done unto them, not as unto pure and simple men, but demi-Gods, earthly, mortal, visible gods. And this is the reason why Philo the Jew said,

40  
*Of the duty of  
children to-  
wards their pa-  
rents.*

that



that the Commandment touching the duty of children was written the one half in the first Table, which contained the Commandments that concern our duty towards God; and the other half in the second Table, wherein are the Commandments that concern our neighbour, as being half divine, and half humane. This duty likewise is so certain, so due and requisite, that it may not be dispensed withall by any other duty or love whatsoever, be it never so great.

For, if it shall happen that a man see his father and his sonne so indangered at one and the same instant, as that he cannot rescue and succour them both, he must forsake his sonne, and go to his father though his love towards his sonne be greater, as before hath been said. And the reason is, because the duty of a sonne towards his father is more ancient, and hath the greater priviledg, and cannot be abrogated by any later duty.

41  
This duty consisteth in five points.

Now this duty consisteth in five points, comprehended in this word; *Honour thy father and thy mother*. The first is reverence, not only in outward gesture and countenance, but also inward; which is that high and holy opinion and esteem, that a child ought to have of his parents, as the authors and original causes of his being, and of his good: a quality that makes them resemble God himself.

2  
Jer. 35.

The second is obedience, even to the roughest and hardest commands of a father, according to the example of the *Rechabites*, who to obey the command of their father, never drank wine in all their lives.

Nay more than that, *Isaac* refused not to yield his neck to the sword of his father.

3

The Third is to succour their parents in all their needs and necessities, to nourish them in their old age, their impotency, and want; to give them their assistance in all their affairs.

In Examer.

We have an example and pattern hereof even in beasts.

In the Stork, whose little ones (as Saint *Basil* affirmeth) feed and nourish their old dams, cover them with their feathers, when they fall from them, and couple themselves together to carry them upon their backs. Love furnisheth them with this art.

This example is so lively and so significant, that the duty of children towards their parents hath been signified by the quality of this creature, ἀντιπελαργία, *reciconiare*. And the Hebrews call this bird for this cause, *Chasida*, that is to say, the debonair, the charitable bird. *Levit.*

We have likewise notable examples hereof amongst men.

*Cymon* the sonne of the great *Miltiades*, whose father dying in prison as some say for debt, and not having wherewithal to bury his body, much lesse to redeem it being arrested for the debt whilst it was carried to the burial, according to the laws of the Country; *Cymon* sold himself and his liberty for money to provide for his funeral. He with his plenty and goods relieved not his father, but with his liberty; which is dearer than all goods, yea and life too. He helped not his father living and in necessity, but dead, and being no more a father nor a man. What had he done to succour his father living, wanting and requiring his kelp? This is an excellent precedent.

We have two the like examples, even in the weak and feeble sex of women, of two daughters which have nourished and given suck the one to the father, the other to her mother, being prisoners and condemned to die by famine, the ordinary punishments of the Ancients. It seemeth in some sort a thing against nature, that the mother should be nourished with the daughters milk, but this is truly according to nature, yea, those first laws, that the daughter should nourish her mother.

The fourth is not to do, to attempt, or enterprize any thing of weight or importance, without the advice, consent, and approbation of Parents, and especially in marriage, 4

The fifth is, mildly and gently to endure the vices, imperfections, and testy and impatient humours of Parents, their severity and rigour. *Manlius* had made good proof hereof; for the Tribune *Pomponius* having accused the father of this *Manlius* in the presence of the people of many crimes; and amongst others, that he over-cruelly handled his sonne, enforcing him to till the earth: the sonne goeth to the Tribune and finding him in his bed putting the point of his dagger to his throat, inforced him to swear, that he should desist from his pursuit he made against his father, de 5

*Manlius*



firing rather to endure his fathers rigour, than to see him troubled for it.

A child shall find no difficulty in these five duties, if he consider how chargeable he hath been to his parents, and with what care and affection he hath been brought up. But he shall never know it well, until he have children of his own, as he that was found to ride upon a hobby-horse playing with his children, entreated him that so took him to hold his peace until he were himself a father, reputing him till then no indifferent Judge in this action.

## CHAP. XV.

*The duty of Masters and Servants.*

**H**ERE cometh the third and last part of private and domestical justice, which is the duties of Masters and Servants. Touching which, it is necessary to know the distinction of servants: for they principally are of three sorts: That is to say, of slaves, whereof all the world hath been full in former time, and is at present, except a part of Europe, and no place more free than here about *France*; they have no power neither in their bodies nor goods, but are wholly their masters, who may give, lend, sell, resell, exchange, and use them as beasts of service. Of these hath been spoken of at large. There are inferiour servants, and servants, free people, masters of their persons and goods, yea they cannot bargain, or otherwise do anything to the prejudice of their own liberty; but they owe honour, obedience, and service until such times, and upon such conditions, as they have promised, and their masters have power to command, correct, and chastise them with moderation and discretion. There are also mercenaries, which are lesse subject, they owe no service nor obedience, but only work and labour for money; and they have no authority in commanding or correcting them.

The duties of masters towards their servants, as well of slaves as inferiour servants, are, not to handle them cruelly, remembering they are men, and of the same nature with us, but only fortune hath put a difference which is very variable, and sporteth it self in making great men little, and little great. And therefore the difference is not so great, so much to contemn them. *Sunt homines contubernales, humiles amici, conservi, æque fortune subjecli*: They are

*are men, dwellers with thee, humble friends, fellow servants, equally the subjects of fortune.* To handle servants gently, seeking rather to be beloved than feared, is the testimony of a good nature: to use them roughly and too severely, proceedeth from a crabbed and cruel mind, and that he beareth the same disposition towards all other men, but want of power hindereth the execution thereof. They ought to instruct them with godly and religious counsel, and those things that are requisite for their health and safety.

The duties of servants are to honour, and fear their masters whatsoever they be, and to yield them obedience and fidelity, serving them not for gain, or only outwardly, and for countenance, but heartily, seriously, for conscience sake, and without dissimulation. We read of most worthy, noble, and generous services performed in former times by some towards their masters, even to engaging and hazzard of their lives, for their masters safeguard and honour.

CHAP. XVI.

*The duty of Sovereigns, and Subjects.*

OF Princes and Sovereigns, their descriptions, notes, humours, marks, and discommodities hath been discoursed in the first book, *Chapter 49.* Their duty to govern the Common-wealth hath been spoken of at large in this present book, *chapter 2. and 3.* which is of politick prudence: yet we will touch a little here the heads and general points of their duty.

The Sovereign as the mean betwixt God and the people, and debtor to these two, ought alwaies to remember that he is the lively <sup>I</sup> *The duty of* image, the Officer and Lieutenant general of the great God his *Sovereigns.* Sovereign, and to the people a perfect mirrour, a bright beam, a clear looking glasse, and elevated theater for every one to behold, a fountain where all refresh themselves, a spur to virtue, and who doth not any good, that is not famous, and put in the Register of perpetual memory. He ought then first of all to fear and honour *To be religious.* God, to be devout, religious, to observe piety not only for himself and for conscience sake, as every other man, but for his State, and as he is a Sovereign. The piety which we here require in a Prince, is The care he ought to have, and to shew for the conservation of Religion and the ancient laws and ceremonies of the Country, providing by laws, penalties, and punishments that the Religion be  
neither



Mercur.  
Trism.

neither changed, troubled, nor innovated. This is a thing that highly redoundeth to his honour and security (for all do reverence, and more willingly obey, and more slowly attempt or enterprise any thing against him whom they see fear God, and believe to be in his protection and safeguard: *Una custodia pietas: pius virum nec malus genius nec fatum devincit. Deus enim eripit eum ab omni malo. The only safeguard is piety: neither the evil genius nor fate can overcome a godly man: for God delivereth him out of all evil.*) And also to the good of the State, for as all the wisest have said, Religion is the band and cement of humane society.

2  
To observe the  
laws of superi-  
ors.

The Prince ought also to be subject, and inviolably to observe and cause to be observed the laws of God, and Nature, which are not to be dispenced with: and he that infringeth them, is not only counted a tyrant but a monster.

3  
To keep his pro-  
mise.

Concerning the people, he ought first to keep his covenants, and promises, be it with subjects or others with whom he is interested or hath to do. This equity is both natural and universal. God himself keepeth his promise. Moreover, the Prince is the pledge and form or warrant of the law, and those natural bargains of his subjects. He ought then above all to keep his faith, there being nothing more odious in a Prince than breach of promise and perjury; and therefore it was well said, that a man ought to put it among those casual cases, if the Prince do abjure or revoke his promise, and that the contrary is not to be presumed. Yea, he ought to observe those promises and bargains of his predecessors, especially, if he be their heir, or if they be for the benefit and welfare of the Commonwealth. Also he may receive himself of his unreasonable contracts and promises unadvisedly made, even as for the self same causes private men are relieved by the benefit of the Prince.

4  
To observe the  
laws.

He ought also to remember, that although he be above the law (I mean the civil and human) as the Creatour is above the creature (for the law is the work of the Prince, and that which he may change and abrogate at his pleasure, it is the proper right of the Sovereignty) nevertheless if it be in force and authority, he ought to keep it, to live, to converse and judge according unto it; and it would be a dishonour and a very evil example to contradict it, and as it were falsifie it. Great *Augustus* having done something against the law, by his own proper act, would needs die for grief: *Lycurgus*, *Agessius Zelenus*; have left three notable examples in this point, and to their cost.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, the Prince oweth justice to all his subjects; and he ought to measure his puissance and power by the rule of justice. This is the proper virtue of a Prince truly royal and Prince-like; wherefore it was rightly said by an old man to King *Philip* that delayed him justice, saying he had no leisure, That he should then desist and leave off to be King. But *Demetrius* sped not so well, who was dispossest of his Realm by his subjects; for casting from a bridg into the River many of their Petitions, without answer, or doing them justice.

5

To do justice.

Finally, the Prince ought to love, cherish, to be vigilant and careful of his State, as the husband of the wife, the father of his children, the shepherd of his flock, having alwaies before his eyes the profit and quiet of his subjects. The prosperity and welfare of the state is the end and contentment of a good Prince, *ut Res- pub. opibus firma, copiis locuples gloria ampla, virtute honesta sit: That the Common-wealth be strong in power, rich in plenty, abound in glory, honest in virtue.* The Prince that tieth himself to himself, abuseth himself: for he is not his own man, neither is the State his, but he is the State's. He is a Lord not to domineer, but to defend. *Cui non civium servitus tradita, sed tutela: To whom is committed not the servitude of citizens, but their safeguard,* to attend, to watch, to the end his vigilancy may secure his sleeping subjects, his travel may give them rest, his providence may maintain their prosperity, his industry may continue their delights, his business their leisure, their vacation, and that all his subjects may understand and know that he is as much for them, as he is above them.

6

To take care and affect the common good.

Senec.

To be such, and to discharge his duty well he ought to demean and carry himself as hath been said at large in the second and third Chapters of this book, that is to say, to furnish himself of good counsel, of treasure, and sufficient strength with his state to fortifie himself with alliance and foreign friends, to be ready and to command both in peace and war; by this means he may be both loved and feared.

And to contain all in a few words, he must love God above all things, be advised in his enterprises, valiant in attempts, faithful and firm in his word, wise in counsel, careful of his subjects, helpful to his friends, terrible to his enemies, pitiful to the afflicted, gentle and courteous to the good people, severe to the wicked, and just and upright towards all.

8

9

The duty of subjects.

The duty of subjects consisteth in three points, to yield due honour



Exod. 12.

IO  
Whether it be  
lawful to lay  
violent hands  
upon the per-  
son of a ty-  
rant.  
A double ty-  
rant.

I  
The entrance.

2  
In the executi-  
on three waies.

Hereof see a-  
bove Chap. 4.  
in chap. of ty-  
ranny and re-  
bellion.

nour, to their princes, as to those that carry the Image of God, or-  
dained and established by him; therefore they are most wicked,  
who detract or slander; such were the seed of *Cham* and *Chanaan*  
2. To be obedient, under which is contained many duties, as to go  
to the wars, to pay tributes and imposts, imposed upon them by their  
authority. 3. To wish them all prosperity and happiness, and to pray  
for them.

But the question is, whether a man ought to yield these three  
duties generally to all Princes, if they be wicked, or tyrants. This  
controversie cannot be decided in a word, and therefore we must  
distinguish. The prince if a tyrant and wicked, either in the entrance,  
or execution of his government. If in the entrance, that is to say,  
that he treacherously invadeth, and by his own force and powerful  
authority gains the sovereignty without any right, be he otherwise  
good or evil (for this cause he ought to be accounted a Tyrant)  
without all doubt we ought to resist him either by way of justice,  
if there be opportunity and place, or by surprise: and the *Grecians*,  
saith *Cicero*, ordained in former times rewards and honours for  
those that delivered the Commonwealth from servitude and op-  
pression. Neither can it be said to be a resisting of the prince, ei-  
ther by justice or surprise, since he is neither received nor acknowledg-  
ed to be a Prince.

If in the execution, that is to say, that his entrance be rightful and  
just, but that he carrieth himself imperiously, cruelly, and wickedly,  
and according to the common saying, Tyrannically; it is then also  
to be distinguished: for it may be so three waies, and every one  
requireth particular consideration. The one is in violating the  
laws of God, and nature, that is to say, against the Religion of  
the country, the commandment of God, enforcing and constrain-  
ing their consciences. In this case he ought not to yield any duty or  
obedience, following those divine axiomes, That we ought rather  
to obey God than men, and fear him more that commandeth the  
intire man, than those that have a power but over the least part.  
Yet he ought not to oppose himself against him by violence of si-  
nister means, which is another extremity, but to observe the mid-  
dle way, which is either to fly or suffer *fugere aut pati*; these two re-  
medies are named by the doctrine of verity in the like extremities.  
2. The other lesse evil, which concerneth not the consciences, but  
only the bodies and the goods, is an abuse to subjects, denying  
them justice, imprisoning their persons, and depriving them of their  
goods

good. In the which case he ought, with patience and acknowledgment of the wrath of God, yield these 3 duties following, honour obedience, vows and prayers: and to be mindful of 3. things, that all power and authority is from God, and whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: *Principi summum rerum iudicium dii dederunt: Subditis obsequii gloria relicta est bonos principes voto expetere, qualescunque tolerare.* God hath given the sovereign judgment of affairs to the Prince: The glory of dutiful service is left to the subjects: to desire by prayer good Princes, and tolerate them whatsoever they be. And he ought not to obey a superiour, because he is worthy and worthily commandeth, but because he is a superiour, not for that he is good, but because he is true and lawful. There is great difference between true and good, every one ought to obey the law, not because it is good and just, but simply, because it is the law. That God causeth an hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people, though he reserve him for a day of his fury; that the wicked Prince is the instrument of his Justice, the which we ought to endure as other evils, which the heavens do send us; *quomodo sterilitatem aut nimios imbres & cætera nature mala, sic luxum & avaritiam dominantium tolerare: As when we suffer sterility or unseasonable weather, and other evils of nature, so must we endure the riot and covetousnesse of our rulers.* 3. The examples of Saul, Nebuchadonozor, of many Emperours before Constantine, and others since him as cruel tyrants as might be: towards whom nevertheless these three duties have been observed by good men, and enjoyed them by the Prophets and learned men of those days, according to the oracle of the great Doctor of truth, which inferreth an obedience to them which sit in the seat of Government, notwithstanding they oppress us with insupportable burthens, and their Government be evil.

The third concerneth the whole State, when he would change or ruinate, seeking to make it elective, of hereditary; or of an Aristocracy, or Democracy, a Monarchy; or otherwise: And in this case he ought to withstand and hinder their proceedings, either by way of justice, or otherwise: for he is not master of the state, but only a guardian and a surety. But these affairs belong not at all, but to the tutors and maintainers of the State, or those that are interested therein, as electors of elective States; or Princes apparent in hereditary States; or States general, that have fundamental laws. And this is the onely case wherein it is lawful to resist a tyrant. And all this



is said of subjects, who are never permitted to attempt any thing against a sovereign Prince for what cause soever; and the laws say that he deserveth death, who attempteth, or giveth counsel, and which intendeth, or onely thinketh it. But it is honourable for a stranger, yea it is most noble and heroicall in a Prince by warlike means to defend a people unjustly oppressed, and to free them from tyranny; as *Hercules* did, and after *Dion*, *Timoleon*, and *Tamberlain*, Prince of the Tartars, who overcame *Bajazet* the Turkish Emperor, and besieged *Constantinople*.

12  
*Examinations  
of Sovereigns  
after their  
deaths.*

These are the duties of subjects towards their living Sovereigns: But it is a point of justice to examine their life after they are dead. This is a custom just and very profitable, which benefiteth much those nations where it is observed, and that which all good Princes do desire, who have cause to complain, that a man handleth the memory of the wicked as well as theirs. Sovereigns are companions if not masters of the laws; for seeing justice cannot touch their lives, there is reason, it taketh hold of their reputation, to the good of their successors. We owe reverence and duty equally to all kings, in respect of their dignity and office, but inward estimation and affection to their vertue. We patiently endure them, though unworthy as they are: We conceal their vices; for their authority and publick order where we live, hath need of our common help; but after they are gone, there is no reason to reject justice, and the liberty of expressing our true thoughts, yea it is a very excellent and profitable example, that we manifest to the posterity faithfully to obey a Master or Lord, whose imperfections are well known. They who for some private duty commit a wicked Prince to memory, do private justice to the publick hurt. An excellent lesson for a successor, if it were observed.

## CHAP. XVII.

### *The duty of Magistrates.*

1.  
*For what cause  
Magistrates  
are allowed of.*

GOED people in a common-wealth would love better to enjoy ease of contentment, which good and excellent spirits know how to give themselves in consideration of the goods of nature, and the effects of God, than to undertake publick charges, were it not that they fear to be ill governed, and by the wicked; and therefore they consent to be magistrates: but to hunt and follow publick charges, especially the judgment-seat, is base and vile, and

condemned.

## *The duty of Magistrates.*

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condemned by all good laws, yea even of the Heathen; witnesse the law *Julia de ambitu*, unworthy a person of honour: and a man cannot better expresse his insufficiency, than by seeking for it. But it is most base and vile by bribery or money to purchase them; and there is no merchandize more hateful and contemptible than it: for it necessarily followeth, that he which buyeth in grosse, selleth by retail: Whereupon the Emperour *Severus* speaking against the like inconvenience, saith that a man cannot justly condemn him which selleth that he bought.

Lamprid.

Every man apparelleth himself, and putteth on his best habit before he departeth his house to appear in publick: so before a man undertake publick charges, he ought privately to examine himself, to learn to rule his passions, and well to settle and establish his mind. A man bringeth not to the Turney a raw unmannaged horse; neither doth a man enter into affairs of importance, if he hath not been instructed and prepared for it before: so, before a man undertakes these affairs, and enters upon the stage and theater of this world, he ought to correct that imperfect and savage part in him, to bridle and restrain the liberty of affections, to learn the laws, the parts, and measures thereof, wherewith it ought to be handled in all occasions. But contrarily it is a very lamentable and absurd thing as *Socrates* saith, that although no man undertaketh the profession of any mystery or mechannical Art, which formerly he hath not learned; yet in publick charges, in the skill to command and obey well, to govern the world, the deepest and difficultest mystery of all, they are accepted, and undertake it, that know nothing at all.

2  
*How a Magistrate ought to prepare himself before he take the charge.*

Magistrates are intermixed persons, placed between the Sovereign and private men, and therefore it behoveth them to know how to command, and to obey, how to obey their sovereign, yield to the power of superiour Magistrates, honour their equals, command their inferiours, defend the weak, make head against the great, and be just to all: and therefore it was well said, That magistracy describeth a man, being to play in publick so many parts.

3  
*A general description of Magistrates.*

In regard of his Sovereign, the Magistrate according to the diversity of the commands, ought diversly to govern, or readily, or not at all to obey, or surcease his obedience. First, in those commands which yield unto him acknowledgment and allowance, as are all the warrants of justice, and of all other, where this clause, or any equivalent unto it (if it appear unto you) or which are with-

4  
*The duty of Magistrates as touching the Sovereign.*



*The duty of Magistrates.*

out attribution of allowance, just and indifferent of themselves he ought to obey, and he may easily discharge himself without any scruple and danger.

In those commands which attribute unto him no acknowledgment, but only the execution, as are warrants of command, if they be against right and civil justice, and that have in them clauses derogatory, he ought simply to obey: for the Sovereign may derogate from the ordinary law, and this is properly that wherein Sovereignty consisteth.

3. To those which are contrary to right, and contain no derogatory clause but are wholly prejudicial to the good and utility of the Common-wealth, what clause soever it hath, and though the Magistrate knoweth it to be false, and enforceth against right and by violence, he ought not to yield readily in these three cases, but to hold them in suspence, and to make resistance once or twice, and at the second or third command to yield.

4. Touching those which are repugnant to the law of God and nature; he ought to dismiss and acquit himself of his office, yea to endure any thing, rather than obey or consent: and he need not say that the former commands may have some doubt in them: because natural Justice is more clear than the light of the Sun.

5. All this is good to be done in respect of the things themselves: But after they are once done by the Sovereign, how evil soever they be, it is better to dissemble them, and bury the memory of them, than to stir and lose all (as *Papinian* did) *Frustra niti, & nihil aliud nisi odium querere, extrema demerita est: It is extreme folly to labour to no purpose and to get nothing else but hatred.*

5.  
As touching  
private men.

In respect of private Subjects, Magistrates ought to remember that the authority which they have over them, they have but at a second hand, and hold it of the Sovereign, who alwaies remaineth absolute Lord, and their authority is limited to a prefixed time.

Deut. 16.

The Magistrate ought to be of easie access, ready to hear and understand all complaints and suites, having his gate open to all, and himself alway at hand: considering he is not for himself, but for all, and servant of the Common-wealth. *Magna servitus, magna fortuna: Great fortune is a great servitude.* And for this cause the law of *Moses* provided that Judges and the Judgment seats were held at the gates of the Cities, to the end every man might have easie access thereto.

He ought also indifferently to receive and hear all, great and little, rich and poor, being open to all; Therefore a wise man compareth him to an altar, whereto a man repaireth, being oppressed and afflicted, to receive succour and comfort.

But he ought not to converse and be familiar with many; but with very few, and those very wise and advised, and that secretly: for it debaseth authority, it diminisheth and dissolveth the grace and reputation thereof. *Cleon* called to the Government of the Commonwealth, assembled all his friends, and there renounced and disclaimed all intimation, or inward amity with them, as a thing incompatible with his charge; for *Cicero* saith, he depriveth himself of the person of a Friend, that undertaketh that of a Judg.

His office is especially in two things, to uphold and defend the honour, the dignity, and the right of his Sovereign, and of the weal- *Cic. lib. I. Officior.* publick which he representeth: *Gerere personam civitatis, ejus dignitatem & decus sustinere;* to represent the person of the City, to uphold the dignity and glory thereof, with authority and mild severity.

Then as a good and loyal Interpreter, and Officer of the Prince, he ought exactly to see that his will be performed; that is to say, the law, of which he is the Minister, and it is his charge to see it diligently executed towards all, therefore he is called the living law, the speaking law.

Although the Magistrate ought wisely to temper mildness with rigour, yet it is better for a Magistrate to be severe and cruel, then gentle, facil, and pittiful: And God forbiddeth to be pittiful in judgement. A severe Judg holdeth subjects in obedience of the laws: a milde and pitiful makes them to contemn the laws, the Magistrates, and the Prince, who made both. To be brief, to discharge well his office, there is required two things, honesty and courage. The first hath need of the second. The first preserveth the Magistrate free from avarice, respect of persons, of bribes, which is the plague, and smoother of truth, (*Acceptatio munerum prevaricatio est veritatis: An accepting of gifts, is a prevarication of the tru.b.*) From the corruption of justice, which *Plato* calleth an hal-lowed virgin: Also from passions, of hatred, of love, and others, all enemies to right and equity. But to carry himself well against the threatnings of great men, the importunate intreaties of his friends, the lamentations and tears of the poor distressed, which are all violent and forcible things, and yet have some colour of rea-



son and justice, and which maketh sometimes the most resolute to relent; he had need of courage: firm and inflexible constancy is a principal quality and vertue in a Magistrate, to the end he may not fear the great and mighty, and be not moved and mollified with the misery of another, though it carry with it some shew of goodness. But yet it is forbid to have pity of the poor in judgement.

## CHAP. XVIII.

*The duty of great and small.*

Exod. 2.

**T**He duty of the great consisteth in two things, in endeavouring by all means, to spend their blood and ability, for the defence, and conservation of piety, justice, of the Prince, of the State, and generally for the welfare and good of the Common-wealth; of which they ought to be pillars and supporters; and after in defending and protecting the poor afflicted and oppressed, resisting the violence of the wicked: and like good blood, to run to the wounded part, according to the Proverb; That good blood, that is to say, noble and generous, cannot lie, that is to say, deceive where is need. By this means, *Moses* became the head of the Jewish Nation undertaking the defence of men injured, and unjustly trod under-foot. *Hercules* was deified for delivering the oppressed from the hands of Tyrants. Those that have done the like, have been called Heroes, and demi-gods; and to the like, all honours have been anciently ordained, that is, to such as deserved well of the Common-wealth, and were the deliverers of the oppressed. It is no greatness for a man to make himselfe to be feared, (except it be of his enemies) and to terrifie the world, as some have done, which also have procured them hate. *Oderint quem metuant, They hate whom they fear.* It is better to be beloved, than adored. This cometh of a natural pride, and inhumanity, to contempt and disdain other men, as the ordure and excrements of the world, and as if they were not men; and from thence they grow cruel, and abuse both the bodies and goods of the weak, a thing wholly contrary to true greatness and honour, who ought to undertake the defence thereof.

The duty of inferiours towards their superiours consisteth in two points in honouring and reverencing them, not only ceremoniously and in outward shew, which he must do as well to the good as the evil,

evil, but with love and affection, if they deserve it, and are lovers of the Common-wealth. These are two things, to honour and to esteem, which are due to the good and truly great : to others to bend the knee, to bow the body, not the heart, which is to esteem and love. Moreover, to please them by humbly and serviceable duties, and to insinuate into their favour.

*Principibus placuisse viris non ultima laus est:*

*The praise is not the least,*

*To please men of the best.*

And to make himself capable of their protection ; which if he cannot procure them to be his friends, yet at the least, not to make them his enemies, which must be done with measure and discretion. For over-greedily to avoid their indignation, or to seek their grace and favour, besides, that it is a testimony of weakness, it is silently to condemn them of injustice and cruelty : *Non ex professu cavere aut fugere : nam quem quis fugit, damnat ;* Not of set purpose to beware and avoid : for he whom any man shunneth, he condemneth : or to stir up in them a desire to execute their fury, seeing so base and fearful a submission.

*Of Fortitude the third Vertue.*

P R E F A C E.

THE two former precedent virtues, rule and govern men in company, or with another : these two following rule him in himself : for himself respecting the two visages of fortune, the two heads and kindes of all accidents, Prosperity, and Adversity : for fortitude armeth a man against adversity, Temperance guideth him in prosperity : moderating the two brutish parts of our soul ; fortitude ruleth the irascible, temperance the concupiscible ; These two virtues may wholly be comprised and understood by this word Constancy, which is a right and equal stayedness of the minde, in all accidents and outward things, whereby he is not puffed up in prosperity, not dejected in adversity. *Nec adversis frangitur, nec prosperis æstuat.*



## CHAP. XIX.

## Of Fortitude or Valour in general.

I  
The description  
of valour.

Senec.

**V**Alour (for this vertue is more properly so called, than fortitude) is a right and strong resolution, an equal and uniform staydness of the mind against all dangerous, difficult, and dolorous accidents : in such sort, that difficulty and danger is the object and matter wherein it is exercised : to be brief, it is all that which humane weakness feared. *Timendorum contemptrix, quæ terribilia, & sub jugum libertatem nostram mittentia, despicit, provocat, frangit : It contemneth things to be feared, despiseth, challengeth and destroyeth dreadful things, and bringeth our liberty into bondage.*

2  
The praise here-  
of.

Senec.

Of all the vertues in greatest estimation and honour, this is most renowned, which for the prerogative thereof, is simply called virtue. That is the more difficult, the more glorious, which produceth the greatest, famous, and most excellent effects, it containeth magnanimity, patience, constancy, an invincib'e resolution, heroical virtues, whereupon many have sought the inconveniencies that belong thereunto, with greediness to attain so honourable employment. This virtue is an impregnable Bulwark, a compleat armour to encounter all accidents. *Munimentum imbecillitatis humana in- expugnabile : quod qui circumdedit sibi, securus in hac vite obsidione perdurat : An invincible fortress of humane weakness, that whosoever armeth himself withall, continueth secure in this siege of life.*

3  
Of imperfect  
or false va-  
lours.

Military va-  
lour.

But because many do mistake and in place of the only true vertue, conceive the false and bastardly valours ; I will in declaring more at large, the nature and definition thereof expel those popular errors that are here intruded. We will note then in this vertue, four conditions ; the first is generally and indifferently against all sorts of difficulties and dangers ; wherefore they are deceived, that think there is no other valour than the military, which only they esteem, because, it may be, it is most renowned and glorious, and carrieth greatest reputation and honour, which is the tongue and trumpet of immortality ; for to say truth, there is more fame and glory therein than pain and danger. Now this is but a small part, and a little ray or light of the true, entire, perfect, and universal, whereby a man is one and the same in company in bed with his griefs, as in the field, as little fearing death in his house, as in the Army. This

mi-

primary valour is pure and natural in beasts: with whom it is as well in females as in males; in men it is often artificial, gotten by fear, and the apprehension of captivity, of death, of grief, of poverty; of which things, Beasts have no fear. Humane valour is a wise cowardliness, a fear accompanied with fore-sight, to avoid one evil by another; choler is the temper and file thereof: Beasts have it simply. In men also it is attained by use, institution, example, custom, and it is found in base and slavish minds: of a servant, or slave, or a factor, or fellow trained up in merchandise, is made a good and valiant souldier, and often without any tincture or instruction of virtue and true philosophical valour.

The second condition, it presupposeth knowledg, as well of the difficulty, pain, and danger, which there is in the action that is presented; as of the beauty, honesty, justice, and duty required in the enterprise or support thereof. Wherefore they are deceived, that make valour an inconsiderate temerity, or a senseless brutish stupidity; *Nou est inconsulta temeritas, nec periculorum amor, nec formidabilium appetitio, diligentissima in tutela sui fortitudo est: & eadem patientissima eorum quibus falsa species malorum est:* It is not an inconsiderate rashness nor a love of danger, nor a desire of dreadful things; but fortitude is most diligent in the safeguard of a mans self, and most patient in those things wherein there is a false shew of evils. Virtue cannot be without knowledg and apprehension, a man cannot truly condemn the danger which he knoweth not; if a man will also acknowledg this virtue in Beasts. And indeed, they that ordinarily attempt without any foresight or knowledg, when they come to the point of execution, the sense is their best intelligence.

The third condition; this is a resolution and stayedness of the mind, grounded upon the duty, and the honesty, and justice, of the enterprise; which resolution never slacketh, whatsoever hapneth; until he have valiantly ended the enterprise, or his life. Many offend against this condition, first, and more grossly, they that seek this virtue in the body, and in the power and strength of the limbs. Now valour is not a quality of the body, but of the mind; a settled strength, not of the arms and legs, but of the courage. The estimation and valour of a man, consisteth in his heart and will: here lieth his true honour, and the only advantage and true; the victory over his enemy, is to terrifie him, and to arm himself against his constancy and virtue; all other helps are strange and borrowed strength.



strength of arms and legs is the quality of a porter : to make an enemy to stoop, to dazzle his eyes at the light of the sun, is an accident of fortune. He whose courage faileth not for any fear of death, quelleth not in his constancy and resolution : and though he fall, he is not vanquished of his adversary (who perhaps may in effect, be but a base fellow) but of fortune ; and therefore he is to accuse his own unhappiness, and not his negligence. The most valiant, are oftentimes the most unfortunate. Moreover, they are deceived, which disquiet themselves, and make account of those vain Thraconical brags of such swaggering Braggadochios, who by their lofty looks, and brave words, would win credit of those that are valiant and hardy, if a man would do them so much favour, as to believe them.

6  
Art and Industry.

Moreover, they that attribute valour to subtilty and craft, or to Art or Industry, do much more profane it, and make it play a base and abject part. This is to disguise things, and to place a false stone for a true. The *Lacedemonians* permitted no Fencers nor master-wrestlers in their Cities, to the end, their youth might attain their to by nature, and not by Art. We account it a bold and hardy thing to fight with a Lion, a Bear, a wild Bore, which incounter a man only according to nature ; but not with Wasps, for they use subtilty. *Alexander* would not contend in the Olympick games, saying, there was no equality ; because a private man might overcome, and a King be vanquished. Moreover, it is not fitting for a man of honour, to try and adventure his valour in a thing, wherein a base fellow, instructed by rule, may gain the price. For such victory cometh not of virtue, nor of courage, but of certain artificial tricks and inventions : wherein the basest will do that, which a valiant man knoweth not, neither should he regard to do it. Fencing is a trick of Art, which may be attained by base persons, and men of no account. And although infamous and ruffin-like fellows are apt to fight, or do any thing in Cities or Towns, with the dexterity of the sword ; if they see an enemy, would they not run away ? Even so is it in that, which is attained by long habit and custom, as builders, tumblers, mariners, who undertake dangerous things, and more difficult than the most valiant, being trained and instructed therein from their youth.

7  
Passion.

Finally, they which consider not sufficiently, the motive and circumstance of actions, wrongly attribute to valour and virtue, that which appertaineth and belongeth to passion or particular intent.

For

For as it is not properly virtue, nor justice to be loyal and officious towards some, which a man particularly loveth; nor temperance, to abstain from the carnal pleasure of his sister, or of his daughter; nor liberality towards his wife and Children: so it is not true valour to adventure himself to any danger, for his own benefit and particular satisfaction. Wherefore if it be for gain, as spies, pioneers, traitors, merchants on the Sea, mercenary souldiers; if for ambition or reputation to be esteemed and accounted valiant, as the most part of our men of war, who say, being naturally carried thereunto, that if they thought they should lose their life, would not go; if weary of his life through pain and grief, as the souldier of *Antigonus*, who living in extreem torment, by the means of a fistula he had, was hardly to attempt all dangers, being healed avoided them; if to prevent shame, captivity, or any other evil; if through fury, and the heat of choler: to be brief, if by passion or particular consideration, as *Ajax*, *Cataline*, it is neither valour nor virtue; *Sicut non martyrem pana, sic nec fortem pugna, sed causa facit*: As the torment maketh not a martyr, so doth not the conflict make a valiant man, but the cause.

The fourth condition. It ought to be, in the execution thereof wife and discreet, whereby many false opinions are rejected in this matter, which are, not to hide themselves from those evils, and inconveniences that threaten them; neither to fear lest they surpris us, nor to fly, yea not to feel the first blows, as the noise of thunder or shot, or the fall of some great building. Now this is to understand amisse: for so that the mind remain firm and entire in its own place and discourse, without alteration, he may outwardly disquiet and make a stir. He may lawfully, yea, it is honourable to overthrow, to undo, and to revenge himself of evils, by all means, and honest endeavours: and where there is no remedy, to carry himself with a settled resolution. *Mens immota manet; lachrymæ voluntur inanes*; Vain tears flow apace, but the mind remaineth immoveable. *Socrates* mocked those that condemned flight: What, saith he, is it cowardyness to beat and vanquish them by giving them place? *Homer* commendeth in his *Ulysses* the skill to fly the *Lacedemonians* professors of valour, in the journey of the *Platians*, retired the better to break and dissolve the *Persian*-Troop, which otherwise they could not do, and overcame them. This hath been practised by the most warlike people. In other places the *Stoicks* themselves allowed to wax pale, to tremble at the first sudden



sudden encounter, so that it proceed no farther into mind and courage. And this is valour in grosse. There are things which are justly to be feared and fled, as shipwracks, lightnings, and those where there is no remedy, neither place of virtue, prudence, valour.

*Of Fortitude and Valour in particular.*

*The proposition  
and division of  
this matter.*

**T**O divide the matter and discourse of that which is here to be said, this virtue is exercised and employed against all that which the world accounteth evil. Now this evil is twofold, external and internal, the one proceedeth from without, it is called by divers names, adversity, affliction, injury, unhappiness, evil and sinister accidents: The other is inward in the mind, but caused by that which is outward: These are hateful and hurtful passions, of fear, sadness, choler, and divers others. We must speak of them both; prescribe means and remedies to overcome, suppress and rule them. These are the arguments and counsels of our virtue, fortitude and valour. It consisteth then here of two parts, the one of evils or ill accidents, the other of passions, which proceed thereof. The general advice against all good and evil fortune, hath been declared before: we will speak here more specially and particularly thereof.

## CHAP. XX.

*The first part of outward evils.*

**I**  
*The distinction  
and comparison  
of evils by their  
causes.*

**W**E will consider these outward evils three wayes, in their causes, which shall be declared in this Chapter; afterward in their effects; lastly, in themselves distinctly, and particularly every kind of them: and we will give advice and means in them all, by virtue to be armed against them,

The cause of evil and hateful accidents which happen to us all, are either common and general, which at the same instant they concern many, as pestilence, famine, war, tyranny: And these evils are for the most part scourges sent of God, and from heaven, or at least, the proper and neereſt cause thereof we cannot properly know: Or particulars, and those that are known, that is to say, by the means of another. And so there are two sorts of evil; publick and private. Now the common evils, that is to say, proceeding of a publick cause, though they concern every one in particular,

are

*The first part of outward evils.*

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are in divers kinds, more or lesse grievous, weighty and dangerous, than the private, whose causes are known. More grievous, for they come by flocks and troops, they assail more violently, with greater stir of vehemency and fury: they have a greater concourse and train: they are more tempestuous, they bring fourth greater disorder and confusion. Lesse grievous: because generality and community seemeth to mitigate and lessen every mans evil. It is a kind of comfort, not to be alone in misery: it is thought to be rather a common unhappinesse, where the course of the world and the cause is natural, than personal affliction. And indeed those wrongs which a man doth us, torment us more, wound us to the quick, and much more alter us. Both these two have their remedies and comforts.

Against publick evils, a man ought to consider from whom, and by whom they are sent, and to marke their cause. It is God, his providence, from whence cometh and dependeth an absolute necessity, which governeth and ruleth all, whercunto all things are subject. His providence, and destiny, or necessity, are not, to say the truth, two distinct laws in essence, *πρόνοια καὶ ἀνάγκη*, neither are they one. The diversity is only in the consideration and different reason. Now to murmur and to be grieved at the contrary, is, first of all, such impiety, as the like is not elsewhere found: for all things do quietly obey, man only torments himself. And again it is a folly, because it is vain and to no purpose. If a man will not follow this sovereign and absolute mistress willingly, it shall carry all by force; *Ad hoc Sacramentum adaecti sumus ferre mortalia, nec perturbari iis, quæ vitare nostræ potestatis non est: in regno nati sumus, Deo parere libertas est; We are brought to this necessity, to suffer mortal things, and not to be troubled at those things which are not in our power to avoid: we are born in a kingdom, it is freedom to obey God.*

2  
The advice against publick evils.  
Providence.  
Destiny.

*Desine fata deum flecti sperare querendo:*

*Surcease to think that destiny.*

*Can by complaining be put by.*

There is no better remedy, than to apply our wills to the will thereof; and according to the advice of wisdom to make a virtue of necessity, *Non est aliud effugium necessitatis, quàm velle quod ipsa cogat:* There is no other avoiding of necessity, than to will that which it constraineth. In seeking to contend or dispute against it, we do but sharpen and stir the evil; *Laeto animo ferre quicquid acciderit,*



*cideret, quasi tibi volueris accidere; debuisses enim velle, si scisses ex decreto Dei fieri: To suffer with a cheerful minde, whatsoever shall happen, as if thou wouldest have it happen unto thee; for thou oughtest to be willing, if thou knowest it to be done by the decree of God. Besides we shall better profit our selves, we shall do that which we ought to do, which is to follow our general and sovereign who hath so ordained it: Optimum pati, quod emendare non possis: & Deum, quo authore cuncta proveniunt, sine murmuratione comitari. Malus miles est qui imperatorem gemitus sequitur: It is an excellent thing patiently to suffer what thou canst not remedy; And to yield unto God without murmuring, from whom, as authour, all things proceed. He is an evil souldier that felloweth his Commander with grudging. And without contestation to allow for good whatsoever he will. It is magnanimity of courage to yield unto him. Magnus animus qui se Deo tradit: It is magnanimity to yield himself unto God. It is effeminacy and dastardlyness to murmur or complain; pusillus & degener qui obliuiscitur, de ordine mundi male existimat, & emendare mavult Deum quam se: He is base and ignoble, that struggleth against him; he judgeth ill of the order of the world, and had rather amend God than himself.*

3  
The distinction  
of private  
evils.

Against those private evils, which do proceed from the act of another, and which pierce us more, we ought first well to distinguish them, lest we mistake them. There is displeasure, there is offence. We often conceive ill of another, who notwithstanding hath not offended us neither in deed nor will, as when he hath either demanded, or refused any thing with reason, but yet was then hurtful unto us: for such causes it is too great simplicity to be offended, since that they are not offences. Now there are two sorts of offences, the one crosseth our affairs against equity; this is to wrong us: the others are applyed to the person, who is contemned by it, and handled otherwise than it ought, be it in deed or in word. These are more grievous and harder to be endured, than any other kind of affliction.

4  
The advice a-  
gainst them in  
general.

The first and general advice against all these sorts of evils, is to be firm and resolute, not to suffer himself to be led by common opinion but without passion to consider of what weight and importance things are, according to verity and reason. The world suffereth it self to be perswaded and led by impression. How many are there, that make less account to receive a great wound, than a little blow? more account of a word, than of death? To be brief, all is mea-  
sured

sured by opinion: and opinion offendeth more than the evil; and our impatience hurts us more, than those of whom we complain.

The other more particular counsels and remedies are drawn first from our selves, (and this is that we must first look into.) These pretended offences may arise of our own defects and weakness. This might be a folly grounded upon some defect, in our own person, which any one in derision would counterfeit. It is folly to grieve and vex himself for that which proceedeth not from his own fault. The way to prevent others in their scoffs, is first to speak and to let them know, that you know as much as they can tell you: if it be that the injury hath taken his beginning by our default, and that we have given the occasion of this abuse, why should we be offended therewith? for it is not offence, but a correction, which he ought to receive, and make use of as a punishment; But for the most part it proceedeth of our own proper weakness, which makes us melancholy. Now he ought to quit himself of all those tender delicacies, which make him live unquietly; but with a manly courage, strong & stoutly to contemn, and tread underfoot, the indiscretions and follies of another. It is no sign that a man is sound, if he complain when one toucheth him. Never shalt thou be at rest if thou frame thy self to all that is presented.

5  
*Particular ad-  
vised men:  
drawn from  
our selves.*

They are also drawn from the person that offendeth. We represent in general the manners and humors of those persons with whom we are to live in the world. The most part of men take no delight but to do evil, and measure their power by the disdain and the injury of another. So few there are which taste pleasure to do well. We ought then to make account that whithersoever we turn us, we shall find those that will harm, and offend us. Wheresoever we shall find men, we shall find injuries. This is so certain and necessary, that the Lawyers themselves, who rule the traffick and affaires of this world, have winked at, and permitted in distributive and communicative justice many escapes in Law. They have permitted deceit and hindrances even to the one half of the just prize. This necessity to hurt and offend cometh, first of the contrariety and incompatibility of humours and wills, whereof it cometh that a man is offended without will to offend. Then from the concurrence and opposition of affairs, which inferreth that the pleasure, profit, and good of one, is the displeasure, damage, and ill of others; and it cannot be otherwise, following this common and general picture of the world; if he who offendeth,

6  
*Of those who  
offend.*



fendeth thee is insolent, a fool, and rash as he is, (for an honest man never wrongeth any) wherefore complaineſt thou, ſince he is no more his own man, than as a mad man? You can well endure a furious man without complaint, yea, you will pittie him; an innocent, an infant, a woman, you will laugh at them: a fool, a drunken man, a cholerick, an indiscreet man in like ſort. Wherefore when theſe people aſſail us with words, we ought not to answer them: we muſt hold our peace, and quit our ſelves of them. It is an excellent and worthy revenge, and grievous to a fool, not to make any account of him; for it is to take away that pleaſure which he thinketh to have in vexing us, ſince our ſilence condemns his ſimplicity, and his own temerity is ſmothered in his own mouth: if a man answer him, he makes him his equal, and, by eſteeming him too much, he wrongs himſelf. *Male loquuntur quia bene loqui nesciunt, faciunt quod solent & sciunt, male quia mali, & secundum se:* They ſpeak evil becauſe they know not how to ſpeak well, they do what they are uſed to, and what they know; evilly becauſe they are evil, and according to themſelves.

7  
The conclusion  
of these coun-  
ſels with the  
rule of wiſe-  
dom.

Behold then for concluſion the advice and counſel of wiſdom: we muſt have reſpect unto our ſelves, and unto him that offendeth us. As touching our ſelves, we muſt take heed we do nothing unworthy and unbecomming our ſelves, that may give another advantage againſt us. An unwiſe man that diſtruſteth himſelf, growes into paſſion without cauſe, and thereby gives encouragment to another to contradict him. This is a weakneſs of the mind, not to know to contemn offence: an honeſt man is not ſubject to injury: he is inviolable: an inviolable thing is not only this, that a man cannot be beat, but being beaten, neither receiveth wound nor hurt. This reſolution is a moſt ſtrong bulwark againſt all accidents; that we can receive no evil, but of our ſelves. If our judgment be as it ought, we are invulnerable. And therefore we alwaies ſay with wiſe *Socrates*; *Anitus*, and *Melitus* may well put me to death, but they ſhall never inforce me to do that I ought not. Moreover, an honeſt man, as he never giveth occaſion of injury to any man, ſo he cannot endure to receive an injury; *Ledere enim ledique conjunctum est.* For to hurt and to be hurt, are near neighbours. This is a wall of braſſe, which a man is not able to pierce; ſcoffes and injuries trouble him not. Touching him that hath offended us, if you hold him vain and unwiſe, handle him accordingly, and ſo leave him: if he be otherwiſe, excuſe him. Imagine that he hath  
had

had occasion, and that it is not for malice, but by misconceit and negligence; he is vexation enough to himself, and he wisheth he had never done it. Moreover, I say, that like good Husbands, we must make profit and commodity of the injuries that are offered us. Which we may do at the least two ways, which respect the offender, and the offended. The one, that they give us occasion to know those that wrong us, to the end, we may the better fly then at another time. Such a man hath slandered thee, conclude presently, that he is malicious, and trust him no more. The other, that they discover unto us our infirmity, and the means whereby we are easily beaten; to the end, we should amend & repair our defects, lest another take occasion to say as much or more. What better revenge can a man take of his enemies, than to make profit of their injuries, & thereby better and more securely to manage our affairs?

CHAP. XXI.

*Of outward evils considered in their effects and fruits.*

**A**FTER the causes of evil, we come to the effects and fruits thereof, where are also found true preservatives and remedies. The effects are many, are great, are general and particular. The general respect the good, maintenance and culture of the universal. *General effects  
very profitable.*

First of all, the world would be extinguished, would perish, and be lost, if it were not changed, troubled, and renewed by these great accidents of pestilence, famine, war, mortality; which season, perfect and purify it, to the end, to sweeten the rest, and give more liberty and ease to the whole. Without these, a man could neither turn himself nor be settled. Moreover, besides the variety and interchangeable course, which they bring both to the beauty and ornament of the universe, also all parts of the world are benefited thereby. The rude and barbarous are hereby polished and refined, Arts and sciences are dispersed and imparted unto all. This is as a great Nursery, wherein certain Trees are transplanted from other stocks, others pruned and pulled up by the root, all for the good and beauty of the Orchard. These good and general considerations, ought to remain and resolve every honest and reasonable mind, and to hinder the curious inquiry of men, into those great and turbulent accidents, so strange and wonderful, since they are the works of God and Nature, and that they do so notable a service in the general course of the world. For we must think, that that



which is a losse in one respect, is a gain in another; and to speak more plainly, nothing is lost; but such is the course of the world, so it changeth, and so it is accommodated. *Vir sapiens nihil indignetur nisi accipere, sciatque illa ipsa quibus lædi videtur, ad conservationem universi pertinere, & ex his esse, quæ cursum mundi officiumque consummant*: Let a wise man disdain nothing that shal happen unto him, and let him know, that those things that seem hurtful unto him, pertain to the preservation of the whole universe, and to be of the nature of those things that finish up the course and effice of the world.

<sup>2</sup>  
Particular ef-  
fects are divers.  
1. Lib. of the  
three verities,  
cap. 11.

The particular effects are divers, according to the divers spirits and states of those that receive them: For they exercise the good, relieve and amend the fallen, punish the wicked. Of every one a word; for hereof we have spoken else-where. These outward evils are, in those that are good, a very profitable exercise, and an excellent school, wherein (as Wrestlers and Fencers, Marriners in a tempest, Souldiers in dangers, Philosophers in their Academies, and in all other sorts of people, in the serious exercise of their profession) they are instructed, made and formed unto virtue, constancy, valour, the victory of the world and of fortune. They learn to know themselves, to make tryal of themselves, and they see the measure of their valour, the uttermost of their strength; how far they may promise or hope of themselves, and then they encourage and strengthen themselves to what is best, accustom and harden themselves to all, become resolute and invincible; whereas contrarily, the long calm of prosperity mollifieth them, and maketh them wanton and effeminate. And therefore *Demetrius* was wont to say, that there were no people more miserable, than they that had never felt any crosses or afflictions, that had never been miserable, calling their life a dead sea.

<sup>3</sup>  
Medicine and  
chastisement.

These outward evils, to such as are offenders, are a bridle to stay them, that they stumble not, or a gentle correction, and fatherly rod after the fall, to put them in remembrance of themselves, to the end, they make not a second revolt: They are a kind of letting blood, and medicine, or preservative to divert faults and offences; or a purgation to void and purifie them.

<sup>4</sup>  
Suffering.

To the wicked and forlorn they are a punishment, a sickle to cut them off, and to take them away, or to afflict them with a long and miserable longishment. And these are the wholsom and necessary effects, for which these outward evils are not only to be esteemed of and quietly taken with patience, and in good part, as the exploits of divine justice, but are to be embraced as tokens and instruments

of

*Of outward evils, &c.*

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of the care, of the love and providence of God, and men are to make a profitable use of them, following the purpose and intention of him, who sendeth and disposeth them as pleaseth him.

*Of outward evils in themselves and particularly.*

**AN ADVERTISEMENT.**

**A**LL these evils, which are many and divers, are privations of their contrary good, as likewise the name and nature of evil do signify. And therefore as many heads as there are of good, so many are there of evils, which may all be reduced and comprehended in the number of seven; sickness, grief, (I conclude these two in one) captivity, banishment, want, infamy, losse of friends, death; which are the privations of health, liberty, home dwelling, means or maintenance, honours, friends, life, whereof hath been spoken before at large. We will here inquire into the proper and particular remedies and medicines, against these seven heads of evils, and that briefly without discourse. *In the first Book*

**CHAP. XXII.**

*Of sickness and grief.*

**W**E have said before, that grief is the greatest, and to say the truth, the only essential evil, which is most felt, and hath least remedies. Nevertheless, behold some few that regard the reason, justice, utility, imitation and resemblance with the greatest and most excellent.

It is a common necessity, To endure; there is no reason that for our sakes, a miracle should be wrought; or that a man should be offended, if that happen unto him, that may happen unto every man.

It is also a natural thing, we are born thereunto; and to desire to be exempted from it is injustice, we must quietly endure the laws of our own condition. We are made to be old, to be weak, to grieve, to be sick, and therefore we must learn to suffer that which we cannot avoid.

If it be long, it is light and moderate, and therefore a shame to complain of it: if it be violent, it is short and speedy, ends either it self or the patient, which comes all to one end. *Confide, summus*



*non habet tempus dolor. Si gravis, brevis; Si longus, levis. Be bold of this; Extreme pain hath no perpetuity: if it be grievous, it is soon gone; if long, than light.*

4 And again, it is the body that endureth: it is not our selves that are offended, for the offence diminisheth the excellency and perfection of the thing; and sickness or grief is so far from diminishing that contrarily it serveth for a subject and an occasion of a commendable patience much more than health doth: and where there is more occasion of commendation, there is not less occasion of good. If the body be the instrument of the spirit, who will complain, when the instrument is employed to the service of that whereunto it is destinated? The body is made to serve the soul: if the soul should afflict it self for any thing that hapneth to the body, the soul should serve the body. Were not that man over-delicate and curious, that would cry out and afflict himself, because some one or other had spoiled his apparel, some thorn had taken hold of it, or some man passing by had torn it? Some base Broker perhaps would be agrieved therewith, that would willingly make a commodity thereof: but a man of ability and reputation, would rather laugh at it, and account it as nothing, in respect of that state and abundance, that God hath bestowed on him. Now this body, is but a borrowed garment, to make our spirits for a time, to appear upon this low and troublesom stage; of which only we should make account, and procure the honour and peace thereof. For from whence cometh it, that a man suffereth grief with such impatiency? It is because he accustometh not himself to seek his content in his soul; *non assuerunt animo esse contenti; nimium illis cum corpore fuit: they have not accustomed themselves to be content in mind; their contentment was too much with the body.* Men have too great a commerce with their bodies, and it seemeth, that grief groweth proud, seeing us to tremble under the power thereof.

5 It teacheth us to distaste that which we must needs leave, and to unwind our selves from the vanity and deceit of this world, an excellent piece of service.

6 The joy and pleasure we receive by the recovery of our health, after that our grief or sickness hath taken his course, is a strange enlightning unto us; in such sort that it should seem that nature hath given sickness for the greater honour and service of our pleasure and delight.

Now then if the grief be indifferent, the patience shall be easie if

if it be great, the glory shall be as great: if it seem overhard, let us accuse our delicacy and niceness; and if there be but few that can endure it, let us be of the number of those few. Let us not accuse nature for having made us so weak, for that is nothing, but we are rather too delicate. If we fly it, it will follow us; if we cowardly yield unto it, and suffer our selves to be vanquished, it will handle us the more roughly, and the reproach will light upon our selves. It would make us affraid, and therefore it standeth us upon, to take heart, and that when it cometh, it find us more resolute than was imagined. Our yielding makes that more eager, and more fierce, *Stare fidenter: non quia difficilia non audemus, sed quia non audemus, difficilia sunt.* To stand confidently: we do not shrink at them, because they be difficult; but they are difficult to endure, because we shrink at them.

But lest these remedies should seem but fair words, and meer imaginations, and the practice of them altogether impossible, we have examples, both frequent and rich, not only of men, but of women and Children, who have not only a long time endured long and grievous sicknesses with such constancy, that their grief hath rather given them life than courage; but have attended and born even with joy, yea, have sought after the greatest and most exquisite torments. In *Lacedemon*, little Children whipped one another, yea, sometimes to the death, without any shew in their countenance, of any grief or smart that they felt, only to accustom themselves to suffer for their Countrey. *Alexanders* Page suffered himself to be burnt with a cole, without cry or countenance of discontent, because he would not interrupt the sacrifice: and a Lad of *Lacedemon*, suffered a Fox to gnaw his guts out of his belly, before he would discover his theft. *Pompey* being surprised by King *Gentius*, who would have constrained him to reveal the publick affairs of *Rome*, to make known, that no torment should make him to do it, did voluntarily put his finger into the fire, and suffered it to burn, until *Gentius* himself took it out. The like before that, had *Mucius* done, before another King, *Porfenna*: and that good old *Regulus* of Carthage, endured more than all these: and yet more than *Regulus*, *Anaxarchus*, who being half pounded in a mortar, by the tyrant *Nicochreon*, would never confess, that his mind was touched with any torment; Beat and pound the sack of *Anaxarchus*, till you be gluttoned, as for himself you shall never touch him.

8

Examples.



## CHAP. XXIII.

## Of Captivity and Imprisonment.

**T**His affliction is no more than nothing, and in respect of sickness and grief, it is an easie matter to vanquish it. For sick folk are not without captivity in their beds, in their houses, for the time they lie in; yea, they ingrosse as it were affliction above captivity; neverthelesse, a word or two thereof. There is nothing but the body, to cover the prison of thy soul that is captive; the soul it self remaineth alwayes free and at liberty, in despite of all; and therefore how should that man know or perceive that he is in prison, who as freely, yea, and more freely too, may walk and wander whither he will, than he that is abroad? The walls and Dungeons of the Prison, are not strong enough to shut him up; the body that toucheth him and is joyned unto him, cannot hold nor stay him. He that knoweth how to maintain himself in his liberty, and to use and hold his own right, which is not to be shut up, no not in this World, will but laugh at these slight and childish embarrments, *Christianus etiam extra carcerem seculo renuntiavit: in carcere, etiam carceri: nihil interest ubi sitis in seculo qui extra seculum estis: feramus carceris non enim, secessum vocemus: & si corpus includitur, caro detinetur, omnia spiritui patent, totum hominem animus circumfert, & quae vult transferi.* A Christian man even out of prison, hath renounced the World: in prison also, he hath renounced the prison: it mattereth nothing where thou art in the world, who art of the world: Let us take away the name of prison, and call it a quiet retiring place, and if the body be included, the flesh is prisoner, but the spirit is free to all things, the mind carrieth about the whole man, and whither he list it transporteth him.

Tertul.

The prison hath gently received into the lap thereof, many great and holy Personages; it hath been the sanctuary, the haven of health, and a fortress to divers that had been utterly undone, if they had had their liberty; yea, that have had recourse thereunto, to be in liberty; have made choice thereof, and espoused themselves unto it, to the end, they might live at rest, and free themselves from the cares of the world *ex carcere in custodiam translui*, Translated from the prison of affairs, to the quiet of 4. walls. That which is shut up under lock and key, is in safest custody: and it is better to be under the safeguard of a key, than to be bound and enthralled with those fetters

ters and stocks, whereof the world is full; that publick places and courts of great Princes, and the tumultuous affairs of this world bring with them, jealousies, envies, violent humours, and the like. *Sirecogitemus ipsum magis mundum carcerem esse, exisse nos è carcere Tertul. quàm in carcerem introisse intelligimus, majores tenebras habet mundus quæ hominum præcordia excæcant, graviores catenas induit, quæ ipsas animas constringunt, pejores immunditias expirat, libidines hominum, plures postremo reos continet, universum genus hominum: If we consider, that the world it self is a prison, we shall understand, that we are rather gone out of the world, than entred into prison; the world hath greater darkness, wherewith the inward cogitations of the hearts of men are blinded; it fettereth with more grievous Irons, wherewith mens very souls are shackled; it breatheth forth worser uncleannesses in the lusts and sensualities of men; it containeth more guilty persons, even whole Mankind. Many have escaped the hands of their enemies, and other great dangers and miseries, by the benefit of imprisonment. Some have there written Books, and have there bettered their knowledge. *Plus in carcere spiritus acquirit quàm caro amittit: The spirit getteth more in prison, than the flesh loseth. Divers there are, whom the prison having kept and preserved for a time, hath re-sent unto their former sovereign dignities, and mounted them to the highest places in the world; others it hath yielded up unto Heaven, and hath not at any time received any that it restoreth not.**

CHAP. XXIV.

Of Banishment and Exile.

**E**Xile is a change of place that brings no ill with it, but in opinion, it is a complaint and affliction wholly imaginary: for according to reason, there is not any ill in it: In all places, all is after one fashion, which is comprehended in two words, Nature and Virtue. *Duo quæ pulcherrima sunt, quocunque nos moverimus, sequentur, natura communis & propria virtus: there are two excellent things, which will follow us, whilber soever we go, common Nature, and mans own Virtue.*

In all places, we find the self same common nature, the same heavens, the same elements. In all places, the heavens and the stars appear unto us in the same greatness, extent; and that is it which Nature. principally we are to consider, and not that which is under us, and which we trample under feet. Again, at a kenning we cannot see of



the Earth above ten or twelve leagues: *Angustus animus quem terrenis delectant: The mind is narrow and strait, whom earthly things delight.* But the face of the great azured firmament, decked and counterpointed with so many beautiful and shining Diamonds, doth alwayes shew it self unto us; and to the end, we may wholly behold it, it continually whirleth about us. It sheweth it self all unto all, and in all respects, in a day and a night. The Earth, which with the Sea, and all that it containeth, is not the hundred and sixtyeth part of the greatness of the Sun, sheweth not it self unto us, but in that small proportion that is about the place where we dwell: yea, and that change of that earthly floor that is under us, is nothing. What matter is it to be born in one place, and to live in another? Our Mother might have layen in elsewhere, and it is a chance, that we are born here or there. Again, all Countries bring forth and nourish men, and furnish them with whatsoever is necessary. All Countries have kindred: nature hath knit us altogether in blood and in charity. All have friends; there is no more to do, but to make friends and to win them by virtue and wisdom. Every land is a wise mans Countrey, or rather no Land is his particular Countrey. For it were to wrong himself, and it were weakness and baseness of heart, to think to carry himself as a wrangler in any place. He must alwayes use his own right and liberty, and live in all places as with himself, and upon his own; *Omnes terras tanquam suas videre, & suas tanquam omnium; to see all Lands as their own, and their own as the Lands of all.*

Moreover, what change or discommodity doth the diversity of the place bring with it? Do we not alwaies carry about us one and the same spirit and virtue? Who can forbid saith *Brutus*, a banished man to carry with him his virtues? The spirit and virtue of a man, is not shut up in any place; but it is every where equally and indifferently. An honest man is a Citizen of the World, free, chearful, and content in all places, alwayes within himself, in his own quarter, and ever one and the same, though his case or scabbard be removed, and carried hither and thither: *Animus sacer & eternus ubique est diis cognatus, omni mundo & aeo par: The sacred and eternal soul is every where, of near affinity with God, alike to all the world, and to all ages.* A man in every place, is in his own Countrey, where he is well. Now for a man to be well, it dependeth not upon the place but himself.

4.  
Examples.

How many are there, that for divers considerations, have willingly

ly banished themselves? How many others banished by the violence of another, being afterwards called home, have refused to return; and have found their exile not only tolerable, but pleasant and delightful; yea, never thought they lived until the time of their banishment, as those noble Romans, *Rutilius, Marcellus*? How many others have been led by the hand of good fortune out of their Countrey, that they may grow great and puissant in a strange Land.

CHAP. XXV.

Of poverty, want, losse of goods,

**T**His complaint, is of the vulgar and miserable sottish sort of people, who place their sovereign good, in the goods of fortune, and think that poverty is a very great evil. But to shew what it is, you must know that there is a two-fold poverty: the one extreme, which is the want of things necessary, and requisite unto nature; this doth seldom or never happen to any man, nature being so just, and having formed us in such a fashion, that few things are necessary, and those few are not wanting, but are found every where; *Parabile est quod natura desiderat, & expositum: That which nature desireth is ready and easie to be had*; yea, in such a sufficiency, as being moderately used, may suffice the condition of every one. *Ad manum est, quod sat est: That which sufficeth, is ready and at hand.* If we will live according to nature and reason, the desire and rule thereof, we shall always find that which is sufficient. If we will live according to opinion, whilest we live, we shall never find it: *Si ad naturam viveres, nunquam eris pauper; si ad opinionem, nunquam dives: exiguum natura desiderat, opinio immensum: If thou wilt live according to nature, thou shalt never be poor; if according to opinion, never rich: nature desireth little, opinion much, and beyond measure.* And therefore, a man that hath an Art or science to stick unto, yea, that hath but his arms at will, is it possible he should either fear, or complain of poverty?

The other is the want of things that are more than sufficient, required for pomp, pleasure and delicacy. This is a kind of mediocrity and frugality: and to say the truth, it is that which we fear, to lose our riches, our moveables, not to have our bed soft enough, our diet well drest, to be deprived of these commodities; and in a word, it is delicateness that holdeth us, This is our true malady.

Now.

<sup>I</sup> Poverty two-fold.

<sup>1.</sup> Want of things necessary.

<sup>2.</sup> Want of things superfluous.



Prov. 30.

The praise of  
sufficiency.

2. Tim. 6.

Now this complaint is unjust; for such poverty is rather to be desired than feared: and therefore the wise man asked of God; *Nec mendicitatem nec divitias, sed necessaria*: Neither poverty nor riches, but things necessary. It is far more just, more rich, more peaceable and certain, than abundance, which a man so much desireth. More just; for man came naked, *Nemo nascitur dives*; No man is born rich, and he returneth naked out of this world. Can a man term that truly his, that he neither bringeth nor carrieth with him? The goods of this world; they are as the moveables of an Inne. We are not to be discontented so long as we are here, that we have need of them. More rich; It is a large signory, a Kingdom: *Magna divitiarum lege nature composita paupertas: magnus questus pietas cum sufficientia*: Moderate and quiet poverty by the law of nature, is great riches; Godliness is great gain with sufficiency. More peaceable and assured; it feareth nothing, and can defend it self against the enemies thereof: *Etiā in obsessa via paupertas pax est*: Poverty hath peace, even in a besieged way. A small body that may cover and gather it self under a Buckler, is in better safety than a great, which lieth open unto every blow. It is never subject to great losses, nor charges of great labour and burthen. And therefore they that are in such an estate, are alwayes more chearful and comfortable; for they never have so much care, nor fear such tempests. Such kind of poverty is free, chearful, assured, it maketh us truly masters of our own lives; whereof the affairs, complaints, contentions, that do necessarily accompany riches, carry away the better part. Alas! what goods are those, from whence proceed all our evils? They are the cause of all those injuries that we endure, that make us slaves; trouble the quiet of our souls, bring with them so many jealousies, suspicions, fears, frights, desires? He that vexeth himself for the losse of these goods, is a miserable man; for together with his goods, he loseth his spirit too. The life of poor men, is like unto those that sail near the shore; that of the rich, like to those that cast themselves into the main Ocean. These cannot attain to land, though they desire nothing more, but they must attend the wind and the tide; the other come abroad, passe and repasse, as often as they will.

3

Finally, we must endeavour to imitate those great and generous personages, that have made themselves merry with such kind of losses, yea, have made advantage of them, and thanked God for them; as *Zenon*, after his ship-wrack, *Fabricius*, *Seranus*, *Curius*. It should seem that poverty is some excellent and divine thing, since

since it agreeth with the gods, who are imagined to be naked ; since the wisest have embraced it, or at least have endured it with great contentment. And to conclude in a word; with such as are not over passionate it is commendable, with others insupportable.

CHAP. XXVI.

*Of infamy.*

**T**His affliction is of divers kinds. If it be losse of honours and dignities, it is rather a gain than a losse : Dignities are but honourable servitudes, whereby a man by giving himself to the wealpublick, is deprived of himself. Honours are but the torches of envy, jealousy, and in the end, exile and poverty. If a man shall call to mind the history of all antiquity, he shall find, that all they that have lived, and have carried themselves worthily and virtuously, have ended their course, either by exile, or prison, or some other violent death: witness amongst the Greeks, *Aristides, Themistocles, Phocion, Socrates*; amongst the Romans, *Camilus, Scipio, Cicero, Papinian*; among the Hebrews, the Prophets : In such sort, that it should seem to be the livery of the more honest men; for it is the ordinary recompence of a publick state, to such kind of people. And therefore a man of a gallant and generous spirit, should contemn it, and make small account thereof, for he dishonoureth himself, and shews how little he hath profited in the study of wisdom, that regardeth in any respect, the censures, reports, and speeches of the people, be they good, or evil.

CHAP. XXVII.

*Of the losse of friends.*

**I**Here comprehend Parents, Children, and whatsoever is near and dear unto a man. First, we must know upon what this pretended complaint or affliction is grounded, whether upon the interests, or good of our friends, or our own. Upon that of our friends; I doubt we shall say Yea to that, but yet we must not be too credulous to believe it. It is an ambitious feining of piety, whereby we make a shew of sorrow and grief for the hurt of another, or the hinderance of the weal-publick : but if we shall withdraw the veil of dissimulation, and sound it to the quick, we shall find that it is  
our



*Of the losse of Friends.*

our own particular good that is hid therein, that toucheth us nearest. We complain that our own Candle burneth, and is consumed, or at least is in some danger: This is rather a kind of envy, than true piety, for that which we so much complain of, touching the losse of our friends, their absence, distance from us, is their true and great good: *Morere hoc eventum, invidi magis quàm amici est: to mourn for this event, is rather the part of an envious person than of a friend.* The true use of death is, to make an end of our miseries. God had made our life more miserable, if he had made it longer.

And therefore to say the truth, it is upon our own good, that this complaint and affliction is grounded: now that becommeth us not, it is a kind of injury to be grieved with the rest and quiet of those that love us, because we our selves are hurt thereby. *Suis incommodis angī, non amicum, sed seipsum amantis est: to be grieved for his own dis-commodities, sheweth a man not to love his friend, but himself.*

Again, there is a good remedy for this which fortune cannot take from us; and that is, that surviving our friends, we have meanes to make new friends. Friendship, as it is one of the greatest blessings of our life, so it is most easily gotten. God makes men, and men make friends. He that wanteth not virtue, shall never want friends. It is the instrument wherewith they are made, and wherewith, when he hath lost his old, he makes new. If fortune hath taken away our friends, let us endeavour to make new; by this means, we shall not lose them but multiply them.

*Of Death.*

**W**E have spoken hereof so much at large, and in all respects in the eleventh and last Chapter of the second book, that there remaineth not any thing else to be spoken: and therefore to that place I refer the Reader.

*The second part of inward evils, tedious and troubleſome paſſions.*

## THE PREFACE.

**F**ROM all those above-named evils, there spring and arise in us, divers passions and cruel affections: for these being taken and considered

considered simply as they are, they breed fear, which apprehendeth evils as yet to come, sorrow for present evils, and if they be in another, pitty and compassion. Being considered as comming, and procured by the act of another, they stir up in us the passion of choler, hatred, envy, jealousy, despight, revenge, on all those that procure displeasure; or make us to look upon another with an envious eye. Now this virtue of fortitude and valour, consisteth in the government and receipt of these evils, according to reason, in the resolute and courageous carriage of a man, and the keeping of himself free and clear from all passions that spring thereof. But because they subsist not, but by these evils, if by the means and help of so many advisements and remedies before delivered, a man can vanquish and contemn them all, there can be no more place left unto these passions. And this is the true mean to free himself, and to come to the end; as the best way to put out a fire, is to withdraw the fuel that gives it nourishment. Nevertheless, we will yet add some particular counsels against these passions, though they have been in such sort before deciphered, that it is a matter of no difficulty to bring them into hatred and detestation.

## CHAP. XXVIII.

*Against fear.*

**L**Et no man attend evils before they come, because it may be, they will never come: our fears are as likely to deceive us, as our hopes; and it may be, that those times that we think will bring most affliction with them, may bring greatest comfort. How many unexpected adventures may happen, that may defend a man from that blow we fear? Lightning is put by with the wind of a mans hat, and the fortunes of the greatest states, with accidents of small moment. The turn of a wheel mounteth him that was of lowest degree, to the highest step of honour; and many times it falleth out that we are preserved by that, which we thought would have been our overthrow. There is nothing to easily deceived, as humane foresight. That which it hopeth it wanteth; that which it feareth, vanisheth; that which it expecteth, hapneth not. God hath his counsel by himself: That which man determineth after one manner, he resolveth after another. Let us not therefore make our selves unfortunate before our time, Nay when perhaps we are never likely to be so. Time to come which deceiveth



veth so many, will likewise deceive us as soon in our fears, as in our hopes. It is a maxim commonly received in Physick, that in sharp maladies the predictions are never certain: and even so it, in the most furious threatnings of fortune; so long as there is life, there is hope, for hope continues as long in the body as the soul: *quam diu spero, spero.*

But forasmuch as this fear proceedeth not alwayes from the disposition of nature, but many times from an over-delicate education (for by the want of exercise and continual travel and labour, even from our youth, we many times apprehend things without reason) we must by a long practice, accustom our selves unto that, which may most terrifie us, present unto our selves the most fearful dangers that may light upon us, and with chearfulness of heart attempt sometimes casual adventures, the better to try our courage, to prevent evil occurrents, and to seize upon the arms of fortune. It is a matter of lesse difficulty, to resist fortune by assailing it, than by defending ourselves against it. For then we have leasure to arm our selves. we take our advantages, we provide for a retreat; whereas when it assaulteth it surpriseth us unawares, and handleth us at her own pleasure. We must then whilest we assail fortune, learn to defend our selves give unto our selves false alarums, by proposing unto us, the dangers that other great personages have passed, call to mind, that some have avoided the greatest, because they were not astonished at them; others have been overthrown by the least, for want of resolution.

## CHAP. XXIX.

## Against Sorrow.

THE remedies against sorrow (set down before as the most tedious, hurtful, and unjust passion) are two fold: some are direct or straight, others oblique. I call those direct, which Philosophy teacheth, which concern the confronting and disdaining of evils, accounting them not evils, or at leastwise, very small and light (though they be great and grievous) and that they are not worthy the least motion or alteration of our minds; and that to be sorry for them, or to complain of them, is a thing very unjust and ill-befitting a man as teach the *Stoicks*, *Peripateticks*, and *Platonists*. This manner of preserving a man from sorrow and melancholick passion, is as rare, as it is excellent, and belongs to spirits of the first rank. There is likewise

wise another kind of Philosophical remedy, although it be not of so good a stamp, which is easie, and much more in use, and it is oblique; this is by diverting a mans mind and thought to things pleasant and delightful, or at least indifferent from that that procureth our sorrow: which is to deal cunningly, to decline and avoid an evil, to change the object. It is a remedy very common, and which is used almost in all evils, if a man mark it, as well of the body as of the mind. Physitians, when they cannot purge a Rheum, they turn it into some other part lesse dangerous. Such as passe by steep and precipitate deeps and downfalls, that have need of lancings, searing Irons, or fire, shut their eyes, and turn their faces another way. Valiant men in war, do never taste nor consider of death, their mindes being carried away by the desire of victory; in so much, that divers have suffered death gladly, yea, have procured it, and been their own executioners, either for the future glory of their name, as many *Greeks* and *Romans*; or for the hope of another life, as Martyrs, the Disciples of *Hegeſius*, and others, after the reading of *Plato* his book to *Antiochus*, *De morte contemnenda*; or to avoid the miseries of this life and for other reasons. All these, are they no diversions? Few there are that consider evils in themselves, that relish them as *Socrates* did his death; and *Flavius* condemned by *Nero*, to die by the hands of *Niger*. And therefore in sinister accidents and misadventures, and in all outward evils, we must divert our thoughts, and turn them another way. The vulgar sort can give this advice, Think not of it. Such as have the charge of those that are any way afflicted, should for their comfort, furnish affrighted spirits, with other objects. *Abdūcendus est animus ad alia studia, sollicitudines, curas, negotia; loci denique mutatione sæpe curandus est. The mind is to be led away to other studies, cares, affairs; lastly, by change of place it is often cured.*

CHAP. XXX.

*Against mercy and compassion.*

There is a two-fold mercy, the one good, and virtuous, which is in God, and in his Saints, which is in will, and in effect to succour the afflicted, not afflicting themselves or diminishing any thing that concerneth honour or equity; the other is a kind of feminine passionate pittie, which proceedeth from two great a tenderneſs and weak



weakness of the mind, whereof hath been spoken before in the above-named passion. Again this wisdom teacheth us to succour the afflicted, but not to yield and to suffer with him. So is God said to be merciful, as the Phylician to his patient, the advocate to his Client, affordeth all diligence and industry, but yet taketh not their evils and affairs to the heart; so doth a wise man, not entertaining any grief or darkning his spirit with the smoke thereof. God commandeth us to aid, and to have a care of the poor, to defend their cause; and in another place he forbids us to pittie the poor in judgment.

## CHAP. XXXI.

## Against choler.

I  
The first  
head.

**T**He remedies are many and divers, wherewith the mind must before hand be armed and defended, like those that fear to be besieged; for afterwards it is too late. They may be reduced to three heads; the first is to cut off the way, and stop all the passages unto choler. It is an easier matter to withstand it, and to stay the Passage thereof in the beginning, than when it hath seized upon a man to carry himself well and orderly. He must therefore quit himself from all the causes and occasions of Choler, which heretofore have been produced in the description thereof, that is to say, 1. weakness and tendernefs, 2. malady of the mind in hardning it self against whatsoever may happen. 3. too great delicateness, the love of certain things do accustom a man to facility, and simplicity the mother of peace and quietness, *Ad omnia compoſitiſſimus: quæ bona & paratiora, ſunt nobis meliora & gratiora*; Let us be ſeiled to all things: let those things which are good and ready at hand, be better and more acceptable to us. It is the general doctrine of the wise King Cotys, who having received for a present many beautiful and rich vessels, yet frail and easie to be broken brake them all, to the end, he might not be stirred to choler and fury, when they should happen to be broken. This was a distrust in himself, and a base kind of fear that provoked him thereunto. 4. Curiosity; according to the example of *Cæſar*, who being a Conqueror, and having recovered the letters, writings, and memorials of his enemies, burnt them all before he saw them. 5. Lightness of belief. 6. And above all, an opinion of being contemned, and wronged by another, which he must chace from him as unworthy a man of spirit: for

for though it seem to be a glorious thing, and to proceed from too high esteem of himself (which nevertheless is a great vice) yet it cometh of baseness and imbecillity. For he that thinketh himself to be contemned by another, is in some sense his inferiour, judgeth himself or fears that in truth he is so, or is so reputed, and distrusteth himself. *Nemo non eo, à quo se contemptum judicat, minor est; No man but is lesser than he of whom he thinketh himself to be contemned.* A man must therefore think that it proceedeth rather from any thing than contempt, that is, sottishness, indiscretion, want of good manners. If this supposed contempt proceed from his friends, it is too great familiarity: If from his subjects or servants, knowing that their master hath power to chasten them, it is not to be believed that they had any such thought: If from base and inferiour people, our honour, our dignity or indignity, is not in the power of such people: *Indignus Caesaris irâ: unworthy the wrath of Caesar.* Agathocles and Antigonus laughed at those that wronged them, and hurt them not, having them in their power. Caesar excelled all in this point; and Moses, David, and all the greatest personages of the world have done the like. *Magnam fortunam magnus animus decet; a great mind becometh a great fortune.* The most glorious conquest is for a man to conquer himself, not to be moved by another. To be stirred to choler, is to confess the accusation. *Convicia si irascere agnita videntur, spreta exolescunt: Reproachfull speeches if thou be angry at them, seem acknowledged; if thou despise them they vanish to nothing.* He can never be great, that yieldeth himself to the offence of another: if we vanquish not our choler that will vanquish us. *Injuris & offensiones superne despiciere: Highly to despise injuries and offences.*

2. Head.

The second head is of these remedies that a man must employ when the occasions of choler are offered, and that there is a likelihood that we may be moved thereunto; which are first, to keep and contain our bodies in peace and quietness, without motion or agitation; which inflameth the blood and humours, and to keep himself silent and solitary. Secondly, delay in believing and resolving, and giving leisure to the judgment to consider. If we can once discover it, We shall easily stay the course of this Fever. A wise man countelled *Augustus* being in choler, not to be moved before he had pronounced the letters of the Alphabet. Whatsoever we say or do in the heat of our blood, ought to be suspected, *Nil tibi liceat, dum irasceris. Quare? Quia vis omnia licere. Nothing is law-*  

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full



ful for thee whilst thou art angry. Why? because thou wilt then have all things lawful for thee. We must fear and be doubtful of our selves, for so long as we are moved, we can do nothing to purpose. Reason, when it is hindred by passions, serveth us no more than the wings of a bird being fastened to his feet. We must therefore have recourse unto our friends, and suffer our choler to die in the midst of our discourse. And lastly, diversion to all pleasant occasions, as musick, &c.

3. *Head.*

The third head consisteth in those beautiful considerations, wherewith the mind must long before be seasoned. First, in the consideration of the action and motions of those that are in choler which should breed in us a hatred thereof, so ill do they become a man. This was the manner of the wise, the better to dissuade a man from this vice, to counsel him to behold himself in a glasse. Secondly, and contrarily, of the beauty which is of moderation; Let us consider how much grace there is in a sweet kind of mildness and clemency, how pleasing and acceptable they are unto others, and commodious to our selves: It is the Adamant that draweth unto us the hearts and wills of men. This is Principally required in those whom fortune hath placed in high degree of honour, who ought to have their motions more remisse and temperate; for as their actions are of greatest importance, so their faults are more hardly repaired. Finally in the consideration of that esteem and love which we should bear to that wisdom which we here study, which especially sheweth it self in retaining and commanding it self, in remaining constant and invincible; a man must mount his mind from the earth, and frame it to a disposition, like to the highest region of the air, which is never over shadowed with clouds, nor troubled with thunders, but in a perpetual serenity: so our mind must not be darkned with sorrow, nor moved with choler, but fly all precipitation, imitate the highest Planets that of all others are carried more slowly. Now all this is to be understood of inward choler, and covered; which endureth being joyned with an ill affection, hatred, desire of revenge: *qua in sinu scultorum requiescit, ut qui reponunt odia; quodque seve cogitationis indicium est, secreto suo satiantur*: which rest in the bosom of a fool, as he that layeth up hatred; and which is a token of a cruel mind, being inwardly glutted therewith: For the outward and open choler is short, a fire made of straw without ill affection which is only to make another to see his fault, whether inferiours by reprehensions

or in others by shewing the wrong and indiscretion they commit, it is a thing profitable, necessary, and very commendable. It is good and profitable, both for himself, and for another, sometimes to be moved to anger; but it must be with moderation and rule.

There are some that smother their choler within, to the end it break not forth, and that they may seem wise and moderate; but they fret themselves inwardly, and offer themselves a greater violence than the matter is worth. It is better to chide a little, and to vent the fire, to the end it be not over ardent and painful within. A man incorporateth choler by hiding it. It is better that the point thereof should prick a little without, than that it should be turned against it self: *Omnia vitia in aperto leviora sunt, & tunc perniciosissima, cum simulata sanitate subsidunt*: All diseases that appear openly are the lighter, and then are most dangerous when they rest hidden with a counterfeit health.

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To be angry,  
when it is good  
and commodi-  
ous.  
For himself.

Moreover, against those that understand not, or seldom suffer themselves to be led by reason, as against those kind of servants that do nothing but for fear, it is necessary that choler either true or dissembled put life into them, without which there can be no rule or government in a family. But yet it must be with these conditions: First, that it be not often, upon all, or light occasions. For being too common, it grows into contempt, and works no good effect. Secondly, not in the air, murmuring and railing behind their backs, or upon uncertainties, but be sure that he feel the smart that hath committed the offence. Thirdly, that it be speedily, to purpose and seriously, without any mixture of laughter, to the end it may be a profitable chastisement for what is past, and a warning for that which is to come. To conclude, it must be used as a medicine.

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For another,  
with condit-  
ions.

All these remedies may serve against the following passions.

CHAP. XXXII.

Against Hatred.

THAT a man may the better defend himself against hatred, he must hold a rule that is true, that all things have two handles whereby we may take them: by the one they seem to be grievous and burthen some unto us; by the other, easie and light. Let us then receive things by the good handle, and we shall find that there is



*Against Envy.*

something good and to be beloved, in whatsoever we accuse and hate. For there is nothing in the world that is not for the good of man. And in that which offendeth us, we have more cause to complain thereof, than to hate it: for it is the first offence, and receiveth the greatest damage because it loseth therein the use of reason the greatest losse that may be. In such an accident then, let us turn our hate into pity, and let us endeavour to make those worthy to be beloved, which we would hate; as *Lycurgus* did unto him that had put out his eye, whom he made, as a chastisement of that wrong, an honest, virtuous, and modest Citizen by his good instruction.

## CHAP. XXXIII.

*Against Envie.*

**A**gainst this passion, we must consider that which we esteem and envie in another. We willingly envie in others riches, honours, favours; and the reason is, because we know not how dearly they have cost them. He that shall say, thou shalt have as much at the same price; we would rather refuse his offer, than thank him for it. For before a man can attain unto them, he must flatter, endure afflictions, injuries; to be brief, lose his liberty, satisfie and accommodate himself to the pleasures and passions of another. Man hath nothing for nothing in this world. To think to attain to goods, honours, states, offices, otherwise, and to pervert the law, or rather custom of the world, is to have the mony and wars too. Thou therefore that makest profession of honour, and of virtue, why dost thou afflict thy self if thou have not these goods, which are not gotten but by a shameful patience? Do thou therefore rather pity others, than envie them. If it be a true good that is happened to another, we should rejoyce thereat; for we should desire the good of another: To be pleased with another mans prosperity, is to encrease our own.

## CHAP. XXXIV.

*Against revenge.*

**A**gainst this cruel passion, we must first remember that there is nothing so honourable, as to know how to pardon. Every man may prosecute the law to right that wrong that he hath received; but to give grace, to remit and forgive, belongeth to a Sovereign

soveraign Prince. If then thou wilt be a King, of kings themselves, & do an act that may become a king, pardon freely, be gracious towards him that hath offended thee.

Secondly, there is nothing so great and so victorious, as hardinesse and a couragious insensibility in the suffering of injuries, whereby they return and rebound wholly upon the wrongers, as heavy blows upon a hard and steeled anvil, which do no other but wound and benum the hand and arm of the striker: To mediate revenge is to confess himself wounded; to complain is to acknowledg himself guilty and inferiour. *Ultio, doloris confessio est: non est magnus animus quem incurvat injuria: ingens animus & verus estimator sui, non vindicat injuriam, quia non sentit: revenge is a confession of grief: a high and generous mind is not subject to injury; magnanimity and true valour revengeth not an injury, because it feeleth it not.*

But some will object, that it is irksome and dishonourable to endure an offence. I agree thereunto, and I am of opinion not to suffer, but vanquish and master it; but yet after a fair and honourable fashon, by scorning it and him that offered it; nay, more than that, by doing good unto him. In both these, *Cesar* was excellent. It is a glorious victory to conquer, and make the enemy to stoop by benefits, and of an enemy to make him a friend, be the injury never so great. Yea to think that by how much the greater the wrong is, by so much the more worthy it is to be pardoned; and by how much the more just the revenge is, by so much the more commendable is clemency.

Again, it is no reason that a man should be judge and a party too, as he that revengeth is. He must commit the matter to a third person, or at least take counsel of his friends, and of the wiser sort, not giving credit unto himself. *Jupiter* might alone dart out his favourable lightnings; but when there grew a question of sending forth his revenging thunderbolts, he could not do it without the counsel and assistance of the twelve gods. This was a strange case that the greatest of the gods, who of himself had power to do good to the whole world, could not hurt a particular person, but after a solemn deliberation. The wisdom of *Jupiter* himself feared to erre, when there is a question of revenge, and therefore he hath need of a council to detain him.

We must therefore form unto our selves a moderation of the mind; This is the virtue of clemency, which is a sweet mildness and graciousness, which tempereth, retaineth, and represseth all

Clemency.



our motions. It armeth us with patience, it perswadeth us that we cannot be offended but with our selves; that of the wrongs of another nothing remaineth in us, but that which we will retain. It winneth unto us the love of the whole world, and furnisheth us with a modest carriage agreeable unto all.

## CHAP. XXXV.

## Against jealousie.

**T**He onely mean to avoid it; is for a man to make himself worthy of that he desireth, for jealousie is nothing else but a distrust of our selves, and a testimony of our little desert. The Emperour *Aurelius*, of whom *Faustine* his wife demanded, What he would do if his enemy *Cassius* should obtain the victory against him in battel, answered, I serve not the gods so slenderly, as that they will send me so hard a fortune. So they that have any part in the affection of another; if there happen any cause of fear to lose it, should say; I honour not so little his love, that he will deprive me of it. The confidence we have in our own merit, is a great gage of the will of another.

He that prosecuteth any thing with virtue, is eased by having a companion in the pursuit; for he serveth for a comfort, and a trumpet to his merit. Imbecillity only feareth the encounter, because it thinketh that being compared to another, the imperfection thereof will presently appear. Take away emulation, you take away the glory & spur of virtue.

My counsel to men against this malady, when it proceedeth from their wives, is, that they remember that the greatest part, and most gallant men of the world have fallen into this misfortune, and have been content to bear it without stirring and molestation: *Lucullus*, *Cesar*, *Pompey*, *Cato*, *Augustus*, *Antonius*, and divers others. But thou wilt say, the world knoweth and speaks of it: And of whom speak they not in this sense, from the greatest to the least? how many honest men do every day fall into the same reproach? and if a man stir therein, the women themselves make a jest of it: the frequency of this accident, should moderate the bitterness thereof. Finally, be thou such that men may complain of thy wrong, that thy virtue extinguish thy hard fortune, that honest men may account never, the lesse of thee, but rather curse the occasion.

### Of Temperance in General.

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As touching women; there is no counsel against this evil, for their nature is wholly composed of suspicion, vanity, curiosity. It is true, that they cure themselves at the charge of their husbands, turning their evil upon them, and healing it with a greater. But if they were capable of counsel, a man would advise them not to care for it, not to seem to perceive it: which is a sweet mediocrity between this foolish jealousy, and that other opposite custom practised in the Indies and other nations, where women labour to get friends, and women for their husbands seek above all things their honour and pleasure (for it is a testimony of the virtue, valour, and reputation of a man in those countries to have many wives.) So did *Livia* to *Augustus*, *Stratonice* to King *Deiotarus*: and for multiplication of stock, *Sarah*, *Leah*, *Rachel*, to *Abraham* and *Jacob*.

### Of Temperance, the fourth virtue.

#### CHAP. XXXVI.

### Of Temperance in general.

**T**emperance is taken two ways, generally for a moderation and sweet temper in all things. And so it is not a special virtue, but <sup>1</sup>general and common, the seasoning sauce of all the rest; and it is perpetually required, especially in those affairs where there is controversy and contestation, troubles and divisions. For the preservation thereof, there is no better way, than to be free from particular phantasies and opinions, and simply to hold himself to his own devoir. All lawful intentions and opinions are temperate; choicer, hatred, are inferior to duty, and to justice, and serve only those that tie not themselves to their duty by simple reason. <sup>2</sup>

Specially, for a bridle and rule in things pleasant, delightful, which tickle our senses, and natural appetites. *Habena voluptatis Special.* *inter libidinem & superem natura posita, cujus due partes: verecundia in fuga turpium, honestas in observatione decori: The bridle of pleasure, is placed between desire and dulness of nature, of which there is two parts: shamefastness in the avoiding of filthy dishonest things: and honesty, in the observation of comeliness and decency.* We will here take it more at large, for a rule and duty in all prosperity as fortitude is the rule in all adversity; and it shall be the bridle,



as fortitude the spur. With these two we shall tame this brutish, savage, untoward part of our passions which is in us, and we shall carry our selves well and wisely in all fortunes and accidents, which is a high point of wisdom.

<sup>3</sup>  
The description  
of Temperancy. Temperancy then hath for the subject and general object thereof all prosperity, pleasure, and plausible things; but especially and properly pleasure, whereof it is the razor and the rule; the razor to cut off strange and vicious superfluities; the rule of that which is natural and necessary: *Voluptatibus imperat, alias odit & abigit, alias dispensat & ad sanum modum redigit: nec unquam ad illas propter illas venit: scit optimum esse modum cupitorum, non quantum velis, sed quantum debeat.* It commandeth our pleasures; some it hateth and chaseth away, others it setteth in order and bringeth to a sound mediocrity: neither doth it ever come unto them for them; it knoweth that the best mean of things to be desired, is not so much as thou wouldest, but so much as thou oughtest. This is the authority and power of reason, over concupiscence and violent affections, which carry our wills to delights and pleasures. It is the bridle of our soul, and the proper instrument to clear those boyling tempests which arise in us by the heat and intemperancy of our blood, that the soul may be alwaies kept one, and appiant unto reason, that it apply not it self to sensible objects, but that it rather accommodate them unto it self, and make them serve it. By this we wean our soul from the sweet milk of the pleasures of this world, and we make it capable of a more solid and soveraign nourishment. It is a rule that sweetly accommodateth all things unto nature, to necessity, simplicity, facility, health, constancy. These are things that go willingly together, and they are the measures and bounds of wisdom; as contrarily Arts, lust, and superfluity, variety, and multiplicity, difficulty, malady, and delicateness, keep company together following intemperancy and folly. *Simplex enim constant necessaria, in deliciis laboratur. Ad parata nati sumus; nos omnia nobis difficilia facilius fastidio fecimus:* There needs no great care for things necessary, the labour is in delicacies. We are born to things already prepared: but we have made all things that were ease, difficult unto us though loathsomeness.

CHAP. XXXVII.

Of prosperity, and counsell thereupon.

**T**Hat prosperity which sweetly falls upon us, by the common course and ordinary custom of the World, or by our own wisdom and discreet carriage, is far more firm, and assured, and lesse envied, than that which cometh from Heaven, with fame and renown, beyond and against the opinion of all, and the hope even of him that receiveth these bounties.

Prosperity is very dangerous: whatsoever there is that is vain and light in the soul of man, is raised, and carried with the first favourable wind. There is nothing that makes a man so much to lose, and forget himself, as great prosperity, as corn lodgeth by too great abundance, and boughs overcharged with fruit break a-sunder, and therefore it is necessary that a man look to himself, and take heed, as if he went in a slippery place, and especially of insolency, pride, and presumption. There be some that swim in a shallow water, and with the least favour of fortune are puffed up, forget themselves, become insupportable, which is the true picture of folly.

From thence it cometh that there is not any thing more frail, and that is of less continuance than an ill advised prosperity, which commonly changeth great and joyfull occurrents into heavy and lamentable, and the fortune of a loving Mother is turned into a cruel step-dam.

Now the best counsell that I can give to a man, to carry himself herein, is, not to esteem too much of all sorts of prosperity and good fortunes, and in any sort not to desire them: if they shall happen to come out of their good grace, and favour, to receive them willingly and cheerfully: but as things strange and no way necessary, but such as without which a man may passe his life, and therefore there is no reason he should make account of them, or think himself the worse or better man for them; *Non est tuum, fortuna quod fecit tuum. Qui tutam vitam agere volet, ista viscata beneficia devitet; nil dignum putare quod speres. Quid dignum habet fortuna quod concupiscas?* It is not thine, which fortune hath made thine. He that will lead a safe life, let him eschew those alluring benefits, and think nothing worthy that thou shouldst hope for. What worthy thing hath fortune, that thou shouldst covet or desire.



## C H A P. XXXVIII.

## Of Pleasure, and advice thereupon.

I  
The description  
and distinction  
of pleasure.

PLeasure is an apprehension and sense of that which is agreeable to nature, it is a pleasant motion and tickling; as contrarily, grief or sorrow, is unwelcome and displeasing to the senses; nevertheless, they that place it in the highest degree, and make it the sovereign good, as the Epicures, take it not so, but for a privation of evil and displeasure, in a word, Indolence. According to their opinion the not having of any evil, is the happiest estate that a man can hope for in this life. *Nimium boni est cui nihil est mali: It is too much good which hath no evil.* This is as a mid-way or neutrality betwixt Pleasure taken in the first and common sense, and Grief. It is, as sometime the bosom of *Abraham* was said to be betwixt paradise, and the hell of the damned. This is a sweet and peaceable state and settling, a true, constant and staied pleasure, which resembleth, in some sort, the tranquillity of the soul accounted by Philosophers the cheif and sovereign good: the other first kind of pleasure is active and in motion. And so, there should be three estates: The two extreme opposites, Grief and Pleasure, which are not stable nor durable, and both of them sickly: and that in the middle, stable, firm, sound, whereupon the Epicures gave the name of pleasure (as indeed it is in regard of grief and sorrow) making it the chief and sovereign good. This is that which hath so much defamed their school, as *Seneca* hath ingenuously acknowledged and said, that their evil was in the title and words, not in the substance, having never had either doctrine or life more sober, temperate, and enemy to wickedness and vice than theirs. And it is not altogether without reason, that they called this Indolence and peaceable state, Pleasure: for that tickling delight which seemeth to mount us above indolence, aimeth at nothing else but indolence, or want of grief, as its proper But; as for Example, that appetite that ravisheth us, with desire of women, seeketh nothing else but to flie that pain, that an ardent and furious desire to satisfie our lust bringeth with it, to quit our selves of this fever, and to purchase our rest.

2  
Against it.

Pleasure diversely hath been spoken of, and more briefly and sparingly than was fit: some have denied it, others detested it as a monster, and tremble at the very word; taking it alwayes in the

the worser part. They that do wholly contemn it, say; first, it is short, a fire of straw, especially if it be lively and active. Secondly, frail and tender, easily and with nothing corrupted and ended, an ounce of sorrow marrs a whole Sea of pleasure: It is called a choaked piece of Artillery. Thirdly, base, shamefull, exercising it self by vile Instruments; in hidden corners, at least for the most part, for there likewise are magnificent, and pompous pleasures. Fourthly quickly subject to satiety. A man knows not how to continue long in his pleasures; he is impatient as well in his delights, as his griefs, and it is not long ere repentance follow, which many times yields pernicious effects, the overthrow of men, families, common-weals. Fifthly, and above all, they alledge against it, that when it is in his highest strength, it mastereth in such a manner, that reason can have no entertainment.

On the other side, it is said to be naturall, created, and established in the world, for the preservation and continuance thereof, as well by retail, of the individuall parts, as in grosse of the speciall kinds. Nature the Mother of pleasure, in those actions that are for our need and necessity, hath likewise mingled pleasure. Now to live well, is to consent unto Nature. God, saith *Moses*, hath created pleasure, *plantaverat Dominus paradysum voluptatis*: The Lord planteth the paradise of pleasure, hath placed, and established man in a pleasant estate, place and condition of life; and in the end, what is the last, and highest felicity, but certain and perpetuall pleasure? *Inebriabuntur ab ubertate domus tua & torrente voluptatis tuae potabis eos. Suis contenta finibus, res est divina voluptas*: They shall be made drunken with the plenty of thy house, and thou shalt make them drink in the streams of thy pleasure. Divine pleasure is a thing that is content with her bounds. And to say the truth, the most regular philosophers, and the greatest professors of virtue, *Zeno, Cato, Scipio, Epaminondas, Plato, Socrates* himself, have been in effect amorous, and drinkers, dancers, sporters, and have handled, spoken, written of love, and other pleasures.

And therefore this matter is not decided in a word, but we must distinguish; for pleasures are divers. There are naturall, and not naturall: This distinction, as more important, we will presently better consider of. There are some that are glorious, arrogant and difficult; others that are obscure, mild, easie, and ready, Though to say the truth; Pleasure is a quality not greatly ambitious; it is accounted rich enough of it self, without the addition of any thing

<sup>3</sup>  
For it, See l. 2.  
cap. 6.

<sup>4</sup>  
The distinction:  
of pleasures.



to the reputation thereof, and it is loved best in obscurity. They likewise that are so easie, and ready, are cold and frozen, if there be no difficulty in them: which is an inducement, a bait, a spur unto them. The ceremony, shame and difficulty that there is in the attainment of the last exploits of love, are the spurs, and matches that give fire unto it, and encrease the price thereof. There are spiritvall pleasures and corporall, not (to say the truth) because they are separated: for they all belong to the entire man, and the whole composed Subject: and the one part of our selves hath not any so proper, but that the other hath a feeling thereof, so long as the marriage, and amorous band of the soul, and body continueth in this world. But yet there are some wherein the soul hath a better part than the body, and therefore they better agree with men than beasts, and are more durable, as those that enter into us by the sense of seeing, and hearing, which are the two gates of the soul, for having only their passage by them, the soul receiveth them, concocteth and digesteth them, feedeth, and delighteth it self a long time; the body teeleth little. Others there are wherein the body hath the greater part, as those which belong to the taste, and touch, more grosse, and materiall, wherein the beasts bear us company; such pleasures are handled, tried, used, and ended in the body it self, the soul hath only the assistance and company, and they are but short, like a fire of straw, soon in, soon out.

5  
*Advertisements  
hereupon.*

*Which are un-  
naturall.*

The chief thing to be considered herein, is to know how we should carry, and govern our selves in our pleasures, which wisdom will teach us, it is the office of the virtue of temperance. We must first make a great and notable difference between the naturall, and not naturall. By the not naturall, we do not only understand, those that are against nature, and the true use approved by the laws; but also the naturall themselves, if they degenerate into too great an excessse and superfluity, which is no part of nature, which contenteth it self with the supply of necessity; whereunto a man may add likewise decency and common honesty. It is naturall pleasure to be covered with a house and garments against the rigour of the Elements, and the injuries of wicked men; but that they should be of Gold, and Silver, of Jasper, or Porphyry, it is not naturall: Or if they come unto a man by other means than naturall, as if they be sought and procured by Art, by medicines, or other unnaturall means: Or if they be first forged in the mind, stirred by passion, and afterwards from thence come unto the body

dy, which is a preposterous order: for the order of nature is; that pleasures enter into the body, and be desired by it, and so from thence ascend unto the mind. And even as that laughter that is procured by tickling the arme-holes, is neither naturall, nor pleasing but rather a kind of convulsion; so that pleasure that is either sought or kindled by the soul, is not naturall.

Now the first rule of wisdom, concerning pleasure is this, to chase away, and altogether to condemn the unnaturall, as vitious, <sup>6.</sup> *the first and* <sup>generall rule.</sup> *generall rule.* bastardly (for as they that come to a Banquet unbidden, are to be refused; so that those pleasures without the invitation of nature present themselves, are to be rejected) to admit and receive the naturall; but yet with rule and moderation: and this is the office of temperance in generall to drive away the unnaturall, to rule the naturall.

The rule of naturall pleasures consisteth in three points. First, *Rules for the* <sup>naturall.</sup> that if it be without the offence, scandall, dammage and prejudice of another.

Secondly, that it be without the prejudice of himself, his honour, his health, his leisure, his duty, his functions.

Thirdly, that it be with moderation, that he take them no more to the heart, then against the heart, neither covet them, nor fly from them, but take and receive them, as men do honey with the tip of the finger, not with a full hand, not to engage himself in them too far, nor to make them his principal business, and onely work; much less to enthrall himself unto them, and of recreation make them necessities, for that is the greatest misery of all others. Pleasure should be but as an accessory, recreation for the time, that he may the better return to his labour; as sleep which strengtheneth the body and giveth us breath to return the more cheerfully to our work. To be short, a man must use them, not enjoy them. But above all, he must take heed of their treason: for some there are that whilst we give our selves unto them, and love them overdearly, return evill for good, and more displeasure, than delight: but this is treacherously, for they go before to besot, and deceive us, and hiding from us their tail, they tickle us and embrace us to strangle us. The pleasure of drinking goes before the pain of the head: such are the delights, and pleasures of indiscreet and fiery youth, wherewith they are made drunken. We plunge our selves into them, but in our old age they forsake us as it were drowned and overwhelmed, as the Sea in his reflux over-runne the Sandy-banks.

That.



That sweetness which we have swallowed so greedily, endeth with bitterness and repentance, and filleth our souls with a venomous humour that infecteth and corrupteth it.

8  
Want of go-  
vernment in  
pleasure, preju-  
dicial.

Now, as moderation, and rule in pleasures is an excellent and profitable thing according unto God, nature, reason, so excess and immoderate unrulinesse is of all others the most pernicious, both to the publick and private good. Pleasure ill valued, softneth, and weakneth the vigour both of soul and body; *Debilitatem induxere delitiæ, blandissime Domine: Delicacies have brought in debility, as a most alluring Mistresse*, it besotteth, and effeminateth the best courages that are, witnesse *Hannibal*: and therefore the Lacedemonians that made profession of contemning all pleasures, were called men; and the Athenians, soft and delicate women. *Xerxes* to punish the revolt of the Babylonians, and to assure himself of them in time to come, took from them their arms, forbidding all painfull and difficult exercise, and permitted all pleasures and delicacies whatsoever. Secondly, it banisheth and driveth away the principal virtues, which cannot continue under so idle and effeminate an Empire: *Maximas virtutes jacere oportet, voluptate dominante: The chiefest virtue must be laid aside, when pleasure beareth all the sway*. Thirdly, it degenerateth very suddenly into the contrary thereof, which is grief, sorrow, repentance: for as the Rivers of sweet water run their course to die in the Salt Sea, so the honey of pleasures endeth in the gall of grief. *In præcipiti est, ad dolorem vergit, in contrarium abit, nisi modum teneat. Extrema gaudii lætius occupat. It is subject to sudden downfall, it inclineth towards grief, is converted into the contrary, unlesse there be kept a mean. Sorrow occupieth extremities of joy*. Finally, it is the seminarie of all evils, of all ruine. *Malorum; esca voluptas, Pleasure is the habit of evill*. From it come those close, and secret intelligences, then treasons, and in the end evasions and ruines of commonweales. Now we will speak of pleasures in particular.

## CHAP. XXXIX.

Of eating, and drinking, Abstinence and  
Sobriety.

I  
The use of  
Vittuals.

VITTUALS are for nourishment, to sustain and repair the infirmity of the body; the moderate, naturall, and pleasant use thereof entertaineth it, maketh it a fit and apt instrument for the soul; as contrarily

contrarily an unnaturall excesse weakneth, bringeth great and loathsome diseases, which are the naturall punishments of intemperancy. *Simplex ex simplici causa valetudo; multos morbos supplicia luxuria, multa fercula fecerunt:* A simple health proceeds from a single cause; many dishes have caused many diseases, the punishments of excesse. A man complaineth of his brain for sending down so many rheums, the foundation of all dangerous maladies; but the brain may well answer him. *Desine fundere, & ego desinam fluere.* Cease to pour in, I will cease to pour out. Be thou sober in pouring down, and I will be sparing in dropping down. But what? the excesse and provision, the multitude, diversity, and exquisite preparation of viands is come into request; and it is our custom even in the greatest and most sumptuous superfluities, to crave pardon for not providing enough.

How prejudicate both to the mind and to the body a full diet, with diversity, curiosities, exquisite and artificiall preparation is, every man may find in himself. Gluttony and drunkenesse are idle and undecent vices; they bewray themselves sufficiently by the gestures, and countenances of those that are therewith tainted; whereof the best, and more honest is to be dull and drowsie, unprofitable and unfit for any good: for there was never man that loved his belly too well, that did ever perform any great work. Moreover it is the vice of brutish men, and of no worth; especially drunkenesse, which leadeth a man to all unworthy actions; witnesse *Alexander*, otherwise a great Prince, being overcome with this vice killed his dearest friend *Clitus*, and being come to himself, would have killed himself for killing *Clitus*. To conclude, it wholly robbeth a man of his sense, and preverteth his understanding. *Vinum clavo caret, dementat sapientes, facit repuerascere senes.* Wine wanteth government, it maketh wise men fools, and old men become children again.

Sobriety though it be none of the greatest and more difficult virtues; and which is not painfull to any but fools, and madmen, yet <sup>3</sup> it is a way and a kind of progresse to other virtues: It extinguisheth vice in the cradle, and stiflcth it in the seed: It is the Mother of health and an assured medicine against all maladies, and that lengtheneth a mans life. *Socrates*, by sobriety had alwayes a strong body and lived ever in health; *Masiniſſa* the soberest King of all the rest, got children at 86. years of age, and at 92. vanquished the Carthaginians; whereas *Alexander* by his drunkenesse died.



died in the flower of his age, though he was better born and of a sounder constitution than them all. Many, subject to Gouts and other diseases, by Physick incurable, have recovered their health by diet. Neither is it serviceable to the body only, but to the mind too, which thereby is kept pure, capable of wisdom and good counsell. *Salubrium consiliorum parens sobrietas: Sobriety is the mother of wholesome counsells.* All the greatest personages of the world have been sober, not only the professors of singular vertue and austeritie of life, but all those that have excelled in any thing, *Cyrus, Caesar, Julian the Emperor; Mahomet; Epicurus* the great Doctor of pleasure, herein excelled all men. The frugality of the Roman *Curii*, and *Fabritii* is more extolled than their great victories: the Lacedemonians as valiant as they were made express profession of frugality and sobriety.

But a man must in time and from his youth embrace this part of temperancy, and not stay till the infirmities of old age come upon him, lest that he be utterly cast down with variety of diseases as the Athenians, who were reproached for that they never demanded peace, but in their morning garments after they had lost their kindred and friends in warr, and were able to defend themselves no longer. This is to ask counsell when it is too late; *Sera in fundo parsimonia; It is too late to spare when all is spent.* It is to play the good husband when there is nothing left but bare walls, to make his market when the fair is ended.

It is a good thing for man not to accustom himself to a delicate diet, lest when he shall happen to be deprived thereof, his body grow out of order, and his spirit languish and faint; and contrarily to use himself to a grosser kind of sustenance, both because they make a man more strong and healthful, and because they are more easily gotten.

## CHAP. XI.

*Of riot and excesse in apparrell, and ornaments,  
and of frugality.*

IT hath been said before that garments are not naturall, nor necessary to man; but artificiall, invented, and used only by him in the world. Now inasmuch as they are artificiall, ( for it is the manner of things artificial to vary and multiply, without end and measure, simplicity being a friend unto nature ) they are extended and multiplied

multiplied into so many inventions (for to what other end are there so many occupations and traffiques in the world, but for the covering and decking our bodies?) dissolutions and corruptions, insomuch that it is no more an excuse and covering of our defects and necessities, but a nest of all manner of devices, *vexillum superbie, nidus luxurie*; The banner of pride, the nest of luxurie, the subject of riot and quarrels: for from hence did first begin the propriety of things, mine, and thine; and in the greatest communities of fellowships that are, apparel is always proper, which is signified by this word, disrobe.

It is a vice very familiar and proper unto women (I mean excess in apparel) a true testimony of their weaknesse, being glad to win credit and commendations by these small and slender accidents, because they know themselves to be too weak and unable to purchase credit and reputation by better means; for such as are vertuous, care least for such vanities. By the Laws of the Lacedemonians, it was not permitted to any to wear garments of rich and cottly colours, but to common women: that was their part, as virtue, and honour belonged unto others.

Now the true and lawfull use of apparel, is to cover our selves against wind and weather, and the rigour of the air, and should never be used to other end; and therefore as they should not be excessive nor sumptuous; so should they not be too base and beggerly. *Nec affectata sordes nec exquisite munditie*: Neither affected uncleannesse, nor exquisite pickednesse. Caligula was as a laughing-stock to all that beheld him, by reason of the dissolute fashion of his apparel. Augustus was commended for his modesty.

CHAP. XLI.

*Carnal Pleasure, Chastity, Continency.*

Continency is a thing very difficult, and must have a carefull and painfull guard: It is no easie matter wholly to resist nature, which in this is most strong and ardent. I.  
See the cap. 24.

And this the greatest commendation that it hath, that there is difficulty in it; as for the rest, it is without action and without fruit, it is a privation, a not-doing, pain without profit, and therefore sterility is signified by Virginitie. I speak here of simple continency, and only in it self, which is a thing altogether barren and unprofitable, and hardly commendable, no more than not to play the

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glutton not to be drunken & not of Christian continency, which to make it a virtue hath two things in it, a deliberate purpose always to keep it, and that it be for Gods cause. *Non hoc in virginibus predicamus, quod sint virgines sed quod Deo dicat: We praise not this in Virgins, for that they be Virgins, but because they be dedicated unto God:* witness the Vestals, and the five foolish Virgins, shut out of doores: and therefore it is a common error, and a vanity, to call continent women, honest women and honourable, as if it were a virtue, and there were an honour due to him that doth no evill, doth nothing against his duty; why should not continent men in like sort have the title of honesty and honour? There is no reason for it, because there is more difficulty, they are more hot, more hardy, they have more occasions, better means. So unlikely is it, that honour should be due unto him that doth no evill, that it is not due unto him that doth good, but only, as hath been said, to him that is profitable to the weale publick, and where there is labour, difficulty, danger. And how many continent persons are there trust with other vices, or at least that are not touched with vain-glory and presumption, whereby tickling themselves with a good opinion of themselves, they are ready to judge and condemn others? And by experience we see in many women how dearly they sell it unto their husbands, for dislodging the devill from that place where they row, and establishing the point of honour as in its proper throne, they make it to mount more high, and to appear in the head to make him believe that it is not any lower elsewhere. If neverthelesse this flattering word, Honour, serve to make them more carefull of their duty, I care not much if I allow of it. Vanity it self serves for some use, and simple incontinency and sole in it self is none of the greatest faults, no more than others that are purely corporall, and which nature committeth in her actions either by excess or defect without malice. That which discrediteth it, and makes it more dangerous, is, that it is almost never alone but it is commonly accompanied and followed with other greater faults, infected with the wicked and base circumstances of prohibited persons, times, places; practised by wicked means, lies, impostures, subornation, treasons, besides the losse of time, distractions of those fractions from whence it proceedeth, by great and grievous scandals.

3.  
 And because this violent passion and likewise deceitfull, we  
 Advise must arm our selves against it, and be wary in descrying the baits  
 thereof.

thereof, and the more it flattereth us, more distrust it: for it would willingly embrace us to strangle us; it pampereth us with honey, to glut us with gall; and therefore let us consider as much, that the beauty of another, is a thing that is without us, and that as soon it turneth to our evil, as our good, that it is but a flower that passeth, a small thing, and almost nothing but a colour of a body; and acknowledging in beauty the delicate hand of nature, we must prize it as the Sun and Moon, for the excellency that is in it: and coming to the fruition thereof by all honest means, always remember that the immoderate use of this pleasure consumeth the body, effeminateth the soul, weakneth the spirit, and that many by giving themselves overmuch thereunto, have lost, some their life, some their fortunes, some their spirit, & contrarily, that there is greater pleasure and glory in vanquishing pleasure, than in possessing it; that the continency of *Alexander & Scipio* hath been more highly commended, than the beautifull countenances of those young damosels that they took captives.

There are many kinds or degrees of continency and incontinency. The conjugall is that which importeth more than all the rest, which is most requisite and necessary, both for the publick and particular good, and therefore should be by all in greatest account. It must be kept and retained with the chaste breast of that party, whom the destinies have given for our companion. He that doth otherwise, doth not only violate his own body, making it a vessel of ordure by all laws; the law of God which commandeth chastity; of Nature, which forbiddeth that to be common which is proper to one, and imposeth upon a man faith and constancy of Countries, which have brought in marriages; of families, transferring unjustly the labour of another to a stranger; and lastly Justice it self, bringing in uncertainties, jealousies, and brawls, amongst kindred, depriving children of the love of their parents, and parents of the piety and duty of their children.

C H A P. XLII.

*Of Glory and Ambition.*

**A**mbition, the desire of glory and honour (whereof we have already spoken) is not altogether and in all respects to be condemned. First, it is very profitable to the weal-publick as the world goeth, for it is from thence the greatest of our honourable actions doth rise, that heartneth men to dangerous attempts, as



we may see by the greatest part of our ancient heroicall men, who have not all been led by a Philosophicall spirit, as *Socrates*, *Phocion*, *Aristides*, *Epaminondas*, *Cato* and *Scipio*, by the onely true, and lively image of virtue; for many, yea the greatest number have been stirred thereunto by the spirit of *Themistocles*, *Alexander*, *Cæsar*: and although these honourable atchievements and glorious exploits have not been with their authors and actors, true works of virtue, but ambition; neverthelesse their effects have been very beneficiall to the publick state. Besides this consideration, according to the opinion of the wisest, it is excusable and allowable in two cases: the one, in good and profitable things but which are inferiour unto virtue, and common both to the good and to the evil; as Arts and Sciences: *Hænos alit artes: incenduntur omnes ad studia gloriæ: Honour nourisheth the Arts: all are inflamed through glory to study.* Invention, industry, military valour. The other, in continuing the good will, and opinion of another. The wise do teach, Not to rule our actions by the opinion of another, except it be for the avoiding of such inconveniences, as may happen by their contempt of the approbation and judgement of another.

2

But that a man should be virtuous, and do good for glory, as if that were the salary and recompence thereof is a false and vain opinion. Much were the state of virtue to be pitied, if she should fetch her commendations and prize from the opinion of another; this coine were but counterfeit, and this pay too base for virtue; She is too noble to beg such recompence. A man must settle his soul, and in such sort compose his actions, that the brightnesse of honour dazzell not his reason; and strengthen his mind with brave resolutions, which serve him as barriers against the assaults of ambition.

3

He must therefore perswade himself, that virtue seeketh not a more ample and more rich Theater to shew it self than her own conscience: The higher the Sun is, The lesser shadow doth it make: The greater the virtue is, the lesse glory doth it seek. Glory is truly compared to a shadow which followeth those that fly it, and flyeth those that follow it. Again, he must never forget that man cometh into this world as a Comedy, where he chuseth not the part that he is to play, but only bethinks himself how to play that part well that is given unto him: or as a banquet wherein a man feeds upon that that is before him, not reaching to the far side of the table, or snatching the dishes from the master of the feast. If a

Man commit a charge unto us, which we are capable of, let us accept of it modestly, and exercise it sincerely; making account that God hath placed us there to stand sentinel, to the end that others may rest in safety under our care. Let us seek no other recompence of our travel, than our own conscience to witness our well doing, and desire that the witness be rather of credit in the Court of our fellow Citizens than in the front of our publick actions. To be short; let us hold it for a maxime that the fruit of our honourable actions, is to have acted them. Virtue cannot find without it self, a recompence worthy it self. To refuse and contemn greatness, is not so great a miracle, it is an attempt of no difficulty. He that loves himself, and judgeth soundly, is content with an indifferent fortune. Magistracies very active and passive are painful, and are not desired but by feeble and sick spirits. *Otanes* one of the seven that had title to the sovereignty of *Persia*, gave over unto his companions his right, upon condition that he and his might live in that Empire free from all subjection and magistracy, except that which the ancient laws did impose, being impatient to command, and to be commanded. *Dioclesian* renounced the Empire, *Celestinus* the Popedom,

CHAP. XLIII.

Of Temperance in speech, and of Eloquence.

**T**His is a great point of wisdom: he that ruleth his tongue well in a word, is wise. *Qui in verbo non offendit, hic perfectus est*: The reason hereof is, because the tongue is all the world; in it is both good and evil, life and death, as hath been said before. Let us now see what advice is to be given to rule it well.

The first rule is, that speech be sober and seldom: To know how to be silent, is a great advantage to speak well; and he that knows not well how to do the one, knows not the other.

*Rules of speech.*

To speak well and much is not the work of one man; and the best men are they that speak least, saith a wise man.

They that abound in words, are barren in good speech and good actions; like those trees that are full of leaves and yield little fruit, much chaffe and little corn.

The Lacedemonians, great professors of virtue and valour, did likewise professe silence, and were enemies to much speech: And therefore hath it ever been commendable to be sparing in speech, to



keep a bridle at the mouth: *Pone Domine custodiam ori meo: O Lord, set a watch on my mouth.* And in the law of Moses that vessel that had not his covering fastened to it, was unclean. By speech a man is known and discerned: The wise man hath his tongue in his heart, the fool his heart in his tongue.

- 2 The second, that it be true: the use of speech is to assist the truth, and to carry the torch before it, to make it appear; and contrarily, to discover and reject lying. Inasmuch, that speech is the instrument whereby we communicate our wills and our thoughts; It had need be true and faithful, since that our understanding is directed by the only means of speech. He that falsifieth it, betrayeth publick society; and if this mean fail us and deceive us, there is an end of all, there is no living in the world. But of living, we have already spoken.

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- 3 The third, that it be natural, modest and chaste: not accompanied with vehemency and contention, whereby it may seem to proceed from passion; not artificial nor affected; not wicked, immodest, licentious.

- 4 The fourth, that it be serious and profitable, not vain and unprofitable. A man must not be too attentive in relating what hath happened in the market place or theater or, repeating of sonnets and meriments, it bewrayes too great and unprofitable leasure, *otio abutentis, & abundantis: Of one abounding with ease, and abusing it.* Neither is it good to enter into any large discourse of his own actions and fortunes, for others take not so much pleasure to hear them as they to relate them.

- 5 But above all, it must never be offensive, for speech is the instrument and forerunner of Charity; and therefore to use it against it, is to abuse it, contrary to the purpose of nature. All kind of foul speech, detraction, mockery, is unworthy a man of wisdom and honour.

- 6 The sixth, to be gentle and pleasing, not crabbed, harsh and envious; and therefore in common speech acute and subtle questions must be avoided, which resemble crabs, where there is more picking work than meat to eat, and their end is nothing else but brawls and contentions.

- 7 Lastly, that it be constant, strong, and generous, not loose, effeminate, languishing, whereby we avoid the manner of speech of Pedanties, pleaders, women.

- 8 To this point of Temperancy belongeth secrecy (whereof we have spoken in the Chapter of faith or fidelity) not only that which

chap. 11.

is

is committed unto us, and given us to keep, but that which wisdom and discretion telleth us ought to be suppressed.

Now as speech makes a man more excellent than a beast, so Eloquence makes the professors thereof more excellent than other men. For this is the profession or art of speech, it is a more exquisite communication of discourse and reason, the sterner or rooter of our souls, which disposeth the heart and affections, like certain notes to make a melodious harmony.

9  
*Of Eloquence  
and the com-  
mendation  
thereof.*

Eloquence is not only a purity, and elegancy of speech, a discreet choice of words properly applied, ended in a true and a just fall, but it must likewise be full of ornaments, graces, motions; the words must be lively, first, by a clear and a distinct voice, raising it self, and falling by little and little; Afterwards, by a grave and natural action, wherein a man may see the visage, hands, and members of the Oratour to speak with his mouth, follow with their motion that of the mind, and represent the affections: for an Oratour must first put on those passions which he should stir up in others. As *Bracidas* drew from his own wound the dart wherewith he slew his enemy: So passion being conceived in our heart, is incontinently formed into our speech, and by it proceeding from us, entereth into another, and there giveth the like impression which we our selves have, by a subtil and lively contagion. Hereby we see that a sweet and a mild nature is not so fit for eloquence, because it cannot conceive strong and courageous passions, such as it ought, to give life unto the Oration; in such sort, that when he should display the master sail of eloquence in a great and vehement action, he cometh far short thereof; as *Cicero* knew well how to reproach *Callidius*, who accused *Gallus* with a cold and over mild voice and action, *Tu nisi fingeres, sic ageres? thou thy self wouldest thou do so, if thou diddest not counterfeit?* But being likewise vigorous; and furnished as hath been said, it hath not lesse force and violence than the commands of tyrants, environed with their guards and halberds; It doth not only lead the hearer, but intangle him, it reigneth over the people, and establisheth a violent Empire over our souls.

16  
*The description*

A man may say against Eloquence, that truth is sufficiently maintained and defended by it self, and that there is nothing more eloquent than it self: which I confesse is true, where the mind of men is pure, and free from passions: but the greatest part of the world, either by nature, or art, and ill instruction, is preoccupied, and ill disposed unto virtue and verity, whereby it is necessary that

11  
*Objections answered.*



men be handled like iron, which a man may soften with fire, before he temper it with water: So by the fiery motions of Eloquence, they must be made supple and maniable, apt to take the temper of verity. This is that whereunto Eloquence especially tendeth; and the true fruit thereof is to arm virtue against vice, truth against lying and calumnies. The Orator, saith *Theophrastus*, is the true Phylitian of the soul, to whom it belongeth to cure the biting of Serpents by the musick of the Pipe, that is, the calumnies of wicked men by the harmony of reason. Now since no man can hinder, but that some there are that seaze upon eloquence, to the end they may execute their pernicious designments, how can a man do less than defend himself with the same arms; for if we present our selves naked to the combat, do we not betray virtue and verity? But many have abused eloquence to wicked purposes, and the ruine of their country. It is true; but that is no reason why Eloquence should be despised, for that is common to it, with all the excellent things of the world, to be used or abused, well or ill applyed, according to the good and bad disposition of those that possesse them: Most men abuse understanding, but yet we must not therefore conclude that understanding is not necessary.

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F I N I S.

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A N



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
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
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